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Preface
The origins of this book lie in the ‘Urban Transformations: Urban Development,
Migration, Segregation and Inequality’ research project, funded by the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and the Economic and Social Research Council
(ESRC, Grant Reference: ES/N007603/1). One of the key goals of that project was to
strengthen links between researchers inCASSand colleagues based at the universities
of Glasgow and Sheffield, UK.
The project culminated in a research conference in the summer of 2017 at the
University of Sheffield on ‘Urban Segregation and Inequality in Europe and China’,
with an associated methods summer school for early career researchers and Ph.D.
students. Speakers at the conference included Prof. Tiit Tammaru, Prof. Houkai Wei,
Prof.YaPingWang, Prof. JingjingShan, Prof.GuoqingLi,DrProf.YimingWangand
Prof. Gwilym Pryce. The quality of the presentations, and the connections between
them, led naturally to the idea of collecting the papers into an edited volume.
Meanwhile, another set of research connections were emerging between the
SheffieldMethods Institute, University of Sheffield, and the Hebei Institute of Statis-
tical Science (HISS), based in Hebei Province, China. HISS is responsible for over-
seeing the collection and analysis of census data for Hebei, which has a population
and land mass of a similar size and scale as the UK. This collaboration led to a
successful research bid to the ESRC Global Challenges Research Fund to investi-
gate the ‘Dynamics of Health and Environmental Inequalities in Hebei Province,
China’ (Grant Reference: ES/P003567/1). Led by Prof. Gwilym Pryce, the initia-
tive brought together a research team comprised of Prof. Hui Song and Dr. Bifeng
Wang from the HISS, and Prof. Gwilym Pryce, Dr. Yu Chen, Dr. Tim Birabi and Dr.
Gwilym Owen from the University of Sheffield (plus additional collaborators from
Beijing Normal University, Dr. Jing Ma, and the University of Liverpool, UK, Dr.
Guanpeng Dong).
A key benefit of the Sheffield-HISS collaboration was that it opened up access to
the Hebei Province Census data, which in turn led to detailed analysis of inequality
and segregation inHebei using cutting-edge statisticalmethods.Thisworkwas able to
progress as a result of follow-on funding from of the ESRC Understanding Inequal-
ities project (Grant Reference ES/P009301/1) of which Prof. Gwilym Pryce was
v
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Co-Director. This expanded the research team to include Prof. David Manley, Dr.
Meng Le Zhang, Dr. Dan Olner and Dr. Iva Křížková.
As these networks of research collaborations bourgeoned, so did the breadth
and depth of the research, and the outcome is what we believe to be a substantial
contribution to the field. From the outset, the goal of this collection of essays was
that it would not only look back at how inequality and segregation have developed
historically in Europe and China but also that it would look forward to how these
phenomena should be researched and addressed in the coming decades. We hope
this forward-looking theme will stimulate research and policy innovation and lead
to substantial positive impacts on society.
Another central ethos in the creation of this book is that of communication, not
only in terms of fostering a dialogue between European and Chinese researchers
but also with respect to making the text as accessible as possible. A key element in
achieving this goal has been the exemplary dedication of copy editor Phil Williams
who has gone above and beyond the call of duty in helping us make the text clear
and coherent. We are hugely indebted to him.
Our aim has also been for the text to become a resource that is freely available to
researchers and policymakers across the globe. For this, we are grateful to funding
from the ESRC that has enabled us to make the text fully ‘Open Access’—that is,
freely available to download for anyone with access to the internet.
We see this collection not as the last word on segregation and inequality, but as the
start of a conversation. In that spirit, we welcome your feedback and your thoughts
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Chapter 1
Introduction: Urban Inequality
and Segregation in Europe and China
Gwilym Pryce, Yu Chen, and Ya Ping Wang
Abstract In this chapter, we set out the rationale and key themes for the book.
We briefly summarise the broad historical and institutional context, particularly the
period of reform in China since 1978, and the background to the hukou household
registration system, which has become a key source of segregation and inequality
in modern China. We then provide an overview of the book including a synopsis of
each chapter and the various links between them. We conclude with a call for further
research and evidence-based policy innovation.
Keywords Hukou · Urban inequality · Residential segregation · Equilibrium
sorting · Urbanisation · Shantytowns · Regional inequality · Urban villages ·
Social frontiers
1.1 Introduction
Issues of segregation and inequality have shifted to the forefront of political and
academic debate in recent years. Piketty’s (2014) magnum opus reinvigorated the
literature on inequality, elevating the topic from the periphery to the central stage of
economics and social science research. At the same time, public concern around
issues of segregation and social integration has been heightened as a result of
increasedmigration (Catney2016; Fingleton et al. 2019; Phillimore 2020). InEurope,
it is migration between countries which has been the main cause for concern. In
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China, internal migration, particularly from rural to urban areas, has generated both
enormous economic growth and significant socio-economic inequalities (Liu 2005).
Unsurprisingly, there has been growing interest in the links between segregation
and inequality in termsof both causes and consequences (Tammaru et al. 2016).While
the literature on integration/segregation and inequality have traditionally been domi-
nated by European and North American studies, there is burgeoning interest in these
issues in the Chinese context. Economic liberalisation, rapid industrial restructuring,
the unprecedented growth of cities and internal migration have reshaped the country
profoundly. They have also led to increased socio-economic residential segregation
and levels of income inequality that now surpass even the most neoliberal Western
economies. Migration, segregation and inequality in Chinese cities have increasingly
attracted academic attention over the last 20 years (Bian and Logan 1999; Wang
2004; Sicular et al. 2007; Cai et al. 2002; Liu et al. 2018). Nevertheless, the Chinese
experience has remained under-represented in mainstream scholarly discussion.
Yet, the story of China’s transition is truly remarkable and of global significance.
Before 1978, China was known for its strict population movement control, welfare-
oriented urban management and relative homogeneity in urban living conditions.
After more than 40 years of economic reform, China has become a very different
country (Wu et al. 2013). On the one hand, China has experienced spectacular success
in urban development, which brought significant improvement for a large proportion
of urban residents. The emerging middle classes in major cities own modern homes
in well-designed new housing estates, many in gated communities. At the same time,
however, millions of the urban poor and especially rural-to-urban migrants continue
to live in shacks in suburban villages or in basements under glossy apartment build-
ings. The Chinese urban residential landscape, alongside the wider social, economic
and political context, is becoming increasingly complex and polarised. Our under-
standing of Chinese cities and Chinese society is continually being challenged and
reformed through these ongoing processes of change (Huang and Li 2014; Wang
2004; Wu 2004).
Chinese research efforts on these topics have clearly been overwhelmed by
the enormity of the migration phenomenon and the complexity of the urbanisa-
tion process. Chinese approaches and methods are strongly influenced by the fast-
changing social, economic and political environment. Within the hierarchical urban
and rural administrative system, there is the distinctive feature of the population regis-
tration (hukou) structure, which affects migration patterns directly and the social and
economic status of the migrants in destination cities and towns (Knight and Song
1999; Zhang and Tao 2012). Researchers from inside China often find it difficult to
communicate these social and political restrictions to the global academic commu-
nity, and researchers from outside find it difficult to understand the particular nuances
of the Chinese social and political context.
The importance of hukou as a driver of segregation and inequality is a theme
that permeates Parts II and III of the book so it is worth saying something here
about its origins and nature.Hukou can be traced back to ancient Chinese systems of
population registration and to ‘techniques of social control…perfected in areas under
Kuomintang and Japanese rule’ in the early twentieth century (Cheng and Selden
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1994, p. 645). However, hukou in its current form emerged during the 1950s when the
communist government sought to introduce a comprehensive system of registration
to control population movement and help demarcate eligibility for state-provided
goods and services allocated under planned economy principles (Chan 2009).
The household registration system, hukou, emerged from these communist
reforms as the,
central institutionalmechanismdefining the city-countryside relationship and shaping impor-
tant elements of state-society relations in the People’s Republic.Hukou registration not only
provided the principal basis for establishing identity, citizenship and proof of official status,
it was essential for every aspect of daily life (Cheng and Selden 1994, p. 644).
For every individual, their registration status established their eligibility for employ-
ment, housing, clothing, food, education, health and social services. It also led to a
bifurcated social system, where the provision of these services in urban areas was
essentially ‘owned and administered by the state’ and urban citizens were ‘the state’s
direct responsibility’ (Banister 1987, p. 328). In contrast, the state assumed no such
responsibility for these services in rural areas. Cheng and Selden (1994, pp. 644–
645) explain that ‘To the extent that any of these services have been available in the
countryside, they have relied on the highly differentiated resources allocated by self-
reliant rural communities (villages) or their collective sub-units (production teams)’.
Migration, especially that from the countryside to cities, was strictly controlled by
the state.
The effect of the hukou systemwas to create a geographical hierarchy where cities
were favoured over rural communities in the allocation of services and economic
development. There have been various reforms of the hukou system since the initi-
ation of the economic reforms, partly to adapt to the unprecedented levels of rural-
to-urban migration (Chan 2009). However, rural residents who moved to cities to
find work, retain their rural hukou status. Without city hukou status, rural migrants
had limited rights of access to health care, education, housing and social services.
This binary system has become a key driver of urban inequality (Zhao and Howden-
Chapman 2010), labour market stratification (Chen and Hoy 2008; Chan 2009) and
residential segregation (Liu et al. 2018).
The focus of the present book is on the shared and contrasting experiences of segre-
gation and inequality in Europe and China, and a desire to improve dialogue between
scholars working in these related fields. Europe’s varied cultural and economic
history, including the rise and decline of communist planned economies, provides a
rich backdrop for the study of segregation and inequality.What have we learned from
the European experience of segregation, integration and inequality, andwhat insights
can be gleaned to inform the bourgeoning interest in these issues in the Chinese
context? How is China different, both in terms of the nature and consequences of
segregation and inequality, and what are the implications for future research and
policy? What forms do inequalities take in modern China? To what extent are they
the natural outcome of an emerging meritocracy, and to what extent are they the
byproduct of entrenched institutional inequities and bureaucratic failures? Has the
process of reform and regeneration itself generated inequalities in housing, exposure
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to pollution, and access to public services? These are the questions at the heart of
this collected volume.
We believe this book offers a timely contribution to scholarship as China’s signif-
icance increases globally and its policy focus shifts towards improving the quality
of life rather than economic growth. To this end, we have drawn together leading
researchers from Europe and China to reflect on the most relevant developments in
research and policy, and to open up new avenues of scholarly conversation. The book
also aims to provide guidance on future directions for policymakers and researchers
in this increasingly important field.
1.2 Overview
The remainder of the book is organised into three parts:
• Part I: Lessons from Europe.
• Part II: Urban Inequality and Integration in China
• Part III: Future Directions for Research and Policy
We shall now summarise each of these sections in turn.
1.2.1 Part I: Lessons from Europe
In Part I, we review the European/Western experience in terms of the underlying
social and economic drivers of segregation and inequality. The section begins with
Chap. 2 by Aneta Piekut, which offers a review of European research on spatial
segregation. Piekut highlights the key theoretical insights that explain why, in the
absence of legally enforced apartheid,Western cities nevertheless become segregated
along ethnic, religious and social divides. This is an interdisciplinary review spanning
urban studies, sociology, psychology, spatial and human geography, providing a
holistic understanding of the underlying mechanisms.
Chapter 3 by Tiit Tammaru and colleagues complements Piekut’s survey of the
literature by providing an empirical overview of trends in socio-economic residential
segregation in European cities. They also investigate the specific hypothesis that
income inequality is a major driver of residential segregation. Drawing on data for
the cities of Amsterdam, Athens, Budapest, Helsinki, London, Madrid, Milan, Oslo,
Prague, Riga, Tallinn, Stockholm and Vilnius, they find that changes in segregation
levels tend to follow changes in inequality with a 10-year time lag. Although the
analysis is preliminary, it nevertheless has important implications for the long-term
trajectory of segregation for both European and Chinese cities if income inequality
continues to rise.
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1.2.2 Part II: Urban Inequality and Integration in China
Part II of the book starts with an overview by Yu Chen and Jie Chen of research
on segregation in Chinese cities. Before the reforms in 1978, urban segregation
had essentially been eradicated as a result of the socialist work-unit systems and
the non-market allocation of housing. Since then, cities have become increasingly
segregated as a result of a complex combination of institutional factors such as the
hukou household registration system, massive rural–urban migration, economic and
spatial restructuring, and market forces.
These themes, and China’s recent policy responses, are explored in depth by Wei
Houkai and Su Hongjian in Chap. 5. The authors document the processes and scale
of urbanisation and rural-to-urban migration since the start of the reform era and the
major shift in policy emphasis since 2014 towards quality improvement. This new
agendum has led to growing recognition among policymakers that urban and rural
poverty poses a major challenge to economic and social development, leading to a
significant nationwide poverty reduction initiative. The authors offer a programme
of reform that includes reform of the hukou system, urban–rural integration and
coordinated poverty management.
One of the distinct features of China’s urbanisation is the emergence of urban
villages. As cities expanded, villages close to the urban periphery were absorbed and
villagers converted their homes into rental properties to take advantage of the growing
demand for accommodation from rural migrants. Many of these urban villages were
redeveloped by city planners, and villagerswere relocated to newhousing. InChap. 6,
Ya PingWang uses a village in Beijing as a case study for this historical development,
highlighting the associated benefits, challenges, and inequalities.Amajor theme once
again is the persistent problem of the hukou system: ‘the new property rights for the
replacement flats confer no additional rights of citizenship for the relocated villagers
who remain “second class” citizens within Chinese cities’.
In Chap. 7, Guoqing Li considers the related issue of shantytown renovation. The
chapter provides a comparative study of four models of shantytown reconstruction,
charting their emergence as new forms of urban community. Guoquing Li highlights
the problems posed by shantytown renovation and the policy reforms needed to
improve their integration into wider society.
In Chap. 8, Jingjing Shan and colleagues encourage us to step back from these
specific examples of urban development to consider the wider system-driven dispar-
ities across the whole country. Inequalities have arisen as a result of China’s rapid
urban expansion and the persistant binary nature of the hukou registration system.
The authors provide a detailed and comprehensive attempt to quantify inequalities
in access to public services between the local urban population and migrant workers.
The chapter considers inequalities between urban and rural areas, and also those
within urban areas, and between regions. They find evidence of large inequalities
at multiple geographical levels and argue for a programme of reforms to reduce
inequalities in the geographical provision of education and medical health services,
particularly in rural areas.
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The final contribution in Part II is byYeqiangWang andXinDong (Chap. 9)which
focuses on the problem of insecure and poor quality housing for migrant workers in
China’s cities. They provide a detailed account of the large discrepancies in levels
of access to good quality accommodation between migrants from rural areas and the
established urban population. These inequalities are exacerbated by inherited forms
of residential registration that adversely affect rural migrants settling in towns and
cities. The situation is worsened by land-use regulations that restrict the construction
of collective dormitories for rural migrant workers. Policy responses over the past
20 years are evaluated, and recommendations for future policy development are
proposed to improve housing conditions, including reform of land use regulations
and improved property rights for migrants.
1.2.3 Part III: Future Directions
The third and final section of the book reflects on areas for future research and policy
development with respect to urban segregation and inequality in China. Given the
content and limitations of extant European research on integration and inequality, and
the unique context of Chinese social and economic development, what should be the
focus of future research and policy development in these fields? The final six chapters
of the book suggest ways forward. They highlight elements of the Western literature
that are most apposite to the Chinese context, and also the important differences
in Chinese culture and society that need to be taken into account. Both aspects
potentially open up new ways of thinking about segregation and inequality. There is
a strong methodological theme to these chapters, drawing on cutting-edge ideas and
methods to illuminate new avenues for inquiry.
The first of these chapters is Chap. 10 by David Manley, Gwilym Owen, Hui
Song and Bifeng Wang. The authors draw on one of the most important innovations
in segregation research in recent decades, the application of multi-level modelling
techniques to the measurement of segregation. One of the limitations of traditional
approaches is that they tend to be uni-dimensional. For example, they struggle to
take into account the extent to which apparent segregation in one dimension (such as
ethnicity) is in fact explained by segregation in another dimension (such as income).
This is an important limitation as particular ethnic groups may have lower than
average income. As a result, their geographic separation from other and wealthier
ethnic groups may have nothing to do with a mutual aversion to living near people
of different ethnicity, but simply due to the geographical concentration of afford-
able housing. The new generation of multilevel modelling approaches potentially
overcomes this limitation, while also allowing researchers to distinguish between
segregation occurring at different spatial scales. The authors of Chap. 10 explain the
theoretical basis for this new approach and offer one of the first applications of the
method to Chinese data. They use the model to estimate the segregation of different
ethnic groups and of migrants versus non-migrants in Shijiazhuang, the capital city
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of Hebei Province. The chapter concludes with suggestions for future research and
policy development.
Residential segregation is a very important aspect of the separation of groups in
society but is, by no means, the only form segregation takes. This is very clearly
highlighted in Chap. 11, which considers segregation in social relations between
care workers in Shanghai. The authors, Wenjing Zhang and Yiming Wang, use
Social Network Analysis to conceptualise, visualise and explain friendships between
workers in a care home. An important innovation is to complement the quantitative
Social NetworkAnalysis with qualitative interviews. Their approach not only reveals
the extent of relationship segregation between migrant worker carers and those born
locally but also shows how this new mixed-methods approach has the potential to
transform and enrich future application network analysis in China and elsewhere.
Chapter 12 provides what is probably the first application in China of an ‘equilib-
rium sorting model’. This sophisticated combination of economic theory and statis-
tical analysis has become one of themost robustways tomodel ‘residential sorting’—
the tendency for the housing market to group people by their characteristics, income
and preferences. Such models have a wide range of applications including the esti-
mation of people’s willingness to pay for intangible amenities such as clean air, low
crime, leisure facilities, green space, access to good schools and employment. The
authors argue that being able to place a monetary value on these important drivers
of human welfare will be essential for China to achieve its new priority goal of
improving quality of life, as opposed to focusing exclusively on economic growth.
Oneof the keymethodological findings of this pioneering study is that it highlights the
importance of incorporating mobility costs when using equilibrium sorting models
to estimate the willingness to pay.
Further methodological developments are highlighted in Chap. 13 in the context
of a particular form of residential segregation that arises from the way communities
border. Authors Ivana Křížková, Meng Le Zhang, Dan Olner and Gwilym Pryce
explore the concept of ‘social frontiers’ (Dean et al. 2019)—the existence of sharp
spatial divisions in the residential make-up of adjacent communities that take on
symbolic and territorial meaning. Whilst some social frontiers are marked by phys-
ical barriers, such as the ‘peacewalls’1 inBelfast,manyothers are effectively invisible
to researchers. Křížková and colleagues explain why these frontiers are considered
an especially problematic form of residential segregation and demonstrate a prac-
tical empirical approach to their estimation. The authors use data on a post-socialist
country, Czechia. This makes the study especially salient to the modern Chinese
context with similar challenges associated with the deconstruction of historical insti-
tutions from the communist era, combined with new problems arising from market
liberalisation.
Whilstmost of the chapters in Part III focus on innovations in segregation research,
in Chap. 14, GwilymOwen and colleagues remind us of the need for methodological
robustness and innovationwith respect to themeasurement of poverty and inequality.
In order for China’s poverty alleviation programme to be effective, it needs to find
1 Security walls erected to keep rival communities apart.
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reliable ways of quantifying and monitoring urban deprivation. Crucially, the burden
of poverty is not just about lack of income, though this is often the keydriver.Deprived
households experience privations in a whole range of factors—including poor health,
inadequate housing, limited access to public services, employment and education,
and high levels of crime and environmental pollution. China’s new public policy
emphasis on improving quality of life leads, unsurprisingly, to the need to target
resources effectively. To this end, Chinese researchers are finding ways to esti-
mate Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMDs) to highlight and address geographical
inequalities. Originally developed in the UK, IMDs offer a powerful tool to capture
multiple layers of disadvantage at the neighbourhood level. Unfortunately, data limi-
tations pose real challenges for computing reliable IMDs in China. These problems
have been made worse by methodological weaknesses in some of the recent Chinese
applications. Gwilym Owen and colleagues ‘seek to bring direction and conceptual
rigour to this nascent literature by establishing a set of core principles for IMD esti-
mation that are relevant and feasible in the Chinese context’. They demonstrate these
principles with an empirical application to census data on Shijiazhuang, the capital
city of Hebei province. Their four-step approach provides a template for provincial
and city-region governments throughout China to monitor and address deprivation.
In the concluding chapter (Chap. 15), Gwilym Pryce attempts to synthesise the
findings of the book, identify areas where more research is needed and highlight
opportunities for innovation both in research methods and policy development. A
key area for future research is the need to shift from a static understanding of segre-
gation towards a dynamic one. This is especially important in the Chinese context
where so much remains in flux and urban change continues at an astonishing pace in
many cities. In line with this dynamic perspective, Pryce then considers the way in
which inequality and segregation are related, drawing on the recent work of Galster
and Sharkey (2017). The chapter goes on to highlight the relational and psychological
impacts of inequality and segregation, which need to be included in the calculus of
social and economic policy. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the implications
of the Causal Revolution in social science research methods. These have the poten-
tial to transform the way urban policy in China is developed and evaluated when
combined with these other proposed directions in future research.
1.3 Conclusion
Our goal in this collected volume is to bring important research on Chinese segre-
gation and inequality to an international audience and further the dialogue between
European and Chinese scholars in particular. We hope you be both intellectually
stimulated by this collection of essays, and also inspired to find new and effective
ways of alleviating the social and economic challenges facing the people of China.
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Abstract Research on segregation is traditionally associated with studies on resi-
dential segregation and the patterns of spatial clustering of minority ethnic groups
or residents with immigrant backgrounds. This chapter examines European research
on spatial segregation through various social science disciplines, including urban
studies, sociology, psychology, spatial and human geography. It presents the range of
theoretical approaches employed to explain why people who belong, or are perceived
to belong, to dissimilar social categories or to hold different identities become
spatially separated from each other, and ways in which this may change. Factors
that influence segregation are interrelated. A holistic, interdisciplinary approach to
spatial segregation is, therefore, essential to understand such mechanisms and then
design policies to counter any negative impacts of segregation. Individual and group
experiences are shaped by varied contexts, whether residential, work, leisure, trans-
port and daily encounters. This chapter examines approaches to spatial segregation
from a variety of disciplinary perspectives and indicates possible directions for future
research.
Keywords Residential segregation · Non-residential segregation · Ethnic
segregation · Domains of segregation ·Measuring segregation
2.1 Introduction
Understanding the patterns of residential segregation and spatial clustering of
minority ethnic groups or residents with immigrant backgrounds has been a key
focus of research on segregation in the last century. More recently, however, there
has been growing recognition in the scholarship on segregation that people’s social
lives are not constrained to one dominant space, such aswhere they live. Spatial segre-
gation might happen in various types of spaces, in living places, work, leisure, means
of transport and daily encounters. Many places of everyday social practices shape
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social relations, and more importantly, can impact individual and group behaviours
and experiences (Van Kempen and Wissink 2014). We can only begin to grasp the
full effects of spatial separation if we concurrently examine conditions both within
and outside the residential space (Van Ham and Tammaru 2016). By looking at
approaches from different disciplines, this chapter aims to identify the potential for
further innovations in conceptualising and measuring spatial segregation.
Some scholars conceive spatial segregation as a neutral concept, which simply
refers to ‘the unequal distribution of a population group over a particular area (a city,
for example)’ (Bolt et al. 2010: 171). Seen from this perspective, segregation simply
involves the over-representation of some groups and under-representation of others in
relation to their overall share in a larger social space. Spatial segregation exists in all
societies, and the perfect equal distribution of various groups across specific spaces
is almost impossible to achieve. Other scholars, however, argue that spatial segre-
gation reflects wider social inequalities and should not be seen as a neutral process.
Spatial separation mirrors the way societies are organised, produce and distribute
resources (Arbaci 2019). Researchers who specifically explore income inequalities
and socioeconomic segregation notice that it is ‘an involuntary concentration of a
social group in a particular area due to their disadvantaged position within society.’
Consequently, it is used as an intended and deliberate strategy by the more powerful
and affluent for ‘conscious socio-spatial distancing’ (Sykora 2009: 432).
In this chapter, spatial segregation is approached in the first sense, in a demo-
graphic manner, as an unequal representation of some groups across various spaces.
Yet, some forms or thresholds of segregation might originate from unequal access
to social resources, and hence represent societal inequalities. The chapter will cite
sources that demonstrate this to be the case.
The focus is on the lackof physical interactionbetweengroups classified as dissim-
ilar at different levels: individual contact, working in different locations, residing in
different neighbourhoods. I draw predominantly on literature published in English,
which analyses inter-ethnic relations. Thismeans that sources are inevitably selective
and chosen to show the variety of theoretical approaches in European scholarship on
spatial segregation.
2.2 Traditional Approaches to Studying Segregation
Those studies that explore residential segregation for pre-defined administrative
areas, and then quantify findings using segregation indices, belong to ‘traditional’
approaches to research of this kind. They developed from the pioneering studies
of the Chicago School, which considered the spatial dispersion of population with
more recent immigration experience as an indicator of their economic integration
(Burgess 1923). This model has become known as the spatial assimilation or spatial
integration model and was extensively tested in studies on segregation in the USA.
Later U.S.-based research questioned the dominant role of socio-economic
factors, such as income and education, in areas with a high concentration of black
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American and Hispanic residents. They demonstrated that even after the mitigation
of such factors, ethnic segregation remains high among lower status groups (Massey
1979). The extremely high concentration of blackAmericans in cities after theSecond
World War was a result of a ‘vicious circle’ of racist attitudes, individual behaviour
and institutionalised exclusion (Massey, Denton 1993).
Past American research perceived the lack of residential mobility amongminority
populations as an indicator of the lack of integration and inclusion, and consequently,
segregation was cast as a negative phenomenon. Many subsequent studies in both the
USA and Europe endorsed this approach, linking the spatial concentration of some
vulnerable populations with their lack of cultural assimilation and integration in the
labour market, low social mobility, and other negative consequences (for review, see
Musterd 2003; Phillips 2007). As Sako Musterd reflected at the beginning of the
present century:
… many studies that were carried out on both sides of the Atlantic contained an underlying
philosophy that mixed neighbourhoods offer the best opportunities for integration and full
participation in society (Musterd 2003: 624).
The straightforward link between integration and residential segregation has since
been widely questioned by European scholars, who recognised different factors
in their own context than applied to white-black segregation in the USA (Arbaci,
Malheiros 2010; Bolt et al. 2010; Musterd 2003). The ‘classic’ spatial assimilation
model does not recognise that some groups might either have different preferences
or there might be structural barriers limiting their spatial mobility. Spatial dispersion
might not be the desired state for some groups, and they might prefer to remain in a
neighbourhood where other members of their social networks live in order to support
each other, have easier access to specific services and networks, or feel safer (Peach
1996).
Such an ‘ethnic minority choice’ approach overtly focuses on the one side of
the choice—the minority group, whereas ‘white segregation’—or segregation of any
other majority group—is rarely seen as problematic (Phillips 2007). While self-
selection into segregation, reflecting a preference for living in more homogenous
areas, is usually connected with ethnic minority or immigrant communities, research
shows that it is in fact more common among the majority group, usually white and/or
indigenous (Harris and Johnston 2018). Studies in the UK and Sweden demonstrate
that the main driving force behind segregation between ethnic minority and majority
groups is ‘white avoidance’, that is the preference among the majority white popu-
lation to settle in neighbourhoods, which are not ethnically diverse (Andersen 2017;
Kaufmann and Harris 2015).
Spatial mixing does not directly translate into social integration for migrant
communities. Integration in the spheres of the labour market, education and political
participation of Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese in Amsterdam in the 1990s was
found not to correspond with their level of segregation (Musterd 2003). By contrast,
a study exploring immigrant concentration in Southern European countries demon-
strated that de-segregation processes were neither a result of more social inclusion
of immigrants nor were they followed by integration understood in terms of parity in
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quality of life and housing conditions (Arbaci and Malheiros 2010). In fact, policies
that support the spatial dispersal of immigrant populations might worsen their living
conditions, as there is often a lower quality of affordable and available accommo-
dation in peripheral areas. However, in many European cities, it is the inner city
that is the least affordable and dominated by affluent households (Brueckner et al.
1999), a pattern that is also becoming increasingly recognisable in cities in the UK
and USA due to urban regeneration and the decentralisation of poverty (Zhang and
Pryce 2019; Keebone and Berube 2013).
While social segregation is usually associated with spatial separation between
people of dissimilar ethnicity, race or migrant status, it often overlaps with socioeco-
nomic divisions. Income inequalities are the driving forces behind residential socioe-
conomic segregation, yet the concentration of migrant communities in more disad-
vantaged areas, as most initially lack resources to live elsewhere, fuels further spatial
separation (Tammaru et al. 2019). Although income inequalities may reduce over
time, ethnic segregation can persist and even be transmitted between generations.
A U.K. study demonstrated that, even after accounting for differences in socioeco-
nomic status and childhood neighbourhood characteristics, second-generation ethnic
minorities, especially Pakistanis, Bangladeshi andAfricans, were still less likely than
White British to reside in areas of low segregation (Zuccotti 2019).
Growing income inequality might not always lead to increased residential segre-
gation. In the post-socialist societies of Eastern Europe, the growth of inequality
was actually accompanied by more social mixing as a result of gentrification, with
wealthier groups moving to areas of lower social status (Sýkora 2009). But this
finding might be contingent on the spatial scale at which segregation is measured;
there may, for example, have been a rise in segregation at the more fine-grained
local level. Similarly, Southern European cities have rather low or moderate levels
of spatial segregation between native and foreign-born groups in comparison to
Northern Europe. However, ethnic minority groups have become more marginalised
over time, through exclusion from homeownership for instance (Arbaci 2019). Both
studies point to the different nature of segregation in Eastern and Southern Europe,
which manifests more as forms of ‘mosaic’ or micro-segregation, harder to capture
with indices of segregation.
In summary, the process of spatial segregation is contextual and driven by varied
factors across different societies (Arbaci 2019). A range of factors lie behind segrega-
tion, both at the micro andmacro levels and extend beyond ‘choice versus constraint’
arguments, such as institutionalised discrimination and hostility from the majority
group or inequality of access to power and resources, including housing, education
or political representation (Peach 1996). Despite that, the ‘minority choice argu-
ment’ has often been accommodated in popular debates, and the voluntary ‘self-
segregation’ of some minorities has become associated with issues of security and
national unity, leading to the stigmatisation of some ethnic groups (Phillips 2007).
The following sections of this chapter will examine research on spatial segregation
across various levels and spaces, to challenge this simplistic perspective.
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2.3 Relational Perspectives: The Scale and the Distance
Research into spatial segregation during the twentieth century drew predominantly
on aggregated data for predefined spatial units, such as administrative or statistical
regions. Over the last two decades, academics have increasingly recognised that such
borders rarely overlap with people’s local social lives or subjectively constructed
boundaries between communities. It could be, for example, that a community
composed of a minority ethnic group spreads across two or three administrative
regions but only comprises a small fraction of their population. In these instances,
commonly applied segregation measures will not capture their spatial clustering.
This is symptomatic of a wider problem that has become known as the modifiable
areal unit problem (MAUP). Point-based data on individual residential locations are
typically aggregated to areal units. The difficulty posed by MAUP is that the results
of a particular segregation measure will vary depending on the size and shape of the
areal units (Nielsen and Hennerdal 2017). Arbitrarily redrawing areal unit bound-
aries, while keeping their size the same, can lead to significantly different segregation
results from standard measures. This is also true of shifting to a larger or smaller
geographic scale, though this may also be the result of genuine differences in the
nature of segregation at different scales.
2.3.1 Multiple Scales
Segregation at different scalesmay be driven by differentmechanisms andmight have
different consequences for minority groups and for inter-group relations (Andersson
et al. 2018). By analysing levels of segregation at a smaller scale, such as walking
distance, we can identify areas of everyday interactions between neighbours, and
the implications for social cohesion, community attachment and belonging, local
support and trust, volunteering and community initiatives (Catney 2018). Easton
and Pryce (2019) also argue that xenophobia and processes of White Flight are
likely to be more potent at the micro-neighbourhood level: ‘social connections and
interactions are more likely to occur in close proximity—residents’ awareness of
other households is likely to be greatest with respect to those who live closest. One
might therefore expect the effect of incomers on the moving decisions of existing
residents to decay with distance—the impact of changes in close neighbours will
likely be much greater than changes a block or two away.’ There is also evidence
that homophily—the tendency for movers to be drawn to areas with a high proportion
of people with the same ethnic/social characteristics as one’s own—is more potent
at the local scale (Bakens and Pryce 2019).
Meanwhile, degrees of segregation on a larger scale might represent processes
at the level of an institutionalised community environment, such as local councils
responsible for schools and services, or even larger government or regional zones
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with their own public transport and budgeting (Reardon et al. 2008). In such cases,
segregated groups have lower chances to meet each other and share activities.
Work on more spatially defined segregation measures has laid foundations for
research by analysing it at multiple scales simultaneously. Using a spatial theory
information index developed by Reardon and O’Sullivan (2004)—which computes
spatiallyweighted and scale sensitive segregationmeasures—a study byReardon and
colleagues (2008) demonstrated how micro- and macro-level segregations behave
differently, although they still might be interlinked. They computed micro/macro
segregation ratios for 40 metropolitan areas in the USA, in the period 1980–2000,
which revealed that micro-scale segregation was in some areas largely due to macro-
scale segregation between white and black populations. They concluded that this
relationship between levels of segregation is ‘a distinct dimension of segregation
patterns than that measured by the segregation level alone’ (Reardon et al. 2008:
500).
However, as Harris (2017) explains, past research has not separated the higher-
level segregation from divisions at lower levels, and the former is automatically
included when calculating the degree of segregation at the finest levels. He advocated
disaggregating the traditional segregation indices into a series of localised values
using multilevel modelling. By employing this technique, a study in Leicester, UK,
contradictedmany previous findings by revealing greater levels of segregation among
residents with Indian ethnicity at the largest rather than the smallest measured scale
(Jones et al. 2018).
Multiscalar research provides various methods to measure degrees and levels of
segregation and the interconnections between them.Astudybasedon individual-level
register data in the Netherlands treated the scale as a continuous variable, assuming
that the closest areas—the immediate neighbourhoods—are ‘the keystones that drive
spatial patterns at both smaller and larger scales’ (p. 1069). They generated bespoke
neighbourhoods (see egohoods below) at 101 spatial scales and created profiles of
ethnic exposure for each 100 m x 100 m cell (Petrović et al. 2018). This innovative
approach showed how different scales of ethnic exposure are affected by the city’s
form and layout, affecting issues like the level of polycentricity and fragmentation.
They also detected ‘social cliffs’ in the segregation continuum, with sudden changes
in ethnic exposure between majority to non-Western minority populations. As such,
this research has brought together the three concepts central to current research on
segregation: multiple scales, the centre and the border. The latter two are discussed
further below.
2.3.1.1 The Centre: Egohoods
Researchers studying community social relations and the social effects of neigh-
bourhood attributes emphasise that people perceive themselves as centres of the
neighbourhood. They coined the term egohood to describe a concentric area around
someone’s residential location. It is an individualised, egocentric neighbourhood
(Andersson and Malmberg 2015). More importantly, they argued that individual
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households do not belong to a single meaningful area, but to multiple egohoods
serving numerous functions at the same time: school catchment areas, housing
estates, shopping and leisure time areas, a political ward and larger municipal area
(Hipp and Boessen 2013).
Egohoods have been defined in multiple ways:
(1) as a pre-defined radius, where an individual or address is taken as the central
point (Reardon et al. 2008; Bakens and Pryce 2019);
(2) in relation to a density of population around a person/household, i.e. using the
number of nearest neighbours—the k-nearest neighbour method (Malmberg
et al. 2018);
(3) using specified travel time buffers to account for access to local services and
resources (Petrović et al. 2018).
Still, the process of circling one-size-fits-all individualised neighbourhoods has
limitations. In reality, they might be irregular in shape, vary in size and form for
different groups and depend on activity patterns, neighbourhood attachment and
social position (Van Gent et al. 2016).
Such a fine-grained statistical analysis of segregation is only possible if data
are available at the individual or very small-scale level. Only then can data for
specific points or tiny areas be flexibly aggregated into egocentric neighbour-
hoods. Researchers have usually computed segregation indices for egohoods of
different sizes, thereby allowing for the analysis of segregation at multiple scales
simultaneously.
Two separate studies in Sweden—based on register data for 1990, 1997, 2005 and
2012—demonstrated that segregation was both higher at the smaller-scale egohoods
and had increased over time (Malmberg et al. 2018; Nielsen and Hennerdal 2017).1
While segregation was on the decline according to the results computed with the
dissimilarity indices, the analysis for smaller egohoods exposed emerging new clus-
ters of non-European migrants in areas of previously lower segregation (Malmberg
et al. 2018). Lower segregation at the larger scale areas might be the result of housing
policies as shown by a comparative study in Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands and
Sweden (Andersson et al. 2018). While, at the smallest scale areas, patterns of segre-
gation were quite similar among the four countries, the Belgian results differed at the
larger scale. Belgium was the only studied country that did not use housing dispersal
policies to manage refugee settlement and this may account for the disparity.
1 Nielsen and Hennerdal (2017) undertook a slightly different approach to measuring egocentric
segregation: the share of immigrant population in the k-nearest area was compared to the share in
the larger population K.
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2.3.2 The Periphery: Borders
An important limitation of simple distance-based egohood approaches is that an
individual may not, however, perceive themselves to be at the centre of a neighbour-
hood—they may recognise that they live at its periphery. The disciplines of crim-
inology extend the pattern outwards by exploring the importance of liminal areas,
the peripheries and boundaries of a community. These include both administrative
borders and physical barriers, and studies can demonstrate how their existence can
often translate into deviant or illicit behaviours. Borders between communities might
be physical, such as streets, rivers, rail tracks, unoccupied land or walls, yet some
might be ‘merely’ symbolic and subjective (Legewie 2018).
The presence of environmental barriers is often associated with different blends
and representation of racial groups, resulting in a higher level of spatial segregation in
a given area (Noonan 2005). Patterns of behaviour can be influenced by proximity to
environmental barriers, as residents are less likely to interact with each other and less
attached to neighbourhoods (Hipp et al. 2014).A study on howpublic space is used by
Protestants andCatholics in Belfast also revealed how physical boundaries, including
the Peace Walls, stimulated further self-segregation. They encouraged people to
travel in ways that avoided contact with members of the other group (Abdelmonem
and McWhinney 2015). Finally, inter-communal violence can cluster around such
territorial boundaries, if they separate gangs and groups,which retain hostile relations
with each other (Brantingham et al. 2012).
Studies have employed the ‘aerial wobbling technique’ (borrowed from ecology)
to detect steep changes between neighbourhoods and identify areas of meaningful
separation between social groups. As argued by Legewie (2018), past segregation
research largely ignored areas of transition between relatively homogenous popu-
lations and spatial inequalities within neighbourhoods. Dean and colleagues named
such boundaries ‘social frontiers’, as they ‘represent cliff edges in the complex land-
scape of segregation’ (Dean et al. 2019: 272). As residents who live in close prox-
imity to a social frontier are likely to be located on the periphery of their community,
they are not so strongly governed by the mechanisms of group social control. Such
boundaries often do not overlap with any physical barriers but are rather perceived
subjectively, reflecting sudden changes in population composition by ethnicity/race
and socioeconomic status, or a combination of each.
It is possible to detect such boundaries in instances where low-level geocoded
data have yet to be extensively applied. Using incident-level crime data, Legewie
(2018) analysed the relationship between racial neighbourhood boundaries and
violent crime in Chicago. In another study, Legewie and Schaeffer (2016) explored
antisocial behaviour in so-called ‘transition/contested zones’ in New York using
geocoded data from emergency calls. In Sheffield, UK, Dean et al. (2019) found
higher levels for various crimes, such as violence, burglary, shoplifting and vehicle
crime, in neighbourhoods adjacent to social frontiers than in neighbourhoods along-
side administrative borders. Chapter 13 of this book describes further research on
‘social frontiers’.
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2.4 Beyond Residential Segregation
The focus on residential segregation can be attributed to the fact that individual
life choices and social lives were once more dependent on longer term residence
in particular neighbourhoods. A few decades ago, people were more likely to spend
their entire lives in one or two areas rather than growing up in one neighbourhood and
then move to another. The neighbourhood, although still important, is not the only
areawhere people spend their time. For thosewho are lessmobile, the neighbourhood
might indeed be the main space that shapes their daily activities, providing social
support and networks. For other people—especially those who spend less social
and leisure time in their immediate locality—it could be a less important space. The
pitfalls of focusing on residential segregationwere explained byRonaldVanKempen
and Bart Wissink:
People have multiple identifications and a varying part of these relate to the neighbourhood.
(…) they receive stimuli from a lot of different people in numerous settings, of which
the neighbourhood is only one. We should therefore not only study people as residents of
neighbourhoods, but also asworkers, visitors, long-distance travellers, shoppers, commuters,
and so forth. These different roles potentially support new meetings and new identifications
beyond the residential neighbourhood. At the same time, we should have special attention
for variations between groups: some people might be “more” neighbours than others (Van
Kempen and Wissink 2014: 103).
Van Ham and Tammaru (2016) urged social scientists to study multiple domains
of segregation simultaneously, considering the linkages between them, and how they
change over time. They identified five major domains for the study of ethnic segre-
gation: home, leisure, work, school and travel. Such a multi-domain approach—
they stressed—is vital to develop relevant policies to counter the negative effects of
segregation as these might not be possible if we only concentrate on the residential
settings. The recognition of a multiplicity of places where people develop social
networks is not new in urban studies; however, such research could flourish given
more availability of data beyond the place of residence (Van Kempen and Wissink
2014).
2.4.1 School Segregation
Schools—like neighbourhoods—are spaces of resources: physical facilities,2 human
capital from teachers and other staff, and social capital from other students. If the
allocation of resources across schools is correlated with their racial composition,
segregation will affect students’ outcomes (Reardon and Owens 2014).
2 School Segregation has received a lot of attention in past decades in the USA, where laws enforced
separation between white and black pupils until 1954 (i.e. Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of
Education decision).
22 A. Piekut
We would expect that ethnic segregation at the primary school level3 to be related
to the composition of the school catchment area. Yet, various European studies
demonstrated that this might not be the case. An analysis based on 2001 School
Census and 2001 Population Census in the UK confirmed a high correlation between
school and residential segregation (Burgess et al. 2005). It was, however, higher in
the case of some minority groups, such as Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi. Inter-
estingly, the deprivation level of the local education area was accompanied by segre-
gation of Black Caribbean pupils only, but not by Indian.4 However, another study
found no relationship between school segregation and school deprivation (measured
by the number of free school meals; Burgess, Wilson 2005).
Free school choice that permits self-selection by some groups into more desirable
schools leads to higher school segregation. The introduction of an open enrolment
system in Sweden has allowed more privileged and better-off parents to choose
schools outside their area of residence. A shorter distance to school was more impor-
tant for less wealthy families, single parents and minority households (Malmberg
et al. 2014). A study in Amsterdam revealed that some parents even decided to
move to less ethnically diverse school catchment areas (Boterman 2013). Similarly,
a Danish study conducted in Copenhagen demonstrated that primary school segre-
gation would be lower if students attended only schools in their catchment area
(Rangvid 2007). The gap between ethnic segregation in residential areas and higher
levels of school segregationwas largely due to parental socioeconomic status. Amore
recent study in Copenhagen showed that despite an overall slight decrease in segre-
gation across state-run schools, segregation increased across the private school sector
(Skovgaard Nielsen and Andersen 2019). This pattern might not be universal and
depends on the size of the minority group. In countries with lower immigration, like
the Czech Republic, the concentration of pupils without Czech citizenship in schools
in the period 2005–20013 was largely an outcome of higher regional concentration
(Hasman et al. 2016).
Another common question raised in the school segregation literature is its effect
on performance. Pupils with migrant backgrounds, such as Turks in Germany, fare
worse in schools with high concentrations of students with similar origins. This
could be due to their undertaking education in schools with less resources and levels
of support (Söhn and Özcan 2006). In Sweden, in regions with high or medium
levels of visibly non-European ethnic minorities, pupil performance substantially
varied across schools (Andersson et al. 2010). This was partially explained by
students’ socioeconomic status, but many inter-school variations remained unex-
plained (Andersson et al. 2010). A U.K. study demonstrated that the school effect
might be very different across migrants from different backgrounds. Indian pupils
3 The particular structure of the educational system and institutional discrimination might be to
blame for school segregation at higher levels. At varying transitional stages, minority students
might be encouraged to select schools with specific profiles, e.g. of vocational not academic profile
(Söhn and Özcan 2006).
4 A Birmingham based study revealed that higher levels of school concentration among Black
Caribbean pupils are partially explained by their preference of faith schools (Harris and Johnston
2017).
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in Leicester achieved good test scores in all types of school, while Pakistanis in
Bradford had higher scores only if they attended schools with lower segregation and
more white students (Johnston et al. 2007).
When it comes to measuring levels of segregation, studies of this kind usually
calculate an index of dissimilarity across educational areas using data for schools as
smaller units (i.e. evenness of distribution of a minority group across schools within
a given education area). An index of isolation is also used to explore the probabili-
ties of meeting students with the same ethnicity or studies calculate percentages of
ethnicminority groupswithin schools. Leckie andGoldstein (2015) used amultilevel
random-coefficient model to studymultigroup segregation among London secondary
schools. They found that segregation levels between cohorts of White, Black, and
Asian pupils remained stable over a decade, 2001–2010 (see multiscale segregation,
Chap. 10).
2.4.2 Workplace Segregation
The workplace constitutes an important arena for social relations and inter-group
contact outside the residential neighbourhood for adults active in the labour market
(DiTomaso et al. 2007). Residential and work lives might be interconnected through
different mechanisms:
(1) the proximity of both locations resulting in the similarity of co-workers, as
people might prefer to work close to where they live;
(2) the network effect: when a neighbourhood support-base may facilitate finding
employment through social networks (Granovetter 1995; Ioannides and Loury
2004);
(3) discrimination against immigrant/minority population living in stigmatised
areas of high concentration, pushing them into jobs with a high proportion
of migrant workers (Strömgren et al. 2014).
These three effects will vary across groups depending on their minority/majority
status, gender and socioeconomic position. Some groups such as recent migrants
may rely more heavily on local networks or prefer to work closer to home due to
caring responsibilities.
One of the main questions in workplace segregation research, as in school-based
studies, is the level of correlation with residential segregation. Do people living in
ethnically segregated neighbourhoods also work in ethnically segregated workplace
areas? A U.S. study has revealed that although workplace segregation is lower than
residential segregation, both were in a strong, positive correlation (Ellis et al. 2004).
The same was found in Sweden (Marcińczak et al. 2015), meaning that immigrants
living in areas of higher segregationwere alsomore likely towork inmore segregated
workplaces. This was more apparent for immigrant women, who might depend more
on residential networks. Gender differences in workplace segregation did not exist
for sectors requiring higher qualifications, like education (Tammaru et al. 2016).
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Studies in Sweden and Germany have shown that workplace segregation between
immigrant and non-migrant workers was common across all industries, but more
pronounced in low-skill intensive sectors, such as agriculture, construction or small
services (Åslund and Skans 2010; Glitz 2014).5
Status inequalities within the workforce will depend on, but also strengthen,
existing structural relationships within society (DiTomaso et al. 2007). Segmenta-
tion of the labour market along ethnic lines is considered to be the driving force
behind workplace segregation and ‘is unlikely to be the result of a completely
voluntary sorting process’ (Åslund and Skans 2010: 489). An analysis based on
linked employer–employee data in Sweden (1985–2002) demonstrated that the lower
economic status ofmigrantswas one of themost important factors explaining the high
concentration of immigrants in some workplaces. A similar analysis for Germany
(1975–2008) revealed that although ethnic workplace segregation declined with time
spent in the labour market, it still remained high for some immigrant groups, such as
those from Asian countries or Turkey, and very low for those from other European
countries such as Austria (Glitz 2014).
2.4.3 Other Domains of Segregation
Spatial segregation is not limited to residential and institutional spaces, such as
schools and employment. Not all people are employees: some are self-employed
working off-site, some work at home taking care of the family, some are unable to
work due to health conditions, unemployment or retirement, or are too young to
work. For such groups, segregation in other activity domains, where they socialise
and spend leisure time, might be more important. Such out-of-home and out-of-
work segregation between Estonians and Russians was a topic of study in Tallinn,
Estonia (Kamenik et al. 2015; Kukk et al. 2019). Based on the Estonian Time Use
Survey for 2000 and 2010 and qualitative interviews, these studies demonstrated
that although both groups were engaged in similar types of leisure activities, they
practised them in different places and different times. Leisure time segregation was
connected to residential segregation, as most participants claimed to have spent free
time in the vicinity of their homes. Hence, although the study originated from the
need to concentrate on issues other than the domestic and employment domains, it
also demonstrated the significance of the neighbourhood as a site for inter-ethnic
encounters, translating into segregation in leisure time spaces.
The level of ethnic segregation across voluntary organisations was indirectly a
topic of Achbari (2015) study. It surveyed 400 participants in 37 organisations in
5 Segregation was defined in terms of levels of separation between workplaces, i.e. minority or
majority workers not working together in one registered unit (so the actual daily exposure was not
tested). Glitz (2014) also computed a conditional segregation measure, which accounted for skills
level of workers.
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the Netherlands to explore whether homogenous Turkish or ethnically mixed organ-
isations supported higher levels of political engagement. The study found that both
attracted participants who were already more politically engaged. A comparative
study of associations from Mannheim, Germany, Enschede, the Netherlands and
Aberdeen in Scotland (van der Meer 2016) surveyed 3166 active participants in
645 organisations of different ethnic make-up. It revealed that more trusting and
tolerant citizens participate in organisations with higher proportions of minority
ethnic groups, which could be seen as a form of self-segregation.
In summary, comparedwith ‘traditional’ segregation research on residential areas,
studies in these other domains have not developed innovative measures to assess
spatial segregation. Instead, segregation has been conceptualised as the exposure
to minority/majority group members and consequently systems to monitor more
complex patterns of separation/contact—such as people working at different floors,
coming to different meetings, etc.—have yet to be devised.
2.5 Segregation at the Micro-Ecological Scale
There is another level of segregation, which has not been considered by research
based on multi-scalar and multi-domain perspectives: the individual. Psychological
research on the so-calledmicro-ecological scale of segregation, ormicro-segregation,
has focused on ‘the everyday, interpersonal interactions between people in informal
settings’ (Tredoux and Dixon 2009: 761). This research has argued that even in
settings, which have low levels of segregation at home or work, people might still
avoid contact with one another in shared everyday spaces. A great deal of micro-
ecological research has been conducted not only in educational spaces, such as
university dining halls, university stairs/sitting areas, university theatres or class-
rooms, but also in various urban public and leisure spaces, such as public transport,
parks, squares and streets, beaches and nightclubs. Researchers have recorded and
analysed the spatio-temporal position of individuals, such as sitting patterns, and the
extent of interactions between individuals perceived to represent visibly different
groups.
A micro-ecological approach to segregation arose from the rich research tradition
on inter-group contact in psychology, starting with the influential work of Gordon
Allport and his contact hypothesis (Allport 1954). This theory posits that prejudice
can be challenged and reduced by positive face-to-face interaction if the status of
involvedmembers of different groups is equal and theyhave a commongoal to pursue.
Micro-segregation research in psychology has its origins in recognising the impor-
tance of space for daily human interactions, and that contact without a contextualised
spatial layer would become a merely neutral act:
… space is highly significant for human interaction; we interact rather differently in the
“spaces” of funerals and weddings. Various kinds of space either enable or constrain partic-
ular kinds of action. Places have specific meanings for people; they resonate with symbolic
and emotional significance. We all carry with us various senses of “place identity”. Spaces
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are anything but mere inert backdrops, as we may immediately recognise in “home” and
“away” sporting records. When space is allowed to disappear so too do two other features
integral to the analysis of space: bodies and temporal sequences. When bodily processes,
space and temporal sequencing are faded into the background, then “contact” just becomes
an apparently neutral event, hollowed out from the very bodily practices which constitute it
and which endow it with different meanings (Foster 2005: 498).
Psychologists argued that macro-level segregation, albeit important and driven by
policies and other macro-level mechanisms, cannot explain how people interact with
each other on a daily basis, and macro-scale research misses the ‘boundary processes
unfolding within the most intimate domains of everyday life’ (Tredoux and Dixon
2009: 774).
A systematic review conducted by Bettencourt et al. (2019) neatly summarises
different, yet inter-linked mechanisms explaining why people self-segregate at
the micro-scale. First, the holding of negative attitudes and stereotypes underpins
stronger in-group identification and higher perceived threats to the holders’ own
identity and values. Such individuals are more likely to feel anxious and uncomfort-
able when meeting dissimilar/other/minority group members (intergroup anxiety);
and as a result, may wish to move only within so-called ‘spatial comfort zones’,
which are ethnically or racially homogenous and provide them feelings of safety.
This behaviour might finally lead to the development of exclusionist social norms
promoting and strengthening micro-segregation patterns.
A micro-ecological perspective does not imply that prejudice operates just at the
individual and every day, banal level, and that society is free from racism or other
forms of structural inequalities. On the contrary, it recognises that ‘space is heavily
implicated in persisting forms of oppression such as racialisation’ (Foster 2005: 496).
Racial evaluation is an ‘activity that people do together’ (Durrheim, Dixon 2004:
632), and such repeated social behaviours of racial exclusion and micro-segregation
represent broader norms and practices operating in a given society.
The main methods of measuring the micro-ecology of segregation involve the
observation and mapping of locations. These are then often quantified with indices
of segregation to enable researchers to compare how they change over the time
involved in data recording. For example, Dixon and Durrheim (2003) plotted the
distribution of white and black beachgoers by taking a series of aerial photos over a
period of 10 days (two photos a day), then mapped the location of everyone present
at the beach and marked whether they were white or black. For each observational
time unit, they computed dissimilarity and interaction indices. In a similar fashion, a
research team conducted a study on sitting patterns in a multi-ethnic cafeteria (Clack
et al. 2005). They recorded specific sitting positions during different lunch times
for white and Asian customers on a diagram divided into six sub-sections and then
computed the level of segregation through spatio-temporal clustering patterns.
The work of South African psychologist John Dixon and Kevin Durrheim, and
specifically their 2003 beach study, demonstrates how segregation in one type of
space operates at multiple levels: (1) individual/micro (no contact between any white
and black beach users), (2) groups occupying different parts of the beach (sectoral
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segregation) and (3) white users responding to the influx of black users by with-
drawing from the beach space altogether.6 Because segregation was institutionalised
across all spheres of life in apartheid South Africa (1948-1994), they coined the term
‘informal segregation’ to describe a form of segregation that operates despite the
absence of legally enforced intergroup boundaries (Dixon and Durrheim 2003).
Research on the micro-ecology of segregation has spread to other countries and
disciplines. In Chicago, USA, a study conducted on train seating patterns also
revealed that segregation persists in everyday life despite the ending of enforced
segregation in the 1960s (Swyngedouw 2013). Americans were more likely to sit
close to and interact with passengers who were similar to themselves in terms of
marks of class and race. A longitudinal study of classroom seating patterns among
Protestant and Catholic pupils in three integrated secondary schools in Northern
Ireland also demonstrated that segregation is persistent over time, even after formal
barriers are removed (McKeown et al. 2016). When asked in a questionnaire, pupils
also expressed their own group preferences for extracurricular activities, such as
playing or eating. The study of cafeteria sitting patterns in a cafeteria affiliated to a
metropolitan university located in a city in the north-west of England—amulti-ethnic
and international setting, supporting intercultural mixing—also displayed patterns
of micro-segregation between White and Asian students (Clack et al. 2005). Pre-
existing social networks, own group preferences and language barriers might be
contributing factors here.
2.6 Time-Space Geography of Segregation
While studying inhabitants of gated communities in London, England, Atkinson and
Flint (2004) discovered that wealthy residents were not only isolated from other
Londoners behind their gates and security technologies but they were also separated
from others when travelling to places of work and leisure, using ‘tunnel-like trajecto-
ries separating class and status categories’ (p. 890). They dubbed this form of spatial
separation ‘space-time trajectories of segregation.’ Years later, with the expansion
of the ‘new mobilities’ paradigm—the shift from studying static aspects of social
life into studying movement of people, objects and ideas (Sheller and Urry 2006)—
geographers have turned attention to the dynamic side of segregation, which is in
constant flux as people navigate their daily lives and move between locations (Shen
2019).
While the modifiable area unit problem (MAUP) has been the main concern
for residential segregation scholars, temporal geographers face a related challenge
known as the Uncertain Geographic Context Problem (UGCoP):
6 Additionally, a potential contact was interpreted differently by white and black South Africans—
by whites as an ‘invasion’ and ‘being pushed out of space’, while black people read this behaviour
as an ‘avoidance’ and white people ‘moving away’ (Durrheim and Dixon 2004).
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This is the problem that findings about the effects of area-based attributes could be affected
by how contextual units or neighborhoods are geographically delineated and the extent to
which these areal units deviate from the “true causally relevant” geographic context (…) It
arises because of the spatial uncertainty in the actual areas that exert contextual influences
on the individuals being studied and the temporal uncertainty in the timing and duration
in which individuals experienced these contextual influences. The UGCoP is a significant
methodological problem because it means that analytical results can be different for different
delineations of contextual units even if everything else is the same. It is perhaps amajor reason
why research findings concerning the effects of social and physical environments on health
behaviors and outcomes are often inconsistent (Kwan 2013: 959).
The temporal and dynamic aspects of segregation are approached differently in
recent studies. The main approaches involve: analysing segregation across an entire
activity space of a person during a day/week or computing segregation measures for
different times of a day/week for various spatial units. They are briefly discussed
below.
2.6.1 Activity Space Segregation
As with micro-segregation research, an individual is the key unit of analysis in the
activity space approach to segregation. However, exposure to other people is treated
as a person-based measure not one of place (Kwan 2009). A person is followed
across multiple spaces and may spend time in different neighbourhoods or even
cities/regions, so their exposure to different populations varies over time.
Wong and Shaw (2011), using travel diary data, computed an exposure index for
residents’ activity space. In contrast to the traditional exposure index, a residential
unit was not the base for calculations, but rather all locations visited by the subject,
which were also weighted by time spent in each area visited. The limitation of the
method, according to the authors, was reliance on census data for the areal units
included in the activity space. It would provide more accurate results if the informa-
tion on the actual exposure and interactions with other residents could be obtained.
Mobile positioning data for city districts, along with data on mobile user age, gender
and preferred language of communication, were employed to analyse segregation
between Estonians and Russians in their overall activity space (Silm et al. 2018).
Russian speakers were found to visit fewer locations, while the Estonians’ spatial
behaviour was more random. Older Estonians, however, were the most likely to
visit more Russian-dominated districts, suggesting higher ethnic segregation among
younger age groups.
Such an approach does not, however, overcome theUncertainGeographic Context
Problem. Whilst it does acknowledge that residents are exposed to different socio-
demographic contexts as they move throughout the day, the contexts themselves
are also dynamic and fluctuate over the daily or weekly cycle (Vallée 2018). Park
and Kwan (2018) proposed a measure called the ‘individual level spatiotemporal
proximity index’ (i-STP index) to capture the temporal variation in segregation levels.
Like egohoods (see above) it uses the method of k-nearest neighbours to define a
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person-specific neighbourhood and it is allowing for changes over time. Themeasure
requires detailed geolocation of all or a sample of ‘neighbours’ (people met through
the day).
2.6.2 Segregation Over Time
Researchers in transport and mobility studies have focused on how segregation
changes over time. In another study in Tallin, Estonia, ethnic segregation was
computed for different hours of a day, different weekdays and seasons on the basis
of mobile phone data (Silm and Ahas 2014). It found that Estonian and Russian
speaking residents were more likely to interact with each other during working times
and days.
Studies in France and Sweden also revealed lower levels of segregation during
daytime than at night. Using a detailed daily travel survey around Paris, Le Roux
and team (2017) computed segregation indices for a 24-hour period across different
educational and occupational groups. The probabilities for these groups to be present
simultaneously were the lowest between low and high-status groups, but lower-
middle and higher status groups were more likely to interact during the day than
night. The mobility of upper-class members was the most fluid over 24 h, providing
them more opportunities for interaction with groups outside their neighbourhood
(Le Roux et al. 2017). In a study in Sweden, even smaller units of time were used
to explore spatio-temporal segregation. Östh et al. (2018) analysed the trajectories
of phone users and their exposure to residents from areas with dissimilar socio-
economic status, over a period of 288 five-minute segments (24 h). Even though
everyday mobility decreases spatial segregation, it remained quite high for residents
from either very poor or very wealthy peripheral areas.
Other research conceptualised daily segregation as the separation between flows
of people travelling to/fromwork. Farber and colleagues (2015) developed ameasure
called ‘social interaction potential’ based on the space–time prism framework. The
study used origin–destination data between places of residence and work, for white,
black and Hispanic populations in Detroit, USA. They identified locations with
the highest ‘interaction potential’ for intra and inter-racial interactions during the
day and the night. The study showed that a ‘potential’ for segregation depends on
the time devoted to travel and that more population mixing happens when work
commute time is longer. The ‘interaction potential’ model was further advanced in a
British study in London on spatial segregation between occupational groups (Shen
2019).7 It highlights that high segregation between large employers and casual
workers during the day time is largely due to different commuting patterns.
7 Commuting flows were conceptualised as networked systems; the ‘flow-based spatial interaction
potential’ between two places measures the cumulative potential of the spatial interaction between
the flow occurring between both places and its neighbouring flows happening between any two
places (Shen 2019: 13).
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In summary, these studies have placed more emphasis on how segregation might
change over specific periods of time, such as a day or a week, or across various
activity spaces in the city. The remaining limitation is that spatial proximity has
been often equated with an interaction between people who are different in terms of
ethnicity/race, age or socioeconomic status.
2.7 Geographies of Encounter and Breaking Down
Segregation
Research on segregation and contact in human geography arose from criticism of
the so-called ‘cosmopolitan turn’ in urban geography, which celebratedmulticultural
cities as sites for ethnic mixing, everyday civility and ‘living with difference’ (Valen-
tine 2008). This research approach has further evolved into the analysis of different
spaces of encounter and closer examination of conditions for so-called ‘meaningful
contact,’ which transforms previously held prejudices and improves social relations
between groups (Mayblin et al. 2016). While the micro-ecological research explores
spatial patterns of distribution for all individuals present in given small-scale loca-
tions, in the spaces of encounter approach the emphasis is on the quality of contact
which occurs between representatives of dissimilar social categories, andwhether the
benefits of such contact might be extended beyond this space (Matejskova, Leitner
2011).
Geographies of encounters research draw inspiration from symbolic interaction-
ists, such as Erving Goffman or Lyn H. Lofland, and their micro-sociological anal-
ysis of everyday behaviours in public space (Swyngedouw 2013). Like psychologists
working on the micro-ecology of segregation, geographers have also been influenced
by the Allport’s (1954) work on prejudice and inter-group contact. The ‘encounter’
has been conceptualised as a specific form of contact, ‘where difference is somehow
noteworthy’ (Wilson 2017: 464). Although the word segregation is not often directly
used in geographies of encounter literature, these studies de facto explore how segre-
gation might be eliminated and more just societies created (Phillips 2015). They try
to understand:
‘… the link between segregation, isolation and social mixing, and the value of interventions
that commonly aim to build “communities of place” through a focus on neighbourhood-based
encounters with difference (…) [They focus] on the productive intersection of strategies for
re-distributional justice, in the face of inequality, the political recognition of unheard voices
and the value of opportunities for social encounter between diverse groups for breaking down
(unequal) social and spatial segregation’ (Phillips 2015: 337, 340).
Spaces that have the potential to lower segregation and bring people together were
termed ‘contact zones.’ Askins and Pain (2011)—drawing on the research of Mary
Louise Pratt, a language and linguistics scholar—examined how friendships can be
formed between children from the British majority and asylum seekers in the north
of the UK. A participatory, art-based research project explored ‘productive tensions,’
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which could be then scaled up to awider community level.A study in another northern
city further developed the concept of the ‘contact zone’ by drawing on the work of
sociologist Boaventura De Sousa Santos on intercultural communication (Mayblin
et al. 2016). This study analysed activities within an interfaith project for Jewish and
Muslim youth. It argued that a zone where meaningful contact takes place ‘is not
a single space of encounter that occurs once. It is a “zone” rather than a space of
encounter precisely because contact must occur on multiple occasions, in multiple
sites, and with a variety of intensities in order to become “meaningful”’ (Mayblin
et al. 2016: 216). Both studies concluded that de-segregation is not just about bringing
dissimilar groups together via policies of ethnic mixing, but the effectiveness of the
‘contact zone’ depends on skilful facilitation of the encounter, so that communication
and intercultural translations are possible (Askins, Pain 2011; Mayblin et al. 2016).
In contrast with methods of micro-ecology in segregation research, contact and
spatial isolation are not quantified with indices of segregation and statistical methods
are also rarely used. Many studies deploy ethnographic observations alongside indi-
vidual in-depth and focus interviews. For example, in a study on encounters between
immigrants and German residents in an estate in eastern Berlin, researchers partici-
pated in community life through volunteering and attending neighbourhood councils
(Matejskova and Leitner 2011). Observations of the conduct and habits of passengers
were used in a study of the everyday encounters on a public transport bus in Birm-
ingham, UK (Wilson 2011). A British-Polish study by Piekut and Valentine (2017)
based on survey data in Leeds andWarsaw explored the relationship between contact
in different types of spaces and attitudes towards minority ethnic groups. The study
showed that contact does work differently not only in varied spaces but also in the
two national settings. In Leeds, encounters in social spaces (such as community and
sports clubs, volunteer organisations, etc.) correlated more closely with tolerance,
whereas encounters in eating spaces (i.e. cafes and restaurants) were more strongly
linked with positive attitudes in Warsaw.
2.8 Conclusions and Future Directions
Spatial segregation has been studied in social sciences from two different, but equally
important, perspectives—place-based and person-based. While the first can provide
a better understanding of spatial separation within specific types of spaces, the latter
complements the ecological approach with insights into individual-level segregation
and how it varies across time and space. It might be possible that whilst some people
live and work in unsegregated areas, yet they continue to move in ‘space-time trajec-
tories’ of segregation (Atkinson and Flint 2004). As such, segregation is not solely
an attribute of places or spaces, but it also a characteristic of individual activities.
In summary, we could divide the approaches into four groups, as depicted in
Table 2.1:
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Table 2.1 Summary of conceptual approaches to spatial segregation
Measure Conceptualisation of segregation
Place-based Person-based





Time-variant Temporal and flow-based segregation Micro-ecology of segregation
Activity space segregation
Source own elaboration on the basis of literature
(1) Place-based segregation using static measures of segregation—studies
exploring residential segregation, which were followed by studies employing
the same spatial segregation indices for other spaces, such as school or
workplaces.
(2) Person-based segregation using static measures of segregation—studies that
approach segregation by considering the position of an individual in a given
space.
(3) Place-based segregation using temporal measures of segregation—studies
recognising that segregation is not static across any space and varies over
the period of a day, week or a year.
(4) Person-based segregation using temporal measures of segregation—studies
exploring segregation from a perspective of an individual and how its temporal
dynamic operates.
The increasing availability of geocoded data at the individual level, coupled with
new, rich sources of (big) data, could bring further methodological and concep-
tual innovations for the joint study of place- and people-based segregation. Cross-
disciplinary knowledge exchange has been the bedrock for many methodological or
conceptual innovations in social sciences. I conclude this chapter by highlighting
potential creative connections between the above approaches and indicate possible
directions for future research.
Residential segregation no longer plays such a dominant role in segregation studies
and isolation patterns in other types of spaces are increasingly explored. However, the
relationship between residential segregation and separation in other domains remains
an important topic for enquiry. Some studies demonstrate its conditional effect on
segregation within schools, workplace and other domains, whilst others point to
different factors and mechanisms that shape non-residential segregation. Socioe-
conomic deprivation and the lower status of minority groups are recurring causes
of segregation, coupled with exclusionary policies, structural racism and individual
prejudices among majority or more privileged groups. Studies comparing segrega-
tion across more than two types of spaces do not yet exist as far as I am aware, due to
the lack of suitable data, which would need to provide information on segregation at
the domestic, work and leisure patterns for the same individuals. It would be inter-
esting to see in future studies not only how segregations in various domains interlink
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and correlate but also whether the implications of segregation in one space resonate
elsewhere, i.e. impact behaviours or inter-group relations.
The complex methodologies developed in studies of residential segregation
patterns, such as the focus onmultiple scales, the centre (conceptualised as egohoods)
and the periphery of neighbourhoods (the role of physical barriers and symbolic
borders), have yet to be applied to the study of segregation in other domains. In
an employment study, for example, most research would either compute segrega-
tion indices for workplaces or examine levels of exposure to minority or immigrant
workers. As within neighbourhoods, there might be multiple scales of segregation
withinworkplaces: cubicles, offices, floors, buildings and locations, etc. Smaller scale
and work activity space segregation within employment could be more easily studied
with qualitative methods, such as observation, or by employing some smartphone-
based tracking technology, if such was permitted by a large enough sample of indi-
viduals. Multiple scales of segregation across other life domains is yet another topic
for social scientists.
Micro-ecology, activity space and human geography studies have concentrated
on the segregation between individuals during everyday interactions. However, they
often rely on a small number of observations.Meanwhile, temporal geography, trans-
port and mobility studies use large datasets, tracking daily routes of residents, and
these disciplines have developed complex measures of segregation that acknowl-
edge its dynamic, not static nature. But there has not been enough attention to the
quality of such interactions in individual activity spaces. Studies of human geog-
raphy recognise that some daily, fleeting interactions might have little meaning and
may not even have been noticed; such contact might be limited to an exchange of
civilities. The visualisation method of socio-spatial isolation as presented by Lee
and Kwan (2011), which integrates data on spatial movements with information on
the quality of encounters, is a promising perspective. It may yet prove difficult to
apply without asking participants to assess their daily interactions. Mobile surveys
that use dedicated survey apps, collect geolocations and ask questions about daily
experiences might offer another inspiration for this area of study.
Finally, studies on segregation across various domains have determined that a
choice of the majority group to avoid spaces perceived to have a too high represen-
tation from minority groups is often a driving force of spatial separation. Public and
political anxieties about ‘self-segregating’ minorities, which view the high segre-
gation of some groups as undesirable and a failure of local policies aiming to
de-segregate them (Phillips 2007), are often not substantiated (see, for example,
U.K. evidence discussed in Catney 2018). A more comprehensive discussion on the
dynamics of ethnic segregation across various types of spaces and times could help
reduce such bias in public debates. The interdisciplinary literature review in this
chapter supports such efforts.
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Petrović A, van HamM,Manley D (2018)Multiscale measures of population:Within-and between-
city variation in exposure to the sociospatial context. Annals of the American Association of
Geographers 108(4):1057–1074
Phillips D (2007) Ethnic and racial segregation: a critical perspective. Geography Compass
1(5):1138–1159
Phillips, D. (2015). Segregation, mixing and encounter. In: Vertovec, S. (eds). Routledge interna-
tional handbook of diversity studies, 337–344
Piekut A, Valentine G (2017) Spaces of encounter and attitudes towards difference: A comparative
study of two European cities. Soc Sci Res 62:175–188
Rangvid BS (2007) Living and learning separately? Ethnic segregation of school children in
Copenhagen. Urban Studies 44(7):1329–1354
Reardon SF, O’Sullivan D (2004) Measures of spatial segregation. Sociol Methodol 34(1):121–162
2 Re-Theorising Spatial Segregation: A European Perspective 37
Reardon SF, Owens A (2014) 60 years afterBrown: Trends and consequences of school segregation.
Ann Rev Sociol 40:199–218
Reardon SF, Matthews SA, O’Sullivan D, Lee BA, Firebaugh G, Farrell CR, Bischoff K (2008) The
geographic scale of metropolitan racial segregation. Demography 45(3):489–514
Schnell I, Diab AAB, Benenson I (2015) A Global Index for Measuring Socio-spatial Segregation
versus Integration. Appl Geogr 58:179–188
ShellerM,Urry J (2006) The newmobilities paradigm. Environment and PlanningA 38(2):207–226
Shen Y (2019) Segregation through space: A scope of the flow-based spatial interaction model. J
Transp Geogr 76:10–23
Silm S, Ahas R (2014) The temporal variation of ethnic segregation in a city: Evidence from a
mobile phone use dataset. Soc Sci Res 47:30–43
Silm S, Ahas R, Mooses V (2018) Are younger age groups less segregated? Measuring ethnic
segregation in activity spaces using mobile phone data. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
44(11):1797–1817
Söhn J, Özcan V (2006) The educational attainment of Turkish migrants in Germany. Turkish
Studies 7(1):101–124
Strömgren M, Tammaru T, Danzer AM, van Ham M, Marcińczak S, Stjernström O, Lindgren U
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Abstract Based on extensive research with distinguished scholars within the
book project ‘Socioeconomic Segregation in European Capital Cities’, this chapter
summarizes the key trends in income inequality and socioeconomic segregation in
Europe. We draw our data from the two last census rounds, and we focus on the most
common indicators of income inequality (Gini Index) and residential segregation
(Dissimilarity Index). We find that levels of residential segregation grew between
the two last censuses in most of the cities included in our study. Changes in resi-
dential segregation follow changes in income inequality with a time lag, and it tends
to happen in both directions. Low levels of income inequality relate to low levels
of segregation after 10 years, and high levels of inequality relate to high levels of
segregation after 10 years.
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3.1 Introduction
Income inequality has long been a feature of most societies and segregation has long
been a feature of cities (Nightingale 2012; Tammaru et al. 2020). Very high levels
of income inequality and high levels of residential segregation are also important
policy concerns since they may bring negative consequences for cities and people,
ranging from a lack of opportunities, constraints on social mobility, poverty, the
intergenerational transmission of disadvantage and even social unrest (Galster et al.
2015; van Ham et al. 2018). Vulnerable population groups, such as low-income
households and ethnic minorities, tend to concentrate in the poorest neighbourhoods
in the case of modest public interventions, for example through various interventions
that stem from social policy and housing policy (Scarpa 2016). The higher the level
of income inequality, the more difficult it is for people with low incomes and their
children to fully realise their abilities and skills, and to undertake upward social
mobility (Krueger 2012) and upward residential mobility (Nieuwenhuis et al. 2020).
Although the exact mechanisms that link inequality and segregation may be
complex (Fujita and Maloutas 2016; Tammaru et al. 2020; Musterd 2020); there
seems to be a regularity that societies with high levels of inequality may become less
dynamic with petrified class structures as the fortunes of children depend heavily
on the fortunes of their parents (Arundel 2017; Hochstenbach and Boterman 2017;
Nieuwenhuis et al. 2020). Low income and spatial clustering of vulnerable popula-
tion groups may lead to the vicious circle of segregation, also across generations, as
social and spatial disadvantage is passed from parents to children (van Ham et al.
2018). High levels of residential segregation between socioeconomic groups tend to
be related to liberal societies (Tammaru et al. 2016a, b).
The vicious circle of segregation may evolve, operating as follows. Money buys
choice on the housing market and it tends to sort people with different incomes
to different neighbourhoods (Hulchansky 2010). Living in certain neighbourhoods
may limit job opportunities, as claimed by the spatial mismatch hypothesis (Kain
1968). According to neighbourhood effects research, living in certain neighbour-
hoods affects many other individual outcomes, ranging from the labour market to
health (Johnston et al. 2005; Wilson 1987). Neighbourhood effects may run also
across generations (Hedman and van Ham 2021). For example, when schools are
neighbourhood based, sorting of parents into certain houses and neighbourhoods
shapes the sorting of children into schools (Boterman et al. 2019). Schools are places
where children get both academic and non-academic knowledge, where values form
and friends are made. Evidence shows that schools located in high-income neigh-
bourhoods tend to have better academic achievements than in those of low-income
neighbourhoods (Owens and Candipan 2019). The differences that evolve at schools
tend to lead to differences in labour market outcomes that, in turn, shape housing
choice.
High levels of inequalitymay cause social problems.However, aiming to eliminate
inequalitymay also be detrimental to individual lives. Post-WorldWar II experiments
in centrally planned European countries did lead to high levels of equality as well as
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to low levels of segregation (Tammaru et al. 2016a, b). These experiments revealed
the disadvantages of socially flat and residentially mixed societies. For example,
cities became less dynamic, less diverse and dull places to live in (Szelenyi 1996).
Hence, widespread public interventions in all domains of society can reduce income
inequality and residential segregation but can also result in low levels of motiva-
tion to achieve. Consequently, the economy can lack dynamism, leading to sluggish
growth and low productivity (Kornai 1992). Hence, it seems that both extreme levels
of inequality and extreme levels of equality may have negative consequences on
individuals, cities and societies.
The current chapter aims to provide an overview of trends in socio-economic
residential segregation in European cities and to investigate the extent to which these
trends are related to different levels of income inequality. The chapter draws on
earlier work by Tammaru et al. (2016a, b) based on the cities of Amsterdam, Athens,
Budapest, Helsinki, London, Madrid, Milan, Oslo, Prague, Riga, Tallinn, Stockholm
and Vilnius. We have also included Helsinki in our analysis.
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section reviews the literature on the
interplay between income inequality and segregation. This is followed by a section
on data and methods. The study employs data on income inequality from the years
1990, 2000 and 2010, and data on residential segregation from2000 and 2010 in order
to account for possible lagged effects between changes in the two variables. We then
present themainfindings.We start our analysiswith a discussion of income inequality
based on the Gini Index. We then proceed with the analysis of segregation in form
of the Dissimilarity Index by measuring the difference in the distribution of top and
bottom socioeconomic groups across urban neighbourhoods. The chapter ends with
an analysis that explores the link between income inequality and segregation by
lagging the Gini Index 10 years (being measured in 1990, 2000) compared to the
Dissimilarity Index (measured in 2000 and 2010). We do not focus on the potential
reverse relationship: i.e. the potential for segregation to cause income inequality to
increase (Cutler and Glaeser 1997).
3.1.1 Link Between Income Inequality and Residential
Segregation
The focus of this chapter is on the link between income inequality and residential
segregation between the top and bottom socioeconomic groups. There are several
mechanisms that connect income inequality and residential segregation (Tammaru
et al. 2020):
(1) changes in household numbers that affect the distribution of top and bottom
socioeconomic groups over neighbourhoods (population shrinkage or growth,
natural change, immigration);
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(2) the geography of housing and its differentiation, attracting, forcing or
constraining the residential mobility of households earning different incomes,
and
(3) residential mobility of top and bottom socioeconomic groups within urban
regions (people change residential neighbourhoods because their incomes
increase or decrease).
Changes in the Distribution of High- and Low-Income Occupations
Since the seminal work by Sassen (1991), debates on changing labour markets, and
how they are affected by globalisation and migration, revolve around issues of social
polarisation and professionalization (Hamnett 2020; vanHamet al. 2020). According
to Sassen (1991), globalisation is the driving force for social polarisation. Highly
skilled professionals, especially in advanced business services and in the technology
sector, are able to sell their labour globally to large multi-national companies. Coun-
tries, cities and companies compete for talent, pushing up their wages. Knowledge-
intensive systems and technological advancements have become complementary
tools for performing tasks for highly skilled professionals, contributing to an increase
in their productivity (Autor et al. 2001; Cirillo 2017). Low skilled workers in devel-
oped countries compete with workers in developing countries, which limits their
wage growth. Professionalisation implies that, over time, a trend for strong upward
mobility across the available workforce can take place alongside an overall improve-
ment of education in each subsequent generation (Hamnett 1994). Hence, even if
some polarization takes place, it is a secondary process, while professionalization or
overall upward occupational and income mobility is the main trend (Hamnett 2020;
van Ham et al. 2020).
The Geography of Housing
Residential segregation is structured by the availability of different types of housing
in different parts of a city. When different types of housing (by tenure and price) are
located in particular types of neighbourhood, the result will be residential segregation
by income (Tammaru et al. 2016a, b; Musterd et al. 2017). School segregation is
strongly related to residential segregation, for a recent overview, see Boterman et al.
(2019). Labourmarket segregation is related to skills and education and so, over time,
an inter-generational vicious circle of segregation may start to operate, leading to an
overlap between social and spatial disadvantage (vanHamet al. 2018).Housing forms
one of the key elements in this spiral of segregation since housing is often the most
expensive ‘good’ that people buy in their lifetime.Money buys choice on the housing
market, but housing choice also determines location, schooling and opportunities.
As young people increasingly rely on their parents for help in entering the housing
market, there is an inter-generational dimension not only in educational and labour
market disadvantage but also in housing market disadvantage (Hochstenbach and
Musterd 2018).
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Residential Mobility of High- and Low-Income Families
Residential sorting hinges also on residential preferences that may both contribute
to higher levels of residential segregation, or to temporarily lower levels of segre-
gation. Two spatial mega-trends seem to have started within European cities: one
related to the gentrification of the rich and the other to the suburbanisation of the
poor (Hochstenbach and Musterd 2018; van Ham et al. 2020). As a consequence of
these trends, we generally see growing levels of segregation between the rich and
poor both in European cities (Tammaru et al. 2016a, b) as well as elsewhere in the
world (van Ham et al. 2020; Musterd 2020). House values have risen quickly in
attractive inner-city neighbourhoods so that such housing in these areas is beyond
the reach of most urban residents. However, the relationship between inequality and
socio-economic segregation is characterised by a time lag (Marcińczak et al. 2016).
Likewise resorting to high- and low-incomehouseholds across neighbourhoods—e.g.
at times of gentrification—can cause temporary mixing of income groups, lowering
rather than increasing levels of segregation (Musterd and van Gent 2016; Tammaru
et al. 2016a, b). As a result of time lags and mixing, it may take even several
decades before a rise in income inequality starts to contribute to the rise of residential
segregation (Wessel 2016).
3.2 Data and Methods
The data sample for this chapter derives from the edited book project ‘Socio-
Economic Segregation in European Cities: East Meets West’ (Tammaru et al. 2016a,
b). We are very grateful to all the researchers that participated in this book project,
and the help we received in solving the various challenges of achieving a compar-
ative dataset. First, we had two different variables for measuring socio-economic
status, occupation and income. Where census data were available, we had to rely on
occupation (Athens, Budapest, Madrid, Milan, London, Prague, Riga). In countries
that use register data, we relied on income (Amsterdam, Oslo, Helsinki and Stock-
holm) and we compare people who belong to the first- and fifth-income quintile in
calculating the Dissimilarity Index. In all other cities, census data on occupations
are used. We used the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO)
to define the main occupational groups. These are managers, senior officials and
legislators; professionals; technicians and associate professionals; clerks; service
and sales workers; craft and related trades workers; plant and machine operators,
and assemblers; and elementary occupations. We compare managers and elementary
occupations in calculating the Dissimilarity Index. Occupation and income are obvi-
ously not the same concepts but they are related and, as a rule of thumb, the higher
the job in the occupational ladder the higher the income (Tammaru et al. 2016a, b).
The study is based on data from the 2000 and 2010 census rounds. Cities are
defined as a common housing market with a continuous built-up area. We calculated
the Dissimilarity Index between the top and bottom occupational/income groups at
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both census dates. We then contrasted the values of the Dissimilarity Index with the
national level Gini Index since Gini Index values are not available for us at the city
level. As a rule of thumb, inequalities in large cities tend to be higher than national
averages,which implies that in using country-level estimates,weunderestimate levels
of inequality of the cities in our study.
Our main interest lies in the relationship between changes in the Gini Index and
changes in the Dissimilarity Index. We measured the Gini Index 10 years earlier
than the Dissimilarity Index since transmission of changes in income inequality to
changes in residential segregation are likely to take some time (Tammaru et al. 2020).
We explored the relationship between city-level Dissimilarity Index values in 2000
and Gini Index levels in 1990, and the relationship between city-level Dissimilarity
Index values in 2010 and Gini Index levels in 2000. As Eurostat does not provide
historical Gini Index estimates, we relied on harmonised Gini Index values produced
by Tóth (2013). We should be aware of the different starting positions for cities in
Eastern Europe and across the rest of Europe. The year 1990 is especially relevant
in this respect as it is statistically less than 1 year before or after regime changes
in various Eastern European countries. Processes of inequality change had already
been operating across the rest of Europe for some time before this. We should also
bear in mind that the changes that took place in the built environment and segregation
were significantly slower than those which took place within economic structures
and income inequality in Eastern Europe in the 1990s (Marcińczak et al. 2015).
We consequently assume that levels of residential segregation in Eastern Europe
were still low in 2000, reflecting the patterns inherited from the period of central
planning. However, due to the growth of inequality in the 1990s in Eastern Europe,
we expected to see a significant increase in levels of residential segregation by 2010.
In other words, we expected to find a similarly strong relationship between levels
of lagged income inequality measured in 2000 and levels of residential segregation
measured in 2010.
3.3 Findings: Income Inequality and Residential
Segregation in Europe
3.3.1 Changes in the Level of Income Inequality
The value of the Gini Index measuring income inequality is higher than 35 in most
world countries.Within Europe, however, Gini Index values tend to be lower than 35.
In 1990, there was a clear geographic pattern in Gini Index values, with the lowest
values in Northern and Eastern Europe, and the highest in Southern and Western
Europe (Fig. 3.1). We can also observe that income inequalities grew across Europe
in the 1990s or immediately after the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of
the Soviet Union (Vihalemm et al. 2017). However, the growth in inequality varies
considerably from country to country, and it is important to distinguish between
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Fig. 3.1 Change in income inequality in selected European countries (Reproduced fromTóth 2013)
levels and changes in Gini Index in understanding the link between income and
segregation. In some countries, most notably in the UK and in Greece, levels of
income inequality are high with very little change over the observed period. By
contrast, levels of income inequality are low and with very little change in Norway
and the Czech Republic. Other countries show different trajectories of change in
income inequality, with some shifting from low inequality categories to the group
of high inequality countries. The most notable examples occur across the formerly
centrally planned countries of Eastern Europe.
Eastern European countries underwent political, social and economic transfor-
mations in the 1990s, and this brought about major changes in income distribution.
Nevertheless, there were important differences between these countries. Across the
former Soviet Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the Gini Index increased
more than it did in the Visegrad countries, such as Hungary and the Czech Republic,
which are included in this study. The very modest increase in income inequality was
in the Czech Republic, which had the highest GDP per capita in the East before the
political transformations, and the smallest decrease in GDP per capita in the 1990s
(Tammaru et al. 2017) is especially notable. Interestingly, despite very complex
reforms that included a transformation from central planning to a market economy
within a democratic system, the Gini Index values initially increased moderately in
Eastern Europe.
Under the influence of the newly introduced market system in Eastern Europe,
the ideological value of blue-collar workers jobs and compressed wage structures
under central planning was replaced by increased poverty and by increased returns to
education in the 1990s (Brainerd 1998; Ladanyi and Szelenyi 2000; Stephens et al.
2015). Blue-collar workers lost their previous high social status, while young people
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born in the 1960s, and entering the labour market were among those who gained
the most from the transitions, alongside members of the old elite (Helemäe et al.
2000;Węcławowicz 1998). Those who occupied better quality housing under central
planning systems received the immediate rewards of housing privatisation that took
place in the 1990s (Stephens et al. 2015).With time, these initial structures of housing
inequality changes as those who benefitted more from economic restructuring and
new opportunities on the labour market started to shape also the dynamics of the
housing market, leading also to new forms of residential segregation (Kovács 2020;
Tammaru et al. 2016; van Ham et al. 2018).
To conclude, three important messages arise from the analysis of the changes
in income inequality in Europe since 1990s: (a) there has been a growth in income
inequality; (b) the increase was especially rapid during the 1990s and (c) the formerly
clear differences between the East and West became increasingly blurred. In this
context, we are especially interested in how the levels of income inequality and
changes in inequality correspond to levels and changes in socioeconomic residen-
tial segregation. Following the recent study by Tammaru et al. (2020), our guiding
hypothesis for the analysis is as follows: we expect to find that levels of residential
segregation correspond with levels of income inequality 10 years earlier. Since we
have to rely on census data, we use a 10-year time lag in our analysis.
3.3.2 Levels and Changes in Residential Segregation
We start our analysis of residential segregation by plotting the values of the Dissim-
ilarity Index between the top and bottom socioeconomic groups in 2001 and 2011
or at the time of the two last censuses in Fig. 3.2. To put the values in perspective,
Marcińczak et al. (2015) suggest that the values of the Dissimilarity Index between
socioeconomic groups can be interpreted as follows: values that are smaller than 20
can be interpreted as being low, and values that are 40 and higher can be considered
being high. In this perspective, our first finding is that all the cities studied were
characterised by medium levels of segregation in 2000. The only exception is Milan
with a Dissimilarity Index above 40. The other most segregated cities in 2000 were
London and Amsterdam. Our second finding relates to the geography of segregation
in European cities in 2000 that corresponds to the level of income inequality in 1990.
Eastern and Northern European cities are the least segregated, and Southern and
Western European cities are the most segregated. More specifically, in our panel of
cities, Oslo and Riga are the least segregated, and Amsterdam, Madrid and London
are the most segregated.
Our third finding is that levels of segregation between top and bottom socioe-
conomic groups grew between the 2000 and 2011 census rounds, with Amsterdam
as the only exception. As a consequence, the Dissimilarity Index reached the value
of 40 and higher in five cities, Stockholm, London, Milan, Tallinn and Madrid, all
belonging to different European macro-regions. In other words, while Milan and
London already had high levels of segregation in 2000 and, hence changes in the
3 Income Inequality and Residential Segregation in European Cities 47
Fig. 3.2 Levels of residential segregation between the top and bottom socioeconomic groups in
the panel of European cities, 2000 and 2010 (Tammaru et al. 2016a, b)
level of segregation between 2001 and 2011 were small, the rise of segregation was
especially high in Stockholm, Tallinn andMadrid. Although different, the three cities
with the most rapid increase in residential segregation in the 2000s shared a strong
new housing construction boom in the 2000s before the housing sector collapsed in
the 2008/2009 recession. New housing construction for the affluent tends to elevate
levels of segregation. There are other more city-specific factors contributing to rising
levels of segregation. Both in Stockholm and Tallinn, big and compact clusters
of modernist blocks of high-rise housing can be found. As higher income groups
move into newer and/or better housing, low-income groups are constrained to the
areas where housing is most affordable. Immigrants and ethnic minorities are over-
represented in Stockholm and Tallin respectively. The arrival of large numbers of
immigrants and refugees earning lower incomes has led to the strong overlap between
ethnic and social segregation (Andersson and Kährik 2016).
The question, of why expectedly similar cities—e.g. the Baltic cities of Riga,
Tallinn and Vilnius or the Nordic cities of Helsinki, Oslo and Stockholm—have
showndifferent trajectories of change, is intriguing. Tallinn showsmuch higher levels
of segregation in 2010 than Riga, yet these cities are very similar when it comes to
history, economic structure, patterns of urban development and population compo-
sition (Krišjāne et al. 2016; Valatka et al. 2016). Both Tallinn and Riga belonged to
the Soviet Union, underwent radical political, economic and social transformations
in the 1990s that culminated in European Union membership in 2004, and both have
sizeable Russian-speaking minority populations. Tammaru (Tammaru et al. 2017)
explains the differences in the speed of economic recovery from the economic crises
of the 1990s. Recovery was far more rapid in Tallinn compared to both Riga and
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Vilnius. There was also a strong overlap between ethnic and income inequality in
Estonia. One effect of more rapid economic recovery was a private house building
boom in Tallinn where homeownership increases alongside weak housing policy and
high levels of income inequality, new housing construction tends to quickly elevate
levels of segregation. In a market dominated context, new housing is accessible only
for higher-earning households.
Differences in the growth of segregation levels between Nordic cities also warrant
some attention. Oslo is the least segregated city with very modest growth in levels
of segregation despite the fact that its housing sector has been market-dominated for
decades. In Norway, the growth in income inequality has been low and the effects
on segregation have been small and with a significant time lag. The oil-rich country
has abundant resources for effective income redistribution policies (Wessel 2016).
Helsinki and Stockholm are interesting comparison cities with moderate segregation
levels in Helsinki andwith only a small increase over time. Segregation in Stockholm
is much higher after a strong increase between 2000 and 2010. The two cities differ
from each other in important ways. First, Stockholm is bigger and more globally
connected than Helsinki. Previous research shows that there are higher levels of
segregation as a result of globalisation (Musterd et al. 2017). Second, and partly
related to the first factor, Stockholm has been longer exposed to immigration. There
is a growing overlap between social, ethnic and residential patterns in Stockholm,
with low income and minority households over-represented in large housing estates
that provide the most affordable housing (Andersson and Bråmå 2018).
Third, market principles have been introduced to Stockholm’s housing market
at a much quicker pace compared to Helsinki that still pursues active housing mix
policies (Andersson and Kährik 2016; Dhalmann and Vilkama 2009; Eskelä 2018).
Amsterdam is also an interesting case, as this is the only city that experienced a
drop in segregation levels. According to Musterd and van Gent (2016), the under-
lying mechanisms affecting residential sorting are very similar in Amsterdam to all
other cities studied. The two main trends within residential mobility in the city are
the gentrification of high-income households and suburbanisation of low-income
households (Hochstenbach andMusterd 2018). The opposite direction of the change
in income inequality and residential segregation has been explained by the segre-
gation paradox; when the residential preferences of high-income households shift
towards previously low-income neighbourhoods—as is characteristic of the gentri-
fication process—a temporary mixing of income groups will follow (van Ham et al.
2020). This may reduce rather than increase the level of segregation, resulting in
neighbourhoods where people with different incomes live together. However, over
time, levels of segregation may start to rise and lower-income households begin to
move from gentrifying neighbourhoods as house prices rise and wealthier people
move in (Musterd and van Gent 2016).
In our earlier study, we found only a weak correlation between levels of income
inequality and levels of residential segregation (Musterd et al. 2017; Tammaru et al.
2016a, b). In this paper, we introduce a time-lag between the two processes by
contrasting graphically levels of the Dissimilarity Index with levels of the Gini Index
10 years earlier. A previous analysis by Tammaru (Tammaru et al. 2020) across
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Fig. 3.3 Relationship between levels of income inequality (lagged 10 years) and residential
segregation in European cities
Northern and Southern European countries showed that by lagging the two variables,
their correlation becomes much stronger. Both the increase and decrease in income
inequality relate to the increase and decrease in residential segregation 10 years later.
The same holds true across our sample of 13 European cities at the two time-points
used in our data analysis.
A positive correlation emerges from contrasting the Gini Index in 1990 with the
Dissimilarity Index in 2000 (Fig. 3.3). In Prague, Oslo and Riga, income inequality
was low in 1990 and residential segregation was low in 2000. In fact, Eastern Euro-
pean cities, shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, did not show any corre-
lation between inequality and segregation. This holds equally for Baltic cities that
later were labelled ‘liberal’, as it does for cities which at that time were still firmly
social-democratic. In London, income inequality was highest in 1990 and residential
segregation was highest in 2000. Other cities fall in-between. Stockholm deviates
the most from this pattern. Levels of segregation in 2000 were somewhat higher
than levels of income inequality would predict in 1990. Clearer positive correlations
emerge when we contrast the Gini Index in 2000 with the Dissimilarity Index in
2010.
The spread in the upper end of the graph has increased somewhat, but when we
consider the relation between lagged inequality and segregation for each of the three
welfare regime types separately, we see three positive relations. The so-called liberal
cities that reached relatively high levels of income inequality in 2000 show only
moderately higher increases of levels of segregation—yet these are still increasing.
Riga shows the most significant deviation where the level of residential segregation
in 2010 is much lower than the 2000 level of income inequality would predict. Riga
is an interesting case in this regard as in the 2000s, after joining the European Union,
it has witnessed the highest level of emigration in our selection of cities. Migration
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in and out of a city, especially when on a massive scale, may intervene with the
process of residential segregation (Bailey et al. 2017) At the other extreme, levels of
residential segregation are higher in Madrid than one would predict from the level
of income inequality in 2000. One of the reasons for this may relate to the extreme
housing boom in Spain in the 2000s, partly supported by tourism and second-home
buyers from across the world, which could distort the relationship.
3.4 Conclusions and Future Research Avenues
In this chapter, we reviewed the relationship between income inequality and socio-
economic segregation. We find that, in general, changes in segregation levels follow
changes in inequality with a time lag. Change in levels of inequality leads to a change
in levels of segregation 10 years later. Low levels of income inequality relate to low
levels of segregation after 10 years, and high levels of inequality relate to high levels
of segregation after 10 years. However, these findings need further research to address
a number of limitations in our analysis.
First, our data do not allow for a more nuanced analysis of the length of the time
lag. We use a 10-year time interval since this is determined by census interval and
our ability to use only two census years. For example, the study by Wessel (2016)
that used a longer time horizon for Oslo shows that the time needed for changes
in inequality to changes in segregation maybe even longer, perhaps two decades
or more. It may also be that changes evolve quickly in some cities. This happened
in Tallinn at a time of rapid transformation from a centrally planned society to a
market-based one (Tammaru et al. 2016a, b).
Second, comparative analysis over time and space always raises concerns
regarding data comparability. The Gini Index may be calculated in different ways
that yield very different outcomes, due to differences in how the tax redistribution is
considered, for example (Hellebrandt andMauro 2015). Moreover, the calculation of
Dissimilarity Index is sensitive to the spatial units used. Therefore, further compara-
tive studies are needed that focus on segregation at different spatial scales and spatial
configurations and how it varies from city-to-city. Furthermore, the Dissimilarity
Index is spatially blind and, hence, may hide more than it reveals. For example,
stability of the Dissimilarity Index over decades may mask dramatic changes in the
geography of segregation as low- and high-income group sort over houses and neigh-
bourhoods (van Ham et al. 2020). In the course of residential sorting, as a result of
gentrification of inner-city neighbourhoods, for example, various forms of mixing
and separation may occur at different spatial scales, with the outcome that city-wide
measures of segregation such as Dissimilarity Index hardly change.
Third, the finding that a change in inequality leads to a change in segregation is
not necessarily causal. It may be that other factors drive levels of segregation that are
correlated with inequality. Most importantly, in Europe, immigration is an important
intervening factor. Immigrants are more likely to work in lower-income occupations.
Hence, the arrival of large numbers of migrants may increase both income inequality
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and residential segregation.Large, economically dynamic urban areas are particularly
likely to attract migrants, leading to both increased inequality and increased segrega-
tion (Glaeser 2008). Other mechanisms may be related to inequality and segregation
in a co-evolutionary way. Segregation exacerbates inequality via spatial opportunity
structures (Galster and Sharkey 2017) and through the importance of housing in the
overall degree of social stratification (Tammaru et al. 2017). For example, living in
certain neighbourhoods affects opportunities to find a job and as well as access to
school for children. As a result, the neighbourhood of residence is not only affected
by inequality but is also an inherent part of inequality in modern urban societies,
with residential advantage and disadvantage being passed from parents to children.
To conclude, our study found a strong correlation between residential socioeco-
nomic segregation and levels of income inequality observed 10 years earlier. Future
studies are needed to shed light on the causal and co-evolutionary characteristics
of this relationship, and the inter-generational connection between inequality and
segregation.
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Part II
Urban Inequality and Segregation in China
Chapter 4
Research on Residential Segregation
in Chinese Cities
Yu Chen and Jie Chen
Abstract This chapter provides an overview of research on the evolution of resi-
dential segregation in Chinese cities since the establishment of the People’s Republic
of China. There were almost no discernible patterns of segregation during the
central planning period, largely due to the socialist work-unit systems and the de-
commodification of land and housing. Since the initiation of economic reforms in
1978, Chinese cities have witnessed significant spatial divisions across socioeco-
nomic groups, driven by forces such as rapid economic and spatial restructuring,
market-oriented housing and land reforms, and massive rural-to-urban migration.
Residents of similar socio-economic status tend to cluster in the same neighbour-
hoods, with the elite moving to expensive gated communities and the urban poor to
dilapidated residential areas. The impacts of segregation on residents’ social contacts
and labour market outcomes are profound and long-lasting. While social segregation
is regarded as a widespread urban phenomenon worldwide, the causes and conse-
quences of segregation in Chinese cities should be interpreted within the country’s
specific historical, social, cultural and institutional contexts.
Keywords Residential segregation · Urban transformation · China · Cities ·
Transitional society
4.1 Introduction
In common with other transitional societies, China has experienced significant trans-
formations of urban landscapes during the shift from a centrally planned economy to
a market one. Before 1978, most urban residents were employed in work units and
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lived in houses allocated by these units in relatively stable and homogenous neigh-
bourhoods close to workplaces (Wang andMurie 1999). Cities were characterised by
mixed neighbourhoods without discernible patterns of segregation (Bray 2005; Lo
1994). The subsequent economic reforms have resulted in significant socio-economic
stratification and spatial divisions (Li andWu2008).Housing reforms privatisedmost
work-unit housing and facilitated the development of a booming real estate market,
which provided options forwealthy people to purchase commercial properties of high
quality, leading to income-based spatial sorting (see Chap. 12 on residential sorting
and Chap. 9 on housing market reform). Land reforms resulted in unprecedented
urban sprawl, creating new industrial zones and residential compounds in suburban
areas. Urban renewal projects have tended to gentrify the city centre leading to the
relocation of millions of residents to suburban areas either voluntarily or against
their will. Meanwhile, a large number of migrants have moved to cities to seek job
opportunities and a better life. Most of them are concentrated in low-skilled jobs and
live in poorer areas or migrant enclaves. Urban neighbourhoods have shifted from
being ‘work-based’ to ‘residence-based’ and from mixed communities to those of
residents of similar socio-economic status (Wang 2000).
Numerous studies have examined the causes, processes, extent and consequences
of urban segregation in China (Li andWu 2008;Wu et al. 2014; Liu et al. 2019; Shen
and Xiao 2019). This chapter aims to provide an overview of research on residential
segregation in Chinese cities, with the focus on both the driving forces behind it
as well as its profound impacts on society. Segregation refers to ‘the processes of
social differentiation and the resulting unequal distribution of population groups
across space’ (Madrazo and van Kempen 2012, p. 159; see also further discussion of
segregation concepts in Chaps. 2 and 10). As the geographic distribution of resources
and opportunities is unevenly distributed, segregation is likely to influence people’s
access to resources, and subsequently their contact with other social groups, social
networks and labourmarket opportunities. An overview of existing knowledge on the
driving forces, extent and consequences of segregation in Chinese cities can provide
rich insights into the life experiences of urbandwellers during the transitional process.
It is also useful to predict the future trends of urban transformations inChina to inform
policy development.
Levels of urban segregation have been researched in various countries and are
generally agreed to be a widespread global phenomenon. The extent and nature
of such segregation vary according to the particular groups affected, the way it is
measured and the historical, cultural and institutional contexts. In this chapter, we
first provide background information by discussing neighbourhood arrangements in
China’s central planning period (1949–1978). Thenwe proceed to discuss the driving
forces of neighbourhood changes and segregation during the reform era (post-1978).
This is followed by a review of the extent andmeasurement of segregation in Chinese
cities. Finally, we explore the consequences of urban segregation in terms of social
contact and labour market outcomes in the specific context of Chinese transitional
cities.
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4.2 Urban Segregation During the Central Planning Period
During the central planning period, the government’s egalitarian policies tried to
reduce socio-economic inequalities and to create a ‘classless’ urban society (Wu and
Li 2005). The majority of urban workers was employed in work units, which were
social organisations established under state socialism to provide employees not only
with lifetime jobs but also a comprehensive package of social benefits and services
including nursery, medical care and pension (Bray 2005). The metaphorical term
‘iron rice bowl’ was coined to indicate the continuity and stability of state employ-
ment. Income differences were minimal. Cities were characterised by a high degree
of social homogeneity, a work-unit-based cellular structure, and mixed neighbour-
hoods without noticeable patterns of spatial segregation (Lo 1994). There was no
private land or housing market. All urban land belonged to the state and was allo-
cated to various land users according to the central planning system. Housing was
regarded as a form of social welfare. The de-commodification of housing and land, an
embodiment of a centrally planned economy, is said to be shaped by both ideological
considerations and development strategies (Chen and Han 2014).
In the early 1950s, many private houses were transferred to local governments as
part of the nationalised wealth redistribution process. Themajority of urban residents
lived in houses allocated by theirwork units,whichwere responsible for constructing,
allocating and maintaining accommodation. Work-unit housing accounted for about
60% of the total urban housing stock in 1978, a figure much higher than that in
former socialist countries such as Hungary (Kirkby 1985). The municipal housing
bureaux provided housing to those few who did not have a work unit. Only 20–
25% of the urban housing stock was owner-occupied (Huang 2004). Most work-unit
housing was constructed near workplaces, forming cellular neighbourhoods. They
became self-contained spatial units with mixed land use for workplace, residential
areas and social services such as nursery and medical centres. Jobs and housing
were, therefore, linked together, enabling workers to minimise their journey to work.
Housing costs formed part of the total costs of the work unit who then bargained with
their supervisory government agents for investment to develop and manage housing.
Work-unit compounds provided the basic urban structure of a socialist city. Their
spatial distribution relied on urban land use under the central planning system.Within
each work-unit compound, housing allocation was based on non-pecuniary criteria
such as seniority, rank and family needs (Wang and Murie 1999). Managers and
workers, regardless of their occupation and social status, lived in the same residen-
tial areas close to their workplace. As a consequence, people’s residential locations
depended on proximity to the workplace rather than personal characteristics such
as income (Logan et al. 2009). It is claimed that ‘social areas in the pre-reform era
were mainly built upon different land uses rather than social stratification’ (Li and
Wu 2008, p. 406).
Despite the socialist ideology, there were inequalities among work units, which
differed according to their economic and political strength. Those producing strategic
products for the state (e.g. large steel companies) or those with higher administrative
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ranking (e.g. provincial-level state-owned enterprises) had more bargaining powers
when they negotiated with supervisory government agents for resources and invest-
ments. They, therefore, had a greater capacity for investment in housing within their
work-unit compounds. Powerful work units provided better facilities and residential
environments for their employees, while others, such as smaller units or those with
performance problems, might experience housing shortage and deterioration. It is
apparent that during the central planning period, housing inequalities between work
units exceeded those within work units (Wang 2000). Despite this, workers in the
same work unit lived in the same residential area and were spatially mixed—that is,
workers of different rank were not segregated by their residential location. Spatial
segregation was limited though it is hard to say whether there were other forms of
segregation as described in Chap. 2, such as friendship stratification by social status.
4.3 Socio-Spatial Differentiation and the Driving Forces
After 1978
Chinese cities experienced dramatic transformation and socio-spatial differentiation
since the initiation of the economic reforms in 1978. This has significantly changed
the socialist egalitarian allocation of urban space, with emerging segregation among
different social groups. Economic reforms have increased income disparity (Bian
and Zhang 2002). Whilst the middle class and the elite have been on the rise, a
significant group of urban poor has emerged. Jobs were no longer allocated by the
government. Millions of workers were laid off from state-owned enterprises as a
result of economic restructuring. Rural migrants who moved to cities to work in low-
skilled jobs also swelled the ranks of the urban poor (Wu et al. 2013). Accordingly,
a new social-spatial structure has emerged with the elite concentrated in expensive
gated communities and the urban poor in run-downneighbourhoods such as oldwork-
unit compounds, residential areas awaiting regeneration and urban villages (Huang
2004; see alsoChap. 6). It iswidely acknowledged that socioeconomic status, housing
market discrimination and economic restructuring are themain drivers of segregation
inWestern cities (Madrazo andVanKempen 2012). In theChinese context, the role of
institutional factors has been highlighted as one of themajor drivers in shaping socio-
spatial segregation. Scholars agree that segregation results from the joint efforts of
market forces and institutions (Li and Wu 2008; He 2010). Such institutional factors
include housing reforms, the land system and the household registration (hukou)
system, all of which significantly influence individuals’ access to social services,
resources and opportunities.
China’s housing system has experienced significant changes as a result of pro-
market housing reforms, which promote homeownership and stratify the socio-
economic structure (Wang and Murie 1999; Huang 2004). Housing reforms initi-
ated in the early 1980s aimed to establish a functional housing market by privatising
existing work unit housing stock and developing a real estate market. Through a
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process of trial and error in selected cities, housing privatisation was gradually rolled
out across the country where existing work unit housing was sold to occupants at
a heavily discounted price. The construction and allocation of work-unit housing
coexisted with commercial properties until 1998 when the welfare distribution of
housing was abolished. Since then, most people who were not allocated a house
through their work unit have had to purchase housing via the market. However, some
large and powerful work units, such as government and public institutions, continue
building or providing subsidised housing to their key workers, resulting in persistent
patterns of residential stratification. The housing privatisation process led to enor-
mous housing inequality. People who enjoyed better-allocated housing before 1998,
including those with higher political ranks in work units, gained more benefits by
purchasing their property at a low price (Wang 2000). A subsequent booming housing
market has further exacerbated housing differentiation and inequality (Logan et al.
2009). The market provides more housing choices, including high-quality commer-
cial properties with access to improved facilities and infrastructure. People with high
income thenmove away from their previouswork-unit compounds or run-down areas
to high-quality housing, leaving those who were unable to move in poorer residen-
tial areas. Rising house prices in many cities has led to serious housing affordability
problems. In contrast with the rapid development of a real estate market (Chap. 9),
the subsidised housing sector targeting low- and moderate-income households has
lagged behind. The government has introduced mitigating schemes, such as the
Economic andComfortableHousing and theAffordableRentalHousing programmes
(Huang 2012). However, both governments and real estate developers are reluctant to
construct subsidised housing due to its low profitability and its great drain on public
finance. Many subsidised housing units are located in suburban areas without suffi-
cient public facilities and services. They become less desirable residential areas. The
housing reforms have resulted in clusters of residents with similar socio-economic
status becoming concentrated in certain neighbourhoods.
Along with the housing reforms, an urban land market has gradually evolved, as
the government separates the ownership and use rights of urban land. This enables
entrepreneurial urban governments to take control of land under their jurisdiction
and to lease land use rights to finance local urban development. Many cities have
experienced rapid urban sprawl, with new industrial zones and residential housing in
suburban areas, to take advantage of cheaper land there. Urban sprawl inChina differs
from the pattern in the USA where residential sorting results in a decayed city centre
surrounded by affluent suburbs. In the Chinese context, local urban governments
play an important role in promoting urban land sprawl in order to develop the local
economy. However, in many cases, they fail to synchronise the development of high-
quality facilities and services such as hospitals and schools, which remain located in
the city centre (Chen and Yeh 2019). Suburban living is associated with low service
accessibility, especially for people without cars.
In the meantime, neighbourhoods in the inner city have witnessed enormous
physical and socio-economic changes. A large number of new buildings have been
constructed since the mid-1980s, and now form the majority of the current urban
housing stock (Li and Huang 2006). Massive urban renewal projects demolished
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many work-unit compounds and neighbourhoods of pre-1949 origin and replaced
them with glossy offices and luxurious apartments. For example, 280,000 homes in
inner city Beijing were torn down in the 1990s, and 605,000 more were demolished
in the 2000s (Liu and Wong 2015). Numerous residents lost their original homes
and had to be accommodated elsewhere. Those who could not afford commercial
properties in their original location were forced to move to resettlement housing in
the city fringe with poor amenities (Fang 2006). Many urban renewal projects have
gentrified the city centre and significantly changed the socio-economic composition
of residents in those neighbourhoods (He 2010).
Since 1978, hundreds of millions of migrants have moved from their places of
origin into the cities to seek jobs and a better life. Three quarters of them originate
from the countryside. As they lack local household registration (hukou) status, they
face many barriers and constraints. The hukou system, implemented in 1958, is
a social control measure that requires all Chinese citizens to register with either
agricultural or non-agricultural hukou status in a particular place inherited from their
parents. Holders of hukou registration in different places are entitled to different
social benefits and services. Those with local urban hukou status have access to better
public services than migrants, and residents in larger cities are entitled to even better
services (e.g. high-quality health and education) than those in smaller cities (Chan
2009). Despite the gradual relaxation of migration control and years of reforms of
the hukou system, most migrants are unable to get local hukou status after they have
moved to live and work in the city. Without local urban hukou status, migrants are
denied access to many local social benefits and services, such as subsidised housing,
unemployment insurance and even schooling for their children in local authority
schools in some cities (Wu 2002).
There is a huge heterogeneity among migrants in terms of their educational qual-
ifications, skills and career prospects. Many migrants, especially those originating
from the countryside, are concentrated in low-skilled jobs inmanufacturing factories,
construction and service sectors. They live in poor urban neighbourhoods, particu-
larly urban villages, which provide low-cost housing and gradually become enclaves
where migrants develop social networks and create job opportunities. Informal struc-
tures and ambiguities arise around land property rights due to illegal building exten-
sions, lax land management and development control, overcrowding, and informal
and insufficient service provision (Wu et al. 2013). An urban village represents an
example of segregated urban space, which we shall discuss in more detail in the next
section and in Chap. 6.
4.4 The Measurement of Segregation in Chinese Cities
In contrast with segregation studies in Western countries which often focus on race
and ethnicity, segregation in Chinese cities is based on socio-economic status. This
is partly because non-Han ethnic minorities account for a small proportion of the
Chinese population (8.5% in 2015) andmost of them are concentrated in western and
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northern regions (NSB2016).Most studies onurbanChina are conducted in coastal or
large cities where the number of non-Han ethnic minorities is extremely small when
compared with the Han majority. A good range of methods have been employed to
measure segregation in terms of socio-economic status in urban China, including
index-based measurements (e.g. dissimilarity index), profiles of clusters, multi-scale
analysis, activity space analysis and spatial-social network analysis. Studies use
different spatial scales, such as predefined administrative spatial units, i.e. residential
committee (juweihui in Chinese), sub-district (jiedao) and district (qu), as well as
residential blocks.Moreover, individual surveydata are used in activity space analysis
and spatial-social network analysis, as we shall discuss later in this section (see Part
III of the book for proposed new methods in Chinese segregation research). There
is a consensus across existing studies that the level of segregation in Chinese cities
has increased dramatically since the initiation of the economic reforms.
As segregation is usually regarded as a spatial issue, index-based measurements
are widely used in segregation studies to measure the concentration of a particular
group in given spatial units using census data (e.g., Duncan and Duncan 1955; see
methods review inChap. 2). For example, Zhao (2013) uses the census data inBeijing
for 1990, 2000 and 2005 to calculate the indices of social segregation and finds that
residential segregation increased significantly over these years. Wu et al. (2014)
use the 2000 census data at the residential committee level in Nanjing and develop
profiles of residential clusters. Their findings reveal clear patterns of segregation
between affluent and poor social groups. Li and Wu (2008) agree that segregation
of social groups emerged in Chinese cities, though the extent was much lower than
that in the USA or UK. Using 2000 census data in Shanghai, the authors examine the
dissimilarity index in terms of housing tenure, educational attainment, hukou status
and location (centre versus suburb). They find that the most significant residential
segregation was based on housing tenure. This finding is supported by Sun et al.
(2017) who reported significant residential differentiation among different housing
tenure types in the coastal city of Xiamen. Similar conclusions are reached in studies
based on the Western contexts which maintain that housing tenure is significantly
associated with segregation because the supply and location of different housing
types influence people’s housing choices and so lead to the spatial concentration
of specific social groups (van Kempen and van Weesep 1998). However, as Li and
Wu (2008) rightly point out, tenure-based segregation in China in the late 1990s
and early 2000 mainly resulted from pre-existing institutional privileges rather than
households’ housing preferences. A subsequent study by Shen and Xiao (2019)
examined the changes in residential segregation in Shanghai using census data from
2000 and 2010 at the residential committee level. They found the city had become
more divided in terms of socio-economic status over the decade, and significant
segregation existed in terms of educational attainment and hukou status, besides the
division between central and suburban locations. The extent of segregation in terms
of educational attainment exceeded that based on hukou status. While the authors
acknowledge the impact of institutional factors on urban segregation, they argue for
the growing importance of the role of human capital and market forces in shaping
socio-economic segregation.
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Using the 2010 census data at an individual level in Shanghai, Liu et al. (2019)
find the spatial unevenness of the migrant residential distribution is much more
evident in smaller geographic units such as residential committee levels than larger
geographic units: where the top 10% of migrant-concentrated neighbourhoods had a
migrant share higher than 75% and the bottom 10% were at 12% or below. Liu et al.
(2019) also show significant differential patterns of segregation among people with
different hukou status; in particular, rural migrants tend to cluster rather more than
local residents and urban migrants, with most of them concentrated in the outskirts
of the city. The significant differences in residential segregation between migrants
and local residents are also found in the cities of Guangzhou (Liu et al. 2015),Wuhan
(Huang andYi 2009) andShenzhen (Hao2015).Manymigrants live in urban villages,
dilapidated neighbourhoods and factory dormitories, away from local residents.
Besides considering the census data, some studies have examined the spatial
distribution of residents of different socio-economic status usingmore finely-grained
block-level data. Liu et al. (2018b) provide such an example, by using the 2005 and
2010 Beijing Travel Survey, which recorded 24-h travel diaries from 210,000 indi-
viduals in 2005 and 116,000 in 2010. The authors studied the socio-spatial changes
in central Beijing at the scale of Traffic Analysis Zones (TAZs), which are derived
according to the road networks by the Beijing Municipal Commission of Transport.
The spatial scale is similar to the size of a block, much finer than that of a residential
committee. By employing latent class analysis and GIS visualisation, the authors
show that 90% of the blocks in the study had over 10% change in the social stratifi-
cation index of their residents. It is generally agreed that the extent of segregation at
a lower spatial scale tends to be larger than that at a higher one (Duncan and Duncan,
1955; Sun et al. 2017), though recent research has challenged this (Manley et al.
2019).
Segregation may occur in people’s activity space outside home, including the
workplace, shopping and leisure, which are regarded as other anchor points for
daily activities (see Chap. 2). The analysis of segregation based on activity space
represents an alternative method of examining segregation through a people-based
approach rather than the conventional place-based method. The rationale is that
activity space may influence individuals’ use of urban space and facilities as well as
their social contact. Studies have used surveys, travel diaries or participant observa-
tion to examine individuals’ activity space in daily life. For example, Lin andGaubatz
(2017) employ an ethnographic method to record migrants’ daily social and spatial
interactionswith urban spaces, includingwork, shopping, leisure activities and social
contacts in the city of Wenzhou. They find that migrants are constrained in their
activity space as they have limited interaction with local people and little access to
urban amenities beyond their residential area, which is close to their manufacturing
factories. The study echoes findings of various significant patterns of segregation
between migrants and local residents from research work using index-based segre-
gationmeasurements such as RCQ (residential concentration quotient) (e.g. Liu et al.
2019).
Wang et al. (2012) used a travel survey of over l,000 residents in 10 different neigh-
bourhoods in Beijing to examine people’s actual use of space in their daily life for
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residents living both inside and outside privileged gated communities. Their results
show socio-spatial differentiation beyond residential spaces in terms of employment,
consumption patterns, leisure and social relations. A similar conclusion was reached
by Zhou et al. (2015), which examined the out-of-home activities of residents in
Guangzhou and found a significantly different activity space between higher and
lower income groups. Similar patterns have been observed in terms of ethnic segre-
gation. Despite the low dissimilation index indicating residential mixing between
the ethnic minorities and the Han majorities in administrative spatial units, Tan et al.
(2017) revealed significantly different space–time patterns within daily activities
between the Han majority and the Hui minority in the city of Xining in western
China. The authors explain the differences in terms of the particular religious activ-
ities of the Hui minority and Hui women’s limited participation in out-of-home
activities. The results show that the dissimilarity index is likely to underestimate the
actual degree of social segregation.
Similarly, Zhao and Wang (2018) reported different everyday activities between
migrants and local residents in an urban village in Guangzhou, despite the fact that
the two groups lived in exactly the same residential area. Using socio-spatial network
analysis, the authors found that local residents socialise more with other locals, visit
pubs and send their children to publicly funded kindergartens, while migrants have
more contact within their own group, visit roadside food stalls and small chemist
shops and send their children to migrant kindergartens. There was only a modest
interaction between the two groups, suggesting levels of segregation that are not
captured by index-based segregation measurements.
Various residential enclaves are discernible in Chinese cities. Two of the most
noticeable are urban villages and gated communities comprising commercial prop-
erties. Urban villages are rural settlements that were engulfed by rapid urban expan-
sion (see Chap. 6). As the compensation of expropriating residential land is much
higher than that of agricultural land, local urban governments expropriated agri-
cultural land for development and left residential land in the village. Due to their
convenient location and the rising job opportunities that accompany urban sprawl,
many migrants flooded into urban villages for affordable housing. Local villagers
took the opportunity to extend their houses and rent them to incoming migrants
to supplement their income after the loss of their agricultural land. In most urban
villages,migrants outnumber local residents.Urban villages are characterised by sub-
standard housing, overcrowding, lack of sanitary facilities and public services. They
do, however, provide low-cost housing and an entry point for many migrants who
develop livelihoods and social networks in the city. A range of institutional factors
create significant levels of differentiation between local residents andmigrants. Local
residents are entitled to local social benefits and services, as well as extra bene-
fits provided by their collective assets, while migrants are treated as ‘outsiders’ as
they do not have local hukou status (Du et al. 2018). Urban villages as migrant
enclaves strongly reflect residential segregation. However, some villages, such as
those in Shenzhen, are located near the city centre thereby providing opportunities
for migrants to access amenities (Hao 2015). If segregation is measured at a larger
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spatial scale, urban villages will actually reduce the level of segregation by providing
low-cost housing for migrants in central areas.
As another typical enclave in Chinese cities, gated communities provide quality
residential space for people who can afford them. The physical barriers such as gates,
and the higher socio-economic status of residents both contribute to social segrega-
tion. It is important to note, however, that gated commercial properties vary hugely
in terms of the quality of the residential environment and the extent of exclusiveness
in Chinese cities. The impacts of gated communities on social contact are contingent
on local context, as we shall discuss in detail in the next section.
4.5 The Consequences of Segregation in Chinese Cities
Segregation is likely to have important consequences for individuals’ life chances
and opportunities because it affects their access to resources, amenities and the bene-
fits of wider social networks (Granovetter’s 1983 ‘strength of weak ties’ argument;
see also Chaps. 11 and 15). While there are positive consequences of spatial concen-
tration for people of the same social group, such as the ability to network effectively,
many studies based onWestern contexts document the negative effects of segregation
(van Kempen and Murie 2009). For example, living in a neighbourhood with large
numbers of ethnic groups tends to be associated with poverty and unemployment.
Segregation is likely to reduce contact between ethnic minorities and the majority,
leading to social exclusion. This might be detrimental to the integration of ethnic
minorities into mainstream society. However, as Kaplan and Holloway (2001, p. 62)
rightly point out, ‘people may be victimised by space or they may utilise space, and
this can change with time. Specific accounts must negotiate the tension between the
marginalising and empowering impacts of segregation’. The impacts of segregation
on people’s life are contingent on local contexts and personal characteristics. We
discuss the consequences of segregation in Chinese cities through the perspectives
of social contact and labour market outcomes.
4.5.1 The Impacts on Social Contact
An important mechanism under which segregation influences life chances is through
social contact. Living in a migrant enclave might reduce social contact between
migrants and local residents. There are studies showing different activity space and
limited interaction betweenmigrants and local residents in an urban village (Zhao and
Wang 2018). Residential segregation may also influence peoples’ perception about
different social groups. Using data from a survey in Shanghai in 2012, Liu et al.
(2018a) examine migrants’ and local residents’ perceptions of social integration and
find that migrants living in neighbourhoods with a larger migrant population size are
more likely to think that they are excluded by local residents. Based on a large national
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micro-level data extracted from the 2014 China Migrant Dynamic Survey, Zou et al.
(2020)findneighbourhood types correlatewithmigrants’ socio-economic integration
but there is broad heterogeneity in the correlations across different migrant groups. In
particular, migrants living in urban villages show significantly lower levels of overall
socio-economic integration than those living in formal urban neighbourhoods such as
work-unit compounds and commercial properties. Through interviews with migrants
living in urban villages, Du et al. (2018) reported that manymigrants agreed that they
were treated as ‘outsiders’ in the locality, because they were excluded from many
local benefits and services, which are only reserved for those with local hukou status.
However, Wang et al. (2016) argue that urban villages per se do not prevent
migrants from interacting with local residents. Using a survey of 1370 question-
naires fromNanjing, the authors examined the impacts of hukou status and residential
characteristics on neighbourhood interaction between different social groups. They
found that migrants are more likely to interact with other migrant neighbours than
longer term local residents. Open spaces, particularly in deprived neighbourhoods
and urban villages, facilitate residents’ interaction with their immediate neighbours.
These neighbourhoods have a higher level of intergroup social contact than commer-
cial housing estates. The finding is supported by Forrest and Yip (2007) who reported
that social contact is more frequent in old neighbourhoods or work-unit compounds
than in commercial property estates where privacy is most valued. According to
another study based on a 1420 questionnaire survey in Shanghai in 2013, Wang et al.
(2017) found that the concentration of migrants in a neighbourhood does not reduce
neighbourhood cohesion, which is measured by social solidarity, common values,
social networks, a sense of belonging and informal social control. These findings
support the conclusion that urban villages do not prevent migrants from interacting
with local neighbours. However, it is unknown whether the experience of living
in an enclave influences migrants’ social interaction with local residents residing
outside urban villages, especially those living in formal urban neighbourhoods such
as commercial properties.
Gated commercial estates represent another of enclave within Chinese cities.
Most studies of gated communities in the Western context focus on their negative
impacts on social contact between different social groups, such as the exclusion
of underprivileged people and limits on social contact (Atkinson and Flint 2004).
In the Chinese context, gates and walls have always been features of the urban
landscape (Wu 2005). Traditional Chinese cities were walled and gated. Within the
residential areas, courtyard houses were characterised by walls and collective living
space. During the period of state socialism, Maoist cities were replete with walls
and gates that defined the boundaries of self-contained work-unit compounds, which
accommodated both managers and ordinary workers. After the economic reforms,
newly constructed commercial properties often have gates to separate themselves
from busy streets and other public spaces. In recent years, there is a push for closed
community management in terms of neighbourhood governance in certain cities.
Any interpretation of gated community within Chinese cities should, therefore, take
this tradition into account.
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The impacts of a gated community on social contact and life opportunities are
contingent on local social and cultural contexts. There are studies that do report
the negative impacts of gated commercial estates. For example, drawing on data
from a retrospective questionnaire survey in three gated estates in Chongqing, Deng
(2017) found that many homeowners’ contact with other people decreased after
they moved from work-unit compounds to gated communities. However, Douglass
et al. (2012) argued that residential enclaves do not necessarily prevent contact across
different social groups for three reasons. First, gates do not necessarily prevent people
from accessing the neighbourhood. Second, amenities in gated communities are
not provided exclusively for residents, as people living outside can also use the
facilities or services. Finally, people in China are more accustomed to the use of
gates to separate living and business environments. This is supported by Breitung
(2012), a study that examines residents’ attitudes towards gated living environments,
using interviews from residents living inside and outside three gated communities
in Guangzhou. Those living inside the gates valued security and a good residential
environment, whilst those living outside showed great acceptance or approval of
using gates and walls. It seems that gating is not seen as a problem or a cause for
social tensions in Chinese cities in contrast with Western contexts.
4.5.2 The Impacts on Job Opportunities and Wages
The literature has long suggested that migrants in Chinese cities have fewer employ-
ment opportunities and lower income than otherwise comparable natives. For
example, migrants are not eligible to apply for certain jobs in the public sector and
state-owned enterprises. Such labour market discrimination against migrants is espe-
cially pronounced for rural-to-urbanmigrants (Meng and Zhang 2001). However, the
urban literature also suggests that residents living in enclaves may experience both
spatial constraints and network spill-over effects in terms of job opportunities. Empir-
ical studies have discussed spatial mismatch effects for ethnic minorities living in
enclaves, i.e. mismatch between the locations of job opportunities and enclaves, as
residents may have poor access to low-skilled jobs located beyond enclaves (Houston
2005). The spatial mismatch effects may lead to longer commutes and reduce labour
market success. On the other hand, ethnic minorities concentrated in enclaves may
develop strong social networks and share information about job opportunities. This
might facilitate their job search and improve their job prospects.
Most studies on enclaves and labour market outcomes in Chinese cities focus on
urban villages. Drawing on data from the 2009 survey in 12 cities in four regions
in China, Zhu et al. (2017) examined job accessibility and commuting behaviour
for rural migrants living in urban villages and formal urban neighbourhoods such as
work-unit compounds, public housing and commercial property estates. They found
that migrants living in urban villages had shorter commuting times and distances
and better job accessibility. This can be partly explained by the network effects,
i.e. migrants originating from the same province or county tend to concentrate in
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the same urban village and share information about job opportunities. The migrant
community is also capable of creating jobs, though many of these are informal. The
other explanation is that many urban villages are located near industrial zones and
factories as the result of urban expansion. Their convenient location helps migrants
to secure job opportunities nearby.
Zhu (2016) further examined employment opportunities and wages for rural
migrants living in urban villages and formal urban neighbourhoods using the same
dataset. The author found that ruralmigrantworkers living in urban villages had better
employment prospects and higher wages, facilitated by their social networks. This is
supported by other studies on urban villages demonstrating that social networks and
a vibrant informal economy help migrants adapt to urban life and develop careers
in the city. In one example, based on the individual-level data of the 2010 census in
Shanghai, Liu et al. (2019) found that migrant enclave residence is positively associ-
ated with employment outcomes for rural migrants. The effect is particularly evident
among female migrant workers and those who live in locations with relatively low
job densities. However, such a positive social network effect is not shared by urban
migrants or urban natives. The authors explain that rural migrants, lacking higher
levels of educational attainment, are more likely to rely on social networks to secure
jobs.
Studies also indicated thatmigrants originating fromZhejiang province developed
successful clothes businesses in urban villages in suburban Beijing (e.g. Ma and
Xiang 1998). A recent study in Guangzhou discusses the entrepreneurial activities
of migrants originating from Hebei Province and their thriving garment business in
an urban village (Liu et al. 2015). Migrant entrepreneurs actively use urban space
to create job opportunities and achieve economic advancement and social mobility.
New migrants from the same place of origin obtain help from their fellow migrants
and find jobs in the same garment industry. It is noted that most of these jobs are
informal in nature. The authors do acknowledge that not all migrant enclaves can
promote migrant-owned business and facilitate migrants’ career development. In
addition to tightly knit social networks in the enclaves, resources linked with native
places and externally oriented economic activities are crucial for the emergence of
migrant entrepreneurs.
4.6 Conclusions and Discussions
During the centrally planned period initiated by Chairman Mao in 1949, Chinese
cities were characterised by mixed neighbourhoods comprised of socially homoge-
nous work units with no discernible patterns of segregation. Since the initiation of
the economic reforms in 1978, cities have experienced enormous transformation and
spatial divisions between different socioeconomic groups, driven bymarket-oriented
housing, land reforms, rapid economic and spatial restructuring and massive rural-
to-urban migration. While the elite can afford to live in affluent gated communities,
the urban poor are clustered in dilapidated neighbourhoods and urban villages. With
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the deepening of the economic reforms and the continued process of urban transfor-
mation, the patterns of segregation in Chinese cities are likely to change rather than
being static.
Various methods have been employed to measure the extent of segregation in
Chinese cities. All studies agree that urban segregation based on socio-economic
status has increased significantly since the start of the economic reforms. Chinese
cities are beginning to resemble Western cities in that people of similar socio-
economic status tend to concentrate in certain residential areas.However, it is difficult
to compare the extent of segregation in Chinese cities with that of North American
or European cities by using index-based measurements. This is because the spatial
scales used in European studies are typically quite different to those in Chinese ones
and we know that, even in the same city, segregation indices can give very different
results for different spatial scales. Index-based measures of residential segregation
are also likely to underestimate the true extent because social segregation may also
occur in leisure and activity contexts as well as places of residence (see Chap. 2).
Segregation may influence residents’ ability to access resources and opportunities.
The impact of urban segregation on social contact and labour market outcomes are
mixed in Chinese cities. While there is evidence of some negative consequences,
evidence also exists to demonstrate that by living in enclaves migrants can actively
develop social networks and achieve economic advancement and social mobility.
Residential segregation can be observed in cities across the world, of course, but
there are particular features within a Chinese urban context. These features should be
understood and interpreted within the particular Chinese historical, social, cultural
and institutional background. Gated communities are an example of how a particular
form of segregation can have a very different meaning and impact in China compared
with American and European counterparts. This is because the gated communities
in China have a communal historical precedent popularised during the Maoist era
and so do not necessarily have the connotations of exclusivity and xenophobia asso-
ciated with gated communities in the West. Moreover, some of the political and
economic processes that lead to segregation are unique to China such as the impact
of land reforms and the ongoing importance of rural migration, increased city-to-
city population mobility and the hukou system in driving socioeconomic inequality
and residential segregation. In this chapter, we have, therefore, attempted to high-
light the role of cultural and institutional factors that have shaped the socio-spatial
structures in Chinese cities. These factors are likely to continue influencing segrega-
tion in China, together with the increasingly important impact of market forces. The
characteristics of continuing urban segregation in China mirror various social-spatial
structural transformations within the country and warrant extensive investigation. It
provides an important area for future research.
In the next five chapters, these drivers of change and their implications for
inequality are discussed in more detail, particularly with respect to urbanisation,
migration and the anti-poverty programme (Chap. 5), the development and redevel-
opment of urban villages (Chap. 6) and Shanty towns (Chap. 7), inequalities in public
services (Chap. 8) and the housing issues facing rural migrants (Chap. 9).
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and the Anti-Poverty Programme
in China
Houkai Wei and Hongjian Su
Abstract From 1979 to 2018, China underwent rapid urbanisation and large-scale
populationmigration. As a result, the permanent urban population increased by about
659 million, and the numbers of rural poor decreased by 754 million. However,
as migration from rural to urban areas has increased, rural poverty has reduced
while urban poverty is gradually increasing. The co-existence of both rural and
urban poverty poses new challenges to development. In this chapter, we analyse
the characteristics of China’s internal migration and urbanisation process. We draw
on relevant data to describe in detail the changes that have occurred since China’s
Reform and Opening-up, as well as China’s programme in reducing rural poverty
and current trends in urban poverty. As the rate of urbanisation in China enters a new
phase, there is a growing imperative to improve and promote an integrated approach
to both urban and rural development. We also discuss the new raft of anti-poverty
and poverty-management measures.
Keywords Urbanisation ·Migration · Anti-poverty programme · China
5.1 Introduction
Since China’s ‘reform and opening-up’, urbanisation has increased rapidly. At
present, the rate of urbanisation (the proportion of people living in urban areas)
in China has reached 59.6% (State Statistical Bureau 2019), and this is well above
the world’s overall level. Although the speed of this process is slowing down, it
is still happening at a comparatively high rate. With urbanisation and large-scale
population movement has come urban poverty. As a result, there has been a growing
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imperative to monitor and improve the quality of urbanisation. Chinese urbanisa-
tion in China has recently entered a new stage steered by moves towards significant
quality improvement (Wei 2014, 2015).
In this chapter, we chart the various stages ofChina’s internalmigration and urban-
isation process over the past four decades and the implications for urban poverty. The
chapter consists of four parts. Section 5.2 describes the slowdown of urbanisation
in China and the new stage of development oriented towards improving the quality
or urban life. In Sect. 5.3, we investigate achievements in poverty reduction in rural
China since the ‘reform and opening-up’. In Sect. 5.4, we discuss urban poverty in
the process of Chinese urbanisation, calculate the size of the population of urban
poor using various methods, and analyse the multi-dimensional aspects of poverty
within this population. Section 5.5 concludes with a brief overview and discussion.
5.2 China’s Urbanisation and New Stage of Development
China’s urbanisation rate has reached twomajor points of development in recent years
(see Fig. 5.1). While internal migration from rural to urban areas has slowed, the rate
of growth continues. The Chinese urbanisation rate increased from 17.92% in 1978
to 58.52% in 2017, with an average annual increase of 1.04 percentage points. In the
sameperiod, theworld’s overall urbanisation rate increased from38.48–54.82%,with
an average annual increase of 0.42 percentage points. From 2010 to 2011, China’s
urbanisation rate rose beyond 50%, so that the country became a predominantly urban
society (Wei 2013). The following year, China’s urbanisation rate reached 52.6% to
Fig. 5.1 Urbanisation rate in China and the world (1978–2017).Data sourcesData on urbanisation
rate in China is derived from China Statistical Yearbook (2018); data on the global rate of urbani-
sation is derived from data published by the World Bank: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sp.
urb.totl.in.zs
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exceed the global urbanisation rate of 52.5% and continued to advance faster than
the world average.
According to Northam (1979), China’s urbanisation rate was less than 30% at the
initial stage of development, growing from 30–70%during themiddle period of rapid
development. The acceleration stage occurred from 30 to 50%, with deceleration
occurring between 50–70%. Anything beyond 70% occurs at the later stage of stable
development (Wei 2014). China’s urbanisation rate reached a turning point of 30%
and 50% in 1996 (30.48%) and 2010 (49.95%), respectively. From 1978 to 1996,
it progressed steadily at a speed of 0.64 percentage points. From 1997 to 2010, it
accelerated at a speed of 1.39 percentage points. The average speed slowed down
during 2011 and 2017, with an average annual increase of 1.23 percentage points.
If we project the S-shaped curve alongside other forms of predictive research (Wei
2014), the Chinese urbanisation rate will reach 70% by around 2030. The rate of
urbanisation is expected to advance rapidly until reaching that point.
The rate of slowdown conforms to Northam’s (1979) S-shaped curve of urbanisa-
tion. An eventual deceleration derives from a slowdown in migration and a reduced
willingness among migrant workers to enter and settle in cities. Under the new
steady-state of China’s economy, the rate of increase in urban employment has also
declined. The migration rate from rural areas has decreased with the downturn in
economic growth and the substitution of capital to labour caused by the rapid rise
in wages. According to annual monitoring and survey reports on migrant workers
released by the National Bureau of Statistics since 2009, the rate of migration from
rural areas has declined sharply since 2012 (see Fig. 5.2). In 2015 and 2016, the
increase was only 630,000 and 500,000, respectively. It should be noted that in 2017,
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Fig. 5.2 Growth ofmigrantworkers from rural areas ofChina in recent years.Data sourcesNational
Bureau of Statistics, annual monitoring and survey reports on migrant workers
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migrant workers mainly flowed from their villages to urban areas within their home
provinces, which accounted for 96.4% of the increase of migrant workers from rural
areas.
The annual increase revived during 2018, rising to 810,000. Due to a combina-
tion of government intervention and market forces, urban capital, technology, and
talent have increasingly flowed into the countryside in recent years. This process is
especially pronounced in the developed coastal areas such as the Delta of the Pearl
and Yangtse Rivers where rural residents enjoy many benefits like homestead and
collective dividends. Some urban residents are now trying to find ways to obtain
rural hukou–household registration status that confers rights of access to local public
services and welfare support (see Chaps. 1, 12 and 4)—through various channels.
In the longer term, the trend will be towards a two-way free migration of urban and
rural populations.
5.2.1 Settlement Rates of Rural Migrants
At the same time, the willingness of migrant workers to settle in cities varies across
different regions. Factors that affect the willingness of rural migrants to settle in
cities include a narrowing income gap between urban and rural residents, a continual
increase in levels of urban-rural integration, and increasingly preferential rural poli-
cies. At present, in some megacities, where stricter hukou systems and settlement
standards are implemented, rural migrant workers show a strong willingness to
settle permanently. Other small and medium-sized cities have liberalised their hukou
system and actively encourage rural workers to settle. Nevertheless, the overall
willingness of rural workers to settle down has declined.
According to statistical surveys (see Table 5.1) conducted in 2014, the proportion
of agricultural migrants prepared to settle longer-term in cities was relatively low,
between 30 and 50%except inChangzhou andZhengzhou. The proportion ofmigrant
workers willing to settle in cities and towns was only 41.5% in Zhongshan, 40.8% in
Harbin, 41.1% in Yantai, 34.5% in Fuling, 51.6% in Ordos, 45.6% in Guang’an, and
46.2% in Shaanxi (see Table 5.1). The Survey on Dynamic Monitoring of Migrant
Population in 2016 reveals that the willingness to settle as residents in the cities
of immigration among the rural registered floating population was 58%, while the
willingness to settle down (including hukou registration in the cities of immigration)
was only 30%. These figures were much lower in small and medium cities (National
Health Commission of the People’s Republic of China 2018). This decline in rural
workers’ willingness to enter and settle in cities will slow the urbanisation rate and
impact the urbanisation pattern (Wei 2019).
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Table 5.1 Results of survey on migrant workers’ willingness to settle in cities (2014)
Survey subject City Sample number Willingness to settle in
cities (%)
Zhongshan Survey




Team of the National
Bureau of Statistics
Changzhou 152 82.9
Harbin Survey Team of
the National Bureau of
Statistics
Harbin 341 40.8
Yantai Survey Team of




Team of the National
Bureau of Statistics
Zhengzhou 120 75.0
Fuling Survey Team of
the National Bureau of
Statistics
Fuling 84 34.5
Ordos Survey Team of












Data sources Collated according to relevant data released by the statistical departments
5.2.2 New Type of Urbanisation: A Period Marked by Quality
Improvement
With the slowdown in the urbanisation process, strategic planning has begun to
emphasise quality improvement issues. At the end of 2013, the CentralWork Confer-
ence on Urbanisation clearly pointed out the necessity to ‘advance people-centred
urbanisation.’ Further clarity was provided by the Chinese State Council and the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 2014. A plan for the
period 2014–2020 made an explicit commitment to quality improvement and a more
‘people-centred’ approach taking complete account of Chinese characteristics. The
aim was to implement a more holistic approach by improving the spatial layout and
addressing ecological and cultural heritage in any new developments.
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The State Council also issued the Comprehensive Pilot Programme for National
New-type Urbanisation at the end of 2014, further emphasising the need for a people-
centred approach. Pilot work considered various aspects, including the citizenisation
of agricultural migrants, investment and financing mechanisms, reform of the rural
homestead system, innovations and reforms in administrative management and insti-
tutional mechanisms, so as to identifymodels that can be up-scaled or replicated. The
practical issues of development and the change at a strategic level show that China
has entered a period of comprehensive improvement in the quality of urbanisation. It
is imperative to advocate a shift from rapid urbanisation to a more quality-oriented
process. Recent measures to improve the quality of the urbanisation process address
three important aspects.
Firstly, active promotion of reforms of hukou and related systems, and the integra-
tion of rural migrants more effectively within the process of urbanisation. In recent
years, in response to the issue of ‘urbanisation of people,’ the State has introduced
a number of reform measures for the hukou system to encourage greater integra-
tion of agricultural migrants. The State Council, for example, issued the Opinions
on Further Promoting the Reform of the Hukou System in 2014. Since 2016, the
Interim Regulations on Residence Permit has come into force. In 2016, the General
Office of the State Council issued the Proposal to Promote the Settlement of 100
Million Non-Resident Population in Cities. As a result, various departments have
issued a series of supporting policies and measures in a concerted effort to solve the
practical issues of education, employment, medical and old-age care, and housing
security for rural migrants, as well as the practical issues of withdrawal of ‘three
rights’1 in rural areas for those workers who settled in cities. The provinces and
central cities have also introduced corresponding plans to implement the reform
of hukou systems. Through such reform, the urbanisation rate of the hukou regis-
tered population reached 43.37% in 2018, and the urbanisation rate of the perma-
nent resident population was synchronously increased. By November 2018, more
than 75 million residence permits were issued throughout the country. The six basic
public services and seven facilities stipulated in the Interim Regulations on Resi-
dence Permits have been implemented in various places, and efforts have been made
to expand the scope of basic public services and improve service standards. With
deeper and wider reforms of hukou and related systems, the goal of ‘Three hundred
million people’2 has been gradually implemented.
The second measure concerns the steady promotion of land systems reform so as
to improve efficiency and create co-ordinated development of the process of urbani-
sation affecting both land use and people. Urban population growth and urban sprawl
1 This refers to rural workers who have settled in cities and voluntarily relinquished rural land
contracting rights, homesteaduse rights, and collective incomedistribution rightswith compensation
according to regulations.
2 In March 2014, the ‘Government Work Report’ reviewed and approved by the 12th National
People’s Congress pointed out that in the coming period, we should focus on ‘Three hundred
million people’, that is, to promote about 100 million agricultural migrant population settled in
towns, renovate urban shanty towns and urban villages where about 100 million people live, and
guide about 100 million people to urbanise in the central and western regions.
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are the main manifestations of urbanisation. In recent years, the State has issued a
number of policies to promote land systems reform so as to achieve ‘people-land
linkage’ in the process of urbanisation. In 2014 the General Office of the Communist
Party of China Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council issued
theOpinions on thePilotWork of Rural LandAcquisition, theMarket Entry of Collec-
tive Business Construction Land, and the Reform of Homestead Land System. The
aim was to actively explore the entry of collective construction land and rental prop-
erty in rural areas into the open market. In 2017, the Ministry of Land and Resources
and the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development jointly issued the Pilot
Programme for Building Leased Housing by Collective Construction Land. In 2018,
the Communist Party of China Central Committee and the State Council issued the
Opinions on Implementing the Rural Vitalization Strategy, clearly specifying the
policy of ‘improving the idle homestead and idle farm houses,’ and exploring the
‘Separation of ownership, qualification and use rights of the homestead.’ This has
set the direction for the reform of rural land systems. On this basis, the Ministry of
Land andResources issued theNotice onActively SupportingPoverty Alleviation and
Development and Relocation of Ex-situ Pro-poverty by Making Good and Flexible
Use of Increase andDecrease Linking Policy in 2016. TheGeneral Office of the State
Council printed and distributed theMeasures for the State’s Overall Management of
Supplementary Arable Land Across Provinces and Regions and theMeasures for the
Adjustment Management of Balanced Indicators of Increase and Decrease Linking
for Land Used for Urban–rural Construction Projects Across Provinces and Regions
in 2018. This could expand the transaction scope of balanced indicators of land used
for urban–rural construction projects. It was conducive to improving land-use effi-
ciency and achieving a co-ordinated development of urban population growth and
urban sprawl.
The third measure comprises the co-ordinated adoption of new strategies for
urbanisation and rural development that accelerate the process of integration. Since
the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2017, there
has been a more pronounced two-way flow between urban and rural initiatives. The
characteristics of intergenerational migration3 in both urban and rural areas have
become more apparent, indicating that the process of urbanisation has entered a
transitional period of greater integration. The report of the 19th National Congress
of the Communist Party of China put forward the Implementation of Rural Vital-
ization Strategy for the first time, highlighting the need for greater integration of
urban-rural development. The Strategy also recognised the need to modernise agri-
cultural industries and improve the quality of life of rural communities. TheOpinions
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council
on the Implementation of Rural Vitalization Strategy further clarified the signifi-
cance, objectives, and priorities of implementing new strategies for rural develop-
ment. Subsequently, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the
3 Since many migrant workers have not obtained urban registration, they will return to their home-
towns when they reach a certain age and revert to their previous status as rural workers once
more.
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State Council jointly issued theOpinions on Establishing and Improving the System,
Mechanism and Policy System for the Integration of Urban-rural Development in
April 2019. As a result, all regions began to implement in-depth rural vitalisation
strategies and establish and improve institutional mechanism and policy systems in
order to integrate urban–rural development more comprehensively.
5.3 Impact of Urbanisation on Rural Poverty Reduction
With the rapid advancement of urbanisation and large-scale rural-urban migration,
China’s economy has continued to grow rapidly. The income of urban and rural
residents has increased sharply, and themost chronic rural poverty level has decreased
drastically. The decrease in rural poverty has contributed more than 70% to global
poverty reduction (Wei and Huang 2019).
5.3.1 Poverty Reduction in Rural Areas
The Chinese government attaches great importance to poverty reduction in rural
areas. It has invested a great deal of manpower, material and financial resources
to help accelerate rural development and achieve prosperity. As a result, levels of
rural poverty have decreased significantly across the country. According to the 2010
rural poverty standard (2,300 yuan per person per year), in constant prices, the rural
poor population dropped from 770.39 million in 1978 to 16.6 million in 2018, and
the poverty incidence decreased from 97.5% to 1.7% (see Fig. 5.3). During this



































































































































Number of poor popula on, 1978 standard
Number of poor popula on, 2008 standard
Number of poor popula on, 2010 standard
Poverty incidence, 1978 standard
Poverty incidence, 2008 standard
Poverty incidence, 2010 standard
Fig. 5.3 Changes in rural poor population and poverty incidence in China (1978–2018). Data
sources Calculated according to China Statistical Yearbook (2018) and the Statistical Communique
on the 2018 National Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China
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reduction of 18.84 million. The incidence of poverty decreased by 95.8 percent, with
an average annual decline of 2.40 percent. This is the only example of a 40-year
process of sustained poverty reduction in the world. The consistent reduction in
levels of poverty can be attributed to three general effects:
• Sustained and rapid economic growth, crucial for rural poverty alleviation.
• Sustained and rapid internal migration to urban areas resulting in increased
prosperity.
• The government’s application of active measures to reduce rural poverty tailored
to address specifically Chinese factors and characteristics. According to the stan-
dard of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) of US$1.9 per day in 2011, China has
contributed 71.82% of the reduction in the world’s 1.10 billion poverty-stricken
population from 1981 to 2012 (Li and Wei 2016).
The fastest rate of poverty reduction has taken place in the east of the country,
while the western region has seen poverty reduce by the largest scale. From 2010
to 2018, China’s rural poor population fell by 90%, with the highest reduction of
some 94.3% in the eastern region, and only about 89% in the central and western
regions (see Table 5.2). During this period, the numbers of rural poor decreased by
Table 5.2 China’s rural poor population and its distribution from 2010 to 2018













2010 16,567 2587 5551 8430 100 15.6 33.5 50.9
2011 12,238 1655 4238 6345 100 13.5 34.6 51.9
2012 9899 1367 3446 5086 100 13.8 34.8 51.4
2013 8249 1171 2869 4209 100 14.2 34.8 51.0
2014 7017 956 2461 3600 100 13.6 35.1 51.3
2015 5575 653 2008 2914 100 11.7 36.0 52.3
2016 4335 490 1594 2251 100 11.3 36.8 51.9
2017 3046 300 1112 1634 100 9.9 36.5 53.6
2018 1660 147 597 916 100 8.9 35.9 55.2
Change −14,907 −2440 −4954 −7514 −6.7a 2.4a 4.3a
Growth
(%)
−90.0 −94.3 −89.2 −89.1
a means a percentage point
Note Unit a is a percentage point. Eastern China includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning,
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, and Hainan; Central China includes
Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, and Hunan; Western China includes
Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai,
Ningxia and Xinjiang
Data sources Calculated according to the annual China Statistical Yearbook and China Statistical
Summary, and Wei and Huang (2019)
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149.07 million, by some 50.4% in the western region, 33.2% in the central region,
and only 16.4% in the eastern region. Because of the rapidity of poverty reduction
in the eastern region, the proportion of the rural poor in that region has gradually
declined in recent years, while the proportion across the central and western regions
has been rising. Since 2017, over 90% of China’s rural poor have been concentrated
in the central and western regions. In 2018 the western region accounted for 55.2% of
the total, with a poverty incidence of 3.2%. The central region accounted for 35.9%,
with a poverty incidence of 1.8%; and the eastern region accounted for only 8.9%,
with a poverty incidence of 0.4%. From the perspective of provincial administrative
regions, the poverty incidence in all provinces generally fell below 6% in 2018.
Incidence of poverty in Guizhou, Tibet, Gansu and Xinjiang was over 5%, while
in Shanxi, Henan, Guangxi, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Qinghai and Ningxia it lay between
2 and 5%. The poverty incidence in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang,
Fujian, Shandong, and Guangdong has dropped to less than 0.5% (Wei and Huang
2019).
5.3.2 The Role of Urbanisation in Poverty Reduction
in Rural Areas
Urbanisation has played an active role in rural poverty reduction, mainly through
promoting economic and social development and labour transfer in poverty-stricken
areas. The process has raised the income level of rural residents, increased the
non-agricultural income of rural dwellers, and gradually narrowed the income gap
between urban and rural areas. The means by which urbanisation reduces rural
poverty can be divided into three aspects.
• First, the attraction of urban centres as places of employment and increased inte-
gration of urban and rural development drives economic and social development
in rural areas and increases income levels. Shen and Jiang (2007) use China’s
provincial panel data and analyse the positive impact of urbanisation on economic
growth, which increases income levels and reduces poverty. Chen et al. (2010)
proved the positive correlation between urbanisation and economic development
at a provincial level.
• Secondly, an increase in non-agricultural income will increase wages or transfer
income from family members employed in sectors other than agriculture.
Ahluwalia (2008) argues that by primarily increasing income levels, urbanisation
is an important condition for poverty reduction.
• Thirdly, urbanisation involves large-scale internal migration from rural areas
leading a reduction in the population of the rural poor. This can also lead to
the problem of urban poverty which will be discussed in the next section. This
process can be called the transfer effect of urbanisation on poverty reduction.
Wang (2008) considers that this transfer effect is achieved by means of ‘urban-
isation—transfer of rural labour –poverty alleviation.’ Calì and Menon (2016)
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believe that urbanisation reduces rural poverty mainly through the transfer of
rural poor population to urban areas, which reduces both the rural poor popula-
tion and the total rural population. Wan et al. (2017) argue that urbanisation can
not only effectively reduce the poverty of rural and migrant workers, but also help
to narrow the urban–rural income and consumption gaps. Some scholars suggest
that whether urbanisation can reduce poverty is related to the particular stage of
urbanisation involved. The early stage of the urbanisation process is conducive
to poverty reduction, while later stages have less impact on reducing levels of
poverty (Panudulkitti 2007; Cui and He 2018).
As Chinese reforms gathered pace from the 1980s, rural workers followed a
pattern of temporary migration—‘departing farming without leaving native land.’
By the beginning of the 1990s the scale of trans-provincial flow of labour gradually
increased. After 2000 the rural surplus labour force began to migrate on a large scale
and to settle in cities more permanently. The process of ‘rural workers moving into
cities’ has both greatly improved their income and living standards and narrowed the
income gap between urban and rural residents, while providing a sufficient labour
force for economic development. The per capita wage income of rural households
and its proportion of workers’ per capita net income have both increased rapidly,
from 152 yuan or 21.4% in 1991 to 772 yuan or 32.6% in 2001, and then to 3448
yuan or 43.6% in 2012 (see Fig. 5.4), making a significant contribution to the increase
of per capita income of rural households. By contrast, the proportion of household













































































































The per capita net (disposable) income
Per capita wage income
Proportion of wage income
Proportion of family operating (net) income
Fig. 5.4 Changes in per capita income of rural households in China (1978–2018). Note Due to the
adjustment of statistical calibrations, the data before 2013 refers to the per capita net income of
rural households, and the data since 2013 refers to per capita disposable income of rural households.
Data sources Calculated and collated by the authors according to the China Statistical Yearbook
(corresponding years) and China Statistical Summary (2019)
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Bureau of Statistics has surveyed integrated household income, expenditure and
living conditions in urban and rural areas, and revised the statistical calibration of
farmers’ income, principally adjusting farmers’ per capita net income to the per
capita disposable income of rural residents. From 2013 to 2018, the proportion of
wage income within rural households’ per capita disposable income increased from
38.7 to 41%. The proportion of net transfer income increased from 17.5 to 20%,
while the proportion of net income from household operations decreased from 41.7
to 36.7%. The income earned by farmers leaving agriculture and rural areas to work
in cities forms a significant proportion of this increase. It follows that the rapid growth
of farmers’ main income in recent years comes from the growth of wages and net
transfer income from urban migration. During 2014 and 2018, nearly 70% of the
increase of rural residents’ per capita disposable income came from wage income
and net transfer income, of which the contribution of wage income to the increase
of farmers’ income was 45.2%, and that of net transfer income was 24.5%.
With urbanisation and population migration, the income gap between urban and
rural residents has fluctuated and expanded continuously. It has gradually stabilised
and narrowed from 2003 (see Fig. 5.5). In the early stages of reform and the imple-
mentation of the rural household contract responsibility system, farmers’ income
increased rapidly, and the urban–rural income gap narrowed. However, since the
focus of economic reform shifted in 1985 from rural to urban areas, the urban–rural
income gap began to expand sharply. From 1984 to 2003, the ratio of per capita
disposable income for both urban and rural residents expanded rapidly from 1.84






























































































































Per capita disposable income of rural residents
Consump on level of rural residents
Urban-rural income gap
Urban-rural consump on gap
Fig. 5.5 Changes in the income of urban and rural residents in China (1978–2018). Data sources
Drawn according to China Statistical Yearbook (2018), China Rural Statistical Yearbook (2018),
China Statistical Summary (2018) and the Statistical Communique of National Economic and Social
Development of 2018
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successively issued 16 No.1 Documents to support the development of ‘agriculture,
rural areas and rural residents’ and introduced a series of policies to support agri-
culture and benefit farmers. With the support of central policies, the income of rural
residents continued to increase rapidly, and the gap between urban and rural resi-
dents’ income and consumption levels continued to shrink. In terms of per capita
disposable income, the income ratio of urban and rural residents in China dropped
from the peak value of 3.14 in 2007 to 2.69 in 2018, while the consumption ratio for
urban and rural residents also declined from the peak value of 3.65 in 2000 to 2.65
in 2017. This shows that China has entered a new period in which the gap between
urban and rural areas continues to close.
However, it should be noted that the current urban–rural income gap in China
remains large. In 2018, the ratio of per capita disposable income of urban and rural
residents was still 48% higher than in 1983. In particular, since an integrated land
market has not yet formed, the channels for rural resources to change into capital and
wealth are not smooth, and the wealth gap between urban and rural residents is very
wide. In 2018, the ratio of per capita net income from capital and wealth of urban to
rural residents reached up to 11.8.
The process of urbanisation correlates both with increases in rural residents’
income and anti-poverty measures. Figures 5.6 and 5.7 show the basic correlation
between the rate of urbanisation, poverty incidence and the size of the provincial poor
population in 2017. It indicates that the higher the urbanisation rate, the lower the
incidence of rural poverty and the smaller rural poor population. It can be seen that,
in 2017, eastern provinces and cities experienced the highest rates of urbanisation.
The rural poverty rate for Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and
Guangdong (at the lower right corner of Figs. 5.6 and 5.7) was 0, and their urbanisa-
tion rates were 86.5%, 82.9%, 87.7%, 68.8%, 68.0%, 64.8% and 69.9%, respectively.
Fig. 5.6 Correlation between urbanisation rate and poverty incidence in rural areas in various
regions in 2017. Data sources Drawn according to China Statistical Summary of 2018
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Fig. 5.7 Correlation between urbanisation rate and size of rural poor population in various regions
in 2017. Data sources Drawn according to China Statistical Summary 2018
In comparison, the urbanisation rate of the western provinces (autonomous regions)
such as Tibet, Gansu, Xinjiang, Guizhou, Yunnan, Guangxi andQinghai (at the upper
left corner of Figs. 5.6 and 5.7) was low, and the poverty incidence in rural areas was
high.
This study further uses the panel data of urbanisation rates, the incidence of rural
poverty and size of the poor population from 2010 to 2017 to examine the correlation
between urbanisation and rural poverty. The result is shown in Table 5.3. In Models
1–6, we use panel data to analyse the correlation between the urbanisation rate, the
incidence of rural poverty and size of the poor population, showing a significant
Table 5.3 Correlation among urbanisation rate, poverty incidence in rural areas and size of poor
population
Poverty incidence Size of poor population



























F 295.27 504.91 127.10 519.48
R2 0.5455 0.5455 0.5455 0.3407 0.3407 0.3407













Note The numbers in the parentheses refer to t-value or z-value
aindicates significance at 1% level
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negative correlation. That means, the higher the urbanisation rate, the lower the
poverty incidence in rural areas, and the smaller the size of the poor population.
Considering that the urbanisation rate is the only explanatory variable, in models 3
and 6 we adopt a fixed-effect model to control for time-invariant omitted variables.
As such, the coefficients of Model 3 and Model 6 are the preferred models for
interpretation. The coefficients reported in Table 5.3 show that for every 1 percentage
point increase in the urbanisation rate, the poverty incidence in rural areas reduces
by about 1.75% (Model 3), and the size of the rural poor population reduces by about
526,300 (Model 6).
5.4 Urban Poverty in the Process of Migration
and Urbanisation
The active role played by urbanisation in rural poverty reduction can be partly
attributed to the migration of population from rural to urban areas, that is, themigra-
tion effect of urbanisation in poverty reduction. Nevertheless, migrants who settle in
cities often face a variety of barriers that can lead them into urban poverty. During the
process of rapid urbanisation and large-scale demographic migration, the national
poverty reduction strategy develops from an early countryside-oriented strategy to
one that lays equal stress on urban and rural areas. It will then change emphasis to
become a city-oriented poverty reduction strategy (see Fig. 5.8), along with a shift in
rural poverty and urban poverty. Current anti-povertymeasures in China have entered






Poverty reduction strategy that lays
equal stress on cities and the countryside
City-oriented poverty reduction
strategy
I Rural poverty reduction-oriented
Stage
II Urban-rural poverty reduction stage III Urban poverty reduction-oriented
stage
Fig. 5.8 Economic development and poverty reduction strategy. Source Wei (2018)
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although some rural–urban migrants live in poverty, Chinese cities have not expe-
rienced the emergence of ‘slums’ like other countries in the process of large-scale
rapid urbanisation. This can be attributed to continuous strengthening of the policy
support for ‘going into the city’ and the policy guarantee of ‘returning home’4 for
rural–urban migrants in China. The policies enable Chinese farmers to realise urban-
isation in an orderly manner and a two-way flow process of ‘moving into the city
and returning home smoothly’.
At present, official statistics for the size of the urban poor populationmainly cover
the lower-income urban registered population. Estimates for transient or migrant
populations are often based on sample surveys. In general, the lower-income popula-
tion with local urban hukou has been decreasing, and poverty levels among the urban
floating population have increased. Growth in floating populations with presumed
high levels of poverty and the problems of relative and multidimensional poverty are
more significant. Further studies on the size, structure and distribution of poverty
among permanent urban residents are needed in order to gain a clearer picture.
5.4.1 Estimation of Poverty Rates Among the Urban Hukou
Registered Population
Currently, China lacks a unified standard for measuring levels of urban poverty.
Consequently, any estimation of the size of the urban poor population will vary
according to the different standards used. To all intents and purposes, ameasure based
on urban minimum living standards (only covering the hukou registered population)
acts as yardstick for levels of urban poverty. This standard is generally the first to be
applied, with other measures added according to circumstances. In order to properly
assess and resolve issues around living standards among the urban poor, the State
Council issued the Notice on Establishing the Minimum Living Security System for
Urban Residents Across the Country on September 2, 1997. Since then, all levels of
government have gradually established and improved their policies for dealing with
minimum living standards in urban areas.
It can be seen from Fig. 5.9 that the number of hukou registered population
guaranteed by the minimum standard of living increased gradually from the time the
new system was introduced. By 2002, numbers had stabilised to around 20 million.
Since 2009, the trendhas decreased, falling to the level of 2002 in 2013 and continuing
to decrease. By 2018, the number of urban dwellers living at the minimum standard
had fallen to 10.08 million.
4 On the one hand, it supports their return to hometown for employment and entrepreneurship and
promotes urbanisation locally; on the other hand, it supports basic public services for them to enjoy
equalisation in cities. At the same time, it maintains land contracting rights, homestead use rights,
and collective income distribution rights for the rural migrant workers who become urban residents,
and promotes an orderly process of citizenisation.




































































































Fig. 5.9 Urban poverty: Chinese urban population living at the minimum living standard (1999–
2018). Data sources Collated according to relevant data from China Statistical Yearbook
5.4.2 Estimating the Scale of Urban Poverty Including
Migrant Populations
According to the early studies of the World Bank (1993), the numbers of urban
poor in China ranged from 500,000 to 3.9 million between 1981 and 1990, with an
average poverty incidence rate of 0.5%. Since there is currently no unified standard
for measuring urban poverty, Chinese analysts and scholars use different methods to
estimate urban poverty, and results vary greatly (Wei et al. 2016).
Comparing these results, we find that:
• The size of the poor population calculated for individual years is much larger than
that obtained according to the urban minimum living security standard.
• The size of the poor population calculated according to consumption and
expenditure is much larger than that calculated according to the income standard.
• Thirdly, due to limited data, the large number of people whomake up the ‘floating
population’ in cities are missing from the calculations. The number of poor rural
migrants in cities cannot be counted accurately. Consequently, the scale of urban
poverty has been underestimated to a certain extent. At present, estimates on the
size of the floating population are mostly conducted by sampling methods across
individual regions; therefore limited knowledge is available concerning the size
and distribution of the floating population at the national level.
According to the existing studies, the poverty rate among the floating population
is higher than that across the original urban residents. Estimates of the incidence of
urban poverty will increase and the estimated size of the population of urban poor
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will significantly increase when the floating population is taken into consideration.
For example, the study by Du ( 2007) shows that the poverty rate of the floating
population is slightly higher than that of urban local residents, at 10.3% and 8.7%,
respectively. Research by Li (2002) shows that the national average poverty rate
among the floating population is 15.2%. The study also finds that its proportion in
some cities is even higher than 20%. The average poverty rate among the floating
population is about 50% higher than that of the urban registered population. Based on
a review of the actual situation and general living expenses standards,Ma (2005) used
the national per capita living expenses indicator to classify the urban poor population.
If ruralmigration into citieswere to be taken into consideration, the poverty incidence
rate would be estimated at 11% in 2003 and the urban poor population at 60 million.
(1) Estimation based on the existing results
We use existing studies to estimate the current scale of urban poverty.
According to the survey by Du (2007), the poverty incidence of the floating
population is slightly higher than that of urban residents, but the two are roughly
the same. This is mainly due to the mobility of the floating population between
urban and rural areas, and consequently, urbanpoverty is a result of the choice of
living location. When their urban living standard is low, rural migrants choose
to return to their hometowns. The research by Wang (2011) also shows that
the income of the floating population is at times even higher than that of local
residents. This is mainly because they work long hours and intensively, but the
income per unit time may be lower than that of local residents. In addition, the
urban poverty rate, even estimated according to the US$2 a day international
poverty standard, remains at more than 8.5%.5
Using this criterion, we make a conservative estimate of a poverty rate of
8–10% based on income. In 2014, China’s urban population was 749 million,
with a poor population of between about 60million and 75million, comprising
about 18 million ‘registered’ citizens and a floating ‘unregistered’ population
of between about 42 million and 57 million.
(2) Estimation based on a sample survey
In order to investigate poverty levels among the urban floating population and
estimate the numbers of poor migrant workers, we designed a questionnaire
based on the experience of previous studies. We modified and improved the
questionnaire design during pre-survey tests, and conducted a sample survey
among migrant workers in Beijing, Shenzhen and Huizhou. We distributed
a total of 1800 formal survey questionnaires and received a total of 1305
valid questionnaires in response, excluding invalid returns and responses from
residents staying in cities for less than half a year.
We estimated the size of the poor population in the survey results. The
floating population was not covered by the urban minimum living security
standard at the time of the survey, nor were they completely covered by urban
public services. Their poverty can therefore be described as ‘multidimensional
5 In October 2015, the World Bank adjusted the international poverty standard from US$1.25 and
$2 to US$1.9 and $3.1, respectively.
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poverty’ or relative poverty compared to urban residents. The scale of the
relatively poor population is larger than that of the absolute poor population.
The poverty rate calculated according to the relative poverty standard is corre-
spondingly higher than the indicator value obtained according to the absolute
poverty standard.
Based on the previous research experience, we adopted a standard of 50% of
local residents’ per capita consumption expenditure in that year to measure
levels of poverty. A total of 263 poverty samples were identified, with an
overall incidence of poverty at around 20.15%. Based on this, according to the
20% poverty incidence of migrant workers, we estimated that the total number
of migrant workers in China was about 274 million in 2014, and the number
of migrant workers in poverty was about 55 million. The estimated results are
in the range of 8–10% of urban residents living in poverty which accords to
the most credible estimates.
Thus, it can be seen that the size of the ‘registered’ population of urban poor has
decreased in recent years, while that of poor migrant workers has increased. In
2015, the population of urban ‘registered’ poor was about 17 million, and poor
migrant workers around 55 million, accounting for around 75% of the total
of urban poor. Without effective measures to alleviate poverty among migrant
workers and accelerate the process of citizenship, it is likely that the problem
of rural poverty will shift to cities.
5.4.3 Other Dimensions of Poverty Among Urban Migrant
Workers
Sen (1981) argues that poverty means low levels of wealth and the loss of the ability
to acquire more due to inequalities in economic status. Based on existing studies,
combined with the results of our questionnaire survey, we recognise that the quality
of life of urban migrant workers needs to be improved in terms of the nature of
work, family incomeand expenditure, living conditions, social security and children’s
education (Wei et al. 2016; see alsoChap. 14). The first dimension, the nature ofwork,
comprises low wages, long working hours and low skills. First of all, wage levels
are low. Restricted by educational levels, lack of personal skills and information
acquisition, poor migrant workers still greatly rely on their relatives and friends to
get jobs, and usually have to sell their labour cheaply. Long working hours are also
an issue. The survey found that 21.1% of the poor population worked more than
eight hours per day, and nearly 10% worked more than 10 h per day. A third point
is their low level of job skills. Nearly half of all poor migrant workers have not
participated in any form of vocational training, and most of them are engaged in
jobs with low technical requirements, such as nannies, waiters, or in industries with
relatively difficult and dangerous conditions, such as construction, transportation,
handling and loading.
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The second dimension involves issues like small living spaces with relatively
backward facilities. According to the survey, the living area per capita housing for
urban poor migrant workers was only 11.73 m2, less than half of the national average
for urban residents (32.91m2).More than 20%of urban poormigrant workers lived in
simple housing, basements or semi-basements, and nearly 70% lived in dormitories or
one-bedroom apartments, with narrow living space and a tough living environment.
The housing quality indicator for poor migrant workers was only 0.47, measured
by the average ownership rate of various housing facilities (televisions, the internet,
toilets, bathing facilities, refrigerators, air conditioners, etc.). That is lower than the
sample average value of 0.58.
Thirdly, the proportion of rural migrants claiming social security is lower than that
of urban residents, which exacerbates their poverty. According to the survey, only
27.80% of urban poor migrant workers have actively participated in unemployment
insurance schemes, and48.65%of themhave takenoutwork-related injury insurance.
17.76% of them have not participated in any form of medical insurance, and 16.99%
have no form of pension insurance. Poor migrant workers have a strong requirement
for social security assistance, and 40–50% of respondents considered that the level
claiming social security needs to increase.
A fourth element is the proportion of children who do not receive any form of
educationwhere their parents or carerswork.According to the survey, 57.4%of urban
poor migrant workers are compelled to leave their children in their hometowns to
receive education because of their exclusion from hukou or higher tuition fees where
their parents work. Currently, a high proportion of children living with their migrant
worker parents are either too young for school, have dropped out of education or
else reached the legal working age. Many children of migrant workers have to return
to their registered permanent residence for schooling. The survey results also show
that the demand among married migrants for their children’s education (50.77%) is
higher than that of the total samples (43.37%).
At the same time, poverty seriously impedes the willingness of poor migrant
workers to stay in cities. Urban poor migrant workers show a low level of willingness
to settle in cities (24.69%),mainly due to high living costs (71.67%) and issues around
hukou problems (38.20%). Consequently, poorer people give less consideration to
factors affecting where their children live. Among the respondents, 50.75% have not
considered this issue, which is directly related to their lower willingness to stay in
cities.
For further discussion on themultidimensional nature of deprivation, see Chap. 14
which sets out the theoretical basis for indices of multiple deprivation and offers
practical guidelines for estimating them in a Chinese context.
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5.5 Conclusion
Since China’s Reform and Opening-up, the country’s rapid urbanisation and large-
scale internal migration have greatly contributed to social developments and the
promotion of well-being. From 1978 to 2017, China’s permanent urban population
increased from 172 to 813 million, with an increase of 641 million in the overall
population. This accounted for 26% of the world’s new urban population in the same
period. At the same time, in the context of China’s rapid economic and social growth,
benefiting from both income and transfer effects in the process of urbanisation,
China’s rural poor population has decreased by 754 million over the past 40 years.
This marks a contribution of more than 70% to the reduction of global poverty, an
unprecedented and almost miraculous decrease in levels of human poverty.
In recent years, levels of poverty within urban hukou populations in China has
continuously decreased. In contrast, levels of chronic poverty amongmigrantworkers
has continued to grow, accounting for about 75% of the total population of urban
poor. The urban poor population has been increasing in proportion with total urban
numbers, and themultidimensional characteristics of their poverty are significant (see
Chaps. 14 and 15).
As a result, measures to tackle issues of urban/rural inequalities and challenges
around population flows from rural to urban areas and back, have entered a new stage
of higher quality development. In the future, China needs to prioritise these new chal-
lenges, increasing levels of ‘citizenship’, urban-rural integration, and co-ordinated
poverty management, so as to achieve high-quality development and interventions.
Firstly, to address the problem of ‘incomplete urbanisation’, China will have to
accelerate the paceof increasing levels of citizenship and reforming thehukou system.
China suffers from significant structural contradictions in the process of increasing
citizenship. There are higher barriers for permanent settlement in megacities, while
rural migrants are less willing to settle in small and medium-sized cities. To improve
the reformof institutionalmechanisms, such ashukou, land andpublic services,China
should continue to steadily promote the reform of relevant systems, accelerate the
process of citizenship for rural migrants. The aimmust be to narrow the gap between
the urbanisation rate among hukou registered and permanent populations andmigrant
workers.Allied to the provision ofmore adequate and equal public services and social
security, these measures need to focus on comprehensively improving the well-being
of various groups.
Secondly, to address the imbalance between urban and rural development, China
will need a coordinated policy response. This will entail improving the level of
urban-rural integration and development through the implementation of innovative
programmes to revitalise both rural and urban areas. This will help improve the
quantity and quality of capital resources, and encourage labour to flow back into
the countryside. Both rural and urban land need to be utilised more effectively and
comprehensively to facilitate greater interaction and equality between urban and
rural areas. China should also gradually introduce measures to coordinate poverty
management and achieve common prosperity across rural and urban areas.
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Since 1978, China has made great strides to tackle rural poverty, but the prob-
lems of urban poverty, especially among migrant workers, have become increas-
ingly prominent. In future, based on the great achievements in the reduction of rural
poverty, China should accelerate the development of systems to address poverty
comprehensively across urban, rural and migrant poor populations. Issues around
urban poverty need to be integrated into the scope of appropriate organisations dedi-
cated to the alleviation of poverty. The focus of policy in China seems to be shifting
towards the need to address relative and multidimensional poverty and to adopt a
comprehensive approach to resolving urban-rural poverty. This will help lay a solid
foundation for achieving common prosperity across both urban and rural areas.
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Chapter 6
Urban Villages, Their Redevelopment
and Implications for Inequality
and Integration
Ya Ping Wang
Abstract Urban villages are a unique product of China’s rapid urban expansion.
They provide a newway of life sustained by property rental income for local villagers.
More importantly, urban villages provide cheap accommodation for millions of
rural migrant workers in most large cities. Recently, with the increasing demand
for land by commercial developers and public projects, urban villages have become
the targets for redevelopment. This chapter uses a case study village in Beijing as
an example to assess the social and economic impacts of urban village redevelop-
ment on both the original local inhabitants and migrants in rented accommodation.
The case study village went through a very long and complicated redevelopment
process from 2004 to 2017 involving different stages of demolition and relocation.
It provided a rare opportunity to evaluate the effects on the local population, both
pre- and post-redevelopment. The study involved several field visits, observation and
interviews with village residents. It shows that urban village redevelopment offered
no positive benefits for migrant workers who often lost their homes to demolition.
For local villagers, redevelopment and relocation into new flats may improve their
living conditions. However, most suffer from the loss of long-term economic and
income generation opportunities. Moreover, the new property rights for the replace-
ment flats confer no additional rights of citizenship for the relocated villagers who
remain ‘second-class citizens’ within Chinese cities.
Keywords Urbanisation · Urban villages · Land · Village redevelopment ·
Migrants
6.1 Introduction
Urbanisation, industrialisation and globalisation have rapidly transformed China
from a traditional agricultural-based society into a global economic powerhouse
over a period of just 30 years. China’s urban population grew from 20% in 1980
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to 60.6% in 2019 (State Statistical Bureau 2020). However, the country’s rapid
economic development and urban growth remain unbalanced across different regions
and social groups. China boasts some of the most impressive modern urban land-
scape globally, and some Chinese cities are among the most expensive places to live.
Simultaneously, social divisions, income inequality, environmental pollution, traffic
congestion and ecological degradation all pose serious problems to urban residents
and policymakers. Many of these problems and challenges are clearly manifested in
the so-called urban villages (城中村).
In pre-Communist China, major coastal cities developed under Western influence
and took on very different forms to traditional inland cities and towns (Murphey
1980). This colonial versus Chinese division was replaced by urban/rural diver-
gence supported by the hukou (residence registration) during the early years of the
Communist period from 1949 to 1976. Towns and cities housed the non-agricultural
population and functioned as bases for industrial development and administration,
while people living in villages remained peasant food producers. China’s rapid entry
into the global economic system since the 1980s has created new social and spatial
divisions (Wang andMurie 1999;Wang et al. 2009). Traditional rural villages along-
side the fast-growing suburban areas of major cities were either partially urbanised or
entirely overrun by rapid urban sprawl. These villages have been physically absorbed
into towns or cities, but they retain many traditional characteristics in the composi-
tion of their buildings and populations. This distinctive phenomenon within Chinese
urbanisation has changed the simple dichotomy between the rural and the urban, to
create a third category of residential space: the ‘urban village.’ Their populations
comprise large numbers of rural migrants (the ‘floating population’). Modern busi-
ness and commercial districts, occupied by ‘official’ residents and linked closelywith
the global economic system, form a sharp contrast with informal and poor residential
areas represented by urban villages.
The most publicised early urban village in the 1990s was probably Zhejiangcun
(浙江村) in Beijing. Located in the south of the city, the Zhejiangcun district
comprised 24 administrative villages with around 100,000 migrant workers in 1995
(Liu and Liang 1997). Since 2000, almost all villages located within commuting
distances from a city have been turned into urban villages in the prosperous Pearl
River Delta and Yangtze River Delta regions. Traditional family houses have either
been extended or demolished and replacedwith narrow high-rise buildings to provide
rental accommodation to migrant workers. Shenzhen and Dongguan near to Hong
Kong, where the migrant population outnumbers local residents many times, are two
extreme cases. When the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ) was set up in
1980, the government initially took a piecemeal approach to land acquisition from
local villages for development. As urban development intensified and more land was
taken out of agricultural production, all traditional villages became urban villages in
some form.
Traditional Chinese villages were all integrated holistically with agriculture. The
layout of the village settlement was also simple. Each family often occupied a small
courtyard, which contained one or several simple one- or two-storey houses built
of bricks and timber. The courtyards were normally arranged in rows with streets
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running between them. Larger and richer families occupied more buildings and more
yards. As cities grew and the demand for rental housing increased, unplanned and
unauthorised building activities multiplied out of control in many suburban villages.
New houses were constructed with modern materials such as steel and concrete. In
Shenzhen for example, 80% of post-1990 buildings constructed in urban villages by
individual families were between 6 and 9 storeys high. Another 5% were over 10
storeys, and some even reached 20 storeys (Shenzhen City Urban Village Redevel-
opment Planning Working Group 2004). In order to maximise floor space, only very
narrow gaps were left between buildings. This practice resulted in extremely high
density and the so-called ‘kissing buildings.’ It was said that people in different build-
ings could kiss each other through their windows. A Shenzhen government report
showed that urban villages in 2004 occupied a total land area of 9,204 hectares. There
were altogether 307,000 privately owned dwellings, of which 44% were constructed
after 1999. The average size of construction floor space per building was 343 square
metres (Shenzhen City Urban Village Redevelopment Planning Working Group
2004). In Futian District alone, there were 15 urban villages; together, they occupied
390 hectares of land and housed 572,100 migrants and 19,300 local villagers (China
Academy of Urban Planning and Design, Shenzhen Branch 2004).
In other cities, the scale of urban village development was not as large. Neverthe-
less, in the inland city of Xi’an, for example, among the 624 administrative villages
located inside the six urban districts and four development zones, 286 were offi-
cially classified as urban villages in 2010. These urban villages housed 370,000
rural residents. The inner-city areas contained 72 urban villages. These villages had
25,000 households and 89,800 people, most of them rural hukou holders. Xi’an
also includes three suburban districts and counties, where another 40 villages with
a combined population of 90,000 were classified as urban villages (Xi’an Munic-
ipal Urban Village Redevelopment Office, 2010). All these population figures only
include the original village inhabitants. Ifmigrantswere included, the total population
would be at least several times larger.
There is an increasing volume of literature on urban villages in China (Yeh 2005;
Lin 2006). Papers produced outside the country are more concerned about the rights
of local residents andmigrants, working class living conditions, poverty and the poli-
tics of land and property rights, etc. (Fan 1996, 2001; Ma and Xiang 1998; Knight
and Song 1999; Solinger 1999;Wang 2004 and 2019). Researchers often linkChina’s
migrant experiences to the international experience and some compare Chinese
urban villages with slums in other developing countries (Wang et al. 2009). Inside
China, urban villages have been a controversial issue for many years. Mainstream
academic and policy researchers have focused on the negative aspects of unplanned
and overcrowded developments, crime and poor safety records, serious health, envi-
ronmental and sanitary problems. To them, urban villages are the ‘tumours’ of cities
and must be redeveloped. These arguments are often based mainly on the city’s
overall economic, infrastructural and environmental considerations. Urban village
redevelopment rarely considers the interests and needs of a large number of migrant
residents.
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More recently, particularly since the implementation of its 12th Five Year Plan
(2010–2015), the Chinese government has begun to address these serious urban
inequality problems through an integrative and transformative strategy—effectively
introducing a new style of urbanisation. The strategy aims to integrate economic,
political, social, cultural and ecological development. Transformative development
policies shifted from urban and rural division toward urban-rural integration and
equality; from economic and industrial development toward social development;
from environmental degradation toward environmental improvement. These policies
have important socio-economic, political, physical, and environmental implications
for cities, and especially urban villages. To build a harmonious urban society, resi-
dents living in urban villages must be integrated into the local urban communities.
Long-term migrants must also receive the same citizenship rights as others to enable
them to settle in the city and access the social and economic rights they are entitled to.
Urban inequality, segregation and integration have also become hot research topics.
However, such policy changes and newer research emphases have not changed the
overall direction of planning policy, which still inclines toward the elimination and
redevelopment of urban villages, especially in districts with high land values. Poli-
cies focus mainly on physical changes rather than social and economic upgrading of
the poor communities living in the urban villages.
This chapterwill focus on the urban village redevelopment processes and its impli-
cations for inequality and integration. I shall do this by looking closely at the changes
of a case study of urban villages—SC Village, located in the northwest suburbs of
Beijing. SCVillage is interesting because it has been undergoing redevelopment since
2000. Unlike the redevelopment of other villages that are normally completed in a
couple of years, the relocation and redevelopment process in SC Village happened
sporadically for over 15 years. The authorities only achieved complete demolition
and relocation in 2017. The prolonged process highlights many issues and problems
associated with the urban village redevelopment programme. I will discuss the back-
ground context, the long and messy process of redevelopment, the gains and losses
of the original villagers and other stakeholders involved, and the impacts on migrants
who rented accommodation there. I will question the extent to which urban village
redevelopment leads to social integration and as well as the reduction of inequality.
The findings are based on continuous monitoring and observation of the redevel-
opment process over a number of years. I visited the original village and replaced
housing estates between 2009 and 2018 and conducted interviews with residents
before and after relocation.
6.2 Urban Village and Land Ownership
Access to land is a central issue because it is a crucial asset for food production and a key
factor for shelter and community development. How issues related to rights of access are
addressed in development projects and programmes has a direct impact on the livelihood
and security of people not only in rural areas, but in urban and peri-urban settings as well.
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Failure to address the land tenure interests of all stakeholders in land development or land
reform can cause problems and inequalities. These problems can unintentionally fall on the
most vulnerable and disadvantaged members of society. (FAO 2002, p.1)
This statement from the Food and Agricultural Organisation’s tenure studies
provides a guiding principle for dealing with land issues in fast urbanising regions.
It also offers a good theoretical perspective for discussion and analysis about land
development in China. Before we look at our case study for urban village redevel-
opment, it is important to have some understanding of the Chinese rural and urban
land management system.
Chinese land reforms in the 1950s created two different types of land ownership
for urban and rural areas. In urban areas (including the officially defined suburban
areas), land was nationalised and municipal governments became the legal owner
of land on behalf of the state. In rural regions, inherited and unequal private family
land holdings were firstly redistributed across the villages to give poor families their
share. After several collectivisation movements in the 1950s, rural land ownership
was centralised to the village level. Land owned by individual families was pooled for
farming and all villagers became members of collective teams. Before the Commu-
nist era, individual families occupied residential land. After the reforms, collective
teammembers worked together on the main agricultural land with a small proportion
divided between families as private plots. From 1978, agricultural land was redis-
tributed to individual families under the so-called ‘responsibility system’ in order to
stimulate farming activities and increase grain production. Farmers were promised
the right to hold onto the land for at least 15 years, later extended to 30 years, for
production. Land ownership remained collective and individual families could not
sell or change the land to other uses (Wu 1999; Cartier 2001; Zhu 2004 and 2005;
Ho and Lin 2003, 2004; Ding 2003, 2004; Deng and Huang 2004; Yeh 2005).
Under this system of dual land ownership, there was a policy provision for munic-
ipal governments to take over collectively owned land for development. In the 1980s,
when the land was taken over by municipal governments or other new users, mainly
from the public sector under the socialist planned economy, they had to pay compen-
sation to farmers. Simultaneously, new users and municipal governments had to
arrange jobs for working-age farmers affected by the land transfer. As urban-based
employment provided an alternative and more secure way of life to peasant farmers,
the process did not causemuch concern. Farmers also welcomed the practice because
it provided them an opportunity to have a new life in cities or towns. As the urbanisa-
tion process intensified and the planned economic system was replaced by a market
system from the early 1990s, municipal authorities and new land users, no longer all
from the public sector, struggled to find suitable jobs for all those farmers affected.
As a result, compensation changed from job assignments to alternatives such as cash
payments and housing resettlement. Large-scale urban development coupled with
the change of land transfer process created a serious problem of landless farmers and
urban villages around all Chinese cities and towns.
The way that Chinese suburban villages are redeveloped is determined by the
unique urban and rural land ownerships and the channels through which rural land
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is transferred into urban ownership. The definition of land ownership and the mech-
anism for a state monopoly of land development through compulsory purchase and
taking over land may appear clearly defined. In practice, the process, especially
compensation arrangements, is really problematic because collective land ownership
is a very ambiguous concept, as this case study shows. Government land manage-
ment officials, academics, and even some farmers believe that in socialist China,
the village collective ownership of land is only another form of public ownership,
and farmers use of land was granted by the government. When the state requires
the land, the farmers have no other options apart from relocation or some form of
compensation.
6.3 Urban Village Redevelopment: The Case of SC Village
SCVillage is one of the six traditional settlements (natural villages) under the admin-
istration of SCVillage Committee, itself part of the Haidian Zhen (Town or Township
before 2011) in Beijing’s Haidian District. SC Village has a long history. During the
Qing Dynasty, the village was an important agricultural, commercial and handicraft
centre beside the Imperial Palace (圆明园). It benefited from the station of Imperial
Guards from the 8th Military Division (八旗). Commercial activities in the village
declined when the Imperial Palace was destroyed by European invasion at the turn
of the twentieth century. SC Village remained predominately an agricultural area
until 1949. Immediately after the Communist government land reforms, plots were
redistributed to individual farmers. Between 1952 and 1958, various rural collec-
tives were formed. In 1958, SC Village and several other villages in the area formed
the Haidian People’s Commune, which was replaced by the Haidian Township in
1984. Farmland owned by the village was redistributed and contracted to individual
families under the ‘responsibility system’ for farming. Throughout all these periods,
village residential land was under the control of individual families.
From the middle of the 1980s and especially the 1990s, farm land owned by the
village was taken over piece by piece by the Beijing Municipal Government or large
public institutions for urban development. Villagers gradually switched from farming
to other activities, such as seeking jobs in the city or setting up family businesses.
Accommodation and room renting to migrant workers also became amajor source of
family income when urban sprawl reached the area. While most families had come
out of poverty and became prosperous, they remained poor in SC Village like many
other suburban villages. This was due to diversification of economic activities and the
physical and environmental conditions in the village (SC Village Committee 2004).
Houses in the traditional style were not well maintained. A lack of planning control
encouraged new buildings and extensions inside the family courtyards to provide
more rooms for either family expansion or for rent.
Most agricultural activities had ceased by 2000 and cultivated land was taken
over by the municipal government and other public institutions. Rents from migrant
workers became a major source of income. In 2010, on average, each family could
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earn about 5000 yuan amonth from rent (interviewwith residents); butmany villagers
had to sacrifice their privacy and share their homes and facilities with lodgers. The
village lacked some modern infrastructure, especially properly paved roads, sewage
and drainage systems and private flush toilets. The large-scale increase in themigrant
population made the living environment worse day by day. Foul-smelling sewage
flowed openly along the sides of littered streets. Communal latrines and individual
toilets in various traditional formswere dotted around the village with little byway of
the planned structure. Various types of shops and services could be found along the
main streets, including restaurants, food stalls, daily utility shops, barbers, electronic
and car repairs, furniture, construction andDIYmaterials, distributionmarkets, waste
collection and recycling, small and cheap hostels, etc.
SC Village began to plan for redevelopment in 1997. The scheme involved the
relocation of villagers to new nearby high-rise housing estates to free the land for
part of the city’s planned green belt. In 2000, SC Village Redevelopment Plan was
approved as part of the Beijing Green Belt and suburban village renewal scheme.
The Haidian Township Government established the Beijing Wangseng Real Estate
Development Company Ltd to carry out the redevelopment in the same year. The new
relocation housing was on a new nearby housing estate - WSY Residential Estate,
about 500 metre away on a piece of remaining farmland owned by the village.
Original villagers (homeowners, excluding migrants) were to relocate to this new
housing estate. Construction work started in the autumn of 2000 and most buildings
in the new estate were completed by 2004.
The completion of the new housing estate was intended to bring this traditional
village into the normal life of the capital city and integrate the villagers with the
local urban community. The physical changes were, however, not completed, nor
were they matched by social developments. During visits each year from 2008 to
2015, it became apparent the old SC village was still there; only about half of the
traditional houses were demolished before 2008. As relocation and compensation
deals were negotiated between the residents and the developer on a family-by-family
basis, some families accepted the relocation terms and moved to new flats in the
WSY Estate. Their old houses were pulled down. Families who did not accept the
relocation terms stayed. Demolition was selective and spread out across the village,
so the remaining residents lived among the ruins of their neighbours’ demolished
houses and blocked roads and streets (Fig. 6.1).
6.3.1 Life in the Half-Demolished Village
The remaining families could not reach a satisfactory relocation and compensation
agreement with the village authority and development company because they felt
that:
• The decision-making process lacked transparency and they were not properly
consulted.
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Fig. 6.1 Traditional houses and street in SC Village, partially demolished in March 2008
• There was confusion over the organisation and responsibilities of the redevelop-
ment process.
• There was confusion over the relocation and compensation policies and practice.
• There were unclear legal bases for the relocation.
Essentially, they were either not satisfied with the amount of cash compensation
offered to them and/or with the new flat they might receive if moved. The remaining
residents believed that powerful and rich families could bribe either the demolition
company who carried out both the physical clearance and handled compensation on
behalf of the developer, or the village leaders, who had control over the developer
and the demolition company, for better deals. As a result, relatively poor families
and larger families with small properties and therefore entitled to less compensation,
had been left behind. Early movers were often given various incentives and had the
right to select houses on the new estate, whereas those left behind had to choose
from poorly located flats on undesirable floor levels or locations, for example elderly
people may have to move to flats located on the 5th or 6th (top) floors. There were
no lifts in these buildings.
Some complaints, such as the actions of corrupt officials, were verified by some
of the ongoing building activities inside the partially demolished village. A one-story
house was built in 2008, even after the demolition process had already begun. The
new house also took over part of the old village street. The remaining residents cited
this as an example of power abuse and corruption. ‘If they can build it, they will also
have a way to claim compensation,’ said one local resident during the 2008 visit.
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There was no more evidence of demolitions between 2008 and 2015, but more new
buildings were constructed over the demolished area. Some of the new buildings seen
in 2010 were much bigger than traditional houses. They were up to three storeys in
height with 10 to 15 rooms on each floor (Fig. 6.2). One new three-storey dormitory-
style building had 10 rented rooms on each floor. The common corridors shared by
tenants were well maintained. Rent for these rooms (about 12 square metres each)
ranged from 550 to 650 yuan per month in 2010. The total rent for the whole building
could be over 18,000 yuan per month. ‘The landlord did not live here. His family
had a house somewhere else’, according to the caretaker of the building. Two new
buildings next door were also three storeys in height, but were built together at the
same time. They offered similar rooms for rent. ‘These buildings belong to two
landlords, they are relatives,’ tenants reported. When villagers in both old and new
areas were asked who built these new rental houses, they all indicated that it was
village leaders. ‘Who else can do that?’ When asked whether they built on their
original courtyard, the villagers replied, ‘No, they built on land freed by others.’ Did
they build these houses for more compensation in the future? ‘Not necessarily, they
just take advantage of the free land at the time. They know that the final clear up is
not going to happen soon, by the time it has to be demolished, they will earn enough
money,’ local residents said.
There appears to be no pressure for them to move for several years as for the
remaining residents. As SC Village was planned as part of the green belt for the city,
no commercial developer was there to push forward the relocation and demolition
process. Suppose this land was planned for other uses such as commercial housing.
Fig. 6.2 A new house built inside the half-demolished village
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In that case, the relocation process could be much faster and possibly even violent
as commercial developers could not afford to wait so long. During the 2008 visit,
a large bulldozer was parked at the entrance of the village, waiting to push more
houses down. It had disappeared by 2010.
Collectively owned properties, as well as residential buildings, were also rented
out to migrant workers. A row of enterprise workshops owned by the village was
turned into a rental accommodation. Because of the poor quality and facilities, rent
was 200 yuan per month in 2008, cheaper than the properly built dormitories. The old
village committee office quarter was also rented out to migrant workers. However,
the rental income from these collectively owned properties did not necessarily end
up in the communal village fund. Some of these properties were ‘contracted out’ to
individuals many years ago. Their contracts have not yet run out, although the use
has changed from township industries or businesses to rented accommodation.
There were about 2000 original residents in the village before the relocation,
and around half of them moved into the new estate. Local residents estimated that
more than 30,000 peoplewere living in this half-demolished village in 2010. The total
population had definitely increased substantially by 2013.Most tenants weremigrant
workers from rural areas or other cities. Sanitary conditions in the village declined.
The streets were very muddy and malodorous, with rubbish dumps scattered here
and there, often on top of debris from demolished houses. More shops, restaurants,
barbers, snooker halls and other amenities emerged to serve the increased popula-
tion. A small supermarket also opened in the village in 2010. Despite the declining
environmental quality of life, the economic activities in this half-demolished village
were much more vibrant and dynamic in 2013 than in 2008 (Fig. 6.3).
6.3.2 Life in the New Housing Estate
The new housing estate, WSY Xiaoqu, consists of around 20 mainly six-story tene-
ment buildings without lifts (Fig. 6.4). It was also visited several times since 2008.
Most buildings were occupied during that time, manifested by the amount of clothes
hinging at balconies, steel barbed-wire windows, and air conditioning units fixed on
the external walls. Only a small proportion of buildings remained empty, still waiting
for those who had yet to move in. The number of empty flats was definitely not
enough to accommodate those left behind in the old village. Some residents claimed
that powerful families had bought two or more flats, and some were sold to people
who were not residents of the original village. Trees and gardens between buildings
weremore established andmore cars were found parked beside the buildings in 2013.
Those who had moved early were relatively happier when interviewed in 2008
because of the significant change in the general living environment and modern
facilities that came with the move. However, the positive mood appears to have
declined over time. ‘There were a lot of attractions for us to give up our old house
and move into a new flat in this estate, but I personally would prefer to stay in my
original home. My old house brought us steady rental income and the money looked
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Fig. 6.3 Typical street of old SC Village in 2010: increasing economic activities and population,
but declining living environment
Fig. 6.4 Replacement flats in WSY (left) and new Village Committee office (right)
after my whole family. In the new housing estate, we have no extra space to rent and
we have to pay for everything. We have to earn money somewhere else to look after
this flat. I know the living environment in our old village was poor, but we could
have improved the environment rather than destroy it’ (Interview with a resident in
2010).
Another resident also said, ‘I miss our life as farmers very much. It was a pity
to see our fertile cropland and houses being turned into open space. Our land had
served us for generations. I don’t know what lies ahead for us and our children.’
When asked about life in the new estate, one resident summarised: ‘There were
both advantages and disadvantages in moving here. In general disadvantages were
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more than advantages. The main problem is that in the past we could earn rent from
our houses, now there is no such income, but we have to spend money every day on
everything, including estate management fees. My family of three was given a flat
about 90 square metres of floor space. After paying the costs of the new house, we
also received about 600,000 yuan (other families could have more—700,000). This
sounds a lot of money before you move. If everything is fine after the move, it can
run for few years. If someone fell sick, the money could run out very quickly.’ ‘When
you have nothing to do everyday, you tend to become sick easily. Many people my
age now have diabetes’ (Middle age resident living in the estate).
‘Do you regret moving to here?’ ‘Yes, we should have stayed. Now they [the
government] will have to pay a much higher compensation. The families who stayed
behind will eventually get a better deal.’ ‘Why did you agree tomove in the first place
then?’ ‘They want Communist Party members, Communist Youth League members
to set examples for others. Families were dealt individually, household by household
behind doors. They offered a little more money as incentives each time, and we
eventually gave up’ (Local resident).
New houses in the estate were the so-called xiaochanquan housing—those with
limited property rights (小产权房)—as the land they occupy is still owned collec-
tively by the village rather than the state. These houses cannot be legally traded in
the open market. This seems not to have concerned some residents who continue to
rent or to sell properties on the estate. Advertisements on walls inside the estate and
at the nearby estate agency offices showed that in summer 2010:
• A one-bedroom flat with furniture (56 m2) in WSY could rent for 2000 yuan per
month (equivalent to the rent of four rooms in the old village).
• A two-bedroom flat with some furniture (80 m2) could get 2500 yuan per month.
These rents were cheaper than similar flats in commercial housing estates in the
area. A similar-sized two-bedroom flat on a neighbouring commercial estate could
get around 3,000 yuan per month. A one-bedroom flat (64 m2) atWSYwas marketed
for 960,000 yuan. The asking price for a two-bedroom flat (88 m2) was 1.05 million
yuan. These were one-off payment cash prices. As these properties do not have full
property rights, no bank loans can be secured. These sale priceswere alsomuch lower
than those in the commercial market housing estates. For example, the sale price per
square metre of construction floor space in the neighbouring upmarket estate Boya
Garden, was more than 50% higher than that in WSY. Not many ordinary residents
in WSY could afford to sell or rent their flats, as these houses were their only homes.
The new estate is managed by an estate management company set up by the
village committee. The estate management fee was relatively low compared with
commercial housing estates (Table 6.1). On average, each family had to pay about
1000 yuan management fee per year. If there were highly paid workers in the family,
this should not pose a problem. If there were only lowly paid manual workers, the
advertised service sector wage in the area was around 1,500 yuan per month, the
family will have to rely on the compensation money they receive. Residents seem
to take the estate management issue casually: ‘If we cannot afford the fee, we don’t
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Table 6.1 Real estate management charges at the relocation housing estate
Name of charge Annual rate of charge Rate of Tax Payable (%) Charge plus tax*
1. Gardening 0.55 per m2 5.5 58.03
2. Sewage 0.3 per m2 5.5 31.65
3. Management fee 2.4 per m2 5.5 253.2
4. Small repairs 2.36 per m2 5.5 248.98
5. Maintenance of public
facility
1 per m2 5.5 105.5
6. Building maintenance 5.42 per m2 5.5 571.81
7. Service charge 12 per flat 5.5 12.66
8. Waste and rubbish
collection and disposal
30 per flat 5.5 31.65
9. Public security and
neighbourhood watch
60 per flat 5.5 63.3
10. Cleaning and public
health
24 per flat 5.5 25.32
11. Other
Total 1402.10
*Based on a unit of 100 m2 of construction floor space
Source BeijingWSY Real Estate Management Company, August 2010
pay it. They [the Village Committee] have a lot of money from renting collectively
owned properties and other business’ (Resident).
6.3.3 The Final Clearance
For a few years around the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, local authorities across
the capital took a rather relaxed approach toward residential resistance to village
redevelopment in order to avoid social disorder and confrontations. This was one of
the reasons why the redevelopment process dragged for so long in SC Village. The
half-demolished village was eventually cleared away in late 2016 and early 2017,
more than 15 years from the initial launch of the village redevelopment project.
The changing national and municipal political climate facilitated this move. At the
national level, there was an emphasis on the improvement of the urban living envi-
ronment and a campaign for speedy renewal of urban shanty towns. At the municipal
level, there were policies to improve the general public images of the city, reduce the
population of those on lower incomes, including migrants and removal of polluting
industries. The municipal government had a very ambitious plan to reduce the total
population in the six urban districts by 15% over five years (3% a year). To achieve
this target, many political and economic measures were employed. By 2017, many
small informal businesses were shut down, such as small restaurants, shops, fruits
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and vegetable stores/stands andmarkets, through theComprehensiveUrbanManage-
ment (城市综合整治), and Health, Sanitation and Safety Inspection (卫生治安大
检查) schemes. Lower end or informal economic activities such as waste/recycling
material sorting and wholesale trade (批发市场) in Beijing were also moved out
of the main urban areas and relocated to the surrounding provinces and counties.
Most of these activities took place in urban village settings. The city government
also turned its back on low-income migrants. The campaign aimed to eliminate
informal commercial and employment activities, and premises which provide jobs
for unskilled migrant workers. In the past, the informal sector flourished through the
so-calledwaqiang kaidong (literally: replace walls with shops and open windows for
commercial activities). The new policy aims to mend and repair the walls and close
the window shops in residential areas. Any unplanned extensions of buildings used
as commercial activities can be demolished.
Urban villages like SC Village became the target for clearance. In August 2016,
SC Village Residential Committee relaunched the relocation project, which involves
1224 yards/houses and 3149 persons across an area of 216,000 m2 (Xu 2019).
The main reasons given by the Village Committee for the redevelopment project
were:
• Improving the general living environment in the district.
• Beautification of the area.
• Reduction of non-local population.
New relocation flats were built and made available in a nearby new housing
estate—Lijingyuan (丽景苑小区). Families and residents with local hukou rights
were given another chance to sign the relocation agreement with the developer. The
relocation and compensation arrangements for traditional house owners include:
• A new flat in the new housing estate with a standard allocation of 50 m2 floor
space per qualified person for only locally registered hukou holders.
• Housing floor space in an existing house could be exchanged for new housing,
provided it fits within the 50 m2 standard.
• If old housing floor space is large, cash compensation will be given for extra floor
area (above 50 m2 per person) at 40,000 yuan/ m2.
• Only housing floor space with legal and registered entitlement will be exchanged
or compensated.
Under this new political climate, it is not surprising to find that most remaining
families quickly accept their location terms and move away. By the March 2017
visit, over 95% of the remaining families had signed the compensation agreement,
and only a few of the original houses remained standing. Posters with large characters
were hung on these houses issuing strong warnings to put pressure on the remaining
residents to move. The water supply had been cut and one woman fetched water from
a nearby tapwhich continued to run. The electricity supply remained on. Interviewees
said that therewas great pressure on them to accept the terms andmove. Some of them
were still not happy for the same reasons given previously: ‘People with connections
and power can negotiate a better deal for their family.’ But all agreed that they had
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to move eventually. By late 2017, the whole area was cleared for the city park. The
general compensation scheme appears better than that offered during the last round,
when only 30 m2 replacement houses were allowed. The unit cash compensation
for larger houses was also higher, but house prices in the area had at least tripled.
No residents expressed regret at not moving during the first round. Although they
have lived in poorer conditions for another 10 years, they could now enjoy larger
replacement housing floor space (50 rather than 30 m2).
6.3.4 Impacts on Renters and Migrants
The impact of the redevelopment of SC Village on migrant workers was similar to
that of other urban village redevelopment schemes across the country, losing their
temporary home without relocation arrangement and compensation. The only option
was to move away from where they had been living. The notice in large characters
placed upon the walls in SC village for migrants is very telling:
…. All accommodation-renter friends, you have been living in SC Village for some time
and your intelligence and hard work have made great contributions to the local economic
development and environmental protection. We are very grateful!
…… you come from all over the country, but all have high moral and civilised standards,
hope you can see the overall picture …. Understand and support our redevelopment works;
find newproduction and living places as soon as possible to ensure the smooth redevelopment
work (SC Village Residential Committee 2019).
No one cares where migrants and other room renters go. In most cases, migrants
will try to find a similar type of accommodation nearby for living or business oper-
ation, normally in another urban village slightly further away from the city centre.
In SC Village’s case, the delay in demolition and the revival of the old village gave
migrant families many more years stay in this preferable location, with affordable
housing and good access to nearby jobs. The development of informal economic
activities in the village also provided many of them with employment opportunities;
although their living conditions were similar to those in other urban villages, they
were very poor in comparison to new and properly planned and built areas. With
the more recent round of redevelopment, migrants all face very serious challenges.
As large-scale urban village redevelopment clears away many areas similar to SC
Village, the housing choices for low-income migrants become fewer and fewer. One
of the main overall urban priorities for the municipal government is to reduce the
low-income population. This means many migrants who lived in SC Village may
have to move to other cities or return to their rural homes in other provinces.
A male migrant lived in SC Village for more than 10 years, running a waste
collection and recycling business. He was one of the few left in the village in 2017,
cleaning some old aluminium window frames from the ruins when interviewed. His
wife only joined him recently. She worked as a cleaner in the area and earned about
2000 yuan per month. They have two grow up children, neither of them living with
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their parents. Due to the redevelopment, they have to find a new place to live and
work. Informal waste collection and sorting are unwelcome in the city; they may
have to give up and return home.
Beijing does not welcome migrants anymore. Many small businesses and shops were shut
down. We cannot find reasonable food anymore. In the past, we could get a bowl of noodles
for around 10 yuan, not anymore. …We migrants cannot afford to eat in proper restaurants,
the only way now is to buy instant noodles from the supermarket. … For a large city like
Beijing, migrants are necessary, why drive us all away? (Migrant living in the village).
6.3.5 Other Parties in the Redevelopment Process
The redevelopment of urban villages involves a change of land use from agricul-
tural activities to urban uses. The process is complicated and involves many other
stakeholders. With the market reform in cities, land values increased substantially in
all areas. Land-use changes have become a very contentious economic and political
issue. We looked at the impacts of the process on the original village residents and
migrant workers. This section will focus on the other main players involved in the
project.
The Constitution and central government policies laid down the main guide-
lines for state land requisition, development and compensation. Local governments
produce detailed policies on redevelopment and compensation levels for their area.
In Beijing, theMunicipal Construction Land Compensation and RelocationMethods
list the bodies responsible for land requisition and compensation. At themunicipality
level, the Land and Resources Management Bureau controls land-related compensa-
tion and relocation management. The Labour and Social Security Bureau is respon-
sible for the employment of working-age farmers and arrangement of social security
such as pension and health insurance. The Civil Affairs Bureau looks after other,
non-working age people affected by the requisition. At District and County level,
the corresponding departments take the same responsibilities within their jurisdic-
tion. Other relevant government organisations, including the township government
are required to assist and help with the land requisition process. Rural economic
organisations and village committees are required to assist the process and perform
appropriate works (BeijingMunicipal Government 2004). Figure 6.5 shows themain
actors in the SC Village redevelopment process. This is also why residents in SC
Village felt the whole process was confusing and they did not know exactly where
responsibilities lay. They were dealing with the demolition company on the surface,
but in reality, there was a thick web of interests and powers in the background.
Firstly, the municipal government planned and negotiated the redevelopment
project with the district government, the town/township government, and the village
committee. The municipal government, in theory, has to make sure there is enough
land for development; at the same time, it has to implement central government poli-
cies to protect agricultural lands and ensure a sufficient food supply. It also has an
obligation to ensure farmers’ interests are protected when land is required. In prac-
tice, the national food security priorities were not on top of the agenda for municipal
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Fig. 6.5 Key stakeholders in village redevelopment and compensation
authorities, especially in the national capital city. Municipal governments are more
interested in economic growth andmeeting their financial demands. In relation to this
particular village relocation project, it seems that the municipal and district govern-
ment did not play a major role. In fact, the fate of the project was largely determined
by the government even before it was started. The municipal government plays a
crucial role in determining land uses and land values through its urban planning
functions.
The value of a piece of land could be changed substantially by planning poli-
cies. While most fresh agricultural land in the surrounding areas has been appro-
priated and used for very profitable purposes, including commercial housing estates
and the high profile Shangdi Information and Technology Industrial Park, the area
occupied by SC Village and many other villages was intended to form part of the
green belt in the northwest sector of the city. SC Village residents were to move
into a high rise and higher-density new housing estates under the plan, and the land
freed would be used for planting trees and open spaces. This reduced the market
value of the traditional village residential area to nothing. To help with the village
redevelopment and relocation, a municipal government fund had to be provided
to pay compensation, which was often fixed and limited. This means that the SC
Village redevelopment could never produce the millionaires created by other highly
profitable redevelopment projects in the city. For SC Village residents, the rede-
velopment aimed only to improve their living conditions. This planning practice is
very common in suburban areas of the city. In another case at the nearby village of
Houying (后营), planning simply increased the original building density to enable
redevelopment and also to accommodate villagers relocated from the neighbouring
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settlement of Liulangzhuang. The land freed by Liulangzhuang village was used for
other purposes.
Another important issue for SC Village’s redevelopment was also determined
by the government. Under normal circumstances, this type of redevelopment would
involve a process of land ownership transfer from the village collectives to themunic-
ipal government, for both pieces of residential land—the old village and new housing
estates. In SCVillage, the old village residential landwas taken over by themunicipal
government for the urban green belt and the Village Committee was compensated
for helping with the redevelopment. In the case of the new housing estate, there was
no change in village collective land ownership. The government only allowed this
piece of agricultural land to be used for village relocation and housing development.
This means the new housing estate remains a ‘rural’ community, rather than an urban
community, with a ‘Village Residential Committee’, not an urban ‘Neighbourhood
Committee’. Those residents who moved into the estate only own part of the prop-
erty, the so-called ‘small rights’ property, because the land they occupy is not state
owned. For ‘small rights’ properties, the title for all rural village houses, has a much
lower market value in Chinese cities, as discussed above in the section on rent levels
and house prices. The government also retains the right to redevelop these types of
areaswhenever it becomes necessary. This land ownership arrangement considerably
differentiates the new housing estate from neighbouring commercial housing estates
and the move to the new housing estate became less attractive to many of the original
residents of SC Village. Even for these who moved, their integration with the urban
community is not complete.
Under the municipal government, district authorities—the Haidian District in
SC Village’s case—and the town/township government, Haidian Town, both played
important roles in the redevelopment process. The implementation of municipal
government land use and planning policies were carried through the District govern-
ment and its relevant departments. TheHaidian Town authorities were involved in the
organisation of the redevelopment and direct negotiationwith theVillageCommittee.
Theoretically speaking, theVillage Committee is a self-governing organisation of the
rural collective and ismade up by representatives from among the residents. In reality,
the Village Committee is also the lowest branch of the government system, which
follows orders from the Haidian Town authorities. When the government required
village land, the Village Committee members had to face the choice between two
different responsibilities: to help the government to secure the land for development
or protect villagers’ interests. It is almost impossible for the Village Committee to
stand against the government’swishes by holding back the land.At best, it can bargain
for more compensation for both themselves and the village as a whole. In some
instances, there was strong resistance from individual village committee members.
This explains the reason that residents were often unhappy with their village and
township leaders.
Rather than organising and carrying out the redevelopment directly, it is common
practice for township government and village committees to hire demolition and
development companies to implement the schemes. Ostensibly, this seems to follow
the principle of an openmarket economy. It also avoids direct confrontations between
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the township/village officials and individual residents, which sometimes creates
irregular opportunities that are difficult to check. Suppose the developerwas a general
commercial company for a piece of commercially valuable land. In that case, the
township government and the village committee may work together on behalf of
the residents for a better compensation scheme. In the SC Village case, the fixed
amount of compensation came from themunicipal government. This put the township
government, the village committee, and the residents into very different negotiation
positions. The developer was set up and owned by the township government with
support from the Village Committee. This leaves individual families to struggle with
themachinery of the whole development process, including their Village Committee,
the demolition company, and the town government. It is not surprising that some poor
and less powerful families were left behind.
6.4 Conclusion
Urbanisation is the process of converting rural residents into urban citizens, and citizenisation
is therefore the essence of urbanisation.
(Pan and Wei 2013, p.3)
China’s urbanisation level has increased exponentially over the last three decades.
About one-third of the urban population are migrants, some 240 million in 2013, and
suburban landless farmers. These groups of people have often been segregated from
the established urban residents, and their inequality is enormous. The integration of
rural migrants and landless farmers in Chinese cities is a process known as citizeni-
sation. To achieve the desired overall level of urbanisation, China needs to convert
390 million rural residents into urban citizens by 2030. Wei and colleagues at the
China Academy of Social Sciences identified several areas of change that are essen-
tial indicators of a successful citizenisation process for individuals or families (Wei
and Pan 2016). These include:
• A change of social status from agricultural hukou registered at the migrant’s
original village to local urban residence hukou.
• Being granted full political rights: as migrant workers, rural residents do not have
the right to stand for election in cities.
• Being given access to social and public services: migrants do not have a right for
many social and public services such as health, education, employment, social
security and housing welfare.
• A change in economic situation and life style: most rural to urbanmigrant workers
are engaged in low level and low paid and insecure jobs. Their income is relatively
low and their personal and family economic situation is often poor.
• Development of cultural and other social capitals: it is often assumed that rural
residents and migrant workers possess backward cultural habits and customs
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which are not suitable for urban life. The lack of proper education and training
opportunities made their situation worse.
• Finally, being accepted by the urban society where they live.
Measured against these criteria, SC Village’s redevelopment shows a very mixed
picture. Firstly, it contributed little or nothing toward the integration of rural migrants
who lived in the village. The final redevelopment ended their association with the
village and loss of their rental and temporary homes in the area. The delayed demoli-
tion of the original village benefited themigrantsmost, as they (over 100,000 of them)
gained a few peaceful and undisturbed years, though living under poor conditions.
In relation to inequality, the redevelopment scheme increased rather than decreased
the gaps between the migrants and other urban residents, both economically and
politically. In terms of migrant integration and citizenisation, migrants have to find
a new place in the city and start all over again.
For the original villagers, the landless farmers, there are obvious improvements in
their general living environment. Themodern flats in the new housing estates provide
essential amenities and facilities such as water, electricity, gas, sewage and drainage.
There are no more dangerous buildings, muddy roads, or shared unhygienic toilets.
Many families no longer share their houses with lodgers and enjoy some privacy.
On the other hand, they have lost many economic opportunities. Traditional village
houses had economic functions alongside the living spaces. There is no way that
the new replacement flats can be extended to create more rooms for renting. Family
members had to find secure jobs in the city to earn a good income. Many of them
did not succeed and rely on the compensation payments, which could last for some
years if there were no major costs such as medical bills or other emergencies. All
these changes are related to the loss of control of the housing land they had for
generations. Balancing the gains and losses, some residents felt the relocation was
not a good move. Redevelopment is not the preferred choice for many villagers.
The redevelopment process may have a very limited effect on levels of inequality
among the village residents. Families with larger residential plots and larger houses
had more bargaining power and would receive both more compensation and reloca-
tion housing floor space. Large families with a smaller residential plot and smaller
traditional houses would receive less compensation and smaller flats. A superficial
comparison between urban villagers and other urban residents could conclude that the
redevelopment process enables villagers to capitalise rural collective land ownership
and exchange it for new and modern flats, bringing their lifestyle into line with the
rest of the population. In reality, the loss of land resources could affect the economic
life and community support network for this and future generations. Urban village
redevelopment actually created a special category of residents, one that differs from
other urban communities in property management and ownership. The only differ-
ence is that the whole village now occupies less land and people continue living in
a self-managed high-rise settlement.
The unique situation in SC Village and the long period of confrontation between
the developer, the officials and residents, provide a useful case study for under-
standing the problems associated with urban village relocation and redevelopment.
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Superficially, the problematic redevelopment process resulted from poor manage-
ment and the corruption of local and village officials. A closer analysis highlights
deeply-rooted problemswithin theChinese land ownership system. The initial design
of the project by the government resulted in unfair treatment of the villagers. Even
if there was no local corruption, the new relocated housing estates would still have
become second-class communities in the modern city. In this sense, if we must
identify a loser, it would be the village as a whole, not just those who were left
behind for years and only moved recently. In addition to the specific issues around
land ownership system, there is a larger theme that comes through in many of the
examples described in this case study, and that is the need for policymakers to think
throughmore carefully the unintended consequences of reforms, and to respondmore
sympathetically and proactively to the concerns of those affected.
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and Construction of New Communities
A Comparative Study of Four Low-Income Settlements
Guoqing Li
Abstract Large-scale shantytown renovation initiated in 2005 has completely
changed the living environment of lower-income residents in Chinese cities. It has
also brought about great changes in the make-up of urban communities. Over 100
million people now live in newly renovated former shantytowns, creating a new type
of community across China’s cities and towns. This chapter summarises the evolu-
tionary phases in this process, outlining the characteristics and the different models
involved. It then uses research from field investigations into four models of shanty-
town reconstruction to consider changes in social mobility and levels of segregation
within the reconstructed communities. It also establishes the more holistic features
of these new communities as a model for future development and greater social inte-
gration. The process draws on the shared heritage—the ‘roots and souls’—of earlier
communities and reshapes ‘shantytown removal’ in a more socially integrated way
for the future development of Chinese urban society.
Keywords Shantytown renovation · Low-income settlement · New type of
community · Shantytown removal
7.1 Introduction
Urban development follows a historically constant rhythm of rise and fall. Cities do
not simplygrowbut also shrink anddecline.Contemporary urban regression ismainly
due to rapid changes in industrial structure. For instance, the economy of a rising
industrial or mining city may suddenly decline as resources are exhausted, leading
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to structural and social decline. Faced with ‘Resource Curse,’1 the process of urban
development changes from one of peripheral growth into a standard development
model that aims to improve the efficiency of urban interior space. The urban renova-
tion strategy then shifts focus from revitalisation, improvement and micro-updating
to the concurrent regeneration of older areas alongside the introduction of large, new
development projects. Meanwhile, contemporary ideological trends that emphasise
continuity with the traditional context, such as inclusive and sustainable develop-
ment, encourage a more comprehensive approach. This includes both social inno-
vation and economic renovation and takes community as the essential foundational
factor. The contemporary approach to urban regeneration involves remodelling the
quality of life, and re-establishing and re-constructing positive community relations.
The renovation of China’s shantytowns is a successful example of contemporary
urban regeneration in practice.
Most existing studies on urban renovation in China consider ancient big cities,
such as old Beijing and the ‘three-olds’ (old towns, old factories and old villages) in
Guangdong. Few studies cover shantytown renovation. From the perspective of tradi-
tional approaches to urban regeneration, the renovation of shantytowns is a lesser
form of urban regeneration. Chinese urbanisation has grown at an unprecedented rate
and scale since the 1970s. As the process continued into the present century, China
began to optimise and upgrade the stock of urban buildings. This process has not
only changed the urban architectural scene but also directly influenced social struc-
tures. The renovation of shantytowns has also dramatically changed urban commu-
nities. The typical classifications for Chinese communities were traditional: those
connectedwith organisations, those consisting of commercial, residential houses, and
those with a combination of organisationally run and commercial residential houses.
These classifications correspond to the shift from a communist collectivist system
to a market economy, with consequent changes in geo-social structures (Community
Informatization Research Centre, Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, 2014; Li Guoqing, 2007). It represents a substantial and significant shift.
When the shantytown renovation project nears completion in 2020, over a hundred
million people will live in some 54 million newly renovated shantytown houses,
accounting for about 10% of China’s total population. These newly renovated sites
will undoubtedly form new communities within Chinese towns and cities.
Urban life is becoming more individualised on a global level, with enhanced
administrative infrastructures developing to support this transition. In the case of
the refurbishment of Chinese shantytowns, the government and residents made high
demands for community sustainability and services. An emphasis on the role of the
communities themselves in slum regeneration developed only gradually worldwide.
Such communities were generally seen as passive social groups with limited active
1 The resource curse refers to the income gap often observed between ‘rich regions with access
to advanced technology and regions that are rich in natural resources but poorer in technology’
(Cao et al. 2015, p.1). This gap, sometimes called the ‘paradox of plenty’, can lead to ‘can lead
to a Kuznets trap, in which economic inequalities between the rich and the poor increase during
the process of socioeconomic development. This can also lead to depletion of natural resources,
environmental degradation, social instability, and declining socioeconomic development’ (ibid).
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functions. UN-Habitat, in the 2003 report The Challenge of Slums: Global Report
on Human Settlements noted a change in attitude towards the involvement of ‘folk
society’ and rural dwellers in the improvement of living standards and the promotion
of the democratisation process (UN-Habitat 2003, 190). The report emphasised that,
collective management is also an important feature for the redevelopment of lower-
income settlements at the broader, societal level. A series of working groups and
organisations are typically established to realise such collective endeavours effec-
tively. These could include everything from water supply and other utilities to health
services, education, health services, security and crime control. Voluntary and non-
profit making groups and associations are also an effective way to mobilise and
empower women in the decision-making process.
In China, the government both coordinates and strongly promotes shantytown
community engagement in the redevelopment of former shantytowns. The govern-
ment provides residents with comprehensive social security through a two-way
process of community engagement. Meanwhile, government agencies actively culti-
vate the ‘self-service’ capacity of community organisations to empower them to
make their own decisions in post-shantytown renovation. These communities largely
consist of low-income earners, unlike those living in collective or in commercial,
residential properties. Residents are consequently faced with the important task of
developing their quality of life. The community becomes a crucial ‘reciprocal plat-
form’ for two-way engagement with the administrative authorities. Not only does
the community cooperate with the administration to provide social security services,
but also helps to shape and diversify the services they receive.
Various studies chart the transition from a communist collective system to more
communal or grass-roots systems within a market economy (Sun Liping 2003) as the
process unfolded, the responsibility for managing the social life of residential ‘units’
transferred to the communities themselves (Yipeng et al. 2014). The second phase
involved the transition from ‘community management’ to ‘community governance’.
At its heart was the empowerment of the public to participate in community affairs.
Stakeholders were mobilised to form co-operative and mutual forms of governance
and thereby invigorate social vitality (Qiang and Ying 2015). Hitherto, investigations
into community structures were always derived from studies on system transition,
social governance and organisational development. They lacked the awareness of
problemswith community structures as the standard, and lacked studies showing how
to realise sustainable community development. As a result, they failed to develop a
‘discourse’ system centred on the community itself.
The social science disciplines have yet to fully explore and discuss these transi-
tions. There is a dearth of studies of the preliminary stages of such developments
and there is a need to clarify the relevant background information and knowledge
required. To encourage this process, this chapter first briefly outlines the spatial–
temporal characteristics of shantytown renovation. We then consider four types of
shantytown to chart their formation, their separation frommainstream urban society,
and various mechanisms for their renovation, development and integration as new
forms of urban community. According to varied and complex historical processes and
context, the four types of shantytowns shaped community characteristics in different
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ways. Strategies for spatial management and social governance and their impact on
communities varied during the process of shantytown renovation. Nevertheless, the
four shantytown models share many features in common. They are characterised by
a drastic renovation of social and industrial infrastructures against a background of
a shared tradition in the ‘communist collective system.’ There have been dramatic
changes in both their original physical layout and structures as well as the geo-
political structures of Chinese society during the era of market reform. The rich
and complex process of historical development that affects these newly renovated
shantytowns can be encapsulated into a single conceptual framework where lower-
income settlements are transformed into new forms of urban community. The chapter
concludes by comparing the varying abilities of these four types of community to
establish a shared economic base and common consciousness. What is required
is a transformation of the heart and soul of these shantytowns to integrate more
fully with the future development of mainstream urban society. An understanding
of this process will inform the emergence of new lower-income communities and
settlements in China.
7.2 Phases and Features of Shantytown Renovation
Large-scale shantytown renovation in China started in Liaoning Province in 2005.
As urban redevelopment gathered pace, shantytown renovations were initially under-
taken as humanitarian projects to improve the living conditions of lower-income
groups. With changes in domestic and foreign policies, it became a new engine to
boost economic growth and promote urban regeneration. The process offered benefits
across social, economic and urban developments.
7.2.1 Three Phases of Shantytown Renovation
Launch and exploration phase (2005–2008)
The process began with the regeneration of state-owned industrial and mining enter-
prises in Liaoning Province. Shantytowns developed as a result of insolvency and
industrial decline across state-owned enterprises following restructuring in 1993
(Xiangfei andChunyan 2010, 5:58). Under the previous communist collective system
workers lived in accommodation connected to the industries that employed them. As
state-owned enterprises closed, communities lost both vital services and geograph-
ical cohesion, the support structures they needed in daily life. This resulted in a
breakdown in community cohesion and a deterioration in health and public order.
In early 2005, Liaoning Provincial Party Committee launched centralised and
continuous regeneration projects throughout the province. These arose both in
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response to internal demand for urban development and direct government interven-
tion to address social issues. The Party adopted a ‘five in one’ mechanism comprising
party committee leadership, government promotion, social participation, enterprise
support and community autonomy. By 2009 some 760,000 properties were under-
going continuous redevelopment, providing a model for state-owned industrial and
mining shantytowns.
Transition from local to national policy (2008–2012)
The global financial crisis from September 2008 had a serious impact on Chinese
exports. Economic growth declined sharply after a period of rapid and sustained
growth. In response, the Chinese government introduced ten measures to expand
domestic demand and promote economic growth. The first was to accelerate the
construction of government-subsidised housing projects. In December 2009, five
ministries, including the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development issued
Instruction on Promoting Shantytown Renovation of Urban and State-owned Indus-
trial and Mining Enterprises. This marked the formal launch of shantytown renova-
tion projects nationwide. The relocation of shantytown residents comprised mone-
tary and in-kind compensation, chosen voluntarily by each household, increased tax
policy support, and reduced operating charges to reduce the renovation costs. In
December 2009, the Datong Shantytown RenovationWork Conference extended the
regeneration projects to state-owned forestry and reclamation areas.
In this period, a total of 12.6 million shanty dwellings were renovated nationwide.
The government invested a total of RMB150 billion, which has promoted investment
and increases in household disposable income, and improved housing conditions
among the preliminary results.2
Comprehensive extension of shantytown renovation (2013–2017)
In 2013, the newChinese government proposed the objective of renovating another 10
million houses across four categories of shantytowns in cities, state-owned industrial
and mining areas, forestry areas and agricultural reclamation areas. In 2014, the
central government established the ‘Three One-Hundred Million People’ policy,
which included renovating urban shantytowns and villages in cities of around 100
million inhabitants. The regeneration of shantytowns became the strategic pillar of
a new approach to urbanisation. To realise this aim, the regeneration of shantytowns
must be fully accelerated. For this purpose, in 2015, the State Council launched an
initiative to renovate some 18 million dwellings, including dilapidated houses and
run-down urban areas between 2015 and 2017.3
In February 2016, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
and the State Council issued Several Opinions on Further Enhancing Construction
2 “By 2020 in China, 21,770,000 sets of new shantytowns will have been completed, and the
minimum investment will have exceed RMB 4,000 billion”,
https://money.163.com/14/0325/16/9O6OUATN00253B0H.html.
3 Opinions on Further Renovation of Urban Shantytowns and Urban & Rural Dilapidated Houses
and Construction of Supporting Infrastructure.
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and Management of Urban Planning. This confirmed that shantytown and housing
improvements were the primary goals in enhancing urban public services. The three-
year campaign of shantytown renovation should remain a core priority and be carried
out fully as possible. According to this policy, in May 2017, the central government
introduced a new three-year plan to renovate another 15 million shanty dwellings
from 2018 to 2020 to complete the regeneration within that time scale.
7.2.2 Four Types of Shantytown Renovation
The National New Urbanization Plan (2014–2020) issued in 2014 divided shan-
tytown renovation into four types: renovation of urban shantytowns and of state-
owned industrial and mining shantytowns, renovation of state-owned forest-area
shantytowns and renovation of dwellings in state-owned reclamation areas. The first
mainly involved the inclusion of both shantytowns and ‘urban villages’ in the regen-
eration process. The second involved communities within the railway, steel, non-
ferrous and gold industries. In the third category, eligible communities in forestry
areas were included in the local urban housing security system alongside those from
state-owned properties. Equally, in the fourth category, non-state-owned farms and
properties were also uniformly included in the regeneration schemes.
7.2.3 Main Achievements in Shantytown Renovation
From 2005 to the end of 2014, a total of 20.8 million shanty dwellings were reno-
vated in China.4 During the six years from 2015 to 2020, the phase of the ‘Three
One-Hundred Million People’ policy, some 33 million houses will be constructed.
On the calculation that there are 3.02 people per household in China,5 these could
accommodate about 100 million people. When examining the achievements of this
remarkable regeneration from the perspective of urban sociology, it becomes readily
apparent that these newly renovated areas form a new category of the Chinese urban
community. The full impact and value of this aspect of urban regeneration warrant
further study.
4 Opinions on Further Renovation of Urban Shantytowns and Urban & Rural Dilapidated Buildings
and Construction of Supporting Infrastructure of the State Council. People’s Publishing House,
2015, P1.
5 National Health and Family Planning Commission: Development of Chinese families presents
seven big changes, Xinhuanet [cited on March 1, 2019].
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7.3 Shantytowns Separation from Mainstream Society
Despite varying conditions and characteristics, there are striking similarities in the
way Chinese shantytown communities developed within the four categories identi-
fied. The process involved different factors to those that affected the rise of slum
areas in other countries. The study of social mobility explores dynamic trends in
social stratification according to changes in social status. There are two important
indices in the analysis of social mobility. The first is the rate of upward mobility.
The rate of structural mobility depends on differences in class distribution caused by
changes in industrial conditions. Such mobility is not a matter of personal choice but
a ‘passive mobility’. It is something that happens to people without their involve-
ment or consent. Secondly, there is a ‘circularmobility’ rate, social mobility achieved
through self-effort such as education and career advancement.
In 1992, Deng Xiaoping’s South Inspection Speech brought China into a new
round of political and economic reforms, leading to a period of rapid economic
development. In 1993, the Third Plenary Session of the 14th Central Committee of
theCommunist Party ofChina decided to adopt themarket economy system.Reforms
of state-owned enterprises went beyond the adjustment of management structures. It
extended deeply into the revision of property rights and joint-stock system reforms
entered the mainstream. Many state-owned industrial, mining, forestry, reclamation
and agricultural enterprises went bankrupt through industrial depression, serious
operational losses and a failure to adopt market mechanisms. The result was a
continuous deterioration of living conditions in shantytowns through industrial and
systemic failure. Shantytown dwellers were left behind as rapid industrial and
economic development took place across mainstream urban society. People living in
these areas were excluded from the process of modernisation and urbanisation and
lost the capacity to join the mainstream trajectory of Chinese urban life.
7.3.1 Industrial and Mining Shantytowns
The social status of industrial and mining workers underwent dramatic fluctuations
both before and after the renovation of shantytowns. Liaoning Province provided
China’s older industrial base. Figure 7.1 shows the location of shantytowns connected
with state-owned enterprises within the province. Cities developed around state-run
industries such as coal mining, rather than natural population growth on a mercantile
model. As coal reserves were exhausted from the 1980s, economic depression and
decline followed.
Following the economic reforms from 1993 onwards, former industrial dormi-
tory areas became run-down shantytowns. Control of both the enterprises and their
associated worker accommodation transferred to the local government level. Over
the course of time, this led to the spread of large areas of self-built and maintained
properties. Very unusually, most shantytown residents in Liaoning Province had
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Fig. 7.1 State-owned industrial and mining enterprise shantytowns in Liaoning Province
permanent urban residence certificates, unlike migrants from rural areas. Workers
who had once been employed in large collective or state-owned enterprises lost social
status during the industrial and economic reforms. An example is the community in
Beihou, Fushun City. In 2004, there were more than 1,600 households, including
over 400 farming households. The total population was over 4,800, more than 1,200
of the farmers. Over 800 people lived in individual units, more than 1,680 lived in
collectively owned units and over 20 in individual households. As can be seen from
Table 7.1, the highest proportion of workers—47.5%—lived in the large collectively
owned units.
Social mobility for shantytown residents tended to be downward. Mining was the
most prestigious occupation in the old industrial base of Liaoning Province, with
extensive growth and development in state-run extraction enterprises. There were up
to 120,000 workers in Benxi Mining Bureau in 1988. Mining was the core industry
in ‘The City of Coal and Iron’. Underground workers enjoyed special privileges such













Data source Statistical data provided by the cities to the research group
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as exclusive access to wine and meat coupons. The mining industry entered reces-
sion, reserves were exhausted, there were financial losses in successive years, and
mining became the primary focus for industrial reform. The government undertook
management buy-outs, and awarded compensation of nearly RMB 10,000 to each
miner to enable them to leave the industry and re-enter wider society. The social
and economic status of former miners declined rapidly. They went from respected
workers in state-owned enterprises to poor shantytown dwellers. Their social and
economic status dropped from bourgeois to that of the proletarian poor.
The economic decline led to community collapse. Before the industrial reforms
of the 1990s, employers’ logistics department provided services and social security
functions. Social relationships in these neighbourhoods reflected the relatively high
status and prestige of the workers themselves. There were high levels of social cohe-
sion and order. With economic decline, municipal authorities took responsibility for
formerwork-unit communities. They became defined by geographical location rather
than links with particular industries and the support infrastructure these provided.
Municipal governments were unable to cope with large-scale industrial reform and
community organisations were paralysed by the size and rapidity of these changes.
As a culture of poverty developed, social security systems deteriorated. Unem-
ployment led to serious social security problems across shantytowns. Without steady
and reliable sources of income, many residents turned to crime. The older collective
system’s social cohesion and regulatory frameworks broke down, leading to a rise
in anti-social behaviour. In addition, levels of educational attainment in shantytown
were comparatively low, mainly only up to primary and junior high school levels.
Low educational and cultural aspirations contributed to social problems.
Table 7.2 shows that, Shenyang had an exceptionally high level of residents
educated to senior middle school level, some 70%. In the other five cities most
people had only attended junior middle school and primary school. A poor educa-
tional background restricted the employment opportunities and economic capacity
of shantytown residents.
Table 7.2 Education background of newly renovated shantytown residents in six cities of Liaoning
Province (%)
Education background Mean Shenyang Fushun Benxi Chaoyang Tieling Fuxin
Primary school 13.3 0.5 15.3 19.8 15.1 6.8 21.5
Junior middle school 53.3 23.7 62.7 61.4 59.2 65.5 45.7
Senior middle school 29.5 70.0 21.5 13.5 20.2 23.3 31.4
University 3.9 5.8 0.5 5.3 5.5 4.4 1.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Data source Statistical results of questionnaire made by 2012 research group investigating
shantytown renovation in Liaoning Province
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Fig. 7.2 Slum-dwellings in reclamation area in Jiangxi Province
7.3.2 Slum-Dwellings in Reclamation Areas
China’s state-run farms form a gigantic socio-economic system with four million
employees, a population of twelve million and over 47,000 km2 of arable land. It
comprises the country’s base for commercial grain production and strategic food
reserves. In 1957 in response to a call for the development of mountainous areas,
land-reclamation projects were established in Jiangxi Province (see Fig. 7.2). Over
50,000 cadres drawn from Communist Party and government organisations, demo-
bilised troops and educated youths from Shanghai and Yangzhou travelled to the
deserted beaches and remote mountains far away from cities and major transport
links. Jiangxi Province had a large number of designated reclamation areas. They
covered a total area of 16,000 m2, and consisted of reclamation farms, companies,
enterprises, schools and managed villages, with some 163 independent accounting
units. The location of these reclamation areas and the slums that developed around
them can be seen in Fig. 7.2. By the end of 2016, the total population in the Province’s
state-owned reclamation areas was 1.3 million in some 383,000 households.6 The
population was divided into four categories: land-reclamation workers, their fami-
lies, non-manual workers, and villagers in settlements attached to land-reclamation
farms.
With China’s economic reforms, industrial, commercial, architectural and service
enterprises developed rapidly, with their total output value exceeding agriculture.
Many former farm workers subsequently found employment in other industries.
There has been a gradual decline in state-run agricultural and land-reclamation
schemes since the 1990s, as their economic planning and operational management
6 Data taken from theReport on theReconstruction of Slum-Dwellings in State-OwnedReclamation
Areas in Jiangxi Province, 5 September 2017.
7 Renovation of Shantytowns and Construction … 131
systems proved inflexible. Financial debts and the adverse social impact were felt
heavily across this sector. By 2009, the asset-liability ratio reached 119%. There was
low social security provision for workers and heavy burden on the state-run farms.
In 1994, state-owned farms reversed their policy of arranging employment for
the children of employees. In November 2010, Jiangxi Province issued Instruc-
tion on Promoting Reform of State-owned Land-reclamation Enterprises in the
Whole Province. The reforms involved job realignment, historic debt repayments,
outsourcing social services, and more flexible ways of operating. An early retire-
ment policy was introduced for those staff due to retire within five years. The
farms disbursed living expenses and paid staff endowment and medical insurance
every month until retirement. For those due to retire after five years, compensation
payments were arranged based on their length of service. Their endowment and
medical insurance were paid under the ‘One Compensation and Two Insurances’
scheme. Some agricultural workers returned to work the arable land as individual
tenant farmers or labourers rather than state employees. Most chose to work in cities,
while a few remained in farms as contractors and farm labourers. At present, there are
a total of 317,000 employees in Jiangxi land-reclamation schemes, including those
formerly employed under the old system. The total is made up of 100,000 primary-
industry employees, 109,000 secondary and tertiary-industry employees and 108,000
retired workers.
There are three main causes for the gradual deterioration of housing stock within
the state-run reclamation schemes. During the 1950s, the ‘Great Leap Forward’
period, prioritywas always placed on production, with quality of life a lesser concern.
Farm workers and their families mainly lived in ‘army barracks’ and ‘tube-shaped
apartments’ initially built with coal cinders, mud bricks and timber. Settlements
were scattered in remote mountain areas with primitive facilities for water, elec-
tricity, gas and other services. Secondly, by the mid to late 1990s, the agricultural
economywithin these schemes began to decline.With lowerfinancial resources, older
houses fell into disrepair. Thirdly, the remote mountain and lake locations with infre-
quent transport and poormedical, health, cultural and education conditions, restricted
opportunities to improve living accommodation. With no development of commer-
cial, residential houses, living conditions lagged behind those of the surrounding
villages.
7.3.3 Shantytowns in State-Owned Forestry Areas
Heilongjiang Forest Industry Group (HFIG) is one of the four big forestry organisa-
tions in China. It comprises four forest warden authorities and 40 forestry divisions.
HFIG specialises in large-scale afforestation and forestry operation andmanagement,
and at the height of its output, its timber yield accounted for 33.5% of the national
supply. It has produced a total of 519 million cubic metres of timber, accounting for
21% of the overall national output. HFIG has established social housing projects in
small towns dotted across secluded areas of original virgin forest, see Fig. 7.3. These
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Fig. 7.3 Shantytowns in state-owned forestry area in Heilongjiang Province
towns are designed to be ecologically sustainable and have advanced industrial and
social systems.
Founder Forestry Bureau was founded in 1958 and was the first to reform shan-
tytowns in forestry areas. It closely combined both physical and social regeneration,
providing a blueprint for subsequent schemes nationwide. Heilongjiang Founder
State-owned Key Forest-area Management Committee was founded in 2015. By the
end of 2018, these forested areas had a total population of 59,298 across 25,476
households. There were 4,428 workers on the payroll, including 2,682 employed
forestry operatives. Forestry areas were divided into two main categories: working
and living space in the mountains and residential areas on the plains. There are ten
mountain forest farms and Gaoleng Bureau comprises 22 departments, including
public security and justice, culture, education and health, a tax bureau, water-power-
heat supply and property management. The sub-district office was established in
1959, and sub-district cadres were all regular staff of the Forestry Bureau. The sub-
district consisted of five communities and six neighbourhood committees, and its
main mission was to organise workers’ families to contribute to food production and
alleviate the shortage of vegetables and cereals. Forestry areas were supplied with
economic, administrative, and social management services and were remarkable for
self-management, autonomy, and community cohesion.
Before 1970 all forestry workers constructed their houses independently. The
Forestry Bureau provided land, timber and other construction materials. Houses
were mainly simple and crude with walls made of strawmixed with yellowmud held
together by panels. From the 1970s, the Forestry Bureau began to supply brick-and-
tile bungalows for the workers. The living area was generally 25 m2 for each house-
hold comprising two generations; and 30–35 m2 per household of three generations.
As the population increased, people built new thatched extensions both in front and
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behind the main house and these soon deteriorated and many of the housing schemes
became slums.
In 1984, the forestry authorities implemented housing ownership reform, and
some staff purchased their public housing. In 1998, the Founder Forestry Bureau
issued a one-off voluntary severance payment and some 4,000 employees accepted
compensation and withdrew their membership. The economic status of forestry
workers remained consistent with fiscal and industrial trends until the 1990s, when
forested areas entered recession. There were two main factors, a lack of sustainable
resources and an economic crisis brought on by excessive logging and over reliance
on the single ‘wood economy.’ Profits declined, and incomes dropped below the
national mean level. Following redundancy, many younger or active workers sought
work elsewhere. InOctober 2000, the government launched theNatural Forest Protec-
tion Project. Key state-owned forestry areas reduced their timber yield greatly, and
commercial logging of natural forests stopped completely in 2014. Safe-guarding
China’s ecological security has become the priority. With a shift from plantation
operations to forestry management and protection, the demand for employment was
greatly reduced. The Founder Forestry Bureau relocated 3,000 surplus staff, and
the number of registered employers reduced to 4,428, only 2,682 of them actively in
service.7 The income of these service staff grew slowly. In 2005, the Forestry Bureau
implemented the second housing reform, whereby all publicly owned dwellings were
sold to individual staff. Housing ownership and the relocation ofworkerswere impor-
tant factors in the formation of forestry shantytowns. The Forestry Bureau’s main
source of income comes from national investment in the Natural Forest Protection
Project. Consequently, the Bureau was no longer responsible for repairing public
housing. The ability of workers to fund repairs weakened through unemployment,
and housing settlements gradually deteriorated to become dilapidated shantytowns.
Nevertheless, even before the sustained regeneration of shantytowns began, some
former forestry employees were able to raise money to improve their living condi-
tions. Those who increased their income from running their own enterprises took the
lead to improve building standards and conditions. By the time of the formal launch
of regeneration projects, the remaining residents faced economic hardship.
7.3.4 Urban Shantytowns: Examples from Beiliang, Baotou
City
Beiliang is the common name for the Northern Plateau in the Donghe District of
Inner Mongolia (see Fig. 7.4). The heritage of Baotou is rooted in Donghe with its
cultural ‘heart and soul’ drawn from Beiliang. These locations are shown on Fig. 7.4.
As the birthplace of ‘Zouxikou Culture’ from the late Qing Dynasty to the formation
of the Republic of China, many Han people in Shanxi-Shaanxi area migrated to
7 Report on the Transformation of Shantytowns in Fangzheng Forest District, Heilongjiang
Province, 5th, March, 2019.
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Fig. 7.4 Urban shantytown in Beiliang, Baotou City, inner Mongolia
Baotou. The most famous of these were the mercantile and financier Qiao’s Family,
who settled in Baotou during the reign of Emperor Qianlong to open up trade and
access to Fushenggong from Qi County, Shanxi. They laid the foundation for the
policy of ‘Fusheng First, Then Baotou’. Beiliang enjoyed a prosperous trade in
furs and feathers, tobacco, tea and other enterprises, and formed ‘Nine Business
Industries and Sixteen Handcraft Industries.’ The area became an important centre
for commerce and trade in the Northwest by shipping goods along the Yellow River.
For this reason, older, traditional dwellings in Beiliang combined both residential and
commercial or workshop accommodation. They typify the characteristic traditional
vernacular building style of old Baotou, and have extremely high cultural value.
In 1953, the state established large-scale steel enterprises drawing on mineral
resources in Bayan Obo. The development of Baogang was identified as a national
key project of the ‘First Five-year’ plan, and Baotou entered the era of heavy industri-
alisation as ‘Grassland Steel City.’ After Baogang became established, Baotou New
Citymovedwestward to KundulunDistrict andQingshanDistrict. BaotouMunicipal
Government moved out of Donghe District, along with all the employees involved
in larger enterprises. Those left in Beiliang were employed in small and medium-
sized enterprises supportingBaogang.Many settlements in Beiliang degenerated into
shantytowns following the development of a market economy in the 1980s. Due to
technical weakness and low market awareness, the local enterprises gradually lost
competitiveness. During the economic reforms across regional state-owned enter-
prises in the 1990s, the previously prosperous Bayantala Street in Donghe District
declined and many residents were unemployed or faced redundancy. The Beiliang
area had a weak municipal infrastructure, with no heating, sewer pipe network and
gas facilities or even fire-fighting services. Old and dilapidated earth and timber
dwellings accounted for above 90% of the housing stock. Living conditions were
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primitive. The impact of the severe earthquake that hit Baotou in 1996—at 5.3 on the
Richter Scale—reduced already run-down areas to the largest urban shantytowns in
the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.
Beiliang shantytowns covered 13 km2, with a population of 124,000 across 47,000
households. The residents mainly comprised people living on minimum incomes,
retirees and vulnerable groups. The reforms of state or collectively owned enter-
prises in the 1990s resulted in high unemployment and an influx of poorer residents.
Over 70% of the population in shantytowns had no regular income. The number
of registered unemployed in Donghe District rose to 11,800, 70% of them living
in Beiliang. Those on minimum income accounted for 18% of the city’s popula-
tion. Within Donghe District, there were 30,100 people living at minimum income
levels, accounting for nearly 50% of the population, with over 40% centred around
Beiliang (Baoshan et al. 2015, 38). The population was also ageing; most young
people left the region to find work, increasing the proportion of elderly people and
retirees. Beiliang took on the characteristics of a migrant city, home to some seven
minorities, includingMongol, Hui andMan.Alongside ethnic diversity came cultural
and religious diversity. Five major religions co-existed, Buddhism, Taoism, Islam,
Catholicism and other forms of Christianity. The renovation of shantytowns had a
direct impact on the stability of religious and ethnic relations.
7.4 Shantytown Renovation and the Remodelling
of Communities
Strong central policies, inclusive local strategies and practice, have both consolidated
China’s ability to implement the large-scale regeneration of shantytowns, making it
become new forms of more integrated mainstream urban settlements. Government
policies that emphasised joint ‘central/local’ action and local interventions, were
the fundamental means to assure effective control of the regeneration process. More
specifically, the policies replaced existing social and planning mechanisms with new
forms of a community organisation that enabled residents to adapt to the market
economy and establish new economic and social life forms. There were dramatic
changes in community organisation, culture and governance. These changes were
driven by requirements at both government and community level. Firstly, the state
needed to reconstruct a community organisation to assist the government in providing
social security and public services. Secondly, the residents of newly renovated shan-
tytowns required a community platform to support economic and social life into the
future. The high degree of overlap between ‘official’ and ‘private’ requirements in
the public realm became a feature unique to the newly renovated shantytowns.
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7.4.1 Shantytown Development of Community
Organisations: Liaoning
Renovation of the living environment
Residents lived in apartment buildings following the regeneration of shantytown
areas. The living environment was integratedwith surrounding communities living in
privately rented flats. The first of the major regeneration projects, the Modi Commu-
nity in Fushun City, serves as a good example. By the end of 2009, after five years
of construction, a total 106 apartment blocks replaced the original shanty dwellings,
comprising a population of 16,300 people in 6,400 households. After renovation,
the average housing area per household reached 53.8 m2, with a per capita living
space of 18 m2. There were major environmental improvements. The introduction of
central heating reduced emissions. Asphalt roads now extended to the entrances of
housing settlements. Improved lighting and other infrastructure projects enhanced
the environmental quality and two public squares became the focus for cultural and
leisure activities.
The regeneration of community
The emergence of regenerated community structures is the highlight of shantytown
renovation inLiaoning.TheCivilAffairsDepartment formulated a community recon-
struction plan before the physical works took place, based on a core working plat-
form of community’s Party organisations. This was an innovative way organising
public services in China at that time. Alongside the community’s Party Committee,
it also established Community Neighbourhood Committee, Residents’ Congress and
a Community Council. Benxi City established and further developed this community
network model involving the alderman, community assistants, residents’ representa-
tives, advocacy organisations, and volunteers to ensure smooth communication and
service delivery channels.
These measures established good order and community cohesion. Following the
renovation, the new community settlements varied in size from between 3,000 and
10,000 inhabitants across some 1,000 to 3,000 households,8 far greater than those
in the older ‘unit’ communities. The increase in scale required new measures for
security and social management. The residents selected their floors and living areas
independently following a fair distribution principle, as the newly formed commu-
nity came from different shantytowns, and did not know each other. The newly
renovated shantytowns were equipped with community police stations and officers
according to national standards and security patrols.Crimeprevention and emergency
management were strengthened, and community security improved significantly.
Public service facilities were also enriched. Health services are one example.
As the state-owned enterprises closed, the unemployed lost medical service assur-
ance, and public health levels declined. Following the regeneration projects, each
settlement had a community clinic and full-time medical workers. Changes in health
8 Report on the Reform of Shantytowns in Liaoning Province, 2012.
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service infrastructure have greatly improved the quality of life for the residents. After
the move from shanty dwellings to more substantial buildings, the biggest change
residents identified was the improvement in the image of their communities. They
had become a mainstream urban community with a clean environment and modern
facilities.
Increased levels of social mobility became the most significant effect of shanty-
town renovation. The inhabitants of the newly renovated shantytowns were mainly
former employees of large state or collectively owned enterprises who had fallen
into poverty during the reforms and the process of industrialisation and urbanisation.
The regeneration of shantytowns supported redundant miners, reversed the decline
in social status and brought them back into modern urban society.
7.4.2 Housing Regeneration and Community Reconstruction
in Jiangxi
Shantytown renovation combines with new urbanisation
The renovation of housing stock in Jiangxi Province started in 2011, the first time
any remedial work had taken place since the construction of large-scale barrack
style accommodation in the 1950s. It began with the construction of 331,000 social
affordable housing, including the renovation of 60,000 substandard dwellings in
reclamation areas.9 The project covered 157 land-reclamation units and involved 71
administrative districts in across the whole province.10
The project focused on the renovation of run-down householdswithin themanage-
rial district of the reclamation areas, and gave priority to supporting the most vulner-
able families, or those on the lowest levels of social security. To be eligible for
renovation, houses had to be either:
• over 40 years old with signs of serious deterioration;
• constructed from mud and thatch;
• identified by the provincial construction department;
• deemed unsafe due to unqualified gas supply, lack of fire-fighting and other
facilities, and pose serious potential safety hazards;
• or part of residential areaswheremore than 50%of the housing stockwas centrally
owned or in disrepair.
9 Report on the reconstruction of slum-dwellings in state-owned reclamation areas in Jiangxi
Province, 5 September 2017.
10 September 4 to 10, 2017, the research group went to Jiangxi Province Agricultural Reclamation
Office, Dongxiang County Hongxing Reclamation and Plantation Farm, Damaoshan Reclamation
and Plantation Farm, Wuxing Reclamation and Plantation Farm and Yunshan Reclamation and
Plantation Farm to conduct field surveys of the renovation of dilapidated houses in state-owned
reclamation areas.
138 G. Li
The regeneration of these properties in Jiangxi was typical of similar renovation
projects in state-owned housing across China. The project placed urban regener-
ation as an important part of a new approach to urbanisation. The basic philos-
ophy was to group population density into open areas, localise industry onto indus-
trial parks, and to modernise agriculture. A new tripartite pattern of community
developed comprising modern open ‘parkland’ for residential and industrial areas,
tourist attractions and new forms of urbanisation. By adopting this approach, people
could be accommodated more strategically and new patterns of urbanisation encour-
aged. It combined urban regeneration with the construction of market towns with
surrounding villages within easy reach. The larger villages were within 3 km of each
market town with smaller hamlets only another 3 km further from the central market
hub. The demolition process ensured that the inhabitants were moved closer to key
tourist attractions, agricultural and industrial districts and industrial parks. There
were 1.1 million people living in land-reclamation projects across Jiangxi Province,
and through the urban regeneration project, a quarter of a million moved to the open
countryside, some 30% of the total population. There was a total of 155 small towns
in land-reclamation areas across Jiangxi, and the total urban area exceeded 450 km2.
There is a large-scale urban population at 690,000, 62.1% of which live in towns,
which is a proportion about 11% higher than the mean value of the whole province
(Xinhua News Agency Jiangxi Branch 2013, 173).11
By 2016, over a quarter of a million run-down properties were renovated and
newly built houses covering an area of over 17 km2. Nearly 17 km2 of dilapidated
housing had been cleared and over three quarters of a million people rehoused. The
older barracks and adobe houses were all replaced with brick and concrete structures.
In the Yunshan Group, for example, per capita, living space more than doubled
from 20m2 to 45m2. In residential districts, improvements in piped drinking water
introduced centralised sewage systems, clean energy and brought living standards
to the same level as urban areas. With the improvement of employment, education
and hospital conditions, peasant farming went from low-income physical labour to
a respected and dignified career.
Rustic market town communities
As the predominant economic activity within the reclamation areas was farming,
living standards and accommodation inevitably took on a primitive, rustic character.
A key aim of the regeneration projects was to reinvigorate and revive rural life,
respecting the rustic character but introducing modern facilities and infrastructure.
An example can be given from Jiangxi Yunshan Group’s Fruit Forest Company.
Displaced communities were resettled in new accommodation in Dayuan Village
managed by Yongxiu County. Residential workers within the Yunshan Group’ were
completely integrated with local villagers, and a community centre provided a shared
leisure square with fitness equipment, basketball court, outdoor stage and a rural
history museum. Following the agricultural reforms of the 1990s, most workers,
11 Report on the reconstruction of slum-dwellings in state-owned reclamation areas in Jiangxi
Province, 6th, Sep, 2017.
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except for a few in managerial posts, no longer relied on farms for employment, and
travelled away to find work alongside local farmers. They would leave the elderly
and children behind and return home only during holidays and festivals. Unlike the
local farmers, the agricultural labourers came from other parts of China away from
their native home towns. The newly renovated housing settlements were often not
their only place of residence and internal migration gave the children of farmworkers
more employment choices.
7.4.3 Forest-Area Shantytown Renovation
Forest-area shantytown renovation
Heilongjiang Forest Industry Group and Founder Forestry Bureau were the first
forestry areas to renovate shantytowns within their jurisdiction. The first phase of
renovation ran from 2009 to 2011, with 900 new houses built. The second lasted
from 2011 to 2015, with a total of four thousand new houses completed. Before
2012, these projects drew on supporting funds from provincial government. Later,
there was a subsidy of RMB 300 per m2 from the state alongside funds raised within
the enterprises themselves.12 The third phase ran from 2015 to 2017, and except for
funds released from the national budget, it completely relied on policy loans from
state-run banks, and the annual interest burden was heavy.13
Founder Forest Bureau received a total investment of RMB 1.13bn and renovated
some 21,600 shantytowns, including, 10,762 newly built settlements within the areas
under its jurisdiction. Some 464 settlements were established or refurbished within
forestry plantations and this encouraged workers deep in the upland areas to migrate
to settlements on lower ground. The result was the urbanisation of forest society
as businesses and urban development spread to forestry areas. Maintenance and
renovation projects involved mainly old, unfit or dangerous houses in plantation
dormitories. A total of 10,390 units were refurbished with replacement windows,
external-wall insulation and roof tile reinforcement.
Community development in forestry shantytowns
In 2005, against the background of a nationwide move to promote the construc-
tion of new urban communities, the forestry Neighbourhood Committee finished
the process of community transformation. Community structures developed as the
regeneration projects progressed, and the number of Neighbourhood Committees
increased from six to ten. Each community had office space of around 500 m2,
with a multi-purpose community service hall, charity supermarket, daycare room,
the school for the children of residents, etc. The range of public services increased.
12 Report on the Transformation of Shantytowns in Fangzheng Forest District, Heilongjiang
Province, 6 March 2019.
13 March 4 to 9, 2019, the research group surveyed shanty town renovation in Heilongjiang Province
Founder Forestry Bureau and Qinghe Forestry Bureau.
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Previously, these community services had been restricted to the most basic needs
such as local Communist Party construction, family planning, civil affairs and re-
employment training. A standard service system developed during the shantytown
renovation process, drawing on the experience gained from projects in Ang’angxi
District and Qiqihar City. The main difference between community organisations
in forestry areas and those in cities was that the former had a vertical management
structure. All 70 cadres for the sub-districts and five communities were employed
by the Forestry Bureau, and under its direct management.
Newly renovated settlements in forestry areas were organised and managed indi-
vidually rather than collectively. Each unitary settlement could make decisions on
investment, development, andmanagement, making full use of the renovation project
and applying planning standards set by Harbin’s provincial capital. This led to a high
standard of construction across junior and senior middle schools and Forestry Bureau
Hospitals in newly developed areas. Not only did the standard of facilities and equip-
ment exceed that of surrounding cities and counties, but the winter heating service
extended a month beyond that of adjacent areas. Distinct communities began to
emerge with a shared destiny.
7.4.4 Shantytown Regeneration in Urban Areas
Physical renovation of urban shantytowns
In February 2013, the authorities in Beiliang began the process of acquiring, relo-
cating and refurbishing shantytowns and temporary settlements across the region.The
process involved three compulsory acquisition and relocation campaigns, known as
the ‘100-day Problem Solving’, the ‘Spring Battle’ and ‘Autumn Battle.’ By October
2014, a total of 124,000 people across 47,000 householdswere rehoused in new prop-
erties or had their homes redeveloped. The total living space involved amounted to
4 km2 houses within an area of 13 km2. Two methods were adopted to manage
the relocation of shantytown dwellers. The first combined monetary compensation
with property-rights exchange, and some 14,000 residents from the 47,000 house-
holds received monetary payments. Another 15,000 were relocated through buy-
back of commercial residential houses, with a monetary repayment rate of 61.7%.14
The second measure combined relocation away from the shantytown areas, supple-
mented by in-situ renovation. To respect the customs of the predominantly Muslim
Hui people’s in living close to places of worship and their taboos against the removal
of tombs, relocation areas were chosen around the Grand Mosque.15
By the end of 2015, 33,000 new or buy-back refurbished houses were completed
and delivered, the relocated residents were all in place. The per capita living space
14 Report on the renovation of shantytowns in Hedong District, Baotou, Inner Mongolia, June 4–8,
2018.
15 June 4 to 8, 2018, the research group made field surveys of shanty town renovation in Donghe
District, Baotou City.
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for former inhabitants of Beiliang shantytowns more than doubled from 12 m2 to 26
m2. Among the 45,000 replacement houses were 20,000 self-owned dwellings with
property rights. The area of these homes ranged from 75 m2 to 90 m2. A total of
25,000 economically affordable houses were provided with an area of between 50
m2 and 65 m2 as well as and lower-rent houses for those on low-incomes.16
Community development in urban shantytowns
Drawing on experience from previous renovation projects, Baotou City planned to
establish a relocation area of some 4.78 km2 near the city centre, in order to engage
the interest of those moved from the shantytowns. Two large areas of newly built
houses were built to the north and south of the catchment area consisting of five
communes and 15 residential communities. Altogether, some 33,000 replacement
houses were constructed. Each of the new communities comprised around 6,000
households with a population of between 3,000 and 10,000, far greater than that
of other schemes. Each settlement was simultaneously equipped with six primary
and secondary schools, eight pre-school nurseries, nine community service centres,
two community health service centres and a large park square. The new living space
environment aimed to satisfy the requirements of young people to in order to retain
a population balance and ensure the longer sustainability of the communities.
Whereas the regeneration process in Beiliang prioritised people’s economic liveli-
hood, the schemes in Baotou City encouraged the improvement of basic public
services. The endowment insurance rate increased from 79% to 91.3%, and the
medical insurance rate increased from 82 to 100%, achieving full coverage of the
population. The schemes actively encouraged growth in public-welfare employment.
When the programme was first launched in early 2013, the number of unemployed in
Beiliang town stood at around 10,000, with another 8,000 added as the shantytowns
were dismantled. By providing employment in property management, cleaning,
ecological projects and social security roles, supporting vocational training schemes,
total 9,277 people were redeployed with minimum salaries coming into line with the
city’s ‘mainstream’ population.17
7.5 Social Characteristics of Newly Renovated Shantytowns
The shantytown renovation projects, which started in 2005, will come to an end in
2020.What historical and theoretical perspectives and lessons can we apply from the
process? In the first instance, the regeneration projects involved physical improve-
ments, but this led to a deeper community and social development level. The process
has completely transformed the living conditions of poorer urban communities. It
16 Report on the renovation of shantytowns in Hedong District, Baotou, Inner Mongolia, June 4–8,
2018.
17 Report on the renovation of shantytowns in Hedong District, Baotou, Inner Mongolia, June 4–8,
2018.
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brought lower-income residents living at the bottom of urban society back into
China’s urbanisation process and achieved a balance between urban regeneration
and social harmony.
By prioritising social and physical development, the Chinese experience can
contribute to urban regeneration practice worldwide. These projects achieved a
balance between centralised initiatives and local autonomy by re-constructing the
social and community structures. They deployed a range of agencies from centralised
authorities through local governments and the residents themselves. Together, they
have completed the heavy tasks of shantytown reconstruction and the relocation of
their inhabitants. New forms of settlement are becoming the most important platform
for lower-income residents from the former shantytowns. This has helped them to
achieve a higher residential status and reconstructed their economic and social life.
Residual traces of shantytowns are gradually phased away as these new settlements
integrate into modern urban life.
These new forms of urban community are of deep social significance, and provide
strong and valuable lessons for urban regeneration practice worldwide.
7.5.1 Urban Regeneration as an Agent for Social Mobility
China’s shantytowns arose as the result of industrial and decline and the passing of
older forms of state-controlled and collective systems of organisation. As China’s
economydeveloped rapidly, shantytownswere left behind in the process of industrial-
isation and urbanisation. Before the economic reforms of the early 1990s, employees
of state-run enterprises lived in industrial dormitories and enjoyedmedium economic
social status. As the planned economic system failed to keep pace with the rapid
development of the market economy, their status declined, and their dormitory areas
deteriorated.
The renovation of former shantytowns has transformed the image of these commu-
nities reduced the gap in living standards and layers of social division within
urban areas. It has brought poorer populations back into mainstream urban society
by a powerful policy of social redistribution. As a people-centred project, these
programmes rebalanced the expectations and living standards of previously disen-
franchised communities. As a form of ‘Urban Development’ practice, China’s urban
regeneration programmes demonstrate a particular ‘socialist’ approach to the recon-
stitution of urban space. It is clearly a very different approach to the process of slum-
clearance and ‘gentrification’ in both Western contexts and the somewhat scattered
and piece-meal regeneration practices encountered in Latin American countries.
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7.5.2 Reconfigured Living Space for Lower-Income Urban
Dwellers
In the early phases of shantytown renovation, the focus was very much on enabling
people to fully enjoy the fruits of China’s economic and social reforms. After 2008,
the emphasis broadened to encompass a response to the global financial crisis. As
well as tackling issues of social mobility and equality, the regeneration programmes
provided a mechanism to boost consumption, expand investment and invigorate the
management of land resources. With the introduction of the ‘three one-hundred-
billion people’ policy in 2014, the mission was expanded again, and the regeneration
programmes became a vehicle for new forms of urbanisation and environmental
management. As a ‘development project’ these schemes sought to achieve a more
harmonious relationship between humanity and the environment, balance the needs
of the economy and society, and improve urban quality.
From the perspective of urban sociology, the distinctiveness of the Chinese experi-
ence lay in thismulti-functional andmulti-dimensional approach to driving economic
development. In this important respect, it differed fromWestern forms of urban regen-
eration and gentrification, in that the shantytown residents were always the largest
beneficiaries. The projects were inclusive and people-centred and did not create
artificial separations between economic and social benefits nor create distinctions
between the affected groups.
The success of China’s shantytown renovation demonstrated the possibility of
improving the physical environment and integrating former residents into contempo-
rary urban life. The biggest challenge facing the newly renovated or relocated settle-
ments was how to transcend purely physical regeneration and achieve systematic and
permanent reforms in community life.
7.5.3 Shantytown Regeneration as a Two-Way Process
The Chinese government always played a central co-ordinating role in the rede-
velopment of shantytowns. While local authorities prepared and implemented the
programmes, the strategic steer came from national government policy. In 2009 the
Ministry ofHousing andUrban-RuralDevelopment issued Instructions onPromoting
Urban and State-owned Industrial andMining Shantytown Renovation. This empha-
sised the need for strongpublic policy andwelfare programmes alongside the physical
refurbishment and placed organisation and guidance, funding and support firmly in
the hands of government agencies. The redevelopment schemes resolved the housing
problems of lower-income groups. Improving the quality of life and environment,
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enhanced the public perception of the Chinese Communist Party and central govern-
ment. The programmes involved local people and empowered them to participate in
developing solutions and creating greater social cohesion.18
The process of ‘community transmission’ involved the government in a co-
ordination role that proved key to the success of the regeneration programmes. The
government’s initiative proved to be themajor driver andwas the decisive factor in the
reconstruction process. Community structures and organisations provided synergies
by conveying residents’ social security and other requirements to central govern-
ment through advocacy networks. The particular features of shantytown community
organisationmeant that human and financial resources’ commitmentwas greater than
those that applied to mainstream communities. For example, Liaoning Province’s
newly renovated shantytowns received an injection of human and material resources
for community governance, improved social services and facilities. These resources
became the key mechanism for improving the quality of life for the local community.
Within Beiliang New District, Baotou City has established mechanisms for commu-
nity development under the direct management of district government at all levels.
These systems comprise interdependent networks with the local Communist Party
Committee as the central hub, service delivery organisations responsible for imple-
mentation and neighbourhood committees sharing responsibility for governance.
With social groups fully participating in the process, this forms a symbiotic ‘circle’
to coordinate and deliver community services.
7.5.4 Community Infrastructure and Improved Services
The improvement of housing conditions and living environment was the first step in
the regeneration process. Once residents moved into the newly built or refurbished
properties, the next step was to ‘de-shanty town’ the emerging communities. The
key challenge was to reduce the gap between the lower quality of life previously
experienced by shantytown dwellers and the wider, strategic goal of integrating them
into contemporary urban economic society.
The refurbishment and redevelopment schemes contributed to rising social
mobility. Thosewho embraced the changes enthusiasticallywere facedwith the fresh
challenge of adapting to new urban and community life forms. Unlike their neigh-
bours, residents of the newly redeveloped communities were originally employed
in collective or state-owned enterprises. Consequently, they tended to have a single
vocational skill and less capacity for re-employment in other industries. They lacked
the social resources to cope with market competition. Most workers from heavy
industrial or mining operations held lower-skilled, non-technical roles. Those from
agricultural or forestry backgrounds worked in lower-skilled or semi-technical roles
18 Ministry ofHousing andUrban–RuralDevelopment, Instructions onPromotingUrban and State-
owned Industrial and Mining Shanty Town Renovation, https://www.mohurd.gov.cn/wjfb/201001/
t20100107_199192.html.
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and consequently lacked employment prospects in other sectors. Workers living in
urban shantytowns tended to be mostly self-employed or freelancers and so were in a
comparatively strong position to adapt to the newmarket economy. Our field surveys
found that the increasing age of industrial and mining workers in the newly redevel-
oped areas further increased their difficulties in finding alternative employment. The
educational background of younger residents was improved, but they tended to move
away, resulting in a predominantly ageing community with associated problems.
All these factors meant that former shantytown residents relied heavily on social
and administrative services and mutual support networks within their community.
Community structures and organisations assumed a far greater importance within
the new or refurbished settlements than in other residential areas. A wider and more
complex support network was required tomanage the transition to new and improved
living accommodation and meet the social, economic and cultural challenges of
building new communities. These new communities had particular challenges and
were a ‘special case’ in wider urban development. Their integration into contem-
porary urban life was the key challenge to overcome as China entered a new era of
urbanisation.
7.6 Comparative Analysis of Community Reconstruction
Projects
A common feature across China’s newly renovated shantytowns was the lack of
access to economic and social resources. Most residents were self-employed having
lost employment in state-owned enterprises. Their only option was to reconstruct
their economic and social position in order to enter mainstream urban society by
using what resources were available to them within their communities. Community
development and capacity-building was an urgent need.
The future of these communities depended on a process of reconstruction and
transformation. The historical legacy of older collective and communist collective
systems forged uniquely distinctive communities. The erosion of these systems
during China’s economic reforms affected the ability of these communities to
organise and support themselves. It could be argued that the capacity for commu-
nity development within the four categories of shantytowns described in this study
varied with the extent of decay within their original social structures. The level of
social deterioration determined the extent to which these communities were able to
reconstruct themselves.
The most dynamic forms of community reconstruction occurred within urban
shantytowns such as those around Beiliang, Baotou City. In this instance, regional
state-owned and collective enterprises had become bankrupt during early economic
reforms in the 1980s. Residents abandoned the thought patterns and behavioural
models associated with a planned economic system, and adapted to the new market
conditions. With no other sources of enterprise support, intervention from the urban
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government was substantial. Through a meticulously planned market and living
environment, these communities have retained their young people and achieved a
more balanced age profile.
In the case of settlements in agricultural and forestry areas, once the commer-
cial and administrative functions were separated through the system reforms, state-
owned enterprises survived as managers and custodians of state assets. They retained
sufficient economic resources to support employment initiatives and entrepreneur-
ship. The special co-operative relationship between state-owned enterprises, local
government and the newly renovated shantytowns created favourable conditions for
subsequent development.
Within state-run industrial and mining communities such as those in Liaoning
Province, the picture was very different. The depletion of natural resources and the
effects of systemic reform led to the complete disintegration of the original state-
owned enterprises. Lacking other forms of support, the former mining and heavy
industrial areas became the exclusive focus of efforts to renew and reinvigorate
any semblance of community cohesion. The reform process began relatively early
in Liaoning Province, with the result that many former shantytown residents were
ageing and less economically active. Economic decline across local cities had weak-
ened their capacity to support community reconstruction, and urban inclusion faced
difficulties.
7.6.1 Mechanisms to Build the Capacity
for Self-Development Across Urban Shantytowns
As already noted, the former shantytown areas around Beiliang had the strongest
capacity for self-development. Their ability to reconstruct their social structures and
community cohesion relied predominantly on the strong role of national urban inte-
gration initiatives (Dan 2018). To strengthen community services’ capacity, Baotou
City implemented a model of direct district management in Beiliang New District.
The existing three tiers of management—‘District/Sub-district/Local Community’
were replaced with a flatter and more direct ‘District/Community’ structure. Donghe
District Government engaged with each community directly, in order to facilitate
detailed community management, and respond to problems more quickly. National
integration systems could effectively mobilise and direct cooperation between the
main agencies within society. Premier Li Keqiang twice inspected the Beiliang
communities and took a direct, personal involvement in the regeneration projects. He
promoted the transition from communities that were simply surviving—‘worrying
about living’—to communities that were ‘liveable and viable’, such intervention laid
a solid foundation for subsequent self-development within these communities. Beil-
iang’s regeneration schemes received full support from China Development Bank,
large-scale enterprises, social organisations and other agencies in financing, project
development and social services. Tsinghua University and the China Urban Planning
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and Design Institute formulated a detailed regulatory plan of Beiliang’s clearance
areas. This ensured that residents had access to the same educational, medical, envi-
ronmental and cultural, public services or information resources as other residents
across the whole city. Indeed, the level of facilities available began to exceed that of
surrounding cities, and the social stigma associated with lower-income shantytown
settlements was eliminated.
Forms of community self-governance emerged from the regeneration process.
North 1st Community, the first to be directly managed by the government of Donghe
District, is one example. It fully implemented Communist Party policy,19 with over
15 full-time staff, plus public-welfare posts for college students and volunteers, a
total of over 30 workers in all. They operated from a centre which occupied some
2,300 m2, which provided a ‘one-stop’ hub for 29 integrated services, including
localised Communist Party branches, sub-district and civil affairs, social security
and family planning, Every 300 households within the community were organised
into a network of individual units, each with their own manager and sub-tiers within
each residential block, forming three-levels of management. Beiliang New District
had 28 social organisations, 38 co-constructed organisations, six residential volun-
tary organisations and five groups. These groups included meetings of residents’
representatives, a consultation committee and owners’ committee, and enterprises
governed by the residential units, all of which worked together to build and develop
the community. The settlements established and promoted their own community
organisations to meet grass-roots requirements.
Finally, systems were established to empower communities to organise them-
selves. The focus was on raising awareness of working in partnership, capacity-
building and helping communities adapt to the changes in their society. Beil-
iang’s ‘Zouxikou’ culture provided the model for these self-support mechanisms,
an approach that developed as modern Shanxi and Shaanxi Han peoples conducted
business in Baotou. It combined a strong sense of self-determination, endurance
and the ability to negotiate and seek consensus or compromise with teamwork, a
sense of neighbourly responsibility mutual assistance. Local cultural attributes of
this kind were embodied and exemplified in the process of shantytown clearance.
The regeneration schemes drew on the inherent sense of self-determination that
characterises the culture of Beiliang, so that community spirit developed organi-
cally. The tradition of local community festivals continued, and extended the ability
to forge and deepen personal relationships. With the new residential blocks as the
core unit, the new settlements drew on traditional social roles such as ‘Peacemaker’
and ‘Old Uncle’ to mediate in neighbourhood disputes, and implemented forms of
participatory community governance.
19 Communist Party Committees (General and Branch) Workstation of Communities model.
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7.6.2 Sustainable Development in State-Owned Agricultural
and Forestry Areas
Within the former state-run industrial and mining areas, the Government had no
option but to intervene directly to reconstruct community organisations and provide
social security services. In these areas, state-run enterprises survived the reforms, and
provided the backbone structure and framework for later regeneration programmes.
Newly renovated communities strove to establish alternative industries within the
forestry areas alongside innovative forms of forest management. With the introduc-
tion of the Natural Forest Protection Project in 2000, ecological services provided
by international management and protection agencies replaced timber production.
Drawing on the rich natural and landscape resources of forested areas, tourism,
conservation, the planting of indigenous species and forestry maintenance became
the main alternative industries.
Forestry areas also had an intrinsic advantage when it came to promoting commu-
nity cohesion. Forestry communities had developed around common goals and a
sense of a shared future and so were willing to invest capital in local education
training, medical health and house building. The emphasis on improving the welfare
of employees meant that the level of public services was generally higher than those
of surrounding counties. Forestry societies were built on strong personal relation-
ships. Community cadres and service provision were run by Forestry Bureau staff
and the combination of close geographical and working relationships ensured effec-
tive communication and the development of appropriate and carefully planned and
targeted services. The state-run Forest Management Co., Ltd. managed substan-
tial forestry resources, and became a regional hub for commerce, health, culture,
education, retail and employment.
Twooutstanding issues remain to be resolved in future redevelopmentwithin state-
run agricultural areas. Firstly, occupation levels within the renovated settlements
remain low, due to the mobility of the workforce. Many residents travelled away to
find work with children and the elderly forming the core of the community. There are
still issues with low levels of supporting infrastructure, which cannot satisfy water,
electricity,waste disposal and other requirements. Failures inwater and power supply,
and infrequent waste disposal, remain common problems. Furthermore, residents of
the new communities were unaccustomed to the bill payment system of collective
dwellings, and at present, recently refurbished dwellings rely heavily onmaintenance
carried out by small enterprises for the agricultural or forestry workforce.
The communities’ own self-support system proved equally important as the
Government’s urban integration and management systems. The ability of these
new settlements to support themselves depended on the capacity of each individual
community. The strengthening and building of capacity for community governance
and participationwill both reduce the expense of propertymanagement and the ability
of public services to meet basic living requirements.
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7.6.3 Ageing Populations in State-Run Industrial
and Mining Settlements
In 2005, Liaoning Province took the lead in the regeneration of shantytowns in state-
owned industrial and mining areas, a process which has lasted 14 years. Before the
first of the major co-ordinated schemes, the responsibility for shantytown renovation
lay with local authorities. Time scales were tight since the houses had to be demol-
ished, constructed and occupied within the current single fiscal year. Construction
qualitywas low, often leading to subsequentmaintenance andmanagement problems.
The biggest problemwas low expenditure on maintenance, mainly due to the general
ageing of the population. Workers made redundant in the 1990s entered old age ten
years after the renovation schemes, and employment difficulties increased for those
groups with lower skills and weak employment prospects. The continuing gap in
living standards between former shantytown residents and other urban communities
led many ‘second generation’ shantytowns dwellers to move away. This weakened
these communities’ capacity to organise themselves when they still had a long way
to go.
There were also problems shantytowns consolidation and sustainability. The level
of poverty and lack of capacity meant that state support was still required. To ensure
sustainable development into the future, capital support should be ensured by helping
local communities establish maintenance funds. Combining central and local finan-
cial initiatives should be possible to sustain the operational capacity of these newly
renovated settlements.
7.7 Conclusion
As urbanisation increases and societies become more individualised, people rely
less on the public domain, and community cohesion tends to decline. Within
China, however, particular factors encourage community reconstruction. Commu-
nities provided the essential platform for the transfer of systems and services from
state-run enterprises during the economic reforms. With the rise of greater social
mobility, the community played an important role in promoting social integration as
an intermediate platform connecting the state and the individuals.
It must be emphasised that, following the transformation of the economic system,
and the renewal of community structures, the renovation of shantytowns became a
major force for community development. As the public domain between Govern-
ment and individuals, the local community provided common living space and was
the nearest approximation to the private domain. The living requirements of residents
became the main driver for productivity within these communities. All communities
and all societies require geographical links and associations to maintain and improve
their quality of life and civilisation. A responsive approach to the needs of individual
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communities became the main theme and hall-mark of new forms of urban commu-
nity within China. The community-centred approach of promoting social cohesion
by transforming the subordinate status of communities was the outstanding feature
of these social regeneration projects. Community needs were the central focus in
each case.
We envisage that in future, the redevelopment of these communities will break
the cycle of community administration→ administrative dependence→ insufficient
capacity for self-management. Instead, greater levels of empowerment will resolve
economic and social development problems at a local level. Communities faced three
main challenges in the transition from shantytowns to new forms of urban settlement.
Firstly, they required a balanced population structure to remain sustainable, and
scientific planning and regulation were required to achieve this. Baotou began its
shantytown renovation eight years after Liaoning Province, and consequently, Beil-
iang had the advantage of learning from previous experience. There was a high
standard of planning with improved living standards as the goal. There were greater
public service resources available than in surrounding areas, enabling the schemes
to meet the basic living, cultural and educational requirements. This encouraged
younger people to stay within the community, avoided rapid ageing and ensured
regional vitality. A balanced population structure relied on sound planning and
design and also required constant improvements in living standards. The basic
conditions to ensure a population balance included better living facilities, a more
‘fashionable’ environment, improved public services and sufficient employment and
self-employment.
These newly regenerated settlements should remodel the ‘heart’ of the community
at a grass-roots level. The foundation for this transformation involves the vigorous
improvement of the employment and entrepreneurial environment, and reconstruc-
tion of living standards. Redundant workers urgently need retraining in areas such
as tourism, catering, nursing, housekeeping, child-care, and other specialist occupa-
tional skills. They required venture capital support to overcome reliance on public-
welfare employment and to enhance their employability in the open market. The
communities themselves were not an economic entity or source of employment.
To secure employment residents had to contact a range of government agencies,
universities, scientific research institutions and forestry or agricultural enterprises.
They also had to innovate and establish their own enterprises, and explore what local
resources were, available.
These new settlements need to cultivate the ‘soul’ of community. This involves
improving governance and levels of participation, creating as sense of identity,
improving the cultural level and gradually blending into surrounding urban soci-
eties. The main theme of development was to cultivate a sense of self-renewal and
communal renaissance to create new forms of intentional community. This required
a major shift in systems for community and economic resources, environmental
management and governance frameworks.
China’s large-scale ‘shantytown renovation’ brought over one hundred million
lower-incomeworkers into themodern urban living environment. It is truly an excep-
tional achievement and a global miracle of urban regeneration. As the traces of the
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old shantytown conditions fade at both the economic and social level, these commu-
nities will steadily integrate into the surrounding urban environment. Wider urban
regeneration practice could benefit from the study and consideration of the Chinese
experience.
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Chapter 8
Public Service Provision in China:
Towards a More Equal Access System
Jingjing Shan, Yanan Geng, Jin Fu, and Binglei Yu
Abstract The challenge facing urban policymakers is how to tackle the long-
standing differences in social welfare and basic public services provision for migrant
and incumbent workers arising from the dual-household registration system. In this
chapter, we quantify inequalities in access to basic public services between migrant
workers and the local urban population across different regions ofChina.We consider
both inequalities within urban areas, and inequalities that exist between urban and
rural areas. For urban areas, we find large inequalities in access to basic public
services between the indigenous urban population and migrant workers. There are
also significant differences between urban and rural areas. The level of basic public
services in theWest of China lags behind other regions. Across China as a whole, the
gap within regions is greater than the gap between regions. Internal variations within
a region arisemainly from inequality in access to basic public services between urban
and rural populations and across urban neighbourhoods. Chinese public services are
characterised by ‘dualisation’ in urban–rural provision and ‘fragmentation’ across
regions in terms of the level and quality of service. These two features consti-
tute a formidable obstacle for the ‘citizenisation’ of migrant workers. We provide
detailed examples from across China of countermeasures and strategies currently
being implemented to reduce inequalities in public service provision.
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8.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we investigate the inequalities in access to public services that have
emerged as a result of the urbanisation process over the past 40 years. The urban-
isation rate in China increased from 17.9% in 1978 to 59.58% in 2018, with an
annual average growth rate of 1.04%. The urban population increased from 172 to
831 million, with an annual average increase of 16 million. Since 1995, the rate of
urbanisation has accelerated, increasing by 1.33% every year. The urban population
has also increased by more than 20 million every year, which is greater than the total
population of a medium-sized European country. (For a more detailed discussion of
the phases of China’s migration, urbanisation and growth, see Chap. 5).
China’s urbanisation process, however, can be considered incomplete in the sense
that although large numbers of migrant workers have settled in cities and are counted
among the urban population, they do not have urban hukou (or non-agricultural
hukou), which confers citizenship rights. Despite moving to the city, the status of
their hukou registration remains rural or agricultural, which means they do not have
full rights of citizenship in terms of access to urban public services.1 They have
become industrial workers and made a great contribution to urban construction and
development. Nevertheless, they are restricted by the long-standing urban/rural divi-
sion due to the prevailing dual system of household registration, and cannot enjoy
the same access to basic public services as the permanent urban population. They
have restricted access to employment, medical treatment, provision for the aged, chil-
dren’s education, welfare housing and social security. As a consequence, it is very
difficult for them to integrate into urban society fully. They become the ‘migrant bird’
population, wandering between urban and rural areas. Large-scale and pendulum-
type population movements encourage families to draw on facilities and resources
in their native rural homelands and cities. It also brings about household separation,
left-behind children, a predominance of elderly and women in rural areas and many
other social problems. These may generate many risks and hidden dangers to the
healthy and stable development of the economy and society.
Both theNational New Urbanization Plan (2014–2020) unveiled in 2014, and the
Report of the 19thNationalCongress of theCommunistParty ofChina in 2017, placed
a priority on new ‘people-centred’ urbanisation processes and improved quality.
New models of urbanisation must encompass an increase in the number of towns,
the expansion of urban space and the higher proportion of the population living in
cities. They must also deal with the transformation of human production and living
standards through improvements in the quality of urban development.
The key feature of these new models of urbanisation is that they are ‘people-
centred’. They aim to promote the ‘citizenisation’ of migrant workers through the
process of industrialisation and urbanisation in order to comprehensively transform
the employment prospects, identity, status, ideology, working conditions and living
standards of migrant workers. The aim is to transform them into urban residents and
1 Migrant workers are those who are registered for census returns in rural areas, but who work
outside their registered location for six months and more each year.
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enable them to obtain the same basic public services and social benefits that registered
urban residents currently enjoy, thereby improving living standards and community
cohesion.Whether this process is considered in amore specific sense—the status and
living conditions of migrant workers—or in broader societal terms, the promotion of
the equality of access to basic public services is a key factor and a core challenge. The
so-called ‘equalisation’ of basic public services means that the government should
provide common and roughly equal public services across society. These services
should be appropriate for various economic and social development levels and should
reflect principles of fairness and justice. They should allow all members of society
to share equally in the achievements of China’s reform and opening-up policies and
in the country’s economic and social development.
The Chinese government has set development goals of permanently settling
around 100 million migrant workers in cities and extending access to the bene-
fits of urbanisation to another 100 million people in central and western areas. In
order to achieve this, there needs to be equal access to basic public services, making
it easier for migrant workers to integrate successfully into urban society. The goal is
also to achieve more equal access to public services between urban and rural areas
and across different regions. There is an ultimate commitment to encourage ‘about
100 million people’ to remain within the central and western regions allowing them
to benefit from ‘nearby urbanisation’ in their own areas.
Many studies show that themain challenge to this coremission is the slowprogress
of reform of the urban–rural dual-household registration system. This leads to dispar-
ities in access to social welfare and basic public services and related social problems
(Zhao and Wang 2002; Liu et al. 2008; Cai et al. 2005; Zhao 2006; Zhang 2008; Ji
2009).
Our focus in this article is on the following research questions:
• To what extent do gaps exist in the basic public services of China?
• Are such gapsmainly between different regions, urban and rural areas, or between
migrant workers and local residents in cities?
• What are the key challenges for China to overcome in order to promote equality
of access to basic public services for migrant workers?
Our hope is that research and discussion on these problems can strengthen the
determination of regional governments to accelerate the process of equalising access
to basic public services and the ‘citizenisation’ of migrant workers.
A considerable body of research has emerged from Chinese scholars on reducing
inequality in access to basic public services. For example, Hu et al. (2013) utilised
data from 2006 to 2010 to comprehensively evaluate the levels of development
in basic public services during the ‘11th Five-Year Plan’ period. They found very
evident increases in the levels of access to public services across various regions.
In the meantime, due to rapid progress in less developed areas, regional gaps were
decreasing, with levels of access gradually becoming more equal. The assimilation
rates within infrastructure and basic environmental services increased the fastest. Yu
(2012) utilised theTheil index tomeasure the gaps in public investment in compulsory
education in different regions of China from 1995 to 2009. The study concluded that
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these gaps decreased by varying degrees from 2005 to 2009. Huang and Fang (2008)
analysed the internal and regional differences across eastern, central and western
regions in aspects of public health expenditure from 1997 to 2005. They found that
the overall gaps represented a downward trend from 2000, which mainly came from
the internal differences within each region. Research conducted by Ouyang and Ding
(2011) found that from 2000 to 2008, the difference in social security expenditure
presented a downward and fluctuating trend. The differences mainly derived from
inside the regions, with relatively large variations within the eastern region and rela-
tively smaller variations across central and western regions. Wang (2012) applied
an empirical analysis to the configurations of basic public cultural service resources
(such as cinemas, library books, and libraries) in eastern, central and western regions
of China in 1999 and 2009, and found a consistent upward trend in equality of access
in recent years. At the same time there were increasing disparities between different
provinces, regions and municipalities. Lu (2012) studied data from 31 provinces
from 2003 to 2009 and found that the overall levels of basic public services increased
markedly. Various regions presented obvious step characteristics. The overall level of
basic public services in the eastern region was higher than in central regions, which
were higher than in the western region. But it should be noted that from 2008, the
basic public service level of the western region exceeded the central region. Zhao
(2013) utilised the statistical data from 2011 and conducted a comparative evalua-
tion on the rural grass-roots medical service levels of 28 provinces across mainland
China. The analysis indicated that in general the overall degree of differentiation in
levels of rural grass-roots medical services positively correlated with the total fiscal
revenue of each province, region or municipality. Feng (2014) adopted an entropy
method and conducted spatial analysis into the development and quality of basic
public services across prefecture-level cities in 2001 and 2010. This showed that
the public services within most regions in 2001 were seriously insufficient, and the
overall public service level increased at a lower rate in 2010. Ren (2009) applied Gini
coefficient to analyse inter-provincial basic public service levels from 2000 to 2006.
The study identified an increasing trend for disparities in public services provision
across different provinces in China.
While Chinese scholarship on reducing inequality of access to public services has
created a useful theoretical framework, the research perspectives mainly focus on
regional comparisonor on certain individual public services. There are fewsystematic
studies around the ‘citizenisation’ of migrant workers, and a particular shortage
of studies examining disparities across different groups within a region—such as
between urban dwellers and migrant workers. At the same time, there is insufficient
research into the social costs for increasing equality in access to basic public services.
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8.2 Evaluating Levels of Equality in Accessing Basic Public
Services
At present, China is vigorously promoting a new people-centred approach to urban-
isation, and focuses on solving three so-called ‘100 million people’ problems.2 If
China is to guide about 100 million people into a localised urbanisation process in
central and western regions, we need to further reduce inequality in access to basic
public services across different regions and between urban and rural areas.
Our approach involves three steps: firstly, to establish the basic public service
evaluation index system based on a list of measures that capture the availability of
public services, such as the number of doctors per 10,000 people, and the percentage
of peoplewith unemployment insurance. Secondly, to use the TOPSIS (Technique for
Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution) method to measure and evaluate
the development levels of basic public services. Finally, to use the Theil index model
tomeasure and evaluate inequality of access to basic public services betweenmigrant
workers and local urban populations in eastern, central and western regions, between
urban and rural areas and within cities throughout the country respectively.
8.2.1 The Evaluation Index System
In response to the need to evaluate the degree of equality in access to basic public
services, we have selected 15 evaluation factors to establish a representative and
scientific evaluation index system for public services based on available data. Such
factors mainly focus on medical health, compulsory education, cultural facilities and
social security (see Table 8.1).
8.2.2 Establish Theil Index Model to Measure Equality
of Access to Basic Public Services
There are many measurement methods which could reflect the degree of inequality
in access to public services, such as the coefficient of variation, Gini coefficient
and range ratio. Although these indices could properly reflect the overall level of
equality, it is difficult to use them to reflect the contributions that particular aspects
of inequality—such as inequality within regions versus inequality between them—
make to the overall levels. The Theil index model is our preferred approach as it
2 Three ‘100 million people’ problems is the name given to development goals put forward in the
Chinese government work report 2014, i.e. ‘promote about 100 million migrant workers settling
down in cities and towns, transform the shanty towns and villages in cities where about 100 million
people live, and guide another 100 million people into the urbanisation process in central and
western regions.’.
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Table 8.1 Evaluation index system of basic public services
Primary index Secondary index
Medical health Number of hospitals and health centres for every ten thousand
persons (hospitals/10,000 persons)
Number of doctors every ten thousand persons (doctors/10,000
persons)
Number of beds in hospitals and health centres for every ten thousand
persons (beds/10,000 persons)
Compulsory education Number of middle schools for every ten thousand persons
(schools/10,000 persons)
Number of primary schools for every ten thousand persons
(schools/10,000 persons)
Number of middle school students for every ten thousand persons
(persons/10,000 persons)
Number of primary school students for every ten thousand persons
(persons/10,000 persons)
Number of middle school full-time teachers for every ten thousand
persons (persons/10,000 persons)
Number of primary school full-time teachers for every ten thousand
persons (persons/10,000 persons)
Cultural facilities Number of cinemas for every ten thousand persons (cinemas/10,000
persons)
Number of public library books for every ten thousand persons
(books/10,000 persons)
Number of public libraries for every ten thousand persons
(libraries/10,000 persons)
Social security Coverage of urban employees’ basic endowment insurance (%)
Coverage of urban basic medical insurance (%)
Coverage of unemployment insurance (%)
makes up this deficiency due to its ‘decomposability’—that is the Theil index can
be ‘decomposed’ to show the contributions to overall inequality made by particular
subgroups and areas as a way of investigating the structure of inequality. We use
this decomposition approach below to measure the degree of inequality across basic
public services among different regions, between urban and rural areas and between
different populations throughout the country.
Theil index is initially used for measuring the income gap or the degree of
inequality between individuals or regions. A larger Theil index indicates a larger
overall income difference between individuals or regions; a smaller Theil index indi-
cates a smaller overall income difference between individuals or regions; a Theil
index of 0 means the income is completely equal. The fundamental formula of the
Theil index is:













Of which, T indicates Theil index, yi indicates the income level of individual i,
and y indicates the average income of all individuals. When formula (8.1) is applied
to measure the inequality in access to basic public services, income is replaced by












Of which, pi indicates the basic public service level of city i, p indicates the basic
public service level of the whole country, Ri indicates the population of city i, and R
indicates the total population of the whole country. The degree of inequality across
basic public services is inversely proportional to T. The smaller T is, the lower the
level of inequality.
We use the bivariate Theil index to investigate the level of equal access to basic
public services across the whole country. Firstly, we divide the Theil index into
inter-regional gaps and intra-regional gaps, and formula (8.2) will be converted into:


















where j denotes region. The Theil index of each region is then further split into the
gap between urban and rural areas and the gap within urban or rural areas. The Theil
index T j within region j can be indicated as:
T j = T j urban-rural + T j intra-urban or rural (8.6)















where Tjurban−rural is the Theil index, which reflects the basic public service gap
between urban and rural areas of region j, Pju indicates the basic public service level
in the urban area of region j, Pjr indicates the basic public service level in the rural
area of region j, Pj indicates the basic public service level of region j, Rju indicates
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the urban population of region j, Rjr indicates the rural population of region j, Rj
indicates the total population of region j.
The Theil index, which reflects the inequality of access to basic public services
within the urban and rural areas in each region, is further divided into the Theil index
Tju which reflects the level of equal access to basic public services within urban areas
across the region, and Theil index Tjr which reflects the inequality of access to basic
public services of rural area in the region, then:






















































Of which, Pjui indicates the basic public service level of urban areas i in region j,
Pju indicates the basic public service level of urban areas in region j;Pjri indicates the
basic public service level of the rural area i in region j, Pjr indicates the basic public
service level of rural areas in region j; Rjui indicates the population of the urban area
i in region j, Rju indicates the total population of urban areas in region j; Rjr indicates
the population of the rural area i in region j, Rjr indicates the total population of the
rural area in region j; Rj indicates the total population of region j.
T total = T inter − regional + T intra − regional
= T inter − regional +
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8.2.3 TOPSIS Evaluation of Basic Public Service Level
The TOPSIS evaluation method is a technique for ordering preferences by similarity
to an ideal solution. The basic idea is that, based on the original evaluation matrix,
a dimensionless method is used to process the data to obtain a standardised matrix.
Once this has been done, based on index weighting, it is possible to establish a
weighted decision matrix to identify further both the optimal scheme and the worst
scheme in the existing scenario. Then, it is possible to calculate the distances between
the subject of evaluation and both the optimal andworst schemes, to obtain the degree
of relative closeness between each subject and the optimal scheme, and to use this
as the basis for evaluation sequencing. The specific steps are as follows:
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As the evaluation on basic public services involves a larger amount of varying
index data, all with different dimensions, magnitudes and amplitudes of variation,
direct totalling and comparison becomes unfeasible. Dimensionless processing is
therefore required when handling such data. The specific method is as follows:
Xi =







Of which: Xi is the standardised value of index i; xi is the original value of index i;
max(xi) is the maximum sample value of index i; and min(xi) is the minimum sample
value.
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The positive utility index is given by,
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xi j , i = 1, 2, . . . ,m j = 1, 2, . . . n
And the negative utility index is given by:







, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m j = 1, 2, . . . n




yi j ln yi j (8.16)
then calculate the index difference degree,
K j = 1 − Hj
lnm
(8.17)
And finally the entropy weight,




We use the following formula to convert the decision matrix X = {xi j
}
to
normalised decision matrix Z = {zi j
}
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where gi j = w j × zi j , i = 1, 2, . . . ,m; j = 1, 2, . . . n, w j is the weight of index j.
Screen out the optimal value and worst value of each evaluation index, and build
the optimal solution vector G + and the worst solution vector G−:
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G+j = max(G+1 j ,G+2 j , . . .G+mj ) j = 1, . . . n (8.21)
G−j = max(G−1 j ,G−2 j , . . .G−mj ) j = 1, . . . n (8.22)











(gi j − g−i )2, i = 1, . . .m (8.24)
Of which, D+i indicates the distance from the optimal solution; D
−
i indicates the
distance from the worst solution.






, i = 1, 2, . . .m (8.25)
A larger Ci value which is tending towards 1 indicates a smaller distance between
this evaluation unit and the optimal solution, that is to say, it is closer to the optimal
vector, and the comprehensive evaluation degree is higher.
8.3 Results and Analysis
8.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
We drew data from the China Statistical Yearbook, the China City Statistical Year-
book and the statistical yearbooks of various provinces and cities in 2015, then applied
the TOPSISmethod to measure the levels of basic public services in different regions
of China (see Table 8.2).
The table demonstrates that public medical health services in the northeast are
relatively good, followed by the eastern region, central region, and western region.
The public medical health service indices are 0.4034, 0.3614, 0.3351 and 0.3048
respectively. Themain reason of this kind of result is that the net outflowof population
from northeast China has been ongoing for 20 years. In the past 10 years, the net
population outflow has exceeded 1 million. No significant adjustments in medical
institutions have been made accordingly, so per capita public medical health service
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Medical health 0.3614 0.3351 0.3048 0.4034 0.3512 0.0362
Compulsory
education
0.3202 0.3300 0.3260 0.2628 0.3097 0.0273
Cultural
services
0.3020 0.2083 0.1741 0.2163 0.2252 0.0471
Social security 0.5220 0.1472 0.1127 0.2395 0.2554 0.1608
Combined
indices
0.3764 0.2551 0.2294 0.2805 0.2854 0.0556
Source The China Statistical Yearbook, the China City Statistical Yearbook and the statistical
yearbooks of various provinces and cities in 2015
resources are relatively abundant. In contrast, since the 1980s, the eastern region has
been the main destination of population migration, and the growth in health services
cannot keep up with population growth, so public medical health service resources
are relatively tight.
The Chinese government hasmade great efforts to promote compulsory education
since 1948. More than 98% of the country’s children now receive compulsory educa-
tion. Therefore, the level of access to compulsory education is fairly stable across
the various regions. Nevertheless, a serious ‘brain drain’ from Northeast China has
created a relative scarcity in high-quality full-time teachers in primary and secondary
schools and the compulsory education index is comparatively lower.
The eastern region has the best provision for services promoting social and cultural
development, while the north-eastern, central and western regions lag behind in
comparison.
The level of development for social security services is far ahead in the eastern
region, with a social security index of 0.5220, followed by the northeast region, with
a social security index of 0.2395. The western and central regions are lag seriously
behind in these indices.
Overall, access to compulsory education is the most equally distributed basic
public service, with social security the most unequal in terms of access.
Table 8.3 used the TOPSIS method to measure the urban and rural basic public
services in different regions ofChina. It is clear that in terms of compulsory education,
medical health, cultural services and social security, urban levels of public services
in all major regions exceed that in rural areas. We will analyse this further below.
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0.3784 0.3782 0.3088 0.4083 0.3684 0.0327
Rural
area





0.3631 0.3559 0.3357 0.2597 0.3286 0.0367
Rural
area





0.3409 0.3082 0.2347 0.2986 0.2956 0.0344
Rural
area





0.5705 0.1844 0.1205 0.2743 0.2874 0.1541
Rural
area





0.4132 0.3067 0.2499 0.3102 0.3200 0.0527
Rural
area
0.3036 0.1989 0.2109 0.2348 0.2370 0.0363
Source The China Statistical Yearbook, the China City Statistical Yearbook and the statistical
yearbooks of various provinces and cities in 2015
8.3.2 Inequality of Access to Basic Public Services Among
Different Regions
Using data from the China Statistical Yearbook, the China City Statistical Yearbook
and the statistical yearbooks of various provinces and cities in 2015, we applied the
Theil indexmodel tomeasure inequality of access to basic public services at different
levels throughout the country.
The results showed that the Theil index of national basic public service is 0.156
(>0.1), indicating that the supply of basic public service at the national level is
generally unbalanced. The intra-regional gap of basic public service is higher than
the inter-regional gap of basic public service (see Table 8.4).
We mainly observed and compared the availability of basic public services in
eastern, central, western and north-eastern regions of China and the gaps between the
regions. The resultsmeasured by the TOPSISmethod showed that the comprehensive
indices of basic public service levels were: 0.3764 for the eastern region (highest);
followed by 0.2805 for northeast region; 0.2551 for central region; and 0.2294 for
the western region (lowest). The basic public service level of the eastern region is far
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Inter-regional 10 13 10 16 12
Intra-regional 90 87 90 84 88
Source The China Statistical Yearbook, the China City Statistical Yearbook and the statistical










Cultural facilities Social security Combined index
eastern region central region western region northeast region
Fig. 8.1 Comparison of levels of basic public services in four regions of China (2015). Source
TOPSIS scores computed using data from theChina Statistical Yearbook, theChina City Statistical
Yearbook and the statistical yearbooks of various provinces and cities in 2015
ahead of other regions, and western region lags behind other regions (see Figs. 8.1
and 8.2).
We found that compulsory education had the highest degree of equality across the
different regions, followed by medical health , and public cultural services. Social
security had the greatest inequality of access (see Figs. 8.2 and 8.3).
8.3.3 Urban–Rural Inequality of Access to Basic Public
Services
Wemainly observed and analysed the supply balance and availability of basic public
services in a region. The evaluation results showed that from an intra-regional
perspective, the most unequally distributed aspects of basic public services were












eastern region central region western region northeast region
Fig. 8.2 Comparison of basic public service gap in four regions of China (2015). Source TOPSIS
scores computed using data from theChina Statistical Yearbook, theChinaCity Statistical Yearbook
and the statistical yearbooks of various provinces and cities in 2015
Fig. 8.3 Comparison of inequality in access to various basic public services in four regions of
China (2015). Source calculated according to the relevant statistical data in the China Statistical
Yearbook, the China City Statistical Yearbook and the statistical yearbooks of various provinces
and cities in 2015
mainly concentrated around urban–rural divisions and focused primarily on cultural
services provision and social security (see Table 8.5).
Based on the per capita resource, we observed the urban/rural discrepancies in the
supply of various provincial basic public services. The results showed that although
various per capita resources in urban areas were generally higher than those in rural
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Urban–rural 30 12 35 50 41
Inter-urban 20 22 39 26 30
Inter-rural 50 66 26 24 29
Source Theil index applied to the relevant statistical data in the China Statistical Yearbook, the
China City Statistical Yearbook and the statistical yearbooks of various provinces and cities in 2015
regions, there were differences across individual provinces . In some rural areas in
certain provinces , the per capita compulsory education resource and public medical
health service resources exceeded those available in urban areas. This indicated that
during the urbanisation process, as the rural population moved towards cities and
towns or travelled to work outside their communities, the rural population decreased
sharply. In some areas, public service resources allocated to the permanent or ‘regis-
tered’ population were seriously wasted or used inefficiently (see Figs. 8.4, 8.5, 8.6
and 8.7).
For example, in the past 20 years, the number of primary school students inChina’s
urban areas has increased by more than 28 million, but the number of schools has
decreased by 45,000. Conversely, with the rapid advancement of urbanisation, the
number of students in rural areas has continued to decline sharply. In recent years,
however, the number of newly built schools in rural areas has increased year by year.
This reminds us that we should not adopt rigid and mechanical methods to promote
the equalisation of basic public services. Instead, wemust reasonably optimise public
service resources based on population distribution.
Fig. 8.4 Urban–rural comparison of basic medical public service supply levels across major
provinces on the Chinese mainland (Calculated according to resources owned per 10,000 persons).
Source The China Statistical Yearbook, the China City Statistical Yearbook and the statistical year-
books of various provinces and cities in 2015 (Because the statistics of Xizang Province and Hainan
Province are incomplete, they are temporarily not included in this evaluation)
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Fig. 8.5 Urban–rural comparison of basic educational public service supply levels across major
provinces in mainland China (Calculated according to resources owned per 10,000 persons). Source
The China Statistical Yearbook, the China City Statistical Yearbook and the statistical yearbooks of
various provinces and cities in 2015 (Because the statistics of Xizang Province and Hainan Province
are incomplete, they are temporarily not included in this evaluation)
Fig. 8.6 Urban–rural comparison of social security levels across major provinces in mainland
China. SourceTheChina Statistical Yearbook, theChinaCity Statistical Yearbook and the statistical
yearbooks of various provinces and cities in 2015 (Because the statistics of Xizang Province and
Hainan Province are incomplete, they are temporarily not included in this evaluation)
Figure 8.8 below shows the urban/rural gaps within the provision of basic public
services among various provinces throughout the country. We find that generally,
the gaps are larger in regions with a more developed economy. The urban/rural
discrepancy was smaller in some regions, but their basic public service levels were
also relatively lower, thus presenting a low-level balance (see Fig. 8.8).
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Fig. 8.7 Urban–rural comparison of public cultural service supply levels across major provinces in
mainland China (calculated according to resources owned per 10,000 persons). Source The China
Statistical Yearbook, the China City Statistical Yearbook and the statistical yearbooks of various
provinces and cities in 2015 (Because the statistics of Xizang Province and Hainan Province are




















































































































basic public services-urban basic public services-rural
Fig. 8.8 Urban-rural comparison of basic public services in major provinces of the Chinese main-
land. Source calculated according to the relevant statistical data in the China Statistical Yearbook,
the China City Statistical Yearbook and the statistical yearbooks of various provinces and cities
in 2015. (Because the statistics of Xizang Province and Hainan Province are incomplete, they are
temporarily not included in this evaluation)
8.3.4 Intra-Urban Inequality in Access to Basic Public
Services
In this section, we analyse the gaps in access to basic public services between
migrantworkers and the local urban population from the perspectives of employment,
education, public housing and social security.
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The public employment service system provided by regional governments for
migrant workers has improved gradually over recent years, but up to 2017, still only
about a third of migrant workers had received appropriate vocational skills training.
According to the Research Report on the Situations of Left-Behind Children in
Rural Areas andUrban–RuralMigrant Children ofChina published by theAll-China
Women’s Federation in 2013, there are 35,810,000 urban–rural migrant children
across the country. These children accompany their parents as they migrate to cities.
Pre-school migrant children (0–5) make up some 27.4% of the total. School-age
children in the compulsory education stage (primary school and junior middle school
stages, 6–14) comprise 41.1%, and older migrant children (15–17) another 31.5%.
Most migrant children within the age range for compulsory education (aged 6–14)
can study in local primary schools or junior high schools. However, it is harder for
pre-school aged migrant children to enter kindergartens and for older ones to enter
high schools. In recent years, as the Chinese government pays more attention to
the education of migrant children, urban public and private schools are opening-
up to these children, and the education for migrant children of migrant workers
has greatly improved. According to theMigrant Workers Monitoring Survey Report
2018 published recently by the National Bureau of Statistics, the schooling rate of
migrant children of migrant workers in the compulsory education stage has reached
98.9%. The kindergarten admittance rate of migrant children aged 3–5 (including
pre-school) has reached 83.5%, and the degree of satisfaction ofmigrantworkerswith
their children’s education has reached 75.3%. Nevertheless, those children outside
the age for compulsory education who want to leave for local cities to continue their
education at senior high school or university still face some institutional barriers.
When it comes to access to cultural and sports services, our research in 2010
and 2014 found that most migrant workers rarely or never used the available public
cultural service facilities or participated in related activities. However, more recent
research shows that more than a quarter (26.5%) of migrant workers now participate
in activities organised by local communities.More than 10% ofmigrant workers now
participate in cultural recreation, sports, training and learning activities in their spare
time.3 For example, Hangzhou has carried out a series of public cultural services
for its migrant population, providing a lecture hall for citizens, migrant workers
cinema, supermarket, and migrant workers culture club. These play a very positive
role in improving the cultural life of migrant workers and strengthening their social
cohesion.
The main types of accommodation available for Chinese migrant workers in 2009
were the employer’s dormitory (33.9%), factory premises or production andoperation
sites (17.9%) and rented houses (34.6%). By 2018, the proportions had changed
with the employer’s dormitory accounting for 12.9%, rented houses for 61.3% and
private self-bought property at 19%, a rise from 0.8% in 2009. The per capita living
3 Data source: National Bureau of Statistics,Migrant Workers Monitoring Survey Report 2017, and
Migrant Workers Monitoring Survey Report 2018.
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2009年 2010年 2011年 2012年 2013年 2014
7.6 9.5 13.9 14.3 15.7 16.4
21.8 24.1 23.6 24 28.5 29.7
12.2 14.3 16.7 16.9 17.6 18.2
3.9 4.9 8 8.4 9.1 9.8


























Fig. 8.9 Percentages of migrant workers participating in social security. services from 2009 to
2014. Source arranged according to the relevant data in the Migrant Workers Monitoring Survey
Report 2009 to 2014, National Bureau of Statistics
space reached 20.2 m2. Some 2.9% of migrant workers are entitled to government-
subsidised housing, including 1.3% of public rental housing and 1.6% of self-bought
government-subsidised housing.4
From 2009 to 2014, the proportions of Chinese migrant workers participating in
various insurance schemes increased, including employment injury insurance (from
21.8% to 29.7%), medical insurance (from 12.2% to 18.2%), endowment insurance
(from 7.6% to 16.4%), unemployment insurance (from 3.9% to 9.8%) and mater-
nity insurance (from 2.4% to 7.1%) (see Fig. 8.9). Although in recent years, the
coverage rate of social security services for migrant workers increased markedly, a
larger gap still exists compared with the urban population. During the year 2014,
for example, where the social security data is relatively complete, the proportions of
migrant workers participating in employment injury insurance, medical insurance,
endowment insurance, unemployment insurance and maternity insurance are only
equivalent to 1/2, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4 and 1/6 of the coverage rates of urban employees (see
Fig. 8.10).
4 Data source: National Bureau of Statistics,Migrant Workers Monitoring Survey Report 2009, and
Migrant Workers Monitoring Survey Report 2018.
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Fig. 8.10 Comparison of social security coverage between migrant workers and urban employees
in 2014. Source calculated according to the relevant statistical data in the China City Statistical
Yearbook 2015 and the Migrant Workers Monitoring Survey Report 2014
8.4 Policy Implications
In the light of these very significant inequalities in access to basic public services
between migrant workers and the local urban population across different regions of
China, what should policy makers do? In this section, we summarise some policy
implications.
8.4.1 Administrative and Expenditure Responsibilities
In a market economy, the government’s most important administrative function is
the provision of basic public services. The clear definition of administrative and
expenditure responsibilities at all levels of government and the establishment of
systems that combine fiscal and regulatory powers is both the precondition and basis
for promoting equitable coverage for regional public services.
The clear definition and demarcation between administrative and financial respon-
sibilities between central and local governments would encourage collaboration and
help ensure that different levels of government carry out their duties andmaximisation
efficiency.
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8.4.2 Transfer Payment System
Most countries implement a single vertical transfer payment system for the disburse-
ment of public funds from central government. The typical transfer flow runs from
central to local government and down to the ‘lowest’ levels through a hierarchical
system. In China, there is a large development gap between the eastern and the
central andwestern regions, and the central government’s financial resources are rela-
tively limited. There is a need to establish a rational and consistent financial transfer
payment system so as to promote regional equalisation of basic public services.
Horizontal transfer payments typically operate across the same tiers of govern-
ment. A local government with a relatively developed economy will directly transfer
a portion of its fiscal revenue to the less developed regions to support their develop-
ment. The most developed regions within eastern China are currently approaching
the levels of developed countries worldwide. These regions have the capacity and
conditions to support less developed areas financially. A horizontal transfer payment
system will promote co-ordinated inter-regional development and enhances overall
economic development at a national level.
In themeantime, we need to facilitate vertical transfer payments below the provin-
cial level. We should strengthen transfer payments between provincial and county
levels, to equip and empower the lower tiers of local government to own and manage
expenditure effectively tomeet regional requirements. The second point is to actively
promote financial system reform at county and town-level to best achieve the finan-
cial system reforms necessary to achieve consistency and deliver more equal access
to public services.
8.4.3 Public Service Supply
In order to satisfy the increasingly rising public demand for more and higher
quality services, we must align relations appropriately between government, market
and society, integrate public service resources, and update service delivery. A co-
ordinated approach gives full play to the positive roles of market and society and
ensures that government takes the lead in providing public services.
A marketisation process is necessary to achieve and maintain service efficiency
and equality. The procurement of specific services can be devolved from government
to appropriate and suitably qualified social organisations or profit-making companies.
The government then purchases these services according to quantity and quality.
Another step would be to change the payment model by adopting a voucher
system. For education, medical health, provision for the aged, employment training
and other services that relate directly to individuals, the government’s prime respon-
sibility is to intervene when demand cannot be satisfied, or else the price exceeds
public purchasing power.At this point, government can provide appropriate subsidies
to guarantee that all residents can benefit from these services.
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A third objective would be to establish new investment systems to help secure
the participation of social organisations. Appropriate and qualified social or profit-
making organisations can be allowed to expand the investment channels available for
public services through franchising, competitive tender, rental contracts, or govern-
ment participation. If we take social security as an example, we can build a coop-
erative platform between commercial insurance and social insurance, to harness
the advantages of commercial insurance provision. We also need to resolve current
problems in community management and give more support to people with partic-
ular needs. By combining the advantages of assistance, welfare and insurance, we
can establish a comprehensive and water-tight system with the participation of
government, society, employers and employees.
Public services can be planned and delivered more accurately and intelligently
with input from social organisations. As they are rooted in specific communities,
they offer the great advantage of grass-roots insights to help tailor services to meet
local conditions. Services can then be delivered in a more timely, appropriate and
professional way to satisfy local demand.
8.4.4 Integration of Resources
The current low level of coverage and access to public services for migrant workers
is a major challenge and concern. There is a need to increase access and continue to
deepen the reform of the household registration system. We must enable qualified
migrantworkers to settle in citieswith asmuch right and opportunity to access quality
public services as the permanent and registered resident population.
Disparities between urban and rural services lie largely in service inefficiencies
and poor service quality in the countryside. We should improve levels of take-up
and service efficiency and quality to redress this imbalance. This can primarily be
achieved by combining and rationalising systems and service delivery. For instance,
basic urban medical insurance and new rural cooperative medical care systems can
be combined into a provincially unified and integrated whole. The same could apply
to social security endowments and subsistence allowance systems resulting in a
relatively unified system but pitched at a level appropriate for local conditions. A
balanced approach to the allocation of resources and service delivery couldmaximise
social security coverage and reduce the gaps in service level between urban and rural
areas.
The western region especially faces double challenges of lower service quality
and insufficient coverage. In the future, we should look to increase both coverage and
quality across less developed regions. Improved payment transfer systems at all levels
of government should help to achieve this. At the same time, investment, training
and policies should strengthen targeted support to improve the professionalism of
public service development, especially in poorer and less developed regions.
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8.4.5 Use of Information Technology
The construction of appropriate information platforms and the deployment of digital
information technology is crucial if we are to improve the quality and efficiency of
public service delivery acrossChina. Themarketisation, planning and socialisation of
service supply depends on the development of national and provincial data platforms
to serve various priority services.
A cohesive and unified social security information system is vital. This could
take the form of a ‘One Card’ approach with applications across social and medical
insurance, unemployment andmaternity benefits. Information could be shared across
employment and labour relations services and social assistance institutions.
Another example would be compulsory education, where online technologies
could allow resource-sharing to gradually reduce regional and urban/rural differences
and disparities between different types of school. Within medical health, we should
actively promote online inquiry, telemedicine, and resource-sharing across regions
and between towns and the countryside.
Information technology should also be utilised to build user-friendly, barrier-free
transfer and renewal systems for social insurance services. Levels of expenditure
could be equalised between educational provision in urban and rural areas to follow
the principle of ‘expenditure moving with people’—the allocation of resources to
the points of greatest need.
8.4.6 Standardisation of Laws and Regulations
The gradual establishment and improvement of laws and regulations around basic
public services is of great significance in achieving equality of access to public
services. The process involves the following three aspects:
First, experience from other countries shows that it is necessary to establish a basic
framework for the division and allocation of inter-governmental administrative and
financial powers and responsibilities. In doing so, we ought to clearly and specifically
stipulate financial authority, rights and obligations at all levels of governments. At
present, China has no legal provision for the division of inter-governmental adminis-
trative and fiscal power. Inter-governmental relations currently generally follow the
principal guidance of Communist Party and government documents. This creates
a degree of policy instability at a local level as it becomes easy to distort invest-
ment, consumption and labour market behaviour. Moreover, some local government
agencies may limit the free flow of labour and other production factors to gain
regional advantage, an example of what is known in the economics literature as the
‘externality’ problem. Such ‘externalities’ arise when the behaviour of a person,
firm or government department ‘changes the cost of some subsidy or alters the
revenues collected from some tax, thereby affecting the wellbeing of taxpayers in
general’ (Browning 1999, p.3). The financial externality problem arises when one
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local government’s financial investment benefits or damages others but is unable to
charge or compensate them. The administrative and financial externality problem
may influence the normal exercise of administrative and financial powers of local
governments. Most importantly, the fiscal externality problem makes it harder to
divide central and local responsibility. The central governmentmay shift their admin-
istrative responsibilities away and on to the local agencies. To avoid situations of this
kind we must strengthen the legal system to establish clear lines of authority for
inter-governmental administrative and financial powers.
The second aspect is the need to further develop more detailed legislation relating
to public services. There is a need within China for greater legislative definition
within public service areas like compulsory public education and health care, for
instance. Public education is governed by policies contained in Education Law and
Compulsory Education Law.Within public health care there is theLawon thePreven-
tion and Control of Infectious Diseases and the Health Law. These policies tend
to govern broad brush policy areas and often provide insufficient detail for those
charged with implementing the policies to follow. In some instances, those deliv-
ering services have no option but to act ‘at will’ without clear or adequate guidelines,
introducing uncertainty, inconsistency and even serious compromises in the quality
or appropriateness of service delivery.
Third, further development is needed on the regulation of the marketisation and
socialisation of public services. China is consistently applying measures to marke-
tise and socialise service delivery but with few specialised laws and regulations to
govern and supervise the processes involved.Wemust accelerate the formulation and
introduction of relevant legislation to build a more open, equal and fair environment
for the marketisation and socialisation of basic public services.
8.5 Conclusions and Recommendations
In this chapter we have provided a systematic way of quantifying inequalities in
access to public services arising from the dual-household registration system. We
reported four main sets of results. Firstly, there are still marked inequalities in access
to basic public services between urban populations and migrant workers. These
migrant workers generally face more difficulties in receiving medical treatment,
entering schools, obtaining social security provision, and enjoying entertainment.
Services for migrant workers in urban areas are poorly available and narrow in scope
and these are the main reasons for the sense of a lack of belonging and integration
among these groups in Chinese cities.
Secondly, there is an urgent need for improving service quality in education and
medical health provision in rural areas. It is not a problem of insufficient supply
as rural areas have received compulsory education and medical health provision for
many years. The issue is one of quality and a disparity between rural and urban areas.
At present, the largest gap occurs within public cultural services, often seriously
insufficient in rural areas. In recent years, although China has made great efforts to
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establish public cultural services in rural areas, the ‘take-up’ is generally low due to a
failure to grasp the real requirements of people in the countryside. The Rural Library
Project can serve as one example. In many rural areas the population largely consists
of children and elderly people left behind asmigrants headed to the cities to findwork.
The elderly generally have a lower degree of education and seldom read. There are
often fewer books for children in rural libraries which largely stock reference books
on agricultural science and other practical applications. Consequently, many book
resources are underutilised.
Thirdly, the overall levels of access to basic public services vary very little across
China’s eastern, central and northeast regions. The basic public service level within
the western region does lag behind the others in relative terms. The public service
which shows the smallest regional variance is basic education. There are greater
regional differences in public cultural services and social security, especially in
central and western regions, which trail behind the other regions.
Fourthly, when examined from the perspective of the whole country, it is evident
that basic public services in China are generally unbalanced in terms of access and
coverage. The gaps are more evident between regions rather than within each region
itself. These gaps aremost clearly seen in the disparity between urban and rural public
services and between permanent and migrant populations in cities. Furthermore,
China’s basic public services are currently characterised by the coexistence of a
‘dualised’ urban–rural divide and also ‘fragmentation’ between regions. An example
is a difficulty in transferring and renewing social security claims and entitlements,
which forms a great barrier for the reasonable flow of migrant workers. Finally, there
are disparities between increasing public demand for basic services and improved
quality of life and the relatively low level of development, coverage and quality of
some of the available services.
It is clear then thatChina still has a longway to go to promote and realise consistent
provision of basic public services. There remain large differences in the economic
level and financial strengths of different regions. Gaps in provision cannot be filled in
a short time. On the other hand, China is undergoing rapid urbanisation and the pace
of this processmakes thewidening of provision tomigrantworkers a key and pressing
problem. Equally, it is not enough to simply provide wider coverage of basic public
services, issues of supply, quality and public satisfaction should also be taken into
account. In order to promote urbanisation and the ‘citizenisation’ ofmigrant workers,
and to establish a financial system with matched financial and administrative power,
China needs to:
• delineate administrative and expenditure responsibilities,
• develop a transfer payment system,
• diversify and enhance public service supply,
• integrate resources,
• use information technology to reduce public service inequality,
• standardise laws and regulations.
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Chapter 9
Housing Policies for Rural Migrant
Workers in China
Yeqiang Wang and Xin Dong
Abstract Lack of housing security is a major problem for rural migrant workers in
China. This chapter explores the range and depth of housing problems facing rural
migrants. These challenges include issues of affordability and poor housing quality
and administrative barriers that inhibit access to commercial housing and housing
welfare programmes. There is a big difference between the housing consumption
pattern of migrant workers in the city and that in the countryside. This is due to large
discrepancies in levels of access to good quality accommodation between migrants
from rural areas and the established urban population. These inequalities are exacer-
bated by inherited forms of residential registration that adversely affect ruralmigrants
settling in towns and cities. The situation is further exacerbated by land use regula-
tions that restrict the construction of collective dormitories for rural migrant workers.
The key is to promote the system reform of rural land and speed up the establish-
ment of a free market homestead and rural housing. Policy responses over the past
twenty years are evaluated, and recommendations for future policy development are
proposed to improve housing conditions, including reform of land use regulations
and improved property rights for migrants.
Keyword Migrant workers · Housing Policies · Urban housing security system ·
Dual housing consumption modes · Household registration system
9.1 Introduction
The current lack of urban housing security for rural migrants in China constitutes
an important barrier to their ‘citizenisation’1—the acquisition of full rights as citi-
zens—and hinders the process of urbanisation in China. The lack of proper housing
1 Citizenisation refers to rural migrants who have worked in the city for a long time. They need to
be given the same rights as urban residents in education, medical care, social security and other
aspects, so as to integrate into the city in culture, psychology, lifestyle and other aspects.
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or poor housing conditions hinders rural migrant workers from developing a sense
of belonging in the city. Housing is one of the most basic physical and social require-
ments and a lack of housing security makes it harder for rural migrants to integrate
into urban life. The increased sense of alienation and psychological distance from
urban society is a potentially important source of urban disharmony.
In this chapter, we describe the challenges facing housing provision for rural
migrants in China and evaluate the policies that have been introduced. In Sect. 2, we
summarise the main housing problems facing rural migrants (Sect. 2), and in Sect. 3,
we provide an overview of the changes in China’s housing policies. In Sect. 4,
we evaluate these housing policies and consider the implications for future policy
development in Sect. 5. We conclude with a brief summary.
9.2 Housing for Rural Migrants
This section considers the housing situation for rural migrants from three directions:
housing conditions, housing security, housing affordability, and government and
market failures.
9.2.1 Housing Conditions
Lack of adequate living space, poor environmental quality, and inadequate living
facilities all shape the general housing experience for rural migrants in China.
Compared with the increasing per capita living area and improving living condi-
tions of permanent urban residents, urban housing for rural migrants falls far short
of what is becoming the national norm. Because of their poorer economic status and
lack of official local household registration, rural migrants can only choose rented
accommodation. The explosive growth in urban populations and rising real estate
prices in recent years have forced them to settlemainly in older urban neighbourhoods
that are relatively remote, inaccessible, seriously polluted, and lacking in green or
open space, or else in rural areas on the edge of the city. This has serious implications
both for their health and their personal security.
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Fig. 9.1 Per capita living area of rural migrants in cities by city size
Nevertheless, in recent years, across a range of areas, including housing location,
resources and facilities, as well as lifestyle, the living conditions of rural migrants2
in cities have generally improved.
The Monitoring and Survey Report on Rural Migrant Workers of the National
Bureau of Statistics of China have reported on the housing locations, and access to
resources and facilities for rural migrants since 2016. The per capita living area of
urban–ruralmigrantswas 20.2 squaremetres in 2018, an increase of 0.4 squaremetres
over the previous year. The proportion of rural migrants with a per capita living area
of just five square metres or less accounted for 4.4% of the total, a decrease of 0.2%
over the previous year. Figure 9.1 shows how the per capita living area decreases with
2 The term rural migrant workers refers to workers who still hold rural registered permanent resi-
dence and are engaged in non-agricultural industries in cities or have been employed outside their
hometown for six months or above. The term local rural migrant workers refers to those who work
within the township area of their household registration, whereas outgoing rural migrant workers
refers to those who work outside the township area of their household registration. The term urban
migrant workers refers to those who live in urban areas. The urban area is divided according to the
Provisions on Statistical Division of Urban and Rural Areas of the National Bureau of Statistics,
and is consistent with the territorial scope for calculating the population urbanisation rate.
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city size and also shows how the living area of rural migrants increased modestly
across all cities between 2017 and 2018.
9.2.2 Housing Security
The proportion of rural migrants provided with housing by government-funded work
units danwei3 or employers has declined significantly. While the proportion of rural
migrants purchasing housing has increased, the proportion of rural migrants enjoying
housing security is still very low. Rental accommodation has become the primary
form of accommodation for rural migrants in Chinese cities.
Rental housing has overtaken the work unit dormitory as the most prominent
form of accommodation for rural migrants, but a considerable proportion still live
in construction site sheds and on production and operation sites. The proportion of
rural migrants who commute to work from home has increased significantly, while
the proportion of rural migrants purchasing housing in the cities where they work has
increased slightly though it is still very low. In 2015, 37% of outgoing rural migrants
rented houses, 28.7% lived in dormitories, 15.9% lived in construction site sheds
or on production and operation sites, 14% commuted from home, 1.3% purchased
housing in cities where they worked, and ‘others’ accounted for 3.1% of the total.
In 2016, the statistical calibration for theMonitoring and Survey Report on Rural
Migrant Workers of the National Bureau of Statistics changed from source to desti-
nation of rural migrant workers. In 2016, 62.4% of rural migrant workers lived in
rented houses, of which 61% lived in rented private houses, and 13.4% lived in
houses provided by work units or employers. In 2018, 61.3% of urban–rural migrant
workers lived in rented houses, an increase of 0.3% over the previous year; 12.9%
lived in houses provided by work units or employers, 0.4% lower than that of the
previous year; and 19% purchased housing, the same as the previous year. Some
17.4% purchased commercial housing, the same as the previous year.
Various factors contribute to the pressures facing rural migrants during the tran-
sition to urban life: the restriction of household registration, difficulties for their
children entering school, a higher cost of living and limited living space. Most rural
migrant workers usually live andwork in the city alone, and often rent housing jointly
with colleagues and workers to save rent. This results in a relatively lonely lifestyle,
forced to live apart from their families. The dislocation and separation of partners,
3 danwei refers to the employing organisation other than the enterprise. During the pre-reform
period, most urban employers were either state owned institutions, state owned enterprises, or
collectively owned enterprises. They were all referred as ‘danwei’ (work unit). Every working age
person in a city had a ‘danwei’. Since the reforms, the urban economy has become mixed, with
more privately owned companies, institutions and enterprises, but the phrase danwei (work unit)
is still in use. In general, it now means ‘employer’, including private sector employers as well as
those in state-run enterprises. Danwei and work unit, both are used commonly in Chinese studies.
This is the sense in which they are used in this chapter—work units but not necessarily government
funded ones.
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parents and children, siblings and other relatives is a common feature of migrant life
in urban China. It is not conducive to the healthy development of family life and leads
to complex social problems around issues such as left-behind children—offspring of
migrant workers left in the care of rural relatives while their parents work and live
in the city.
The proportion of rural migrants purchasing housing near their places of work
has increased and is a prominent trend. According to data from the National Bureau
of Statistics’ Monitoring and Survey Report on Rural Migrant Workers in 2015,
1.3% of rural migrants purchased housing in places where they work. In 2016,
17.8% of urban–rural migrants purchased housing, an increase of 0.5% over the
previous year. Some 16.5% of these rural migrants purchased commercial houses,
an increase of 0.8% over the previous year. Based on data collected in 2016, in
2015, 17.2% of urban–rural migrants purchased housing, while in 2015, only 1.3%
of purchased housing close to their work-place. Such a large gap is probably due to
migrants purchasing properties in small and medium-sized communities nearer their
hometown.
At the same time, the proportion of rural migrant workers enjoying urban housing
security is still very low. In 2016, less than 3% of urban–rural migrant workers
purchased affordable housing and took public rental housing lets. In 2018, 2.9% of
these workers enjoyed affordable housing, an increase of 0.2% over the previous
year. Among them, 1.3% rented accommodation from publicly owned sources, an
increase of 0.2% over the previous year; and 1.6% purchased affordable housing, the
same as the previous year. It can be seen that the role of urban housing security in
solving the housing problem of rural migrants is still very limited.
9.2.3 Housing Affordability
Theability to afford accommodation canbe further refined to reflect rental or purchase
payments. The rent-income ratio of ruralmigrantworkers does not exceed the reason-
able standard, but the corresponding housing conditions are poor. In 2015, the per
capitamonthly living expenses of ruralmigrant workers in cities and towns amounted
to ¥475, the per capita monthly income was ¥3,072, and the proportion of living
expenses to income was 15.5%. Internationally, the accepted reasonable level for the
rent-income ratio is no more than 30%. According to this standard, it appears that
Chinese rural migrants do not lack sufficient levels of affordable housing in cities
and towns. However, their low living expenses correspond to relatively poor housing
conditions. A considerable number of rural migrants live in urban villages (Chap. 6),
shanty towns (Chap. 7) and work sheds.
In the case of the affordability of purchased housing, the house price-to-income
ratio shows that the ability of rural migrants to purchase housing is generally
insufficient. The specific calculation method for the house price-to-income ratio
is as follows: the ratio of the average sales price of commercial housing to the
average annual household income of outgoing rural migrants. The average sales
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Table 9.1 House price-to-income ratio of outgoing rural migrants’ families in various regions
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Whole country 9.9 11.9 10.6 9.5 9.3
Eastern region 13.1 15.8 13.9 12.1 11.8
Central region 6.6 7.5 7.3 7.1 6.8
Western region 7.5 8.5 8.1 7.7 7.5
Data source Calculated according to the data of 2012 National Monitoring and Survey Report on
Rural Migrant Workers of the National Bureau of Statistics and China Statistical Yearbook
price for commercial housing (yuan/flat) is calculated by multiplying the average
sales price of commercial housing (yuan/m2) by the per capita housing construction
area (m2) and then multiplying the average household population of urban resi-
dents (person/household) (assuming that each household has a flat). The average
annual household income of rural migrants (yuan/household) is calculated by multi-
plying the assumed average number of personnel working away from their homes
per household4 (person/household) by their average annual income (yuan/person).
By comparing the two, we can obtain the house price-to-income ratio for migrants’
families in various regions from 2008 to 2012,5 as shown in Table 9.1.
From Table 9.1, it can be seen that from 2008 to 2012, the house price-to-income
ratio for rural migrants’ families in the national housing market was 9.3–11.9, 11.8–
15.8 in the eastern region, 6.6–7.5 in the central region, and 7.5–8.1 in the western
region housing market. The lower the house price-to-income ratio, the higher the
level of affordability. The comparable international range for a reasonable house-
price-to-income ratio is 4–6. However, considering the actual situation in China, it is
more suitable to adopt the house price-to-income ratio range of 5–7 as a reasonable
standard (Dong 2012). According to this measure, in recent years, the overall house
price-to-income ratio for rural migrants’ families in the national housing market
has exceeded the reasonable standard, indicating a generally insufficient level of
housing affordability for such families in China. The house price-to-income ratio
for such families in the eastern region is much higher than the reasonable range,
indicating a low level of affordable housing in the eastern region. In central and
western regions, the house price-to-income ratio for these families is slightly higher
than the reasonable standard. In some years, the house price-to-income ratio for
the families of rural migrants in the central region lies within the reasonable range,
indicating a good level of affordable accommodation. On occasion, there is a better
level of housing affordability in the central region than in the western region.
4 Outgoing migrant workers: refers to rural labourers who have worked outside their township area
for six months or more during the survey year.
5 Due to the limitation of data acquisition, only the relevant data from 2008 to 2012 can be acquired.
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9.2.4 Government and Market Failures
With the rapid growth in the number of rural migrants, the increasing time they spend
living in cities, and greater measures to improve integration, the housing problems of
ruralmigrants are receivingmore attention. TheSeveralOpinions of the StateCouncil
on Solving the Problems of Rural Migrant Workers promulgated in 2006 proposed
to solve housing problems through multiple channels to ensure that accommodation
meets basic health and safety conditions. The Several Opinions of the State Council
on Solving Housing Difficulties of Urban Low-income Households promulgated in
2007 included rural migrants alongside other urban groups with housing difficulties.
In 2007, the Ministry of Construction, the Development and Reform Commission
and other departments jointly issued the document, Guiding Opinions on Improving
the Living Conditions of Rural Migrant Workers, proposing that employers should
take responsibility for improving living conditions for workers. These documents
established the basic direction of housing policies for rural migrants. Some areas
have also actively resolvedmigrants’ housing problems, introducingmeasures which
include the establishment of apartments for ruralmigrants (affordable rental housing),
the inclusion of qualified rural migrants into the urban housing security system, the
establishment of a housing provident fund system for ruralmigrants, andfinancial and
tax support for rural migrants to purchase housing. The general situation, however,
is one of both market and government failure, mostly manifested in the following
four aspects:
(i) Urban–rural division of the household registration system: this is the primary
root cause of the housing problems facing rural migrants. China still imple-
ments the dual household registration structure that has perpetuated urban–
rural divisions since the 1950s. This creates a significant obstacle for rural
migrants entering the city. The cultural level and social status of rural migrants
makes it difficult for them to live and work in the city, and China’s house-
hold registration system reinforces the disparity at a fundamental level. Rural
migrants have never been able to enjoy the same medical, employment,
pension, education and other rights as urban residents. Restrictions on the
status and ‘identity’ of rural migrants increase their living costs and make
it difficult for them to integrate and generate a sense of belonging. The dual
household registration system and the inequalities it creates is the fundamental
cause behind the housing problems facing rural migrants.
(ii) Commercial Housing Market Barriers to Entry: The income level of the vast
majority of rural migrants is far lower than the urban house price and rent
level. Except when an employer provides housing, most migrants have to
rent from private landlords. However, due to their limited economic capacity,
migrants can only rent private houses from farmers on the urban–rural fringe
or relatively low-priced substandard housing in the city centre. The demand for
housing for rural migrants is very strong, but the market will not automatically
produce a supply tomatch this demand. Themarket fails to resolve the housing
problems of rural migrants. Urban villages comprising rural migrants and
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collective rental patterns reflect the disparity between supply and demand.
If the supply structure is not adjusted, these urban villages and collective
rental patterns will be difficult to resolve and will have an adverse impact on
the entire urban housing market. See Chap. 6 for further discussion of urban
villages.
(iii) Exclusion from the Urban Housing Security System: Under the urban–rural
dual household registration system, rural migrants are regarded as an ‘external
population’ and ‘temporary resident population.’ They have not been subject
to status change and cannot enjoy the same protection rights as urban residents.
Although the Guiding Opinions on Accelerating the Development of Public
Rental Housing jointly issued by seven ministries and commissions in 2010
proposed that rural migrants shall be included in the urban housing security
system, so far, the coverage of housing security system for rural migrants is
still insufficient, and rural migrants are still excluded from the urban housing
security system in China. Although some cities have proposed to include rural
migrants in the urban housing security system, there are too many restrictions,
the threshold for rural migrants to enter the urban housing security system is
too high, and government failures do exist.
(iv) Land Use Policy: At present, there are three ways to construct such collective
dormitories: (1) enterprises in the development zones or industrial parks use
transferred land to build staff dormitories near the factory production areas; (2)
enterprises and agricultural collectives cooperate to build dormitories using
collective farm land in the urban–rural fringe area; (3) renovate or construct
dormitories for rural migrants using redundant factories left by bankrupt or
closed enterprises. The problem is that these solutions conflict with current
land policy. For instance, the use of transferred industrial land to build dormi-
tories for rural migrants conflicts with the current industrial land policy; the
use of collective land to build dormitories for rural migrants conflicts with
the current collective construction land transfer policy; the use of redundant
factories as dormitories conflicts with the current land acquisition and reserve
policy.
In addition, there needs to be further improvement in the exploration and devel-
opment of local policy. For example, sources of funds that could provide affordable
housing are uncertain, there is a lack of suitable housing stock, a lack of detailed
rules for the housing provident fund system, and housing financial services for rural
migrants are almost non-existent’. Therefore, much still needs to be done to improve
the housing security system, to boost housing supply and to match the needs and
characteristics of rural migrants.
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9.3 Changes to Housing Policies for Rural Migrant
Workers
TheStateCouncil’s governmentwork report in 2016 reaffirmed the ‘three 100million
people’ policy goal,6 and proposed ‘to achieve the settlement of about 100 million
agricultural transfer populations and other permanent residents in cities and towns’.
It declares that urbanisation is ‘the biggest potential of domestic demand and devel-
opment momentum in China’, and established a policy objective ‘to achieve the
urbanisation rate of permanent residents of 60% and the urbanisation rate of house-
hold registration of 45% by 2020.’ These goals are related to the migration of agri-
cultural transfer population, which is closely related to urbanisation and economic
promotion. The report of the 19th National Congress in 2017 proposed to ‘take
urban agglomeration as the main body to build a coordinated development pattern
of large and medium-sized cities and small towns, and accelerate the citizenisation
of agricultural transfer population.’
Migration involves two related processes. The first is the migration of popula-
tions from their place of origin, and the second is the settlement of these migrants
in their place of destination (Berger and Blomquist 1992; Cai 2001). Rural–urban
migration has become an important issue in developing countries (Brueckner andLall
2015). Migration processes can also be further sub-divided into permanent migration
and non-permanent migration. As the term suggests, permanent migration refers to
patterns whereby migrants intend to live at their chosen destination for a long time
without returning to their original places of residence. Conversely, non-permanent
migration refers to migration patterns where migrants do not, or do not intend to,
stay for an extended period (Ma and Meng 2003; Cai and Wang 2007). At present,
the key issue for Chinese urbanisation is the second process of population migration,
that is, realising and consolidating permanent migrations and the ‘citizenisation’ of
agricultural migrants within urban centres. This is an important aspect of what has
become known as ‘New Urbanisation’ (Dong 2015).
Housing has become an increasingly important factor affecting population migra-
tion. Even without institutional barriers such as household registration, current prob-
lems within China’s housing market erects a practical barrier to family migration.
Housing issues have become the dominant factor in the social exclusion of migrants
in major cities (Zhao 1999a, b; Li 2008). Where migrants are unable to bear the
costs of urban housing, it becomes impossible for them to settle permanently or for
lengthy periods. This creates transient or circular migration patterns, which prolongs
the process of rural–urban migration and slows down urbanisation (Ren and An
2011). Meanwhile, China’s rural land system closely related to rural housing is the
6 The State Council’s government work report in 2014 emphasised the need to promote the new
people-centered approach to urbanisation and proposed for the first time to focus on solving the
‘three 100 million people’ issue, that is, ‘promoting the settlement of about 100 million agricultural
transfer population in cities and towns, renovating the urban shanty towns and urban villages where
about 100 million people live, and guiding the urbanisation of about 100 million people in the
central and western regions.’
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main reason for the agricultural transfer population’s short-term and highly mobile
migration (Zhao 1999a, b; Yan et al. 2014).
The development and evolution of housing policies for rural migrants since 1998
can be divided into three periods: the lack-of-policy period from 1998 to 2004, the
multi-party exploration period from 2005 to 2010, and the unified integration period
from 2011 to the present.
9.3.1 The First Stage: Lack-of-Policy Period (1998–2004)
During this period, the rate of internal migration slowed and labour shortages began
to appear in the absence of sufficient rural migrants. In 1997, as the financial crisis in
Southeast Asia broke, China’s economic development slowed, and many township
enterprises went bankrupt. In addition, in the middle and late 1990s, large numbers
of employees in state-owned enterprises were laid off, urban employment intensified,
and internal migration again increased, but at a slower rate.
As China’s economic development gradually stabilised in the early 2000s, the
rate of rural–urban migration increased. At the beginning of 2004, enterprises in
Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang and other economically developed southeast coastal
areas found it harder to recruit workers. In the second half of 2004, labour shortages
spread across the country, although the pattern and intensity varied across different
regions. Across inland provinces such as Jiangxi and Hunan, the traditional sources
for migrant labour, enterprises found it harder to recruit workers. Authors such as
Cai (2010) believe that 2004 was the ‘Lewis Turning Point’ when the growth rate
in labour demand exceeded the growth rate of supply. There has been a nationwide
labour shortage since 2004, and wages have increased significantly since that time.
In 2004, the National Bureau of Statistics conducted a sample survey of 68,000 rural
households and more than 7,100 administrative villages in 31 provinces (regions and
cities). It estimated that the number of rural migrants who worked outside of their
hometown in that year was about 118 million, accounting for 23.8% of the rural
labour force. If the rural labour force employed in local township enterprises were
to be included, the total number of rural migrants could be as high as around 200
million.7
There were no specific policies for rural migrants between 1998 and 2004, and
there were only occasional references in some related policies. At this stage, the
housing problems facing rural migrants steadily worsened. Specific policies for rural
migrantsweremore concerned about employment restrictions,wage arrears andother
aspects, with few directly relating to housing issues. In July 1998, the State Council
issued the Notice on Further Deepening the Reform of Urban Housing System and
Accelerating Housing Construction, clearly requiring all provinces, autonomous
regions, andmunicipalities directly under the central government to stop the physical
7 Research Group of the State Council Research Office: Investigation Report on Chinese Migrant
Workers, China Yan Shi Press, 2006 Edition.
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distribution of housing in the second half of 1998 in order to phase in the moneti-
sation of housing allocation. China’s real estate market began to take shape from
this point, and the urban housing market also entered a highly market-oriented stage.
The housing situation for rural migrants changed as the proportion of rental houses
increased while the proportion of accommodation provided by work units decreased.
Migrants’ expenditure on accommodation increased in relative terms, without any
improvement in housing conditions. Levels of satisfaction with the available accom-
modation declined as accommodation problems for rural migrants mounted. In 2003,
the General Office of the State Council acknowledged the need to improve living and
working conditions for internal migrants. Policies at this timeweremainly concerned
with improving the basic health and safety conditions within rural migrants’ housing.
At this stage, economic growth became an important theme within China’s
macroeconomic policies to lessen the impact of the Southeast Asian economic crisis.
The stimulation of domestic demand was a key factor, and housing marketisation
played an important role in this process. The ability of rural migrants to enter the
housing market became one of the driving forces for economic growth.
9.3.2 The Second Stage: Exploration Period (2005–2010)
As the numbers of rural migrants increased across China’s towns and cities, their
living conditions attractedmore attention from social services and sociologists.At the
end of 2008, the National Bureau of Statistics established a statistical monitoring and
investigation system for rural migrants. For the first time the recording of statistics
relating to rural migrants was supported by authoritative data. In 2008, the total
number of rural migrants nationwide8 reached 225 million. In 2010, the had risen
to 242 million, an increase of 12.45 million over the previous year. The increase of
5.4%, can be taken as the high-watermark for the growth in rural–urbanmigration.As
China’s macroeconomic development stabilised, the accumulated housing problems
facing rural migrants became increasingly apparent. Central and regional levels of
government have issued policies on rural migrants’ housing since 2005.
At the national level, housing policies for rural migrants have shifted from owner-
ship to user rights. From2005 to 2007, the housing policies for ruralmigrants focused
on the purchase of housing and housing provident funds for rural migrants. From
2005, research and the resolution of migrant housing problems was first incorporated
into the work of the Ministry of Construction. From 2007, the Ministry of Construc-
tion proposed gradually expanding the legal coverage of the housing fund system to
include rural migrants with stable occupations in cities for the first time.
8 The statistical definition ofmigrantworkers is theworkerswho still hold rural registered permanent
residence and are engaged in non-agricultural industries locally or have been employed outside their
hometown for 6 months or above. Unless otherwise noted, the data of migrant workers used in this
study are all from the National Monitoring and Survey Report on Migrant Workers of the National
Bureau of Statistics.
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From2007 to 2010, housing policies for ruralmigrants shifted further fromowner-
ship to user rights.Measures included compliance with basic health and safety condi-
tions, and the development of collective dormitories on industrial siteswhichwere not
to be sold as commercial housing. Renovation of urban villages would consider the
living needs of rural migrants, and collective dormitories would comply with urban
planning and overall land use standardswhere conditions permitted.Accommodation
for rural migrants would be built under government guidance and operate according
to preferential market policies for affordable housing. Rent would be maintained at
a reasonable level for rural migrants.
It is worth noting that these measures differed from previous legislation. First, it
was clearly proposed that dormitories constructed in development zones and indus-
trial parks could only be rented to rural migrants, and not be sold as commercial
houses. Second, it was stressed that, where conditions permit, housing that met the
particular needs of rural migrants should be built and rented to them as a specific
group. There is no mention of payment of housing provident funds to enable rural
migrants to purchase or rent their own houses. These new measures represented a
shift from ownership to rental rights against the background of increased worker
mobility and a lower level of house purchase.
At the same time, more specific policies were introduced to address issues of
responsibility and governance in addressing housing conditions, such as the provision
of free or subsidised accommodation and low-cost leasing.When ruralmigrantsmake
their own residential arrangements, employers should subsidise their rental payments.
Those enterprises with large numbers of rural migrants should make full use of their
own employee dormitories or raise housing resources for rural migrants by leasing
and purchasing. Collective dormitories for rural migrants built in a centralised way
should be left to rural migrants and not sold or rented as commercial housing. There
could also be active measures on the urban–rural fringe to encourage local residents
to rent their own housing to rural migrants.
Regional governments have also explored specific policies and practices to resolve
migrant housing issues at a local level. Provinces and cities have issued a series
of local supporting policies following the lead of the central government. The
‘Chongqing Model’ has emerged as a prominent measure, one which transforms
vacant houses or unfinished buildings into ruralmigrants’ apartments. The ‘Changsha
Model’ is another initiative that provides rural migrants’ apartments across rural
collective land in the urban–rural fringe. The ‘ShanghaiModel’ concentrates migrant
accommodation in industrial parks while the ‘Huzhou Model’ establishes a housing
provident fund system adapted to the needs of rural migrants.
The Chongqing Model: Chongqing was one of the earliest cities to explore
and resolve the housing problem of rural migrants in China. The city authorities
transformed vacant or unfinished buildings into rural migrants’ apartments. Typical
examples include the ‘Bangbang Apartment’ and ‘Yangguang Apartment,’ which
transform vacant or unfinished buildings scattered across the city into low-cost
apartments.
In Hunan Province, the Changsha Model was also among the earliest cities to
adopt targeted measures to address the issue of migrant worker accommodation.
9 Housing Policies for Rural Migrant Workers in China 193
The authorities built on rural collective land across the urban–rural fringe with the
‘Jiangnan Apartment’ as the representative example.
The Shanghai Model saw the centralised concentration of migrant apartments in
industrial parks. Its typical representative is the ‘Yongsheng Rural Migrant Workers’
Apartment’ in Malu Town, Jiading District, Shanghai.
The Huzhou Model incorporates rural migrants into the housing provident fund
system and formulates a special funding policy suitable for their needs. Rural
migrants have lower incomes than permanent residents and are highly mobile. To
address these particular factors, Huzhou City introduced an innovative policy by
establishing housing provident funds for rural migrants. It introduced a low threshold
to encourage take-up and allowed those leaving employment to withdraw funds at
any time and those withdraw funds for the housing rents. The model also provided
preferential housing loans and interest subsidies for poorer families and supported
rural housing construction.
At this stage, both central and local governments have introduced various migrant
housing policies and actively sought to resolve housing issues. Measures include
adjustments in policy focus, assignment of responsibility and programmes that meet
particular local conditions.
9.3.3 The Third Stage: Unified Integration Period (2011
to Present)
The annual growth of migration within China declined from around 10 million
between 2011 and 2012, to around six million between 2013 and 2014 and to around
four million from 2015 to 2016. The total number of rural migrants reached 288
million by 2018, with less than 2 million being recent migrants. Since 2014, the total
growth rate has remained below2% (see Fig. 9.2). Housing policies have continued to
respond to these developments with various improvements, increased integration and
realignments. Under current conditions, policy changes relating to rural migrants’
housing can be summarised as follows.
First, the responsibility for migrant housing has shifted from employers to local
authorities. In September 2011, the General Office of the State Council proposed,
to adhere to the principle of owner investment and to actively explore recovery of
investment in publicly owned rented property. Local authorities would be empow-
ered to fulfil their responsibilities within overall guidelines set by provincial people’s
governments. Municipal and county-level people’s governments would be respon-
sible for the specific implementation of policy, including preliminarywork, construc-
tion funds, land supply, quality control, affordable housing rental management and
supervision. This was a complete contrast with previous legislation, which put the
onus on employers and placed responsibility at the government level.
Second, rural migrants were to be included in the urban housing security system.
The General Office of the State Council proposed to provide publicly owned rented
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Fig. 9.2 The size and growth rate of migrant workers in China. Data source National Monitoring
and Survey Report on Rural Migrant Workers of the National Bureau of Statistics over the years
accommodation to poorer or middle-income families and to recent migrants as well
as those with stable occupations. The new provisions differ notably from previous
legislation in that the caveat, ‘where conditions permit’ was removed and the scope
extended to include recentmigrants aswell as thosewho had long become established
in China’s cities. In a further development,Opinions of the State Council proposed to
include both ‘qualified’ rural migrants and those in stable employment into housing
security and funding systems, and to include rural migrants alongside the locally
registered population within the scope of housing security rights.
Third, various measures have been implemented to improve housing rights and
security. Construction of publicly owned rental housing or collective dormitories
was encouraged in various announcements focused on the provision of public rented
accommodation for rural migrants with stable occupations. At the same time, indus-
trial zones were to provide a mix of rented accommodation and dormitories in accor-
dance with the principle of intensive land use. The State Council also provided guid-
ance on the provision of residential accommodation alongside office and production
space in industrial parks.
In addition, policies have been introduced to help migrants with housing
purchases. The State Council proposed to actively support eligible rural migrants
to purchase or rent commercial housing, and enjoy preferential deed tax and stamp
tax. It advocated the gradual inclusion of migrants with stable occupations within the
scope of housing provident funding. The State Council also proposed adjusting and
improving the differentiated housing credit policy, developing the individual housing
loan insurance business, improving the housing financial service level for middle-
and low-income groups such as rural migrants, and encouraging and guiding farmers
to purchase houses near small and medium-sized cities.
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Moreover, theStateCouncil proposed to accelerate the promotionof rental subsidy
systems, and use market and government subsidies to support eligible migrants to
rent accommodation through the housing rental market, and to strengthen the envi-
ronmental renovation and comprehensivemanagement services of urban villages and
shantytowns, so as to improve the living conditions of rural migrants.
9.4 Evaluation of Housing Policies
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of these policies, we must first establish the
assessment criteria. Various criteria have been put forward by academic institutions,
which can be summarised as follows:
• Fairness of policy objectives,
• Synchronisation with legal and other policies,
• Appropriateness of policy,
• Enforceability of policy,
• Actual effect of policy.
We will now use these criteria to evaluate housing policies for rural migrants in
China.
9.4.1 The Fairness of Policy Objectives
Housing policies for Chinese rural migrants started from scratch and represented a
milestone in the development of social equity. The intensive introduction of housing
policies for rural migrants after 2005 shows that the government has paid more atten-
tion to improving the living conditions and social security of ruralmigrants. However,
policy objectives remain very general rather than specific, typified by phrases such
as ‘improving the living conditions of rural migrant workers’ (JZF [2007] No. 276),
‘significantly improving the living conditions of rural migrant workers’ (GBF [2011]
No. 45), etc. More detail on specific measures of implementation is needed.
Housing policy for rural migrants still lacks a wider conceptual framework that
integrates urban and rural planning.Under the planned economy system, the ‘welfare-
oriented public housing’ of urban residents and the ‘homestead’ of rural residents
were both a specific form of housing security system and guaranteed ‘shelter for
all’ under low productivity levels (Chen 2006). During the process of urban housing
system reform, ‘welfare-oriented public housing’ for urban residents became private
property, while the ‘rural house site’ is still a potential asset under the collective
ownership of rural land that cannot be effectively realised. The relationship between
the housing security of rural migrants in cities or towns and the ‘rural house site’
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cannot be ignored. It explains why the rural house site in some areas can exchange
as urban real estate. This shows that the objectives of existing housing policies for
rural migrants in China lack an overarching planning framework spanning urban and
rural areas.
9.4.2 Synchronisation with Legal and Other Policies
There is currently no basic legal guarantee for the existing housing policies for
rural migrants, and there are contradictions between the solutions put forward to
resolve migrant accommodation issues current land policies. The formulation of
a more comprehensive legal system is key to resolving housing problems. Most
of China’s housing policies are in the form of ‘Guidance Opinions’ and ‘Notices’
from government departments at various levels and have not been consolidated in
law. Old practices from the Maoist era, such as ‘one case one meeting’ and ‘handle
special caseswith specialmethods’, still persist, and some policies even have obvious
conflicts with current land policies (Lv et al. 2007).
The practice of using rural collective land to build rural migrant workers’ apart-
ments contradicts the Land Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China.
Article 63 of Land Administration Law (2004 Revision) which clearly stipulates that
‘The right to use land collectively owned by farmers shall not be sold, transferred
or leased for non-agricultural construction.’ Apartments for rural migrant workers
clearly belong to the category of non-agricultural construction. The conversion of
redundant factories, libraries and other public facilities into migrant accommodation
and the transfer of land in industrial parks for migrant apartments are likely to change
the use of state-owned land. Suppose land was originally designated for industrial
and mining use rather than residential purposes. In that case, the construction of rural
migrant workers’ housing on this land violates the provisions of Land Administration
Law. Current legislation ensures that development can only take place on state-owned
land in accordance with the rights and conditions that originally applied. The use of
redundant factory buildings or land released from bankrupt or closed enterprises for
migrant accommodation may conflict with the local government’s land acquisition
and reservation policies.
9.4.3 The Appropriateness of Policy
The appropriateness of housing policies for rural migrants in China can be evalu-
ated from the perspectives of housing security coverage, security methods and stan-
dards. Rural migrants are included within China’s urban housing security system,
and housing security has also been diversified. Although there have been great strides
in China’s housing policies for rural migrants, housing security standards have yet
to be improved.
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There are substantial regional differences in rental and spatial policies. The
prevailing guidance on rent for publicly owned rental housing is that it should be,
‘reasonably determined according to the principle of slightly lower than the market
rent’ (GBF [2011]No. 45). The spatial standard for public rental housingfirst requires
that the single floor area shall be strictly controlled below 60 squaremetres (JB[2010]
No. 87), and then stipulates that small apartments with a single floor area of about
40 square metres should be the dominant form (GBF [2011] No. 45). Can super-
low rents be sustainable? Will rural migrants actually be able to rent houses at rates
slightly below the market standard? And are the standards for suitable dormitory
areas incompatible with the trend for family members of rural migrants to move with
them to the city? These questions all need to be answered.
9.4.4 The Enforceability of Policy
Capital investment issuesmainly arise during the implementation of existing housing
policies for rural migrants, when responsibilities are divided between central and
local governments. The GBF [2011] No. 45 Document proposed that provincial
government should take overall responsibility for affordable housing projects in
their region. Municipal and county people’s governments would be responsible for
implementing specific preliminary work, construction funds, land supply, quality
control, rental and sales management and supervision of affordable housing. The
central government would continue to increase funding subsidies while local govern-
ment should prioritise affordable housing projects in their budgetary arrangements
and increase financial investment. It can be seen that local governments are mainly
responsible for raising funds for affordable housing, and the local government’s
financial expenditure is often under great pressure. From 2009 to 2018, the national
fiscal expenditure for housing security increased from RMB 180.34 billion to
RMB 680.637 billion, an average annual increase of 30.82%. Local government
fiscal expenditure has stood higher than 90% since 2011, and central government
expenditure remains below 10%.
However, for local governments with a long-standing gap between revenue and
expenditure, housing security exerts a double pressure, incurring both a decrease
in revenue and an increase in expenditure. Local governments can consequently be
passive about providing housing security, but they have positive power to increase
income by selling land, stimulating economic growth through real estate and main-
taining high house prices. In the new round of local government housing construction
plans over recent years, the scope of government housing security is often smaller
than that determined by the central government (Dong 2011). This shows that there
is a difference between the central and local governments in demand for housing
security. In this context, it is more difficult to implement housing policies for rural
migrants.
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9.4.5 The Actual Effect of Policy
Work is still in progress in devising policy solutions for migrant housing problems,
and the practical effect is limited. In 2018, less than 3% of urban–rural migrants
purchased affordable housing or rented publicly owned accommodation. The propor-
tion of rural migrants who enjoy urban housing security is still very low. At the same
time, there are continuing housing issues facing locally registered residents, which
remain a priority for local governments. Local policies that aim to address migrant
accommodation problems leave issues relating to the local urban registered popula-
tion unresolved. As a result, the practical role of these policies to resolve migrant
housing problems remains limited.
9.5 Policy Implications
Improving housing regulations and policies is essential to the process of ‘new urban-
isation’ and the urbanisation goal of ‘three 100 million people’. As well as steering
population migration by employment, it is also necessary to improve housing regu-
lations and policies to reduce obstacles to migration. We now explore these policy
implications in more detail.
9.5.1 Coordination of Urban–Rural Land and Housing
Systems
The trend for rural–urban migration is likely to continue for some time. In the long
run, land and housing system reforms are necessary for the overall planning of
urban and rural development. To formulate housing policies for rural migrants, it is
necessary to first establish the long-term goal and concept of overall urban and rural
planning. There is a major contradiction between the dual housing consumption
of rural migrants in urban and rural areas. While rural migrants living in the city
‘consume’ housing there, they also typically have a home in rural areas. This has led
to a disconnect betweenmigrant housing patterns across urban and rural areas, which
leads to the phenomenon described as, ‘no one lives in rural housing and people have
no houses in the cities where they work.’ Rural migrants live in the city most of
the time, and their income mainly flows into those cities rather than back to their
rural homelands. On the other hand, there are many rural migrants who plan to build
or purchase houses in their hometown, while few intend to purchase houses in the
city. Given the housing difficulties facing rural migrants flowing into urban areas and
redundant rural homesteads and houses, the establishment of an overall, integrated
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urban–rural land and housing system should be a long-term policy goal. The key is to
promote systematic rural land reform, speeding up the establishment of a free market
for homesteads and rural houses. That way the families of rural migrants who plan
to settle in urban areas can have channels to realise their rural assets so as to increase
their ability to afford housing stock in towns and cities. Once they have realised their
rural assets, such families could obtain urban housing through market transactions.
Those currently unable to afford urban housing could then enjoy the same housing
security as other urban residents. Even if rural migrants’ families are not willing to
realise these rural assets, as long as the free trade market for rural land is established,
the value of such assets can be evaluated against the market transaction price and
included into their total household assets. If they meet the access qualifications for
an overall urban–rural housing security system, they can also enjoy the same housing
security as other urban residents. By setting integrated planning for urban and rural
land and housing systems as a long-term goal it will become possible to improve
policy development and delivery.
9.5.2 Housing Laws, Regulations and Security Systems
Market and government are the two channels that allocate housing resources. Afford-
able housing provides the dividing line between market allocation and housing secu-
rity. Those able to purchase or rent houses can do so through the open market,
while families with insufficient collateral require housing security provided by the
government. The majority of migrant families have insufficient resources to afford to
buy houses in the city and must rely on government intervention. The urban housing
market erects barriers to resolving housing problems. It is both unrealistic and impos-
sible to solve migrant housing problems without considering the issues facing other
urban low-income groups. China’s rural migrants make up a significant proportion
of such groups, but they are by no means alone. Any solution to migrant housing
issues should be carried out under a wider framework of tackling urban inequality
as a whole. Equally, the level of housing security for rural migrants depends on the
overall context across the city as a whole. China’s urban housing security systems
still have many problems and lack sound legal guarantees. From international expe-
rience, the establishment of a comprehensive legal system is an important factor in
resolving housing problems. For example, Japan’s Public Housing Law, Residential
Corporation Act, Basic Residential Law, etc. clearly defined the housing construc-
tion objectives, capital sources and other policy safeguards in a legal form. In China,
specific measures to resolve migrant housing problems may not integrate or even
conflict with legal and other policies. The development and revision of appropriate
regulations are required to improve China’s housing security system to benefit rural
migrants. This will take a long time, so it is appropriate to design policies as a
long-term strategy for improving these systems.
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9.5.3 Affordable Housing
Poor housing conditions and the inability to afford urban property militate against
the integration and settling of rural–urban populations. The key to solve housing
problems is not the right to own property somuch as the ability to obtain safe, healthy
and stable housing. Issues of both supply and demand require attention. Supply-
side measures may mainly include: combining the reconstruction of shantytowns
(Chap. 7) and urban villages (Chap. 6) with the elimination of inferior housing that
falls below health and safety requirements. Alongside these measures should be
the provision of affordable homes for rural migrants and their families. Ways to
extend housing property rights to rural migrants could be explored both for rented
and purchased accommodation. Low-cost housing purchase opportunities could run
alongside the encouragement to vacate vacant housing land in rural areas. On the
demand side, measures could focus on improving access to affordable housing, and
expanding the proportion of monetary subsidies to remove barriers and ensure the
reasonable flow of population.
There are clear regional differences in the ability of migrants to afford property,
so it is necessary to formulate regional housing policies. Government contributions
to housing security should be greater in eastern provinces than in central and western
regions, with the focus on improving the ability of migrants to obtain property rights.
In the central region, the market can chieflymeet the housing needs of rural migrants.
Housing security should improve the ability to rent or purchase houses by combining
low-cost purchase opportunities with encouragement to vacate vacant rural housing
land. The western region could adopt policies similar to those in the central region,
but with stronger government intervention, and more emphasis on the improvement
of housing conditions.
9.5.4 Land Reform
Land system reforms are closely connected with the reform of the household regis-
tration system. The main barrier to permanent urban settlement for rural migrants
derives from land issues in their rural homelands, especially those around the rural
homestead’.9 There is currently an urgent demand for rural land system reform.
Failure to address this has slowed the urbanisation process. The focus for rural land
system reform lies in the reform of the rural house site system. Land reform is neces-
sary to facilitate rural–urbanmigration. The land rights and interests of ruralmigrants
mainly comprise contractual land management rights and rights to homestead use.
The first is the right to own agricultural land, and the second is the right to own sites
set aside for house building as collective construction land.
9 The rural house site is the land occupied by the peasant family as the residential base, and its
ownership belongs to the members of the rural peasant collective.
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There are three key points in the reform of contractual land management rights.
One is to stabilise the contractual relationship and clarify specific long-term provi-
sions. The second is to grant household certificates and to grant collective property
rights to individual members of collective economic organisations. The third is to
promote the orderly transfer and mortgage of land management rights and realise
their potential value.
The reform of homestead rights can be promoted from three aspects. The first
would be to establish an integrated urban and rural construction land market. Under
the present land system framework, urban land is owned by the state—the state occu-
pies land on behalf of all the people. Rural land, however, is collectively owned. Both
systems are concrete manifestations of socialist public ownership. China’s urban–
rural division within the construction land market cannot be sustained indefinitely.
The establishment of an integratedmarket for construction land across rural and urban
areas can only be achieved by transferring collective rural construction land into state-
ownership. The specific means to achieve this needs to be considered thoroughly and
comprehensively. The second measure would be to explore feasible routes for urban
residents to purchase homesteads and commercial houses. Taxation and other fiscal
systems could be designed to enable urban residents to purchase homesteads and
market-value houses, enabling rural populations to realise their assets and improve
the utilisation and efficiency of rural land and houses. The third would be to improve
mechanisms and management for balancing land index differentials between urban
and rural development sites. To establish an integrated urban and rural land market,
we need to take account of fluctuating land use quotas set by the government, which
determine the amount of land that can be used for conversion and development, the
construction of new villages, and the refurbishment of new villages dilapidated rural
housing. These quotas need to be better coordinated between rural and urban areas.
Proceeds from construction land index trading could then be used for land consol-
idation and reclamation in order to transfer subsidies to migrant populations. The
increase in urban construction land could then link with the number of rural migrants
coming into the city.
9.5.5 Urban Housing Management
The rental market appeared relatively late in Chinese cities. As urbanisation gath-
eredmomentum an influx of foreign nationals created rapid development in the rental
market. In sharp contrast, the government’smanagement of the housing rental market
is yet to be implemented. The result is an often chaotic rental market. China should
formulate the industry standard for managing rented housing. It should institution-
alise control of this market from the perspective of market access, only allowing
the provision of accommodation that provides appropriate living standards for rural
migrants. Specialised departments are needed to supervise the management of the
housing rental industry. At the same time, the government could introduce a series
of policies to benefit the people, such as providing low-cost rental housing for rural
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migrants via government channels, and building an open and transparent rental infor-
mation circulation system, etc., to allow rural migrants easier access to information
on appropriate rental options.
There is also a need to strengthen the management of temporary housing. Many
rural migrants are engaged in construction, logistics and other relatively low-end
manual labour-intensive industries. In order to save housing costs, they usually
live in temporary sheds or densely populated dormitories provided by employers.
Adequate living standards within such temporary housing are not always guaranteed.
The government could therefore regulate living conditions to ensure they are main-
tained to a safe and adequate standard. In addition, the government could encourage
employers to build employee dormitories to provide safe and comfortable housing
for rural migrants through land concessions, tax relief and other measures.
Overall, the goal should be to bring rural migrants fully within the scope of urban
housing security. This has been a major Chinese aspiration for more than a decade.
It is, however, difficult to achieve this goal under current conditions, and therefore,
a number of changes are needed. Rural migrants need to be guaranteed access to
the housing provident fund.10 Where rural migrants hold stable occupations in cities,
the government could allow them to use grants or loans to pay their rent and improve
their living conditions. A low-rent housing system for rural migrants would then
be gradually improved. Current low-rent or affordable housing provision mostly
caters for low-income urban groups. To resolve urban housing problems facing rural
migrants, the workers themselves would be among the beneficiaries of low-rent
housing systems. Only when rural migrants have their own houses in the city, can
the permanent transfer of rural population and the urbanisation of China be fully
realised.
9.6 Conclusion
The mass migration of rural workers to the cities has posed major challenges for
the housing system in China. Ambitious policy goals have been proposed, but they
have been vague and disjointed, and as a result, they have failed to impact the living
standards of rural migrants significantly. In order for China to achieve its vision
of ‘new urbanisation’, there needs to be a coordinated approach to housing policy
that is grounded in a broader strategic approach to urban planning. Fundamental
housing and land reforms are needed to bring about system-wide coherence and
lasting change. An essential complement to such reforms is a more comprehensive
and coherent housing safety net to protect the most vulnerable rural migrants. The
private renting and homeownership sectors also need to be reformed in the light of
best practices observed in countrieswithmore establishedhousingmarket institutions
and regulations.
10 The housing provident fund is a form of long-term housing savings that both employers and
employers pay into, with equal contributions form each.
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Part III
Future Directions for Research and Policy
Chapter 10
Multi-scale Inequality and Segregation:
Theory and Estimation
Gwilym Owen, David Manley, Ron Johnston, Tim Birabi, Hui Song,
and Bifeng Wang
Abstract This chapter explores multi-scale estimation methods as an important
future direction for segregation research in China. We explain how these recently
developed methods help address many longstanding problems in traditional index-
based segregation research and open up new avenues of research on Chinese cities.
We explain the conceptual framework underpinningmultilevel analysis in the form of
a series of propositions that capture the theoretical basis and outline why a multilevel
approach to segregation is advantageous. We then illustrate how this approach can
be applied to China using census data on Shijiazhuang, the capital city of Hebei
Province. We use the model to consider segregation of different ethnic groups and
of migrants versus non-migrants. We conclude with a discussion of our findings and
our thoughts on future directions for research and the implications for policy.
Keywords Segregation measurement · Index of dissimilarity · Segregation
theory · Intersectionality ·Multilevel segregation · Shijiazhuang, China
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10.1 Introduction
Much of the academic research on segregation has focused on the degree to which
residents from different socioeconomic, ethnic or cultural backgrounds live sepa-
rately from each other. Because this separation has the potential to exacerbate the
mistrust and antipathy between groups (Allport et al. 1954), it is something that soci-
eties need to measure, monitor and often seek to mitigate. While segregation is often
measured in residential locations, it can take many forms beyond including segre-
gation in the workplace, education, travel patterns, leisure activities, and friendship
groups (see Chap. 2). However, many of these alternative places are nevertheless
affected by, or at least correlated with, where and how people live.
However, segregation is of interest for reasons beyond its effect on inter-group
contact. From an economic perspective, segregation also charts the spatial expression
of inequality within modern society. Recent work has demonstrated that there is a
linkage between the extent to which a country’s urban areas are segregated and the
intensity of more general inequality within that society (van Ham et al. 2015; Jones
et al. 2018a, b). Against this backdrop, a large literature reports the often negative
associations against which segregation is judged. Nevertheless, there may also be
important positive aspects to segregation with the provision of culturally specific
services, access to specific facilities, and strengthening in-group identities, as noted
in the work by Merry (2016) and Merry and colleagues (2016).
In seeking to better understand howwe should conceptualise segregation, Massey
and Denton (1988) proposed five dimensions along which segregation had been be
measured—evenness, exposure, concentration, centralisation, and clustering. These
dimensions have been extensively explored in the literature and form the basis for
much of the current discussion, debate and analysis. However, despite the fact that
we have long had these five dimensions to measure segregation, there has been much
debate—but little clarity—about how to operationalise them. Indeed, there has been
substantial disagreement about which indices to use and how they should be reported.
This is well-trodden ground, andwe have nowish to rehearse these extensive debates.
Rather, we note that the index of dissimilarity (Duncan and Duncan 1955) has been
the most commonly used. Therefore, it represents a common standard against which
the other indices and any new interpretations are judged. As we discuss below, there
remain issues with reporting the index of dissimilarity, although some authors have
explored adaptions to consider how to derive more information from the measure
(Allen et al. 2015; Harris 2018). These become problematic when we set out our
conceptual approach to segregation.
In this chapter,we explore someof the conceptual issues that have driven the recent
wave of segregation research, drawing on multilevel modelling methods, to capture
the multi-scale nature of segregation and to separate out the degree to which different
population attributes (e.g. ethnicity and occupation) are the drivers of residential
separation. So far, all of the studies that have used our multilevel modelling method
for measuring multi-scale segregation have focused on cities in the USA, Europe,
Australia, and New Zealand. There has been very little work of any kind measuring
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segregation at multiple scales in China. We argue that by adopting this approach and
exploring China, we can gain important insights to help enrich segregation research
within the Chinese context, and also inform policy responses. The development of
Chinese cities has been faster andmore extensive than inWestern cities, necessitating
context-specific work to understand the scale at which segregation occurs, where
it occurs and for whom it is greatest. In doing so, we can enable researchers to
understand urban development in China better and equip policy makers with insights
to target their policies better.
We start by setting out our conceptual framework in the form of a series of propo-
sitions that capture the various theoretical reasons why a multilevel approach to
segregation is advantageous. We then illustrate how this approach can be applied to
China using census data on Shijiazhuang, the capital city of Hebei Province. We use
the model to consider segregation at multiple spatial scales for different population
groups. We conclude with a discussion of our findings and our thoughts on future
directions for research.
10.2 Conceptual Framework
Until recently, segregation studies have, in general, proceeded with a clear set of well
formulated, but often implicitly placed, assumptions which it is necessary to explore
in detail. Against this background lies a set of assumptions we wish to scutinise. We
start by exploring ideas of scale (Propositions 10.1 and 10.2) and then consider how
to explore segregation in highly diverse and complex modern urban environments
(Propositions 10.3–10.5).
Proposition 11.1 Segregation is not always greater at finer spatial scales: how tradi-
tional measures of segregation conflate segregation at different spatial scales.
It has long been concluded within the segregation literature that a city divided into
finer spatial scales (that is, smaller neighbourhoods) will have a greater level of
segregation than those with larger neighbourhoods. For instance, Logan et al. (2015)
noted in a study on the emergence of ghettos in New York from 1880 to 1940 that
the purpose of their work was ‘not to demonstrate that segregation is higher at a
finer spatial scale, which is already well known’ (p. 1077). However, this apparent
conclusionmaynot be a result of the spatial organisation of individualswithinmodern
urban society but the consequence of a methodological choice. A long time ago,
Duncan et al. (1961, p. 84) observed ‘[i]f one system of areal1 units is derived by
subdivision of the units of another system, the index computed for the former can
be no smaller than the index for the latter.’ They go on to state that ‘[…] the index
1 In this chapter we refer to areal units and neighbourhoods interchangeably to refer to part of the
town or city which has been grouped together. Although we also acknowledge that neighbourhoods
have multiple meanings depending on the context in which they are being used (see for instance
Talen 2018).
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of concentration on a county basis will exceed the index on a state basis, because
the county index takes into account intrastate concentration’. Therefore, the inherent
rule that the finer the scale, the greater the segregation is, in fact, a rule of index
calculation and not related to the distribution (i.e. the segregation) of people across
space.
This methodological issue has been written about extensively elsewhere within
the quantitative social sciences (see, for instance, Kish 1954; Johnston et al. 2016a,
b). Tranmer and Steel (2001) identified that when processes are occurring at multiple
scales it is crucial to incorporate all these levels into the analysis. If a level is omitted,
then the variation2 related to that level ends up in the lowest level included in the
study. Therefore, if this finding is applied directly to the segregation literature and,
for instance, there is higher-level segregation in the urban environment which is not
included in the analysis, then all the segregation from higher processes is shown
in the index for the lowest level included. The implication of this is that low level
(micro-scale) segregation will often be over inflated, in turn leading to the belief
that the finer the scale, the greater the segregation. In other words, if segregation is
measured at the micro, meso and macro scales then the resulting segregation should
report only micro segregation at the micro level, only measure meso segregation at
the meso level, and so on (see, for instance, Jones et al. 2015; Manley et al. 2019).
When using the standard descriptive indices, this is not what happens because, as
Duncan et al. made clear and Tranmer and Steel further exemplified, the values at
one scale are conflated with the values at other scales.
More broadly, there is a strong theoretical case for including multiple spatial
scales. We suggest that it is highly likely that in any given urban space segregation
processes are likely to be occurring at multiple spatial scales. Individuals (or house-
holds) sort themselves into different parts of the city based on various sets of criteria
and availability. It might be that some groups (ethnic, occupational, cultural, and so
on) associate themselves with regions or large areas within the city, and then smaller
ormore compact neighbourhoodswithin that wider area (Harris 2018). These smaller
neighbourhoods may or may not be contiguous depending on the characteristics and
diversity of the urban landscape and the transitions between locations (Dean et al.
2019). Uncovering these spatial processes is critical to an understanding of the urban
environment and the structure of the influences on the data, leading to a multitude
of methodological challenges and outcomes (see Manley et al. 2006; Jones et al.
2018b).
Once we have included multiple spatial scales, we must also have the means to
separate out the relative contribution of each scale to the overall level of segregation.
Being able to do so is useful for two reasons: Firstly, it is useful from a process point
of view: to understand what causes segregation it is necessary to know at which scale
2 It is useful to note at this stage that we regard variance as a measure of segregation. Within
a city constructed out of many neighbourhoods each neighbourhood will deviate in population
composition away from the overall city composition. This deviation can be measured in modelling
by calculating the variance. It is, therefore, possible to assert the greater the variance the greater
the segregation, because the greater the variance the more different a given neighbourhood will be
compared to the city overall.
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it is at its most intense. Secondly, even if the focus is on the impact of segregation
on residents’ decisions, a knowledge of the source of segregation may be instructive
for policies used to ameliorate those effects. The way in which policy would tackle
genuinely high micro segregation, which pertains to a particular street, differs from
the interventions needed to reduce segregation from higher-level structures such as
full suburbs, towns or even labour markets.
Previously, Harris (2017) has demonstrated this with a decomposition of the index
of dissimilarity on aggregated data, and what we present below offers a modelled
approach. More explicitly, a multilevel model makes it possible to explicitly identify
the amount of variance (that is segregation) located at each scale while ensuring that
the variances at the other scales present in the model do not contaminate it. Without
the modelling framework, it is not possible to identify the net contributions from
each scale and establish whether segregation is ‘necessarily’ greater at micro-scales.
Proposition 11.2 Aggregation of areas reduces segregation, but that does not mean
higher-level segregation is lower!
The idea of investigating geographical phenomena across many scales is not a new
idea—it has appeared in the literature for many years (for recent examples see
Reardon et al 2008; Östh et al. 2015). Often the data used for this work is derived
from Population Censuses (in the UK and US at least).3 For issues of privacy, these
data are routinely aggregated from individuals into progressively larger areal units,
from the smallest basic spatial units, through meso geographies, into larger, more
regional (macro) scale units. The increasing size in terms of spatial extent and popula-
tion count can be problematic for segregation measurement because the aggregation
process fundamentally alters the objects being studied (see Fig. 10.1).
King (1996) notes that this demonstrates that scale (in terms of the modifiable
areal unit problem: see Manley 2014 for details) is a theoretical and conceptual
issue rather than an empirical one: scale changes, so the meaning of these changes
units alters. At the individual level (or scale of the smallest areal unit), there will be
sharper differences between areal units. In the case of a smaller population, it does
not require a substantial change in population to alter the composition of an area
dramatically, or for adjacent areas to be dramatically different in their composition.
All other things being equal, at smaller scales, internal homogeneity will be higher
across many variables than at higher scales.
As the areal units become larger, the population becomes more heterogeneous.
It is likely that there will be the outcomes of multiple processes contained within
a unit (see Manley et al. 2006). Moreover, the changes in population required to
make any meaningful change to the composition of the area will need to be bigger
compared with the smaller areas, and small clusters will be lost. Ultimately, as the
units approach the same spatial scale as the total study area, so the composition of
3 Even when using data held in individual level population registers as is the case in The Nether-
lands or the Scandinavian countries, the aggregation process used to combine individuals into
neighbourhoods (areas) is similar.
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Fig. 10.1 The hierarchical nature of segregation: members of two ethnic groups are shown by red
and blue dots respectively. On the left hand side, the resolution is preserved with the addition of
neighbourhood areas from small units (top) to higher-level units (bottom). By contrast, on the right
hand side the population appears much more segregated when mapping by the dominant ethnic
group at the same two scales
the unit(s) will also reflect the totality of the study area: the population of the areal
units and the city will be the same (see Olteanu et al 2019).
Therefore, combining the smaller units together ‘smooths’ the differences in the
data towards the overall mean of the study space. As segregation is the uneven distri-
bution of individuals across space such ‘smoothing’ will in turn reduce the potential
for segregation because the potential for uneven distributions is also reduced. This
will again contribute to the apparent reduction in segregation with higher spatial
scales.
How should multiple scales be incorporated into the study of segregation in urban
areas?We suggest that one objective should be the preservation of the individual-level
data as far as possible, or if data is not available at an individual level, then the smallest
areal unit scale. To achieve that, we move away from aggregating data to different
and alternative spatial scales and treat scale as a series of ‘hierarchical loops’ around
individuals in the survey areas. As such, we explicitly recognise that the investigation
of segregation in urban areas is about the organisation of individuals over space and
within bounded areas, but not the aggregated proportions of those structures. In doing
so, the initial resolution of the data is preserved. Any changes in magnitude result
from segregation processes and not a product of the statistical process(es) used when
constructing the dataset.
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Proposition 11.3 Measures of segregation need to be able to deal with the multi-
group complexities of modern urban environments, and determine if differences are
meaningful.
One of the main problems with traditional measures of segregation, such as the index
of dissimilarity, is that they limit the number of groups that can be compared to just
two. If there are many groups we want to compare, and we can only compare two
at a time, we end up with an enormously cumbersome set of statistics that are very
difficult to interpret. For example, if we want to compare the segregation of all 23
ethnic groups in the UK, and we can only consider two at a time, we end up with over
500 measures of segregation. These pairwise approaches to measuring segregation
made sense in the originally developed context, namely Black-White segregation in
the USA (Park et al. 1925; Duncan and Duncan 1955). However, their usefulness is
much more limited in the diverse cities of the twenty-first century.
Once we are able to determine more clearly the relationships for many groups
(for instance, ethnic, occupational or educational) within the urban environment,
we then need to be able to examine whether or not the differences between the
distributions aremeaningful. One of themajor issueswithin the segregation literature
is that even relatively small alterations in the distribution of individuals result in
different values on many of the indices, especially with data at micro-spatial scales.
If we measure segregation by modelling the data (rather than reporting descriptive
values), we can also estimate the uncertainty associated with our estimate by testing
statistical significance.4 We can calculate, for example, how likely it is that changes
to our measure of segregation occurred by chance, rather than as the result of a
genuine socio-demographic process. There is an argument that significance testing
is not relevant because we are using full population data or the inherent problems in
using arbitrary significance values (Wasserstein and Lazar 2016). However, in the
context of segregation modelling significance testing remains useful for exploring
uncertainty and to depict similarities between distributions. Using significance (or
Bayesian Credible Intervals) firstly allows the investigation of substantial differences
in levels of segregation between populations, and secondly reveals if there are such
differences across (multiple) groups. Even when it is clear that the data include the
full population, the distribution of individuals across urban space is only one example
of the potential distribution ‘universes’ that they could take. So there remains the
question of whether the particular spatial pattern of segregation we observe at a
particular point in time is the result of random population churn or the outcome of a
systematic ‘sorting’ process (such as homophily or White Flight—see Chaps. 2, 12,
4 and 15). As a result, testing the robustness of the distribution, and the likelihood
that our estimate is random, is a useful addition to the information about segregated
outcomes.
4 Note, however, that modelling techniques can also be applied to traditional measures, such as the
Index of Dissimilarity (see Lee, Minton and Pryce 2015) and the Relative Centralisation Index (see
Kavanagh, Lee and Pryce 2016).
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Proposition 11.4 Intersectionality matters: individuals do not have single group
identities.
Our discussion has so far assumed that when investigating segregation, we are
only interested in a single dimension—perhaps between ethnic groups or occu-
pational status. Suppose we reduce our analysis of ethnic segregation to a simple
majority/minority dichotomy, and leave out highly relevant dimensions such as class,
occupation or age. In that case, we restrict our understanding of the urban social envi-
ronment.As a practical example, a criticism levelled at research into residential ethnic
segregation is that it tends to identify exclusion based on social class and income
rather than any ‘genuine’ ethnic basis. The housing market sorts people by income
levels and so if particular ethnic groups have significantly lower income levels than
others they will inevitably be priced out of more expensive areas. It is, of course,
possible to calculate indices of segregation for multiple dimensions and report the
findings alongside each other. However, as with the issue of scale discussed above,
they are conflated when calculating these indices separately. So how do we know,
from conventionalmeasures, the extent towhichwe are gauging the degree of income
segregation rather than ethnic segregation? When attempting to understand both the
state of the urban environment and the drivers of segregation, the ability to unpick
the entanglement of multiple influences is critical to further our understanding. We
can approach segregation from an intersectional viewpoint where multiple sites of
discrimination are identified (Crenshaw 1990; Jones et al. 2018a, b). This observation
takes us to our next proposition:
Proposition 11.5 Segregation occurs across many different domains, both daily and
across the course of a lifetime.
Spacematters! The location of groups and individualswithin the urban fabricmatters.
Many standard descriptive measures of segregation do not take account of space. For
example, the index of dissimilarity does not consider the proximity of areas with
similar residential composition. This means that clusters of neighbourhoods with
similar population characteristics will go unnoticed by the index. More generally, it
means that if the areal units that comprise a city were completely reorganised (hypo-
thetically), the same segregation result could be achieved even though the pattern
had been altered (this is known in the segregation literature as the checkerboard
problem: see Wong 2004). This can occur when the measure excludes the impor-
tance of space andworks under the assumption that proximity of areas with similar or
contrasting features is of no consequence. This is clearly an unrealistic assumption.
The clustering of neighbourhoods with high levels of deprivation (Chap. 14) can
severely inhibit life chances (see the work of Galster and Sharkey 2017 summarised
in Chap. 15). Note also the emerging literature on the impacts of ‘social frontiers’
which arise when highly contrasting neighbourhoods are contiguous (see Chap. 13
and Dean et al. 2019).
We therefore need to ensure that the measure of segregation we use includes at
least some form of spatial dependency. However, this insufficient it itself, because as
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well as taking account of the spatial structure of the urban environment we need to
understand the detail of the group locations. For instance, in a city with many ethnic
groups, we want to know if they are segregated from the majority population and if
they are segregated from each other—that is, if they are co-located or antagonistically
located. It is possible to discern similar levels of segregation or spatial dependency,
but still not report information on co-location. The ability to explore this aspect is
crucial, given that the potential for contact has long been identified as a critical issue
in the development and maintenance of group acceptance (see Allport et al. 1954).
10.3 Exemplifying Multilevel Segregation—Shijiazhuang,
China
So far, all the studies that have used our multilevel modelling method to measure
multi-scale segregation have focused on cities in the Global North and Australasia.
In fact, there has been very little work of any kind to measure segregation at multiple
scales in China. In the absence of such work there is clearly an important lacuna in
the literature and our understanding of socio-spatial segregation in Chinese cities. To
illustrate how our multilevel modelling method can be useful for increasing under-
standing of the multi-scale patterns of segregation in a Chinese city, we use data
from the Chinese census for the city of Shijiazhuang to answer two research ques-
tions. Firstly, we ask how residentially segregated the different ethnic groups are in
Shijiazhuang? Secondly, we investigate the degree of segregation among Chinese
migrants into Shijiazhuang and how this is changing over time. Shijiazhuang is an
industrial city, which has experienced rapid population growth over the past 30 years.
It is situated on the North China plain (see Fig. 10.2), around 300 km southwest of
Beijing, and is the largest city and capital of Hebei Province with a total population
of around 11 million across the prefecture (by the end of 2019).
Measuring the multi-scale nature of segregation requires accessible multi-scale
data. The lack of (scalar) data may therefore limit the uptake of this approach espe-
cially in countries with data infrastructures that are not as rich spatially nor as
detailed demographically as in the Global North. In China, however, such data exists,
although, as we discuss, with the important caveat that it is not always accessible to
researchers.
Figure 10.3 shows China’s six-tier administrative structure, which also provides
the levels at which census data is compiled. Large urban areas which generally are
of the most interest to segregation researchers are typically either prefecture-level
cities or centrally administered municipalities. However, it is important to be aware
that these administrative divisions usually contain more expansive surrounding rural
hinterlands as well as a city’s urban core and that the size of these rural areas varies
across China. Consequently, researchers who wish to study residential segregation
within a particular city, may need to produce an urban boundary that differs from the
administrative boundary.
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Fig. 10.2 Study area of Shijiazhuang (shaded black) within Shijiazhuang prefecture within Hebei
Province
There are three scales within a large urban area—the district, the sub-district,
and the residential community. In the past, these have been likened to size to the
UK spatial units of local authority, Ward and Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs),
respectively (Wu et al. 2014). However, such comparisons are unhelpful because
the conceptual and spatial meaning behind the units are somewhat different. Any
study that takes them as equivalents to make scalar comparisons between British and
Chinese cities would be misleading.
In our example, we select the five districts (Chang’an, Qiaodong, Qiaoxi, Xinhua
and Yuhua) that broadly correspond to the urban area of the wider city. We used
satellite imagery combined with local knowledge to decide the boundaries, reducing
the prefecture population of 10 million to a core of 2.7 million inhabitants. As five
units are insufficient for reliable multilevel modelling, we do not include this level in
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Fig. 10.3 Administrative
Structure of China (adapted
from Wu et al. 2014)
our analysis of Shijiazhuang. Evenwith two levels (the sub-district and the residential
community) the evidencewepresent still provides an improvement on the single scale
literature which generally implements either the community or the sub-district scale
(Wu et al. 2014).5 Within these five districts there are 49 sub-districts and within
these are 450 residential communities. The size of each unit varies both between and
within cities/regions, but in our data each district has an average of around 675,000
inhabitants, each sub-district 45,000 and each residential community 6,000.
One of the main reasons researchers have used the sub-district as the unit of
analysis in segregation studies, particularly when comparing multiple Chinese cities
(e.g.Monkkonen et al. 2017), is obtaining data at the residential community level can
be difficult, even within China. For the 2000 and 2010 censuses, the sub-district is the
lowest level at which the National Bureau of Statistics has released official census
data, while data on residential communities is often only available unofficially from
local organisations. This is clearly a barrier to the uptake of the multilevel modelling
method and segregation studies generally, as when used alone, sub-district data is
too coarse to learn anything detailed about the magnitude of segregation for different
groups in the city.
The inclusion of additional data from the smaller residential community scale
has much to contribute to segregation studies in Chinese cities, for this very reason.
5 The district level could be included in analyses of the largest Chinese cities, though researchers
should consider possible bias to variance parameters associated with small sample sizes (McNeish
and Stapleton 2016; McNeish 2019).
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Such representation of Chinese communities also offers an advantage over census
collection units such as those in the UK and other European countries, in that they
are units of local administration and, in many cases, units at which important aspects
of social life are organised (Chen, Lu and Yang 2007). Adopting this scale allows us
to implement the study at the level of a spatial process that is beneficial in terms of
understanding segregation (see Manley et al. 2006; Jones et al. 2008). Furthermore,
many communities are gated, creating a clear physical boundary (Xu andYang 2009).
In many urban areas, due to high population densities in high-rise buildings, the
geographical space in which 6,000 people live is more compact than in many urban
areas many Western cities. This is not to say that these communities are necessarily
the perfect unit of analysis for a segregation study. Through urban renewal, housing
estates are gradually replacing the work unit residential areas and traditional housing
on which the residential communities are based. The newer housing estates across
Chinese cities may provide a more appropriate setting for the study of concepts
like community and neighbourhood and are often smaller than the administrative
residential communities.
10.4 Ethnic Residential Segregation
While the residential segregation of ethnic groups is the focus of many segregation
studies in Europe and North America, this issue has received less attention in China.
This is predominantly because in most large cities, despite the existence of 56 offi-
cially recognised minority groups, the proportion from ethnic minorities is low (see
Table 10.1 for the ethnic population in Shijiazhuang). In cases where there have
been low numbers from ethnic minorities, it has been argued that there is insufficient
difference to create distinct social areas within the city, and therefore, ethnic residen-
tial segregation is not traditionally considered a problem (Li andWu 2008). However,
even when numbers are small, understanding how different minorities locate within
a city at different scales can help ascertain the level of integration across different
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exists between the minority and majority populations, and the importance of the
inclusion of minorities in China’s economic reforms has been highlighted as a key
challenge for the country’s future development (Cao 2010).
Of course, segregation, particularly at small scales, may offer certain benefits for
ethnic minorities. This could be, for example, through enabling them to maintain
their cultural heritage, providing social community support or access to specific
services relevant to the group.Nevertheless, other aspects of segregation are negative,
particularly if a group is clustered in deprived areas or distant from employment
and education opportunities. Segregation at different scales may well bring varying
advantages and disadvantages for different ethnic groups. Therefore, it is important
to find methods to measure segregation at more than one scale within the city.
Previous studies of the segregation of ethnic minorities within China have tended
to consider very coarse spatial scales and focused onhowethnic groups are distributed
throughout a province or even throughout the whole of China, rather than within a
specific city (e.g. Wong 2002; Cao 2010). Those that focused on particular cities,
have looked at ethnic enclaves of foreigners such as Africans, rather than segregation
of Chinese ethnic minorities (e.g. Zhang 2008).
We have already highlighted a set of propositions relating to the study of segre-
gation. The multilevel modelling method we adopt here allows us to address each of
these propositions, within the constraints of the data we are using. For this example,
we build on the work of Jones et al. (2015; see also Manley et al. 2015; Johnston
et al. 2018) and usemultilevel modelling to explore the segregation of Chinese ethnic
minorities within a Chinese city at the finest spatial scale, the residential community,
while also considering a larger spatial scale, the sub-district. Our models can handle
multiple groups within a single model without the need for a reference category, and
produce correlations at each scale between the different groups.
To measure segregation, we calculate MRRs or Median Rate Ratios. These are
transformations of the variance estimated at each spatial scale in themultilevelmodels
and are useful as they provide standardised rates with which to make comparisons.
The MRR is defined as ‘the increased rate, (on average; hence, the median) if one
compares the rates of two [residential communities] chosen at random from the
distribution with the estimated variance’ (Jones et al. 2015, p. 2001). If there was no
segregation the MRR would be equal to one and the higher the MRR the greater the
segregation. To aid interpretation, we use the MRRs as analogous to odds ratios and
adopt the heuristic proposed by Cohen (1988). Values below 1.5 are considered low,
between 1.5 and 2.5 are medium, between 2.5 and 4.3 represent high and above 4.3
is considered very high.
Results
Table 10.2 reports the MRRs and associated Bayesian Credible Intervals for segre-
gation by ethnicity at both the sub-district and residential community level. While
ethnic residential segregation exists at both scales, two exceptions are greater at the
residential community level. This is the case for nine out of the ten ethnic groups
and for five of these groups the MRR is more than 50% greater at this smallest scale.
The results are visualised in Figs. 10.4 and 10.5 to highlight the range of credible
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Table 10.2 MRRs and 95% Bayesian Credible Intervals for the nine ethnic groups and the Han
majority
Sub-district Residential community
MRR 95% Credible interval MRR 95% Credible interval
Manchu 1.69 1.50–1.94 2.19 2.05–2.35
Hui 2.53 2.11–3.11 2.21 2.05–2.38
Mongolian 1.48 1.33–1.68 2.25 2.06–2.27
Tujia 1.49 1.30–1.74 3.27 2.82–3.84
Miao 1.59 1.33–1.98 4.18 3.41–5.21
Zhuang 1.71 1.39–2.17 3.82 3.13–4.74
Korean 1.87 1.50–2.38 3.64 2.96–4.50
Tibetan 2.08 1.46–3.15 7.28 5.03–11.12
Yi 1.75 1.37–2.37 7.76 5.50–11.44
Han (Majority) 1.14 1.11–1.17 1.05 1.05–1.06
Fig. 10.4 Graphical Distribution of the MRRs at the Sub-district level
intervals and demonstrate that at the Sub-District level there is little difference in the
values (with the overlapping bars). At the residential community level, however, there
are three clear groups. The Mongolian, Hui and Manchu—along with the majority
Han—are the least segregated, while the Tujia, Korean, Zhuang and Miao are more
segregated, and the Yi and Tibetan are the most segregated.
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Fig. 10.5 Graphical distribution of the MRRs at the residential community level
At this residential community scale, the results show substantial segregation. All
the ethnic minorities have an MRR greater than two meaning that if two residential
communities were picked at random, the rate for the higher residential community
would, on average, be at least twice that of the lower community for all ethnic groups.
There is also large variation in the MRRs at the residential community level between
the ethnic minority groups, ranging from the Manchu with an MRR of 2.19 to the Yi
(MRR = 7.76). In particular, the larger ethnic minority groups, such as the Manchu
and Hui (MRR = 2.21), of whom there are more than 15,000 individuals, are much
less segregated than the smaller ethnic groups such as Yi and Tibetan (MRR= 7.28)
of whom there are less than a thousand. Indeed, the correlation between size of ethnic
group and level of segregation at the residential community level is 0.7.
At the township level (sub-district), segregation is lower and the range of MRRs
is much smaller ranging from 1.49 (Tujia) to 2.53 (Hui). The Hui ethnic group
appears to be an exception to the general rule. The segregation of this group is
higher at the sub-district scale than at the residential community scale, although
not significantly statistically. In fact, the Hui appear to exhibit a completely different
pattern of segregation, being the second least segregated at the residential community
level but the most segregated at the sub-district level. This may reflect the fact, that
the Hui are different from other ethnic groups in that their unique identity is based
around their Muslim religion rather than local customs and language. Additionally,
compared to the other ethnic groups, which have highly localised distributions within
China, the Hui are much more widely spread out across the country (Wong 2002),
and therefore possibly more heterogeneous in their cultural background. Because of
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these factors, the key drivers of where they locate within a city may well be different,
with, for example, the location of mosques within the city, likely to play an important
role.
Using the MRRs as the only measure of segregation, one would conclude that
the segregation of ethnic minorities in Shijiazhuang was very high. It is important
to remember, however that ethnic minorities are extremely rare in the population. In
fact, the numbers are so low that despite this large unevenness in their distribution,
there are no residential communities at all where more than 10% of the population
are ethnic minorities of any kind.
The multilevel modelling method treats segregation as deviation from a theoret-
ical evenness of the population. However, another way of measuring segregation is
by exposure—defined as the degree of residential contact with majority groups (see
Massey and Denton 1988, and as noted in the introduction). In contrast to the even-
ness measure, if we had measured segregation using the concept of exposure, we
would likely have concluded that ethnic minorities are not particularly segregated.
These different dimensions of segregation are important to consider when thinking
about the societal implications that may result. While the numbers are very low for
Shijiazhuang, this is not actually true for all cities in China. For example, in Beijing
there are over half a million inhabitants from the ethnic minorities (National Bureau
of Statistics 2005).
Table 10.3 shows the correlations between the ethnic groups at both spatial scales.
These allow us to see which groups tend to co-locate and if there are any groups
that are separated geographically. The main message from these correlations is that,
Table 10.3 Correlations between pairs of ethnic groups at the Residential Community level (below
the diagonal) and for the sub-districts above the diagonal). Correlations greater than 0.4 in bold.
Correlations where the credible interval includes 0 in italics
Community Manchu Hui Mongolian Tujia Miao Zhuang Korean Tibetan Yi
Manchu 0.68 0.73 0.42 –
0.07
0.47 0.66 0.57 0.21
Hui 0.64 0.55 0.28 –
0.14
0.21 0.48 0.24 –
0.03
Mongolian 0.81 0.52 0.44 0.04 0.26 0.52 0.50 0.18
Tujia 0.21 –
0.10
0.38 0.05 0.13 0.33 0.37 0.12
Miao 0.06 –
0.14
0.22 0.48 0.26 – 0.12 0.07 0.28
Zhuang 0.47 0.21 0.43 0.31 0.41 0.02 0.08 0.41
Korean 0.55 0.33 0.40 0.35 0.19 0.43 0.56 –
0.00
Tibetan 0.42 0.24 0.42 0.34 0.30 0.52 0.24 0.11
Yi 0.21 –
0.03
0.27 0.42 0.39 0.43 0.27 0.51
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generally, ethnic minorities locate in both the same districts and the same communi-
ties as other ethnic minorities. Out of 36 possible pairs of ethnic groups at each level,
only three are negatively correlated at the residential community level and only four
at the sub-district level.
The strongest correlations at both levels are between Mongolians and Manchus
with the correlation between these groups as high as 0.8 at the residential community
level. Interestingly, as both these ethnic groups are also moderately to strongly corre-
lated with the Hui, it seems that it is the largest minority groups that tend to locate
together more. To understand more about the possible implications of this, further
research could investigate other characteristics of the communities where multiple
minority groups are found. For example, it would be useful to know if the different
minorities are choosing to live in these communities because they have desirable
characteristics for minorities, or whether, instead, they live there by default, perhaps
for reasons of poverty, lack of opportunity or discrimination. Furthermore, although
not all ethnic minorities are migrants, the segregation of minorities may be linked
with the segregation of migrants which is the focus of the second research question.
10.5 Segregation of Migrants
In recent decades, many Chinese cities have grown rapidly, in large part due to high
numbers of migrants arriving from rural areas. Past research has suggested that these
migrants are often segregated within their host cities from the local population, both
geographically and socially, in terms of the activities in which they partake in their
daily lives (Zhu et al. 2017; Zhao and Wang 2018). Many rural migrants arrive in
cities with low levels of education and skills and can be further disadvantaged by
institutional factors such as lack of local registration status or hukou. Of particular
relevance to segregation is that in some cities, the lack of local hukou status has
meant restricted access to local services, including housing (Wang and Zuo 1999;
Chan 2010). This is important as past research has shown that settlement patterns
significantly determine the future socioeconomic standing of migrants (Wu 2014).
Past studies have attempted to quantify the segregation between migrants and
local populations in Chinese cities (e.g. Li and Wu 2008, 2016); however, there is
little research into the scales at which this segregation exists and how the extent and
patterns of segregation exist have changed over time. Migrants are likely to be a
highly mobile group both within cities and between cities and rural areas (Wu 2006).
Over time more arrive, some return to their place of origin while others who have
stayed a long time potentially become more integrated into the city. It is therefore
likely that the segregation of migrants within cities is constantly in flux due to a
multitude of processes. By measuring whether the spatial separation of migrants
and locals is widening or decreasing, and at what scales this is happening, we can
contribute to wider research around the extent to which migrants are excluded from
the social benefits of China’s rapid economic development (Li 2005; Li and Rose
2017).
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In this example, we model the segregation of migrants compared to local Shiji-
azhuang residents at both the Residential Community and the Sub-District scale
at two time points, 2000 and 2010, to explore changes over time. One important
challenge in doing so is that there is no official definition of whether an individual
is a migrant or not in the Chinese census. To overcome this, we therefore identify
whether an individual’s hukou registration status is in the sub-district in which they
live. Although this is an imperfect definition of migrants (as it includes those who
have hukou status in nearby sub-districts who would probably not usually be consid-
ered asmigrants) it is a definitionwhich has been previously employed in segregation
studies and is the best available given the data (Li and Wu 2008). It is also important
to note that migrants are also likely to be a highly heterogeneous group. As well as
the rural migrants we have discussed, there will also be highly educated migrants
from other urban areas who have moved for specific economic or social reasons.
As well as the obvious advantage of enabling the study of multi-scale segregation,
our modelling method offers an additional benefit. Because we model segregation
rather than create a descriptive index, we can measure the uncertainty around our
segregation estimates. This allows us to assess whether or not any changes from 2000
to 2010 are systematic changes in segregation levels or if they are simply a random
variation. Conducting this research in a medium-sized city such as Shijiazhuang
is also of interest as most studies into the segregation of migrants have assessed
megacities such as Beijing and Shanghai. It is likely that some of the drivers of
segregation are stronger in these megacities as competition for land is higher and the
importance of the hukou system in terms of access to housing has historically been
stronger (Monkkonen et al. 2017).
The results (Table 10.4) highlight that although there is segregation at both the
Residential Community and the Sub-District, it is greater at the lower residential
community scale. In 2000 and in 2010, the MRR at this scale is approximately two
indicatingnochangeover time (especially as the credible intervals overlap).However,
at the sub-district level, there is a change with the MRR increasing from 1.40 to
Table 10.4 MRRs for
migrants and non-migrants at
both scales for both years
MRR 95% bayesian credible
interval
Migrants
2000 Residential community 2.03 1.93–2.14
Sub-district 1.43 1.31–1.58
2010 Residential community 1.98 1.89–2.08
Sub-district 1.70 1.52–1.92
Non-migrants
2000 Residential community 1.45 1.42–1.49
Sub-district 1.25 1.16–1.35
2010 Residential community 1.37 1.34–1.40
Sub-district 1.20 1.14–1.26
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1.70. Unlike the residential community results, this reflects a non-trivial amount
of change—the difference between the sub-district and residential community level
MRRs has halved. These results show that while the evenness of the distribution of
migrants across residential communities is unchanged, the residential communities
withmoremigrants are nowmore likely to be found clustered in the same larger areas
(sub-districts) of the city. This pattern holds for the non-migrants as well, although
the MMRs for this group is lower than for the migrants indicating less segregation.
Moreover, the differences between the groups are significant, demonstrated by the
lack of overlap in the credible intervals.
10.6 Discussion
Our empirical application has investigated the segregation of different ethnic groups
and of migrants versus non-migrants. These two examples show how our multilevel
modelling method can be used to increase understanding of segregation in a Chinese
city. Both demonstrate howwe canmeasure and report segregation at multiple scales.
The ethnic minority example looks at how the method is easily adaptable to multiple
groups and the migrant example shows how it is useful for analysing change over
time. The results reveal that in Shijiazhuang segregation is highest at the smallest
scale but is also present at higher scales. As we have only studied a single city, future
work in other cities is necessary to explore whether these patterns are typical. In
particular, comparisons with megacities such as Beijing would be fruitful to explore
if Sassen’s Global City framework (Sassen 2001) applies in the Chinese context.
More longitudinal6 work would also extend our knowledge.
The method can clearly be used to study other aspects of segregation in China.
Socioeconomic segregation based on occupation and education levels is also preva-
lent in Chinese cities and could easily be studied with this method (Li and Wu 2008;
Wu et al. 2014). It would also be possible to take our approach further by looking at
the intersection between different types of segregation, as Jones et al. (2018a, b) have
done in Sydney, Australia. Our method also makes it possible to answer questions
around whether migrant status or socioeconomic status has a greater influence on
segregation levels orwhether segregation is greater for poormigrants or richmigrants.
This can contribute greatly to our understanding of socio-spatial inequalities within
cities.
A deeper understanding of segregation inChinese cities is critical for policy devel-
opments. China has urbanised rapidly: in the 20 years up to 1990 the proportion of
the population living in cities rose from 17.9% to 26.4% (Wei 1994) while figures
from the end of 2017 suggest it has reached almost 60% (see Xiao et al. 2018).
The speed and scale of urbanisation presents theoretical and empirical challenges
6 Longitudinal research is based on repeated observations over time on a sample of individuals or
geographical areas, as opposed to cross-sectional research which is based on data collected at a
single time point.
226 G. Owen et al.
and it is likely that current theories of urban development will not fit or explain the
process or their rapidity sufficiently. Elsewhere in this volume (Chaps. 2, 3 and 15)
the issue of marketisation as a driver of segregation has been identified: when house-
holds have the ability to select their neighbourhoods and homes or when housing
markets become increasingly differentiated so that selective sorting into neighbour-
hoods occurs. As these neighbourhoods contain similar households and have ameni-
ties and characteristics reflecting residents’ desired lifestyle status (see Schelling
1969; Clark 1991), they increase segregation. Moreover, marketisation often brings
with it problems of affordability and access and an understanding of how these issues
occur in Chinese cities, will aid our understanding of segregation. However, within
the literature of wider urban geography, relatively little is known about the organi-
sation of Chinese cities compared to the voluminous research on US, European and
other Western cities. Consequently, we know relatively little about which spatial
scales are the most important for measuring and addressing residential segregation..
It is well known from the research literature worldwide that the size and scale of
urban development is an important factor in the composition and structure of urban
neighbourhoods (see Petrovic et al. 2018). As Chinese cities are often far greater in
size than those in the West, then spatial structures are likely to extend over larger
areas. However, we do not know what the impacts are on life outcomes of different
scales of segregation. Recent advances in the neighbourhood effects7 literature will
potentially make this possible in future (e.g. Manley et al. 2020).
In the context of rapid urbanisation and increasing urban expansion, it is essential
to identify scalar segregation at local levels in order to gain useful policy insights.
It might be that the implications of segregation—in terms of potential harm to well-
being, education or social functions—occur irrespective of scale, in which case this
questions the necessity for detailed local analysis. Successful policy interventions
rely on the identification of the scale where they are likely to be most effective. If
segregation is greatest at the micro-scale, for instance—a scale which often relates
to specific dwelling choices rather than to larger neighbourhoods—then successful
interventions are likely to be more targeted. As a case in point, the Hui are the only
ethnic group in China that identify as Muslims and therefore, it is likely that they
will locate near mosques. Other ethnic groups will show preferences for co- or close
location with other specific services and facilities. Such micro segregation would be
missed if the analysis is only undertaken at a macro level. Larger scale segregation,
in contrast, may derive from restricted access to the housingmarket, either in relation
to their migrant status (hukou) or because the type and cost of housing are prohibitive
in those parts of the city.
Unfortunately, while these possibilities are exciting, there are also limitations,
primarily in relation to data access. As discussed, data at the residential community
7 ‘Neighbourhood effects’ is the name given to broad range of impacts on life outcomes caused
by a person’s residential environment. Various features of the neighbourhood (housing, transport,
exposure to crime and pollution, access to employment, amenities, health care, etc.) have been
shown to affect childhood development, educational attainment, employment prospects and long-
term health. See Chap. 15 for further discussion. See also reviews by van Ham et al. (2012), Galster
and Sharkey (2017) and Graham (2018).
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level is often difficult to obtain and cross tabulations are likely to be even more
difficult for researchers to obtain. For instance, data on both the number of migrants
in a community and the number of people working in different occupations were
available in our example, but not the number of migrants working within specific
occupational groups. The sub-district level is the lowest at which we have cross
tabulations. In this case, we can still use the multilevel modelling technique to look
at whether migrants are more likely to be located in communities and sub-districts of
high or low socioeconomic status. We cannot say, however, whether this is because
the migrants themselves have high or low SES or whether they are simply likely to
locate in the same areas. It may also be, as discussed above, that our community
and residential scales are not the most appropriate for future work. In many Chinese
cities, new housing estates are more appropriate subjects for studying concepts of
community and neighbourhood. As these are typically smaller than the residential
committee administrative areas we studies, they may represent a scale at which it
will be even harder to obtain data.
Although there remain considerable challenges in the deployment of comparable
data, the adoption of a modelling approach can also improve comparisons of segre-
gation between countries. Past research has tried to do this with mixed results. One
study suggested that segregation is much lower in China than in cities in Europe and
NorthAmerica (Li andWu2008), while another study (Monkkonen et al. 2017) using
data from the same point in time, concluded the opposite, reporting that several of
the largest Chinese cities are now more socioeconomically segregated than the most
segregated American cities. Trying to make such comparisons is problematic, due
to differences in how segregation is measured and differences between the countries
studied. As an area spatial unit, the Chinese residential community is not necessarily
comparable with any geographical unit elsewhere. Although multi-scale segregation
methods do not necessarily solve these problems, they are helpful in a couple ofways.
Firstly, they help us think critically about any comparisons with segregation indices
in Europe and beyond by explicitly bringing attention to scale impact. Secondly, they
can help us build up a more detailed multi-scale profile of segregation in a city which
can at least be qualitatively compared with profiles in cities in other countries.
Studies using the multilevel method in London, UK and Sydney, Australia have
shown, in general, greater segregation at micro and macro scales with little segrega-
tion present in the in-betweenmeso scales (Jones et al. 2015; Johnston et al. 2016a, b).
In Shijiazhuang we only have two scales and have shown that segregation is greater
at the lower level. Drawing comparative conclusions is difficult. The smallest scale
in the Chinese data we use is akin to the meso scales used in the UK and Australian
studies. Suppose we map scales across national contexts using population size as our
comparison measure. In that case, segregation is higher at the meso scale in Shiji-
azhuang than it is in London or Sydney. By contrast, it is lower at the macro scale.
There is no smallest scale comparison possible because such data does not exist in
China. Our results, therefore, do not allow us to make firm conclusions on whether
segregation is greater or less in Shijiazhuang than in London or Sydney, but they do
suggest that the nature of the segregation may be different.
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Ultimately, the multilevel modelling method combined with the right data allows
us to consider multi-scale segregation in Chinese cities for the first time. This
approach is a range of quantitative approaches that can allow researchers to under-
stand how different socioeconomic groups segregate within cities in China and
beyond.
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Between Rural Migrants and Local
Residents in Urban China:
An Exploratory Social Network Analysis
of Care Workers in Shanghai
Wenjing Zhang and Yiming Wang
Abstract Recent decades have witnessed large migration flows from rural to urban
China. This chapter explores the potential of social network analysis (SNA) for
assessing and understanding social integration in contemporary Chinese cities. We
begin by presenting the background and the complex, multi-dimensional and inter-
connected factors that typically affect segregation and inequality within urban China.
SNA is introduced as a potential analytical approach for characterising and examining
the ongoing dynamic social integration process. We discuss some initial findings
based upon an exploratory case study in Shanghai on multi-dimensional segregation
in the social care sector. We also identify the limitations of SNA as a relatively
innovative method for researching social integration and call for a mixed-methods
approach towards its application in examining the intricacy and complexity of social
integration in contemporary urban China.
Keywords Migrants · Social network analysis · Integration · Urban China · Care
11.1 Introduction
Social integration involves the co-existence of individuals or groups in a society
and the connectedness and interactions between them. There have been many
academic discussions about the definition and measurement of integration, including
social attraction bonds between individuals and exchange processes in groups (Blau
1960); social connectedness and linkage with families and friends (Fischer 2011);
connectedness between people from different neighbourhoods (Ndofor-Tah et al.
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2019) and barriers to integration within a society (Phillips et al. 2019). The multi-
dimensional term encompasses factors like social roles, participation in various
activities, perceived beliefs (Brissette et al. 2000); social control (Umberson 1987);
access to resources and opportunities and social mixing (Ndofor-Tah et al. 2019).
These different definitions naturally entail different approaches to the measurement
of social integration.
The benefits of harmonious social integration are readily apparent. Social integra-
tion has proven associations with better health outcomes (Seeman 1996), increased
social capital, civic participation, trust and solidarity within neighbourhoods and
society (Putnam 2000; Brissette et al. 2000), as well as lower violent crime and
conflict (Sampson et al. 1997; Putnam 2000; Phillips et al. 2019). Although social
integration is an essential feature of cosmopolitan urban life worldwide (Musterd and
Ostendorf 1998), there is still a need to analyse how societies are integrated in rela-
tion to each particular context and timeframe (Phillips et al. 2019). The achievement
of socially integrated, inclusive and connected urban development is a current trend
in Chinese megacities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. All have witnessed
exponential immigration from the Chinese countryside since the early 1980s. The
result is a dynamic, but sometimes daunting, process of social integration between
rural migrants and local residents in urban China (Zhao and Wang 2018).
The spatial and social separation of population groups by religion, race, ethnicity,
country of birth, income or class (Piekut et al. 2019; Yao et al. 2019; see Chaps. 2 and
4), and the underlying problems of inequality (Chap. 15), are often covert, complex,
and mingled with a myriad of local socio-economic factors. Compared to Anglo-
American studies, current research on social segregation in urban China is arguably
insensitive to these cross-cultural subtleties. In the UK and the USA, the word ‘segre-
gation’ often connotes racial apartheid and/or discrimination (Zhao andWang 2018).
Therefore, it is necessary to characterise social segregation within a specific urban
Chinese context, consciously reconstructing the meaning of ‘segregation’ through
applied empirical research. This chapter aims to set out the intellectual framework
for such inquiries.
As explored in earlier chapters (particularly Chaps. 4, 8, and 9), rural migrants
face inequality in different settings in urban China, where there are barriers and
challenges for the assessment and reporting of segregation and exclusion. The rapid
rural-urbanmigrationflowhas accelerated both heterogeneity and disparities in urban
China. This introduces different forms of segregation and inequality, which have
been insufficiently considered so far. This chapter aims to explore how cutting-
edge techniques can be employed to understand segregation in Chinese cities. It
pays particular attention to how problems of exclusion and inequality emerged and
developed and offers a comprehensive perspective. It examines the potential use of
the social network analysis (SNA) approach to assess these problems and further
develops the analytical methods, especially in understanding social integration and
segregation in different urban settings.
Social network analysis originated from the sociology literature and presented
itself as an analytical approach to examining complex social relationships (Scott
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1988). Since the early 1930s, SNA has evolved in three main ways: (i) the develop-
ment of sociometric analysis—it was used initially by sociologists as a way of coding
and visualising social connections; (ii) mathematical analysis—the development of
sophisticated and powerful analytical tools for modelling the structure, formation
and dynamics of social networks; and (iii) anthropological analysis—researchers at
the University of Manchester used SNA to construct a detailed understanding of
the structure of community relations (see a historical overview by Fredericks and
Durland 2005). These developments coalesced to form contemporary SNA during
the 1960s and 1970s and have subsequently been further developedwith the advance-
ment of computer-based analysis techniques (Kilduff and Tsai 2003; Fredericks and
Durland 2005). The origins of this approach also explain the key methodological
procedures and techniques of current SNA, including the analysis of sociometric
data using matrix techniques, providing mathematical models of group structures,
and using graph theory methods.
In this chapter, we intend to demonstrate an explorative application of SNAwithin
an urbanChinese context, and reflect on themerits and limitations of currentmethods.
We begin by examining segregation between rural migrants and urban residents in
China, with an in-depth analysis of the historical background, previous analysis and
the complex, multi-dimensional and inter-connected factors driving segregation and
inequality in urban China (Chap. 15). The second section introduces the applica-
tion of SNA to understand different facets of segregation. It identifies the limitations
of the methods, gives examples of the application of SNA in the social care field,
and explores adjustments to the traditional approach. The third section comprises a
case study on the application of SNA to understand the segregation of rural migrant
care workers in residential care homes in Shanghai. The case study highlights the
importance of exploring multi-dimensional aspects of inequality and intersection-
ality—where multiple layers of disadvantaged identities interact with each other (see
Chap. 10)—among rural migrants in urban China. This chapter also examines the
ways SNA could be refined or developed to understand the relationships between
individuals and groups. The final section summarises the strengths and limitations of
thesemethods and suggests the potential of amixedmethods approach integrating the
application of SNA and in-depth qualitative inquiries to investigate social integration
between rural migrants and urban residents in contemporary China.
11.2 Segregation Between Rural Migrants and Urban
Residents in China
The migration of rural labour to urban areas has been a major factor in demographic
change throughout China’s recent socio-economic reforms (see Chap. 5). Significant
disparities between rural and urban areas and the gradual loosening of migration
regulations have contributed to increasing internalmigration.Most internalmigration
is from poorer, less developed areas, and this has led to an increasing eastward and
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urban concentration (Wang 2000). Migration to urban areas has become the most
common way for rural residents to obtain non-agricultural jobs since the 1990s
(Connelly et al. 2018). Temporary rural migrants have no official local household
registration (hukou) but are engaged in economic and other activities in urban areas
(Gu 1992; Sun 2000).
Over 288 million rural residents have migrated to urban areas in search of better
income (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2019). Contemporary Chinese urban
life is characterised by rural migrants and urban residents operating in different
settings, for activities such as work and education. Although links and interac-
tion between rural migrants and urban residents are increasing significantly, there
remain general and specific segregation and integration issues. The integration of
rural migrants into urban settings is now a key focus of Chinese social policy (Wang
et al. 2016). Researchers have also raised awareness of the levels of integration or
segregation of migrants in urban China, for example, social interaction at the neigh-
bourhood level (Wang et al. 2016), segregation in everyday activities (Zhao andWang
2018), and occupational segregation and earnings (Zhang and Wu 2017).
Fan (2002) analysed the population composition of urban China based on human
capital attributes, mobility resources, labour market entry and shifts in employment
patterns. She identified a hierarchy that includes temporary migrants (without local
hukou) at the bottom, non-migrant locals in between, and permanent migrants as
the ‘elite’ at the top. The assimilation of migrants into urban society is not guar-
anteed (Chen and Liu 2018). It occurs based largely on education, labour market
entry, upward social mobility, family socio-economic background, and interactions
with local friends and neighbours. Only a small number could achieve permanent
citizenship (hukou) and become ‘elite’ migrants. Such a hierarchy based on migra-
tion and hukou status illustrates the disparities in economic success among residents
and distinct differences between migrants and locals and within migrant groups
themselves (Chap. 8).
Based on a study on the variation of interaction between locals and migrants in
Nanjing,Wang et al. (2016) argue thathukou status does not seem to play an important
role in social interactions with neighbours. However, such social interactions cannot
reveal the full extent of meaningful interactions between rural migrants and urban
residents. Rural migrants commonly live in migrant-dominant neighbourhoods such
as urban villages (Wang et al. 2009). Due to high population density and condensed
dwelling patterns, segregation in urbanChina ismuchmorefinely-grainedon a spatial
scale than geographical segregation tends to be in western countries (Zhao andWang
2018). It is not uncommon to find poorer residential blocks alongside wealthier
neighbourhoods. Rural migrants and local indigenous residents may nevertheless
lack meaningful social interactions even when they live in neighbouring blocks.
Survey results fromWang et al. (2016)’s study suggest that rural migrants are 1.8
times more likely to communicate with locals than the other way around. Migrants
are also 1.8 times more likely to help or receive help from local residents than vice
versa. This reveals the problem of low-level social ties between these groups and
the difficulties for further integration of rural migrants into urban society. A further
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study fromZhao andWang from 2018 suggested that the locals have stronger internal
bonds and links compared to their connections with rural migrants.
Consequently, the assessment of such segregation and raising awareness of its
impact become vital issues for policy-makers and researchers. Assessment can be
conducted across multiple areas such as housing, neighbourhood, occupation, educa-
tion, ethnicity and gender. In many cases, traditional assessment methods that focus
on investigating residential segregation would fail to show the fine-grained segre-
gation that exists across Chinese cities. Many inner-city neighbourhoods have an
extremelyhighhousingdensity,which can lead to the under-estimationof segregation
at a neighbourhood level (Zhao and Wang 2018).
Furthermore, the segregation of rural migrants segments even further into indi-
vidual levels of marginalisation or disadvantage, for example, gender, age, and
ethnicity. What is required is an ‘intersectional’ approach that highlights the way
that these multi-layered identities interact. The concept of intersectionality origi-
nates from critical race studies in the late 1980s and is now a primary theoretical
tool for feminist and anti-racist scholars (Nash 2008). It emphasises the need to go
beyond single analytical categories, such as gender, in the case of feminist researchers
(Grabham et al. 2008). The concept of intersectionality means that each individual
is constituted by interrelating axes of age, race, gender, class, sexuality and other
identities. Intersectionality is an important analytical framework for understanding
questions of inequality and injustice (Chap. 10; Hancock 2016). Such an approach
explores relationships, social context, power relations, complexity, social justice
and inequalities rather than a single vector of inequality or differences between
separate analytical methods (McBride et al. 2014; Hopkins 2017). For instance,
intersectionality can be used to analyse how gender and ethnicity interact to shape
the multiple dimensions of female migrants’ experiences of working in science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields.
From the perspective of multi-faceted axes of intersectionality, exclusion and
segregation in urban China can be experienced by people who belong to multiple
disadvantaged social identities. It can be based on gender, disability, age and hukou.
It goes beyond the single aspect of differences in institutionalised household regis-
tration (hukou) and between geographical residential areas. For example, the experi-
ence of rural female migrant workers and older migrants may be different and varied.
Figure 11.1 shows the intersectionality of multiple identities at the individual level,
including hukou, ethnicity, language, occupation, education, age, sex and so on.
Multi-dimensional and intersectional segregation makes it harder to understand
and assess segregation across urban China. Exclusion can increase stress and impact
on the mental health and wellbeing of minority groups. This is especially true for
rural migrants who are subject to multi-layered levels of interaction and segregation.
Therefore, it is imperative for policy-makers, practitioners and researchers to raise
awareness of how the intersectional needs of disadvantaged groups inter-connect.
Existing literature overlooks these important factors. An intersectional perspective
is necessary both to understand interactions between rural migrants and urban resi-
dents and the risks of segregation based on multi-layered identities of sources of
disadvantage.
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Fig. 11.1 Intersectionality of different identities at the individual level
Segregation and inequality at an individual level are often accompanied by varied
forms of segregation among other groups in close relationship with rural migrants.
A range of segregated groups may have strong intra-group interactions, contributing
to complex multi-dimensional segregation and inequality in one geographical or
organisational unit. The case study in this chapter examines the interactions between
migrant care workers and older local residents in care homes in urban China.
Figure 11.2 is a simplified diagram showing disadvantaged identities for both care
workers, mainly low-paid female rural migrants and service users, such as older
disabled people in urban care homes.
To explore how cutting-edge techniques might be employed to understand segre-
gation in Chinese cities, we now explore the potential for SNA applications with
critical reflections on the merits and limitations of the methods. In the following
sections, we advocate the merits of social SNA in understanding segregation from
Fig. 11.2 Interactions of
groups with different
disadvantaged identities in
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different perspectives.We identify the limitations of thesemethods in assessing segre-
gation in urban China, illustrate the application of SNA in social care, and explore
how to adjust the traditional SNA approach.
11.3 Social Network Analysis in Understanding
Segregation
Social network analysis (SNA) is a quantitative approach that investigates network
formation and relationships. It involves a matrix representation of the structures and
patterns underlying social interactions, which is often depicted in graphical form
using a ‘sociogram’ such as the one in Fig. 11.3 (Hanneman and Riddle 2005; Eiler
et al. 2017). The SNA approach asserts that social life is rooted in the structure of
social positions and relations between individuals. This necessitates an analysis of
the way status and positions are distributed across social networks within groups
and societies (Cott 1997). The basic form of SNA includes two elements: compo-
nents (nodes) and interactions (ties) (Eiler et al. 2017; Wölfer and Hewstone 2017).
Specifically, nodes are relevant subjects, which can include individuals or organisa-
tions, within a network, while ties are the interactions between those nodes in a social
network. The SNAapproach can be used tomap and expose communication channels
and information flow between individuals/groups within an organisation/network
(Bae et al. 2015; Sabot 2017).
The application of SNA has been developed to illustrate social interactions
between individuals or organisations, including organisational structure (Cross et al.
2013), healthcare systems (Bae et al. 2015; Eiler et al. 2017), occupational mobility
Fig. 11.3 The social network inSunshineCareHome.Notewhite boxes: ruralmigrant careworkers;
blue boxes: urban care workers; blue circles: urban managers; lines: social ties; arrows: direct work
relationships or friendships
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(Demchenko 2011; Zhang andWu 2017), and segregation within everyday activities
(Zhao and Wang 2018). SNA helps identify nodes and the ties between individuals
and groups and further illustrates interaction levels between individuals and/or organ-
isations in specific settings. Figure 11.3 illustrates the social network estimated for
our case study care home (further details on our approach below) where the boxes
represent nodes/components (rural migrants and urban residents in different colours)
and lines represent interactions (ties) between the nodes. This hypothesised social
network figure could be used to explain the social interactions in an organisation
or neighbourhood. The arrows represent connections between individuals: single
arrows for one-way connections and double arrows for two-way connections. We
focus on both types of connections between individuals and indirect connections
through a mediator, such as #2 links the indirect connections between #1 and #23 in
Fig. 11.3.
SNA is a useful tool for analysing social interactions between different groups in
various settings. The structure of a social network includes relevant components and
the patterns of interactions between these components. Analysis of the components
and how they interact across the network can provide insight into how they relate to
the broader community context, such as healthcare systems (Eiler et al. 2017). SNA
can also investigate intergroup contact across social structures and explore means to
promote social integration. It is an especially suitable ‘fit’ for research on segregation
in Chinese cities.
SNA can help analyse how participants extend contact beyond direct connections
by identifying internal connections and intergroup contacts. By analysing extended
contact we can reflect indirect experience or establish the potential for intergroup
contact. In Fig. 11.3, we can see that ruralmigrant #1 and #3 have no direct intergroup
connection, but their mutually connected migrant #2 has ties linking with an urban
resident #24. This allows #1 and #3 the indirect connection or potential for inter-
group contacts argued by Wölfer and Hewstone (2017). The identification of direct
and extended connections both within and between groups can provide contextual
information across the entire social network. SNA has a particular strength as it iden-
tifies both direct and indirect links between network members, which could be used
to analyse contextual information, potential relationships and integration.
A series of key Social Network Indicators have been deployed to measure social
networks, such as homophily, density and closeness. The homophily principle high-
lights the importance of similarity in encouraging social network connections, which
results in homogeneous personal networks in relation to a variety of demographic,
socio-economic, behavioural, and intrapersonal characteristics (McPherson et al.
2001). Homophily suggests the contacts between dissimilar individuals and groups
occur at a lower rate and dissolves at a higher rate than among groups of people with
shared or similar characteristics (McPherson et al. 2001). Scholars have proposed
a number of ways to measure the degree of homophily, such as the Pearson corre-
lation coefficient of the degrees of adjacent nodes proposed by Newman (2002) as
the ‘simplest and most flexible’ measure (Watts 2004; Dean and Pryce 2017). The
density is measured with the ratio of m (edges observed) and m1 (the number of
edges of all nodes in the network) (White and Harary 2001; Dean and Pryce 2017).
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Network closeness measures each node’s proximity to all other nodes within the
network by calculating the average shortest path to every other node (Okamoto et al.
2008).
Conventional applications of the SNAapproach leave some questions unanswered
around the underlying social mechanisms of segregation in increasingly diverse soci-
eties (Wölfer and Hewstone 2017). Current applications are dominated arguably by
research on internet-based virtual space, although they seem to be less engaged with
the actual urban built environment (Zhao and Wang 2018). While commonly used
to examine residential segregation, SNA could also be applied to investigate social
interactions in other non-residential settings. Zhao andWang (2018) propose an inte-
grated spatio-social network analysis approach to assess segregation in urban China,
demonstrating a methodological shift beyond exclusively location-based measure-
ments. They identified the limitations of segregation assessments based only on indi-
vidualised domains such as housing or the workplace (see also discussion of domain
segregation in Chap. 2). Their study also investigated social interactions between
rural migrants and local residents in terms of everyday activities such as shopping
and eating out in particular venues like restaurants, barber shops and pubs.
A more refined spatio-social network analysis tends to focus on the quantifi-
cation of ‘presence’ or ‘co-presence’ of different groups at specific locations, but
it still reveals few ‘meaningful interactions’ between those involved. Wölfer and
Hewstone (2017) argue that propinquity (befriending with others who are physically
close) is more influential than homophily (befriending those who share similar indi-
vidual characteristics). However, proximity-based availability and presence do not
necessarily contribute to higher degrees of integration between different groups. For
example, local residents and rural migrants might go for lunch at the same restaurant
without conversations or other forms of encounter. Within healthcare settings, Bae
et al. (2015) argue that while many studies investigate social networks, structure
and development, little has been done to investigate system effectiveness or care
processes and patient outcomes. To provide a better understanding of segregation
and inequality, it is imperative for SNA research to investigate more meaningful
interactions and outcomes.
Also important is to consider alternative methods that can overcome the limi-
tations of SNA and apply SNA analysis in a way that helps us acquire an in-
depth understanding based on qualitative exploration. Future research could involve
improved analysis of interactions between ruralmigrants and urban residents to better
understand segregation in urban China. We propose two main ways to achieve this:
I. To refine traditional SNA by including more social interaction analysis. Wölfer
and Hewstone (2017) suggest that network ties be assessed with qualitative data
from observations, interviews and documents in studies other than large-scale
census analysis.
II. To employ quantification via SNA alongside other research methods to gain
a more robust understanding of the interactions between different groups and
subsequent outcomes in terms of segregation and inequality.
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Notwithstanding the potential richness and theoretical depth that SNA can bring
to the research of intergroup connections and transfers, SNA has remained surpris-
ingly underused in research on social segregation, particularly in China. Although
Chinese scholars have adopted SNA in other fields, such as economic integration
(Hou et al. 2009), supply chain (Borgatti and Li 2009) and organisation management
(Li et al. 2011), the conceptual andmethodological advantages of SNA remain largely
unknown to researchers in segregation or integration studies (Wölfer and Hewstone
2017). At the same time, there is also room for improvement in terms of the level
of technical sophistication as reflected in current studies on social segregation in
China. By following recommendations on SNA use in health care studies proposed
by Bae et al. (2015), future studies in segregation in Chinese cities could enhance
the sophistication of research design, analysis, and assessments. Our case study on
the segregation of rural migrant care workers in residential care homes in Shanghai,
is intended to showcase how the SNA approach can be extended and triangulated
with other methods. It is intended to demonstrate how different dimensions can be
interwoven in practice, including age, gender migrants/locals segregation, and how
cutting-edge techniques may help resolve complex multi-dimensional problems.
11.4 The Case of Migrant Care Workers in Shanghai
Care provision for older people is traditionally a primary responsibility of families
in China (Qi and Dong 2018). Just like rural-urban disparities in other fields, care
provision and finance for older people are provided differently in urban and rural
areas in China. With dramatic demographic changes such as ageing, a decreasing
fertility rate and internal migration, fewer adult children are available to provide
care for their parents. The extended family still takes the main responsibility for
care provision in both urban and rural China (Chen and Yang 2012). However, in
developed urban areas, direct care is gradually changing to a combination of care by
family members and paid care workers, mostly migrants from rural areas.
The domestic services market has grown rapidly in China since the mid-1990s
(Connelly et al. 2018). The care labour market has also expanded since the 2000s
in developed urban areas (Zhang 2018). With better economic outcomes and signif-
icant income growth, Chinese families have access to more resources to pay for
care services (Connelly et al. 2018). This is especially true for urban dwellers. Paid
care workers are increasingly employed in both residential care homes and at older
people’s own homes in urban China. In this context, care workers’ employment
becomes an alternative or supplement to familial care provision in urban China
(Zhang 2018).
Due to significant differences in the economic background of urban and rural resi-
dents, two-tier welfare systems, and rural-urban migration, rural migrants comprise
the majority of the care labour force in large Chinese cities. The majority of
care workers in urban areas come from underdeveloped Western and Central
Chinese provinces, such as Gansu, Hebei, Sichuan, Henan, Hubei, Guangxi (Wang
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2012). In the care home in Guangzhou where Wang is the manager, only five
of 60 care workers are local residents with hukou in Guangdong Province. This
percentage represents the common composition for care labour in many Chinese
cities. According to Connelly et al. (2018), around 15–20 million domestic service
workers, mostly female rural migrants, take up paid domestic work in urban families,
including cleaning, cooking, caring for children, older people, and patients.
11.4.1 Case Study Location and Data Collection
Shanghai, a typical metropolis with a relatively advanced care system, was selected
as the case field for our research. In the context of a significantly ageing population
and a developed economy, Shanghai has relatively advanced residential care homes
and welfare institutions for older people. According to the Shanghai Civil Affairs
Bureau (2018), there were 703 care homes with over 140,000 beds across the city
in 2017. Rural migrant workers have increasingly taken up various service jobs in
Shanghai, including care provision. Urban areas like Shanghai attract large numbers
of migrant workers to maintain and develop care provision for older people.
Two public and one private care home were involved in this study. We collected
secondary data such as administrative records from care homes to establish the
composition of social networks among care workers at selected institutions. We
used observational data and semi-structured interviews to explore the experiences
and viewpoints of care home managers and migrant care workers. The aim was to
monitor and evaluate interactions between migrant workers and their employers in
order to guage inequality and social integration levels.
To establish the characteristics of the social networks involved, we collected
administrative data from three residential care homes about the management hier-
archy, lines of staff accountability at different positions, demographic information,
employment records, education and work experiences. We then conducted qualita-
tive observational research in each care home to evaluate how staff at different levels
interact with each other. Finally, three care home managers and eight migrant care
workers took part in semi-structured interviews between 40 minutes and an hour
and a half in length. Interviews focused on exploring experiences and viewpoints of
geriatric care services, interactions between local and rural staff in the workplace,
and the migrant care workers’ daily routine and everyday life activities.
According to the administrative data, the majority (over 70%) of care workers
from the three care homes were in their late 40s and 50s. Only five of 139 (3.6%)
care workers were male. In each care home, we recruited one manager and three
migrant care workers for interviews. All the interviewed migrant care workers were
female, with ages ranging from 32 to 53. The interviews were conducted between
April and July 2013. The authors translated extracts from respondents’ narratives
into English for the purpose of anonymised quotations. The names of organisations
and interviewees in this chapter are pseudonyms.
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11.4.2 Mixing SNA and Qualitative Methods in Examining
Social Segregation
Using the SNA approach, this study classified managers and staff based on their
occupational positions and hukou, to distinguish between locals and migrants. The
process comprised a trial to combine a quantitative SNA approach with qualitative
data from observation and interviews. The application of SNA gives the opportunity
to show the macro picture of all relationships in the network. The in-depth interview
data supported an understanding of the rationale behind the ties between individuals
in the network and the differences in their relationships.
The network in our example consists of two sub-groups—rural migrants and
urban residents. According to the administrative and observational data, there are 61
employees overall in Sunshine Care Home, with 19 locals (12 managers and seven
care workers) and 42 rural migrant care workers. By identifying the job positions
in the network, the study further classifies managers and care workers in the group
of urban residents (blue nodes). As all rural migrants employed in the sampled care
homes were care workers, there is no sub-category under the migrant nodes.
As shown in Fig. 11.3, collaboration and teamwork are occurring within the
sample care homes, but the type and degree of these interactions differ between
managers and care workers, and between urban citizens and rural migrants. Refer-
ring to key indicators of themeasurement of social networks, the interactions between
employees in the care homes show the importance of the homophily principle based
on characteristics in hukou (i.e. contacts are at a higher rate within each group of
migrants or locals than between two groups). This case study suggests that work rela-
tionships or collaboration within Shanghai care homes differ between rural migrants
and local citizens with in-depth qualitative data. The main factor is the level of job
position and division of labour. This finding echoes a 1997 study of a geriatric care
facility in Toronto (Cott 1997). Cott used SNA research across long-term care multi-
disciplinary teams and identified segregation and differences in teamwork between
decision-makers and practitioners. In a similar pattern to that found in Toronto,
collaborative teamwork among Shanghai care workers was limited to management-
level professionals. Care workers’ teamwork only consisted of assisting each other
withwork taskswith little team outputs.More importantly, the structure of the collab-
oration patterns and underlying interactions between each group will lead to a recur-
ring circle that might trap migrant care workers at the caregiving level and not allow
promotion to management positions.
The SNA approach could also be applied to interactions beyond the workplace,
includingmigrantworkers’ daily activities in the community. In the selectedShanghai
care homes,most ruralmigrant careworkers lived in on-site accommodationprovided
by care homes. Most of them spent leisure time eating out and shopping with other
migrant workers close to the care homes. Many care workers also helped older resi-
dents with shopping, as the nature of the job requires. These activities involve inter-
actions with local residents or migrants working in other sectors beyond the isolated
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care settings. It is recommended that SNA be applied beyond work-based measure-
ment on the basis of the spatio-social network analysis focused on interactions at
particular venues (Zhao and Wang 2018).
More importantly, rural migrant care workers experienced extended interactions
with their own families and other connections in their hometown and interactions
with residents of the care homes and their families. In this situation, ruralmigrant care
workers mediate connections between urban and rural areas. Although these connec-
tions are very different for each individual, we cannot underestimate the potential
for interaction and exchanges in the wider context. For example, Li, a female rural
migrant in her 50s, managed to bring her daughter to study in a school in Shanghai
with help from one older resident’s son. Li suggested that it was a reward beyond
the workplace based on the quality of care she provided to the residents.
Further SNA studies might extend our research to include further social inter-
actions beyond the workplace or residential locations. The example shared by Li
is uncommon for rural migrant care workers. Our interview and observational data
suggest that interactions with care home residents cannot significantly reduce segre-
gation in urban society. At the same time, there is an evident consensus that local
older people living in care homes are also somewhat segregated from mainstream
urban life. Their families only visit periodically, whether weekly, monthly or even
less frequently. Segregation based on hukou and age is intertwined in care homes in
Chinese cities.
The findings of our case study suggest that there is very lowmobility across occu-
pations for care workers, especially for those who are temporary migrants without
local citizenship. There is very high mobility between jobs/institutions for care
workers within the care industry as in other countries. Whatever their level of educa-
tion, all the migrant workers rose no further than the position of basic care workers.
The range included a primary school, secondary school, vocational education, and
college and university graduates. In SunshineCareHome, a group of youngermigrant
care workers from Jiangxi Province, who held college degrees in care management,
had been working in the care industry for a few years. However, it was established
that their educational level had not made a significant difference in their employment
prospects for management positions in relation to the division between urban citizens
or rural migrant.
We (rural migrants) are unable to reach a management level in the care industry in Shanghai.
Everyone assumes locals are managers and migrants are care workers… As a rural migrant,
I may try to move to a smaller care agency to find my chance to be a manager, but it will still
be hard. I can see little chance for me to climb the promotion ladder in the care industry. I
can only be a care worker, an experienced care worker, but not a manager.
Mei, rural migrant, 30s, female, with college degree
Segregation and inequality between locals and rural migrants are significant in
the care labour market and the social welfare and employment rights of care workers.
Care work, especially care for older people, is low paid with low social recognition
or status in urban China. As Dong et al. (2017) argued, care workers who provide
services to older people in Shanghai earned 20–28% less than those employed in
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other service sectors involving similar human capital. Moreover, as the mobility of
labour has gradually extended within China, the government has remained cautious
about disconnecting welfare provision and hukou status (Connelly et al. 2018). This
leads to difficulties for migrant workers to get access to welfare benefits and social
services in urban areas.
11.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have explored the potential of social network analysis (SNA)
for assessing and understanding social integration in contemporary Chinese cities.
We illustrated this potential with an application to the relationships between care
workers in the Sunshine Care Home in Shanghai. The SNA framework usefully
revealed the structure of direct and indirect connections among local employees,
migrant care workers and local older residents, and revealed how the spatial mix
itself does not necessarily demonstrate the level of integration between different
groups. Our study identified multi-dimensional segregation in care homes, including
between rural migrants and local workers, age for older residents, and gender in care
labour employment. These care homes are segregated islands in large Chinese cities,
where women and rural migrants make up the majority of the workforce.
Recognising multi-dimensional segregation in the specific setting, this case study
shows the importance of exploring age and gender segregation affecting rural
migrants in urban settings in China. In Western contexts, age segregation has been
discussed in cultural (Gullette 2004) and spatial (Kingman 2016) dimensions. In
China, an increasingly large population of older people face the challenge of segrega-
tion and isolation from other generations who dominate key activities. Policy-makers
and practitioners in China have paid little attention to the embedded problems in age-
segregated space. This case study casts light on the investigation ofmulti-dimensional
segregation occurring in real life. It asks for more attention to be given to diverse,
vulnerable groups, or groups with multi-faceted vulnerable characteristics such as
temporary migrants, female and older workers and older residents.
The SNA approach can be used to understand multi-dimensional segregation and
inequality in settings which remain unexplored in China. For example, SNA could
bring new insights into the investigation of encounters and interactions within inter-
generational space (Jarrott et al. 2011; Vanderbeck et al. 2015). Specifically, further
assessments can be built on such social network analysis in order to promote greater
social and generational interaction. It could help identify which groups could benefit
from these arrangements and how analysis and pilot schemes can be transformed
to practice and policies across various settings, including work, communities and
neighbourhoods, institutions and social care. At the macro level, an application of
SNA that embraces the potential for interconnections between urban and rural areas
will provide a more comprehensive understanding of segregation and inequality in
China. It will also help identify the opportunities and problems inherent within rapid
rural-urban migration.
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Our study of the migrant care workers in Shanghai, albeit exploratory and anec-
dotal, also demonstrated the limitations of SNA. On the one hand, SNA offers a
rich and potentially innovative analytical approach to characterise and examine the
dynamic social integration process that occurs almost ubiquitously across large
Chinese cities. Technically, there are also further opportunities to apply more
advanced SNA statistical methods, such as exponential random graph models, which
could be used to explain why some nodes in SNA are more likely to be connected
than others (see e.g., Robins et al, 2007). On the other hand, there is a limit to how far
SNA may fare by itself as just a technical exercise. In our case study of care homes
in Shanghai, the intricacy and complexity revealed in the qualitative responses by
migrant workers are conceivably beyond the range of what can be captured by SNA.
Indeed, the key intellectual question is perhaps more conceptual than method-
ological, revolving around the very definition of ‘integration’ within present-day
urban China, a social context which is, in many ways, very different from its Anglo-
American counterpart (Zhao and Wang 2018; see also Chaps. 4 and 15). In other
words, although SNA can be employed to characterise the prima facie structure of
social integration, the intellectual strength of SNA may only manifest itself in full
when accompanied by theoretical insights generated from qualitative investigation.
In a nutshell, we call for a mixed-methods approach towards applying social
network analysis to characterise continuing social integration between rural migrants
and urban residents in contemporary China. Our future research will aim to progress
in a corresponding direction, especially by focusing on the more informal and
‘everyday life’ aspects of social interaction (e.g., via shopping or commuting) to
inform social policies to encourage more routine exchanges between the locals and
the migrants.
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Chapter 12
The Role of Migration Costs
in Residential Sorting
Wenquan Liang, Ran Song, and Christopher Timmins
Abstract Economists generally employ two ‘revealed preference’ approaches to
measure households’ preferences for non-market amenities—the hedonic and equi-
librium sorting models. The conventional hedonic model assumes free mobility
across space. Violation of this assumption can bias the estimates of household will-
ingness to pay for local amenities. Mobility constraints are more easily handled by
the sorting framework. In this chapter, we examine the role of migration costs in
household residential sorting and apply these two models to estimate the willingness
to pay for clean air in the USA and China. Our results demonstrate that ignoring
mobility costs in spatial sorting will underestimate the implicit value of non-market
amenities in both countries. Such a downward bias is larger in developing countries,
such as China, where migration costs are higher.
Keywords Migration costs · Discrete choice models · Residential sorting ·
Willingness to pay · Hedonic valuation · Equilibrium sorting models
12.1 Introduction
In the economics literature, an established way of putting a monetary value on things
that affect the quality of life but are not traded in a conventional market, and so have
no observable market price, is to infer the implicit value consumers place on things
from the choices they make. Consider, for example, housing choices and decisions
with respect to residential location. The nature of the housing market means that
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living in an area with a high level of amenities will come at a premium price. This
implies trade-offs. Homebuyers and renters alike will both need to sacrifice other
forms of consumption in order to afford them. Where we choose to live potentially
reveals a lot about our preferences and the trade-offs we are willing to make between
housing costs and various features of the local social and physical landscape. This
includes our preference for ethnic and social homogeneity (Sethi and Somanathan
2004), a potentially important driver of segregation (Chap. 2). Economists refer to
approaches that rely on these trade-offs to value local features as “revealed prefer-
ence” techniques. These techniques attempt to estimate the value people place on
particular goods or services from the actual decisions they make rather than simply
asking them—an approach that falls under the category of “stated preference” tech-
niques. The problems with stated preference techniques are that people may have an
incentive to overstate or understate how much they value various goods and services
(Loomis 2011). It is often not practical or cost-effective to obtain up-to-date large
sample survey evidence.
Over the past 40 years, hundreds (perhaps even thousands) of economics papers
and reports have used the ‘hedonic framework’ (Rosen 1974) revealed a preference
approach to value local non-marketed amenities fromeducation to crime to air quality.
The attraction of the technique is that it uses observed behaviour in housing and
labour markets to recover the economic value of non-marketed amenities. Under the
standard assumption that households choose the residential locations that maximise
their utility, marginal rates of substitution between local amenities and other goods
will equal the price ratio. As a result, the marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for
those amenities can be measured by their implicit prices, as reflected in how housing
prices and wages vary with amenity values.
In the conventional hedonic framework, households are assumed to have full
information, be fully mobile, and make location choices within a discrimination-
free environment. These three assumptions are maintained throughout the literature
with very few exceptions. Under these assumptions, equilibrium is achieved when
every household occupies its utility-maximising location and nobody wants to move,
given housing prices, housing characteristics, wages, tax rates, and amenity levels.
In this chapter, we discuss the implications of these three conventional assumptions
for non-market valuation, move beyond the assumption of free mobility, and focus
on the role of migration costs in residential location sorting and hedonic valuation.
If people canmove freely among locations when they buy homes and choose jobs,
wages and rents must adjust to reflect the implicit prices of local amenities; hence,
MWTP for amenities can be inferred from variation in housing prices and income
across space. In reality, however, migration is costly; moving to a new city entails
both out-of-pocket costs and the psychological costs of leaving behind one’s family
and cultural roots. Moreover, migration costs are substantially higher in a developing
country context, where there are frequently institutional migration costs, such as the
hukou system in China (see Chap.1 Sect. 1.1, and Sect. 12.5.1 below).
How will migration costs affect estimates of MWTP for non-market amenities?
Consider an improvement in air quality in a particular city. In response to the changing
demands of the citizenry to live there, we would expect housing prices to rise and
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wages to fall until a new equilibrium is reached. Ifmigration is costless, these changes
will fully reflect the population’s value for cleaner air. But if migration is costly, the
benefits people get from moving to the city and enjoying its improved air quality
must now compensate them for the higher rents and lower income and the cost of
moving. MWTP estimates that ignore these moving costs will be biased.
Equilibrium sorting models provide an alternative revealed preference approach
for non-market valuation that can easily incorporate mobility costs. Households’
locations were ‘sorted’ according to income, housing prices, migration costs and
their preferences for non-market amenities such as local public services, social char-
acteristics and environmental quality. The location choice decisions of households
reflect their tradeoff between income, housing costs, and moving disutility (i.e. the
inconvenience ofmoving house,which incurs a psychological cost that is added to the
financial cost of moving) as well as local amenities. Consequently, estimates derived
from these decisions can be used to evaluate willingness to pay for local ameni-
ties. Recently, Bayer et al. (2009) proposed a solution to control for (i.e., consider)
the physical and psychological moving costs associated with migration distance in
the equilibrium sorting framework. Freeman et al. (2019) enriched the description
of mobility constraints by further accounting for differential institutional migration
costs across space in the developing country context.
This chapter discusses the role ofmigration costs in non-market valuation and esti-
mates willingness-to-pay for air quality improvements in the world’s largest devel-
oped and developing countries—theUSA andChina. In theUSA context, theMWTP
estimated using the hedonic model is positive but increases substantially in magni-
tude when accounting for moving costs in the residential sorting framework. Even
though we typically think that internal migration costs are relatively small in coun-
tries such as the USA, overlooking mobility costs in spatial sorting can lead us to
understate the implicit value of clean air.
Migration costs are very high in China due to the mobility restrictions imposed
by the hukou system. The hukou acts as an internal passport, without which internal
migrants are not entitled to the same rights and benefits as local people. A conven-
tional hedonic model which assumes free mobility recovers a negative estimate of
the value of cleaner air in China. Given the adverse effects of severe air pollution on
health and productivity in developing countries such as China, these estimates are
unreasonable. Consistent with intuition, the MWTP for air quality has an expected
positive sign when we use an equilibrium sorting model and take migration costs
into account.
Our results reveal salient differences between the conclusions of the conventional
hedonic framework and those of the residential sorting framework incorporating
migration costs. In the United States, although the MWTP estimated by the hedonic
model is significantly understated, it still has a positive sign that is consistent with
prior expectations. But in China, overlooking mobility costs can yield a ‘perverse’
negative sign of the MWTP for clean air. This is because the bias problem is more
severe in developing countries such as China where migration costs are substantially
higher than that in a developed country context.
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12.2 Frictions in Spatial Sorting
In the canonicalwork onhedonic valuation, households are assumed to have complete
information, be freely mobile, and make location choices within a discrimination-
free environment. In the real world, however, householdsmight only have incomplete
information about the characteristics of locations in their choice set, be restricted by
physical and institutional mobility costs when moving to other places, and suffer
from discrimination (outright or statistical) when making location choices. These
frictions in spatial sorting can bias the estimates of the implicit value of non-market
amenities.
12.2.1 Incomplete Information
Online resources have made the housing search process easier than ever. Yet house-
holds still face uncertainty about the amenities, public services, and job opportunities
available when moving to a new location. When peoples’ beliefs are not consistent
with true values, they might choose a location that does not maximise their utility,
which in turn results in welfare losses (Leggett 2002). Researchers lack detailed
information about the extent of people’s knowledge when they move into new areas.
As a result, this aspect of the location decision is generally ignored in the economic
models described in this chapter.
12.2.2 Discrimination
In housing markets, discrimination takes the form of significant constraints on indi-
vidual choices—that is, the options that might have been chosen are unavailable for
one reason or another. These constraints may take the form of outright restrictions
on a housing purchase. There may also be indirect constraints that make it difficult
to obtain a loan or other institutional constraints that might be hard to detect. An
estate agent may even neglect to show a house to a potential purchaser based on
their perception of their ability to pay, a form of ‘statistical’ discrimination based on
prejudice or assumptions about buyers’ preferences. Applied research on residen-
tial locations seldom has information on the set of choices available to a potential
mover, making it difficult to prove that discrimination has occurred. However, exper-
imental evidence collected in audit studies conducted by the US Department of
Housing and Urban Development has shown that minority groups are systematically
provided with recommendations for houses in neighbourhoods with higher poverty
rates, lower levels of education and skills, and higher levels of pollution compared
to their white counterparts (Christensen and Timmins 2018). If discrimination is at
play, then we cannot expect all housing units to be freely chosen. A failure to account
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for this can present problems of interpretation across the various models we describe
later in this chapter.
12.2.3 Moving Costs
‘Moving costs’ will vary according to location. Within a city, they may involve the
cost of renting a truck and spending a day of hard labour to load and unload it or the
costs of hiring someone to do that back-breaking work for you. Buying or selling a
house requires mortgage applications, inspections, and a closing process with lots of
paperwork. Moving to a new city can add psychological costs such as losing social
networks and familiarity with one’s surroundings. In many developing countries,
there can be additional institutional forms of moving costs inherent in the migration
policy. For example, in India, state-level entitlement schemes discriminate against
migrants from other states and inhibit inter-state mobility (Kone et al. 2018). In
China, the hukou system limits or even prohibits internal migrants’ access to many
government-provided benefits (Tombe and Zhu 2019).
In the following sections, we will relax the conventional assumption of free
mobility, discuss the role that migration costs play in shaping spatial sorting and
incorporate their effects in non-market valuation.
12.3 How Economists Model Residential Choice
Where we choose to live potentially reveals a lot about our preferences and the
trade-offs we are willing to make between various features of the social and phys-
ical landscape. These may include things such as beautiful views, the avoidance
of pollution, and practical considerations such as employment prospects. For many
years, economic researchers have used data about residential location decisions to
calculate the value of attributes such as these for use in policy-making. For the most
part, this work has focused on the USA and Europe, where information on housing
markets and migration decisions were readily available (Kuminoff et al. 2013). More
recently, these models have been applied to low and middle-income countries, such
as China and Brazil. This is valuable from a policy perspective as these are countries
where the value of urban amenities (and disamenities) may be particularly relevant
for policy-making. Air pollution, for example, is often far worse in lower-income
countries.
‘Equilibrium sorting’ models combine data on housing market fluctuations
with information on household behaviour to estimate the parameters and factors
behind individual decision-making. Importantly, these parameters summarise how
consumers differ from each other as the range and variety of preferences play an
important part in the sorting process. For ‘large’ policies, these models can be used
to predict new outcomes in the ‘equilibrium’ or balance of determining factors. This
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may involve changes in equilibriumprices and quantities. Itmay also involve changes
in how local public services, such as education and crime prevention, operate. These
models can monitor how these local public services affect decision-making and, in
turn, predict how they will be affected by future policies on the supply of or demand
for housing. Because they can simulate new distributions of households across neigh-
bourhoods, these models can also be used to determine welfare measures for policies
that have yet to be implemented. In thisway, suchmodels contrastwith simpler empir-
ical methods that compare ‘before’ and ‘after’ with actual policies, thereby limiting
analysis to those policies already implemented.
We begin by providing a review of the methods used by economists to model
residential location decisions and discuss how those models are used to value local
amenities. We then describe a particular case in which these methods have been used
to value air quality in the USA and introduce the important role of migration costs in
that context. We typically think of internal migration costs as being relatively small
in countries such as the USA. Equally, external migration costs are also thought to
be relatively small between the European Union member states. Nevertheless, once
they are included in a model to assess location choice, we see that the values for local
characteristics gleaned from individual decisions can change dramatically.
With this as a backdrop, we then move on to consider the role of migration costs
in China. An internal system of migration restrictions known as the hukou applies
across China. Individuals are assigned a hukou based on their birth location, and
that hukou provides them access to the local housing market, labour market, and
public services such as education. Obtaining a hukou in another location, especially
in attractive destinations such as Shanghai and Beijing, can be particularly difficult.
The hukou, therefore, creates a very real barrier to migration, raising the possibility
that simple models of migration behaviour, which ignore migration ‘frictions’, could
yield biased conclusions. After a brief discussion of the details of the hukou system,
we show how estimates of the value placed on clean air in China can differ not just
in magnitude but in perceptions, depending upon whether one takes into account the
restrictions imposed by the hukou or not. We conclude with observations on other
important considerations when applying simple models of migration in China.
12.3.1 The ‘Rosen-Roback’ Framework
There is a long history in the economics of using residential location decisions to
measure the value that individuals place on local public services and amenities.
Tiebout (1956) wrote that individuals ‘vote with their feet,’ revealing their prefer-
ences for local taxes and the public goods that those taxes provide by the trade-offs
theymake in thehousingmarket.Households ‘sort’ across locations according to their
wealth, their particular housing preferences, local public services, social character-
istics, employment opportunities, and the implications for commuting. Equilibrium
models of ‘sorting’ based on Tiebout begin with a simple premise: the amount and
character of housing and public goods vary across an urban area. Each household
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selects its preferred bundle of public and private services given its income the relative
prices involved.
The idea of ‘voting with one’s feet’ next appeared in the ‘hedonic framework’
(Rosen 1974).1 The simplest hedonic models consider a world in which individuals
choose from a set of houses, trading off higher prices for nicer amenities. In an
‘equilibrium’, where everyone is happy and no longer has an incentive to move, the
resulting relationship between house prices and amenities in the market reveals the
households’ preferences for amenities relative to price. For example, when consid-
ering two otherwise identical houses apart from location, if one is in a marginally
better location for schools, then the difference in their equilibrium prices will reveal a
willingness to pay for school quality. Many economic papers and reports2 have used
this method to value local public services, from education to crime to air quality.
A more complicated model that may be more relevant for studying choices over
large geographic spaces (e.g., acrossmetropolitan areas rather than across neighbour-
hoods in a city) considers households’ choices over residential location, recognising
that this can affect both where one lives and one’s employment opportunities. This
modelwas suggested inwork byRosen (1979) and then formalised byRoback (1982).
The ‘Rosen-Roback’ framework begins with a utility maximisation problem.
Readers unfamiliar with the equations and formulae used in models of this kind
may wish to skip to Sect. 4.3.3 at this point. Those familiar with modelling may
find the following detailed description useful for understanding how the modelling
works.
12.3.2 Technical Discussion
Households, indexed by i = 1, 2,…, N, choose among cities indexed by j = 1, 2,…,
J that have attributes denoted by a vector Xj—this might include air quality, public
safety, school quality, and climate variables. In order to choose a city, households
may consider labour market opportunities to determine the level of income (I i,j) that
they can earn. Because incomevaries according to varying factors and characteristics,
we can write it as a function of Xj, I i,j(Xj).
Households can take that income and spend it on housing services, Hi, and
other consumption, Ci. These are broad catch-all categories differentiated primarily
because the price of a unit of housing services, Pj, can differ by location, whereas the
price of a unit of general consumption is the same everywhere and is normalised to
one for convenience. For this discussion, a unit of housing services could be thought
1 The implied relationship between property values, housing characteristics, and local public goods
can be described by a hedonic price function. While the hedonic price function had appeared in
several earlier papers, Rosen (1974) developed the microeconomic foundations of the method,
arguing that the hedonic price function can be interpreted as describing an equilibrium relationship
as a continuous array of differentiated varieties of a product at a single point in time.
2 At the time of writing, a search on Google Scholar for the term ‘property value hedonics’ yielded
22,800 hits. For summaries of the hedonic literature, see Champ et al. (2003) and Palmquist (2005).
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of as a square foot of living space.3 Because the price of a unit of housing services
can differ by location, we can also write it as a function of Xj, Pj(Xj).
The last modelling component that we require is a mathematical representation of
household preferences for location attributes (Xj), housing (Hi) and other consump-
tion (Ci). Economists refer to that as a utility function, and it is denoted here byU(Ci,
Hi, Xj). One can spend many hours studying the properties of utility functions in a
microeconomics class, but the key feature is that utility, or happiness, increases with
the consumption of things such as better schools (e.g. Ci, Hi, and elements of Xj.)
and decreases with the prevalence of detrimental factors such as air pollution (e.g.
elements of Xj).
Following the standard practice,wemodel the household’s behaviour by assuming
that it chooses location j and Ci and Hi levels with a mathematical optimisation.
Equation (12.1) expresses this as a maximisation problem: each consumer i chooses
a location j that maximises overall satisfaction represented by the utility functionUi,j
which, as noted above, is assumed to be determined other consumption, housing, and
location attributes: Ui,j = Ui,j (Ci, Hi, Xj). However, in choosing the location that
maximises overall satisfaction, households are constrained by their income I i,j. So
the consumer maximises Ui,j subject to their income which is assumed to be spent
either on housing H or other consumption C,
max
Ci ,Hi ,X j
Ui, j
(













s.t subject to a constraint
Ci individual i’s consumption of the numeraire composite commodity4
Hi individual i’s consumption of housing services
Xj amenity vector in location j
Pj price of housing services in location j
I i,j income that individual i would earn in location j
This optimisation problem can be re-written in the form of a constrained objective
function known as a Lagrangian.5 This combines the utility objective with the budget
3 In practice, a more complicated index of housing services is typically used where, for example,
10 square feet of low-quality housing stock might provide similar housing services as 5 square feet
of high-quality housing stock.
4 A numeraire composite good is an abstraction that represents all but one of the goods in the
relevant budget, which acts as a benchmark in comparing the value of other products or services.
5 The Lagrangian function is a mathematical expression that combines the function being optimised
with functions describing the constraint or constraints into a single equation. Solving the Lagrangian
function allowsyou tooptimize the variable you choose, subject to the constraints you cannot change.
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constraint in a single expression, where δi represents the ‘shadow value’ of the budget
constraint:
max
Ci ,Hi ,X j
L = Ui, j
(













Taking the partial derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to X j ,Ci and Hi , and
setting them equal to zero optimises the objective function. Thus, the constrained






















) = 0 (12.5)
Economists regularly talk about ‘marginal willingness to pay’ for a local attribute
Xj as the amount of other consumption (Ci) that a household would be willing to
give up in exchange for a small increase in Xj, holding the household’s utility fixed.
This is a concept based in trade-offs.
It is useful because it avoids direct comparisons of levels of happiness measured
in ‘utils’ (i.e., units of utility, which can differ in ways that we cannot observe),
opting instead to measure welfare in terms of other units of consumption. This idea
depends on how much ‘other consumption’ the individual is willing to give up in
order to obtain greater access to amenities such as clean air. The concept is a staple
of work in public economics, underlies countless regulatory studies, and determines
how government funds are allocated.
To consider how first-order conditions might be used to measure willingness to
pay for Xj, we calculate the change in consumption (Ci) given a change in Xj while
holding utility at a fixed point. Mathematically, this is found by taking the total
derivative of the utility function with respect to Xj and Ci while holding utility fixed
at U and then rearranging the expression:
U = Ui, j
(
Ci , Hi , X j
)
(12.6)
dU = 0 = ∂Ui, j
∂Ci
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Equation (12.6) represents the fixed utility jointly determined by consumption,
housing services and amenity X j . Taking the derivative of Eq. (12.6) with respect
to consumption Ci and amenity X j yields Eq. (12.7), which represents the tradeoff
between consumption and amenity. Rearranging Eq. (12.7) yields Eq. (12.8). dCidX j
represents the amount of consumption that household i would sacrifice for a one-
unit improvement in amenity X j while holding utility fixed at U , which we define
as the marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for Xj. Equation (12.8) indicates the
MWTP for X j is the opposite of the ratio between the marginal utility of the amenity
and the marginal utility of consumption Ci .
Using the first-order conditions from the constrained optimisation problem, we










− ∂ Ii, j
∂X j
(12.9)
Noting that Hi may not be readily observable, we can modify this expression to
make it easier to work with. In particular, multiply each term by 1Ii, j and multiply














It describes the marginal willingness to pay for X j as a share of income. By
rearranging terms, this can be re-written as a function of the income share of housing

















and ∂ln I i, j
∂X j




. Equation (12.11) indicates that the
fraction of the marginal willingness to pay for X j in household income is equal to
the income share of housing expenditure multiplied by the derivative of log housing
price with respect to X j minus the derivative of log income with respect to X j .
In particular, the Rosen-Roback framework suggests recovering ∂lnPj
∂X j




lnPj = X ′jβ + ε j (12.12)
ln Ii, j = X ′jθ + Z
′
iγ + u j (12.13)
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where X j is a vector of local amenities and Zi is a vector of individual attributes
there might be an effect on earnings based on characteristics such as education, age,
and gender.
12.3.3 Reflecting on the Assumptions Implicit in Modelling
Sorting Behaviour
Suppose we pull back from the mathematical derivations in the previous section.
We can see that a measure of the value placed on some local attribute—such as air
quality—can be found from the sum of two different partial derivatives—such as
the way that housing service costs and incomes vary across cities with that local
attribute. While the value assigned to that attribute will vary, other local attributes
are kept fixed. In other words, desirable attributes will be found where houses cost
more and people are paid less to do the same job, all other factors being equal. The
model reflects two different margins over which individuals may make trade-offs,
but is based on a number of simplifying assumptions.
Economists are sometimes maligned for the assumptions they make when
describing human behaviour.6 This is certainly the case in their treatment of resi-
dential location decisions. An underlying assumption behind the canonical hedonic
model is that everyone knows everything about every housing unit available in every
city in the nation. Households are also assumed to have accurate and complete infor-
mation about things such as air quality or average daily rainfall. Until recently, this
was an especially dubious assumption in a place such asChina, where official govern-
ment reports did not describe the full extent of air pollution. On the modelling side,
everyone is assumed to have the same preferences and to face no costs when deciding
to pack up and move. Until very recently (Bayer et al. 2016), all households in such
models were treated as though they rented property, whether this was the case or not.
As a consequence, capital gains were not taken into account in models that charted
housing decisions. Finally, households are assumed to face no discrimination that
might directly limit the options available to them, and everyone is assumed to face
the same set of prices in the housing market. Recent research has found this to also
be an over-simplification (Christensen and Timmins 2018; Christensen et al. 2020).
In the remainder of this chapter, we will maintain these assumptions for the
purposes of simplicity, but wewill modify one in particular. The traditional economic
modelling of decisions around residential location assumes free mobility. This
assumption is tenuous, especially in the context of developing countries, and it will
bias conclusions in the traditional hedonic model where moving costs are correlated
6 The old story goes that a physicist, a chemist, and an economist are stranded on a desert island
with no implements and a can of food. The physicist and the chemist each devise an ingenious
mechanism for opening the can. The economist merely says, ‘assume we have a can opener…’
(Boulding 1970). ‘Assuming the can opener’ has become shorthand for economists’ tendency to
assume away important parts of the discussion.
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with the availability of preferred amenities. The greater the cost of moving in relation
to the marginal benefits of an improvement in the amenity, the greater the bias will
be.
12.3.4 Reconsidering Moving Costs
In the context of our economicmodel, individualsmay have idiosyncratic preferences
for locations. These might arise from a preference for one’s hometown, or simply
a financial or psychological cost associated with moving away from one’s current
residence,wherever thatmay be. Eitherway, this creates an important formofmoving
cost that makes the individual’s starting point relevant to the analysis.
Consider a simple example of what this implies for the Rosen-Roback framework.
All households simultaneously choose their location along with consumption of a
composite commodity C and housing service H. Each location j is characterised by
a quantity Xj of a location-specific amenity. In addition, there is a moving cost Mj
associated with settling in city j. We treat Mj as a long-run migration cost (i.e. the
cost incurred by adults choosing where to live relative to their birthplace). As such,
these costs are primarily psychological and do not appear in the budget constraint. In
order to simplify things enough to put them in that framework, suppose that everyone
starts from the same original location so that Mj (i.e. migration cost to location j)
can be treated as a location attribute just such as the elements ofX j .
max
Ci ,Hi ,X j
Ui, j
(






Hi = Ii, j (12.14)
After incorporating migration costs into utility function, and the MWTP for
amenity is expressed as Eq. (12.15):
MWT PX = Hi ∂Pj
∂X j












If mobility had no utility cost (i.e. ∂Ui, j
∂Mj
= 0) or migration costs did not vary
systematically with the amenity being valued (i.e., dMjdX j = 0), this would not be a
concern. Suppose, however, that ∂Ui, j
∂X j
< 0 and dMjdX j > 0 (i.e. people do not like
to move, and preferable locations are further away from where everyone is starting
out). The traditional Rosen-Roback hedonic model would subsequently understate
MWTPX by an amount equal to the final term in the expression above. Important
for policy purposes, an understatement of MWTPX in relative terms would prove
dramatic for local attributes where the true willingness to pay is small relative to the
size ofmobility costs. For example, householdsmay be very likely tomove from their
starting point to a different city in order to access better schools for their children,
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but may be unlikely to make a similar move in order to get cleaner air. The bias from
ignoring moving constraints will therefore be greater for the latter.
12.4 The Sorting Model Framework with an Application
to the Value of Particulate Matter Reductions
in the USA
Migration costs in the USA are surprisingly high, although relatively low in compar-
ison with China. Table 12.1, taken from Bayer et al. (2009), reports the probability
that the head of a household under the age of 35 is living in each of the nine US
census divisions in the 2000 Census, given that they were born in each of those
nine divisions. Notice that the diagonal elements of the matrix, which represent the
frequency of ‘stayers’, comes close to 80% in the case of the South Atlantic division
and only fall to 58% in the West North Central division.
What do these migration costs imply for non-market valuation using the Rosen-
Robackmodel?We usedUSCensus data from 1990 and 2000 that described the loca-
tion decisions of households (household heads aged 25–35) to measure the marginal
willingness to pay for reductions in air pollution.7 Specifically, we used a measure of
particulates denoted as PM10—particles measured 10 microns or less in size. These
small particles, fine solids, and aerosols—typically1/7th the diameter of a human
hair or smaller—can come from fossil fuel combustion, unpaved roads, construction
and demolition, agriculture, mining, and a variety of chemical processes. Particulate
matter is known to be one of the most dangerous forms of air pollution, leading to
lung cancer, heart attacks and strokes, asthma (particularly in the young and elderly),
and even various heritable diseases. A growing body of literature demonstrates the
effects of particulate matter pollution on life expectancy (Pope et al. 2009), espe-
cially on infant mortality (Arceo et al. 2016; Chay and Greenstone 2003; Knittel
et al. 2016), cognitive ability and school performance (Lavy et al. 2014; Suglia et al.
2008), crime (Herrnstadt et al. 2018; Heyes and Saberian 2015), and labour market
outcomes (Chang et al. 2019).
Whymightmigration costsmatter for the valuation of particulatematter? Suppose
people were more likely to be born in places with currently high levels of pollution
(i.e., Northeast, Rust-Belt) and are then reluctant to leave. The wage-hedonic model
would interpret their immobility as evidence that air pollution is not very disagree-
able. Overcoming this complication requires that we extend the modelling strategy
back to the location decision itself, recovering estimates of the disutility of migra-
tion as part of the process of estimating MWTP. However, we cannot easily extend
the Rosen-Roback model to include migration costs when people have idiosyncratic
starting points so that the migration cost associated with a particular destination will
7 Specifically, we use 1% and 5% micro data samples from the 1990 and 2000 US Censuses (www.
ipums.org). Data are collected for 242 MSA’s, representing 86% of the metro US population.










































































































































































































































































































































































12 The Role of Migration Costs in Residential Sorting 265
differ by individual. The sorting model framework, however, allows us to address
this problem directly.
Rather than working from a pair of derivatives that describe the equilibrium of
the sorting process, we base sorting models explicitly on the individual’s utility
maximisation problem. Committing to a particular functional form for utility8:
max





j E X P
{
Mi, j + ξ j + ηi, j
}
s.t.Ci + Pj Hi = Ii, j (12.16)
where
Mi,j long-run (dis)utility of migration associated with moving from individual i’s
birth location to destination j (defined below)
ξ j unobserved attribute of location j.
ηi, j idiosyncratic utility enjoyed by individual i in location j.
Considering the choice of optimal housing services conditional upon having
chosen location j:
max{Hi }
lnUi, j = βC ln(Ii, j − Pj Hi ) + βH lnHi + Mi, j + βX lnX j + ξ j + ηi, j
(12.17)
First-order conditions with respect to Hi yield the optimal demand for housing
services as a function of where individual i chooses to live.
− βC Pj










Inserting this expression for optimal housing services back into the utility function,
we arrive at indirect utility—that is utility with the choice of housing optimised out:
lnVi, j = βI Ii, j + Mi, j + θ j + ηi, j (12.20)
where,
θ j = B0 − βH lnPj + βX lnX j + ξ j
8 The functional form refers to the specific mathematical formulation used to describe utility. The
Cobb–Douglas utility function, used here, is common in the literature. It says that utility is the
product of consumption, housing services, and other amenities each raised to a power that is
estimated with data.
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B0 = lnβ0 + βClnβC + βHlnβH − (βC + βH )ln(βC + βH )
βI = βC + βH
Here, θ j represents city-specific mean utility that is common to the households in
city j and captures all the utility-relevant characteristics of the city, and ξ j captures
the unobservable component of θ j . B0 is a constant that does not vary with location
choice. The household’s problem now comes down to choosing the location j that
maximises lnVi, j , taking as a given that it will choose the optimal H∗i once it gets
there.
Mi, j is written as a function ofmigration distance, with increasing costs associated
with leaving one’s birth state, census division, or census region,9
Mi, j = ϕ1D1,i, j + ϕ2D2,i, j + ϕ3D3,i, j (12.21)
where,
D1,i, j 1 if moving to location j requires that individual i leaves their birth state (=
0 otherwise).
D2,i, j 1 ifmoving to location j requires that individual i leaves their census division
of birth (= 0 otherwise).
D3,i, j 1 if moving to location j requires that individual i leaves their census region
of birth (= 0 otherwise).
This assumes that ηi, j ∼ Type I Extreme Value provides a convenient closed
form for the probability that individual i will choose each location j. An econometric
procedure is used to recover the vector of parameters that maximise the combined
probability of seeing all households choose the locations that they actually did choose.
In addition, themodel dealswith two endogeneity problems—one related to pollution
and the other related to housing prices. First, an instrumental variables strategy is used
to deal with the fact that pollution is likely to be higher in larger, more economically
active cities. People like to live in such cities, and without controlling explicitly for
all factors that make a city economically active, the model might mistakenly attribute
these desirable features to pollution. We do not go into detail here about how this is
addressed, keeping our focus on the role of migration costs. The model also deals
with the endogeneity of housing prices—in particular, prices will be higher in cities
with desirable amenities that attract peoplewho canmove there—that is high demand
drives up prices. Without accounting explicitly for all of these amenities, the model
is likely to conclude that people prefer high prices. There are strategies to deal with
9 US Census divisions are listed in Table 12.1. The US Census regions are Northeast, South, Mid-
West, and West.
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Table 12.2 Utility function
parameter estimates (USA)
Estimate t-statistic
ln (Ii, j ) 0.673 48.36
ln (PM10) −0.34 2.27
Migration Cost
– State −4.31 −32.69
– Census Division −1.27 −17.13
– Census Region −0.878 −18.61
MSA Covariates Yes
Regional dummies Yes
Table 12.3 Median marginal
willingness to pay for a
1 µg/m3 reduction in PM10
Rosen-Roback hedonic model Residential sorting model
$55.20 $148.70
problems of this kind, but for the purposes of this chapter, we will keep the focus on
the role of migration costs.
The results of the sorting model follow below. We begin with the migration cost
parameters in Table 12.2. Costs increase with the distance of a move but do so at a
diminishing rate. This is sensible if fixed costs are associated with initiating a move,
but once the decision to move is made, it is not that much more costly to move
cross-country than it is to move outside of one’s census division.
We next compare the willingness to paymeasures across the twomethods in Table
12.3. The Rosen-Roback method ignores migration costs, and the sorting model
includes them. The MWTP to avoid a one-unit (i.e., micro-gram per cubic metre)
increase in PM10 from the hedonic method is $55.20, while it rises to $148.70 when
we account for moving costs. Indeed, the naïve model mistakenly interprets the
behaviour of many of those who chose not to leave their polluted hometowns as a
reduced distaste for pollution. Including mobility costs in a residential sorting model
yields estimates of MWTP that are more than three times as large as estimates from
a conventional hedonic approach, even in a US application where we would consider
mobility costs to be relatively low.
12.5 Sorting Under High Mobility Costs: China
12.5.1 Migration Costs in China
High costs of migration in many developing countries are driven by institutional
migration restrictions. The hukou system in China is a good example of such an
institutional restriction. Chan (2009) provides a detailed discussion of China’s hukou
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policy, and we summarise its key features here. In 1958, China’s highest legislative
body, the National People’s Congress, formally instituted a comprehensive and far-
reaching system called the hukou to control internal migration.10 The institution
required that each person be classified as rural or urban and assigned a locality of
hukou registration; this would typically be the person’s birth location. Hukou regis-
tration then determines the ability to pursue many activities and eligibility for state-
provided goods and services in a specific place. Because of this, all internal migration
becomes subject to approvals from local authorities at the destination. Migrants who
do not hold a local hukou have limited or no access to many government-provided
benefits, including public education for children and medical care. The red hukou
book consequently plays a critical role as an internal passport that gives Chinese
people rights to reside and work in a particular location.
Since China’s economic reforms in the 1980s, the mobility restrictions imposed
by the hukou system have been somewhat relaxed. People are now allowed tomove to
places that are different from their registration localities, but migrants without a local
hukou are still not entitled to the same rights and benefits as locals. According to the
2019 Urbanisation Plan, China will further relax the hukou restrictions on residence
in small and medium-sized cities in order to increase labour mobility and encourage
urbanisation. In the large cities, which are still themainmagnets formigrant workers,
the hukou policy will continue to impose restrictions.
In China , hukou regulation is determined by the local government with the goal
of controlling the growth of urban populations. Therefore, the hukou restriction is
more stringent in large and first-tier cities that face an influx of migrants. However,
these cities also offer desirable migrant-specific amenities—such as strong migrant
networks, relatively equal economic opportunities and a Mandarin-speaking (rather
than local dialect) environment.11 Figures 12.1 and 12.2 illustrate that the share of
immigrants and the share of workers using Mandarin as their working language are
both higher for higher-tier cities. The overall migration cost associated with a given
location will therefore combine the utility loss owing to the hukou restriction and
utility gain from migrant-specific amenities.
The difficulty of acquiring a local hukou varies across cities and is correlated with
the population size and city tier. Figure 12.3 illustrates this tendency, revealing a
strong positive association between city population and the hukou index. The hukou
index measures the stringency for internal migrants to obtain a local hukou across
Chinese cities. There are five channels through which internal migrants could apply
for local hukou: investment, employment, family reunion, a special contribution to
local society and other channels specified by local government. Only a very small
number of migrants can obtain a local hukou through the channel of their special
contribution to local society and other channels specified by the local government.
10 See Chap. 1 Sect. 1.1 and https://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/10/content_5004332.
htm for more background information, and Chaps. 4 to 9 for the various impacts of hukou.
11 Mandarin is the only official language in China, but local dialects are widely used as oral language
and even working language in many small and medium Chinese cities. It is hard for migrants to
assimilate in local society and compete with local workers in the labour market in a dialect-speaking
environment.









Fig. 12.1 Average share of migrants for cities of different tiers. Notes We assign Tianjin and






Odinary City Provincial Capital Subprovincial City Beijing and
Shanghai
Fig. 12.2 Average share of workers usingMandarin as working languages.NotesWe assign Tianjin
and Chongqing to the group of subprovincial city.Data SourceChina Labour Dynamic Survey 2014
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Fig. 12.3 City population and hukou index. Data Source Hukou index data are drawn from Wu
and Zhang (2010), city population data are drawn from China city statistical yearbook
The hukou policy associated with family reunion is implemented by the central
government and has no variation across Chinese cities. The spatial stratification of
hukou regulation is mainly driven by variations in local hukou policy associated with
investment and employment. Thehukou regulationbasedon employment includes the
regularity of employment (e.g. years working in a given city, requirements on lowest
education attainment) and levels of education and training (e.g. advanced degree,
professional qualification, prestigious university graduates). The policy based on
investment consists of home purchase and other investments such as founding a
company in a given city. Wu and Zhang (2010) construct a hukou index for 45
Chinese cities to measure the difficulty of local hukou qualification based on the
four channels for migrants to get a local hukou investment, home purchase, regular
employment and talent programme. Zhang et al. (2019) collect data from recent local
government documents and employ a similar approach to Wu and Zhang (2010) to
further construct hukou index for 120 Chinese cities.
Figure 12.4 shows that the hukou index is highest for Beijing and Shanghai,
followed by sub-provincial cities, and then by provincial capitals in descending
order. Therefore, in China today, it is very easy for immigrants to apply for a local
hukou in small and medium-sized cities, but it is still very hard in large and first-tier
cities.
Another prominent feature of the hukou system is that it is strongly biased towards
higher education and skills (Liang and Lu 2017). Table 12.4 presents the points
associated with education attainments and professional qualifications required in the
application for local hukou in four first-tier Chinese cites. It indicates that migrant
workerswith a higher degrees or advanced professional qualifications canmuchmore





Provincial Capital Subprovincial City Beijing and Shanghai
Fig. 12.4 Average hukou index for cities of different hierarchies. Notes We assign Tianjin and
Chongqing to the group of subprovincial city. Data Source Wu and Zhang (2010)
easily get the local hukou compared to thosewith less education or fewer professional
skills.
What are the impacts of the hukou system on migration in China? In Table 12.5,
we calculate the simple share of household heads between the age of 25 and 35 that
stay in their hukou provinces. This corresponds to the figures in the diagonal elements
of the matrix in Table 12.1. The mean value is about 90%—much larger than that in
the USA and implies that moving costs will play a larger role in China. In order to
determine just what the impacts of those migration costs are, we apply the Chinese
data in Freeman et al. (2019) to a model similar to that used above to describe US
migration. The raw data on household location sorting in Freeman et al. (2019) are
from the One-Percent Population Census of China collected by the National Bureau
of Statistics of China.
12.5.2 A Model of Residential Location Choice in China
and Implications for WTP Measurements
Following the analysis in Freeman et al. (2019), we first classify Chinese cities into
four categories: Beijing and Shanghai, sub-provincial cities along with Tianjin and
Chongqing, provincial capitals, and ordinary cities. It is hardest formigrants to obtain
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Table 12.4 The comparison of points-based hukou policy across Chinese metropolitans
City Total points required to
obtain local hukou
Education Skills
Beijing Depends on the
population policy
Doctoral degree: 37 points
Master degree: 26 points
Bachelor degree: 15 points
Some college: 10.5 points
Shanghai 72 Doctoral degree: 27 points
Master degrees: 24 points
Bachelor degree: 21 points
College English Test
Band 6 or 8: 8 points
College English Test
Band 4: 7 points
Guangzhou 60 College degree & above:
60 points
Some college: 40 points




























Data source The official government website of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen
a local hukou in Beijing and Shanghai, followed by sub-provincial cities, provincial
capitals and ordinary cities. The pattern is entirely different for migrant-specific
amenities—large cities like Beijing and Shanghai offer much better conditions and
facilities for migrants than small cities. These include economic opportunities that
are more similar to those offered to locals, improved social ties, and a Mandarin-
speaking environment. We use the following equation to model the overall migrant





μk,s Dk,i j +
6∑
k=4
μk,s D1,i j Dk,i j (12.22)
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Table 12.5 The share of
household heads age 25–35
staying within their hukou
province































Data Source 2005 One-Percent Population Census of China
Notes We only use the household sample whose age lie in Knittel
et al. (2016), Palmquist (2005)
D1,i j 1 if location j is outside of worker i ’s hukou city (= 0 otherwise).
D2,i j 1 if location j is outside of worker i’s hukou province (= 0 otherwise).
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D3,i j 1 if location j is outside of worker i’s hukoumacro-regions12 (= 0 otherwise).
D4,i j 1 if location j is Beijing/Shanghai (= 0 otherwise).
D5,i j 1 if location j is a sub-provincial city/Tianjin/Chongqing (= 0 otherwise).
D6,i j 1 if location j is a provincial capital (= 0 otherwise).
The first three ‘dummies’—binary variables used tomeasure categorical factors—
measure the disutility with respect to the physical and psychological costs of leaving
one’s hukou city.13 The interactions between the ‘outside of hukou city’ dummy and
the three city group dummies capture the overall net utility effects of the difficulty of
obtaining local hukou and migrant-specific amenities, which are measured relative
to migration costs in ordinary cities.14
We first report utility function parameter estimates in Table 12.6. In the first
column, we do not account for moving costs, and the estimated coefficient on income
in the utility function is negative. High moving costs in China prevent workers from
moving to places where they could earn higher wages, so when moving costs are
ignored, the model incorrectly interprets their behaviour as expressing a preference
for lower wages. Accounting for moving costs is clearly necessary to avoid this. In
the second column, we add three dummy variables associated with leaving one’s
hukou city, hukou province, and hukou macro-region, respectively, to capture the
physical and psychological moving costs, along with the costs of losing the bene-
fits that come with having a local hukou. The three dummies are all significantly
negative, suggesting that these costs are important. Similar to results from the USA,
the mobility costs increase as households leave their hukou city, province, and then
macro-region, but do so at a decreasing rate. Having accounted for moving costs, the
coefficient on income in the second column is now positive, as expected.
The simple specification in column (2) cannot capture the variations in moving
costs across the destination cities. We therefore add three interaction15 terms to
capture differences in moving costs across Chinese cities of different tiers. These
12 There are seven macro-regions in China: East China, North China, Central China, South China,
Southwest China, Northwest China and Northeast China.
13 InChina,most people’s hukou city is the same as their birth city. TheChinaLabor-forceDynamics
Survey in 2014 provides information on both the hukou and birth locations for 14,226 families and
23,594 individuals in 29 provinces of China. Using this data, we find that only 7.08% of people’s
hukou cities are different from their birth cities. It is natural to guess that this number would be even
smaller in 2005. Additionally, it usually takes a long time for migrants to obtain a local hukou. Some
local governments’ official documents require that migrants must work in the city for more than
three years before applying for local hukou. Generally, if a migrant has moved from his hometown
and obtained a hukou in a second city, he will have had to have worked in that city for a long period.
Overall, there are significant barriers for households leaving their hukou city.
14 We assume that migration disutility varies across the four city groups. Ordinary cities are consid-
ered as the benchmark group in the empirical specification, therefore we do not add the interaction
between ‘outside of hukou city’ dummy and ‘ordinary city’ dummy.
15 An interaction occurs when an independent variable has a different effect on the outcome
depending on the values of another independent variable. In the present context, the utility effect
of moving to different city depends on the tier of destination cities.
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Table 12.6 Utility function parameter estimates (China)
(1) (2) (3)
ln (Ii, j ) −0.184c 1.606c 1.621c
(0.028) (0.064) (0.065)
ln (PM2.5) −0.836c −1.568c −0.983a
(0.246) (0.452) (0.507)
Out of hukou city dummy (D1,i j ) -6.448c −6.846c
(0.030) (0.035)
Out of hukou province dummy (D2,i j ) −1.984c −2.102c
(0.042) (0.042)
Out of hukou macro-region dummy (D3,i j ) −1.978c −1.991c
(0.037) (0.037)












City Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Notes City characteristics include School, Hospital, GDP. capita, Population, Distance. Seaport,
Water. Emission, SO2.emission, and Dust. emission. Pollutant emissions include, ln (Water.




differences are determined by the hukou policies and migrant-specific amenities at
the destination cities. The coefficients on the three interaction terms are all positive,
so the moving cost is reduced for migrants moving to higher-tier cities. Ignoring
these three terms could overestimate moving costs in the larger Chinese cities.16
The coefficient on the natural log of PM2.5 is significant and negative, but nearly
doubles in magnitude when we add in simple controls for migration costs. When we
add interaction terms to capture the range in moving costs across a different tier of
cities, the effects of particulate matter pollution remains negative and significant—
larger than when no controls for moving costs are included, but not as large as when
city-level variations are ignored.
Table 12.7 summarises these results and compares them with the results of a
Rosen-Roback hedonic model specification, which ignores migration costs. The
willingness to pay for a small reduction in particulate pollution estimated with the
16 These results are in accordance with the geographic distribution of internal migrants in China—
the 2005 One-Percent Population Census of China shows that about 31.8% of internal migrants live
in the 10 largest cities.
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Table 12.7 Estimated




Sorting model without incorporating migration
disutility
−162.696
Sorting model incorporating migration distance
dummies
34.943
Sorting model with full specification of
migration costs
21.697
Rosen-Roback model has a negative value—suggesting that people actually enjoy
more pollution. A similar result, seen in the second row, is obtained using our sorting
model but ignoring moving costs. This arises from the counter-intuitive result on
income.17 Given the adverse effects of severe air pollution on health and produc-
tivity in developing countries such as China, these estimates are unreasonable (Chen
et al. 2013; Ebenstein et al. 2017). The remaining rows of Table 12.7 report the
MWTP estimated from the residential sorting model incorporating moving costs.
Estimates have the expected positive sign. MWTP is larger in the model that ignores
city-level variations in moving costs, but it remains significant and positive in both
specifications.
12.6 Limitations and Future Directions
Before concluding, we discuss two key limitations of the work presented in this
chapter and suggest ways forward for future research.
12.6.1 Dual-Location Choice
In the previous sections, we discussed the hukou system in China and its poten-
tial effects on estimated MWTP for amenities. In this section, we focus on another
dimension of residential sorting that can interact with the hukou system. In partic-
ular, households are made up of many members and their decisions can affect those
members differently. A prominent example of the dual-location choice in China is
the case of left-behind children. Figure 12.5 describes the correlation between the
hukou index and the share of migrants who have left their children behind in their
original location. The index measures the degree of difficulty for migrants to obtain
the local hukou in a given city. The positive correlation between them shows that
17 Willingness to pay, measured from the sorting model, is the ratio of the coefficients on particulate
matter and income. In this specification, the coefficient on income has a counterintuitive negative
sign. This translates into the counterintuitive result on the overall willingness to pay.
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Fig. 12.5 Hukou and left-behind children.NoteTheX-axis denotes the city hukou index. TheY-axis
denotes the share of migrants having left-behind children. Data Source China Migrants Dynamic
Survey (CMDS) in 2011
migrants who leave their children behind tend to be those who move to cities with
more restrictive hukou regulation.Using data from the 2011ChinaMigrantsDynamic
Survey (CMDS), we compare the impact of the hukou system and air pollution on the
left-behind children in Table 12.8. The first two columns show that the hukou index
Table 12.8 Hukou index, PM 2.5 and left-behind children
Whether have left- behind children
(yes = 1, no = 0)
Hukou index PM2.5 Hukou index + PM2.5
Hukou index 0.940c 0.916c
(0.230) (0.219)
ln (PM2.5) 0.0558 0.0451
(0.0517) (0.0470)
Constant 2.121c 1.869c 1.954c
(0.199) (0.274) (0.258)
R-squared 0.102 0.091 0.103
Observations 38,433 38,433 38,433
Notes The household characteristics include household income, household expenditure, the age and




Data Source China Labor Migrant Survey (CMDS) in 2011
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Fig. 12.6 Child age and left-behind children. Note The X-axis denotes the age of children and
the Y-axis denotes the share of migrants having left-behind children. Data Source: China Migrants
Dynamic Survey (CMDS) in 2011
significantly affects the left-behind children, but that PM2.5 concentration does not
have a significant effect. In column (3), we consider the two factors together, and
the results hardly change. The key factor is the availability of public education in
the destination cities as children who do not hold a local hukou have limited or no
access to public education systems in their residential cities. Figure 12.6 shows that
the share of migrants that have left-behind children increases sharply when their
children are between the ages of 8 to 14—the age in China when children should be
enrolled in primary and middle schools.
Figure 12.7 shows a similar positive correlation between the hukou index in a
destination city and the share of migrant couples who live in different places. Again,
as illustrated in Fig. 12.8,wefind that the share ofmigrant couple separation increases
sharply when the age of their children is 8 or 14, suggesting one parent is being left
behind to care for the child.
12.6.2 Incomplete Information
China provides a unique setting inwhich to study the impacts of pollution information
on residential location sorting. Despite the hazardous level of exposure to pollution,
Chinese citizens used to have limited or no access to information about local air
quality. In 2000, the ministry of environmental protection of China started to publish
air quality data, including an Air Pollution Index (API) and PM10, but only did
so for 42 cities. Although fine particles (diameter < 2.5 µm) are more hazardous





0 .1 .2 .3 .4
Hukou Index
Fig. 12.7 Hukou and migration couple separation. Note The X-axis denotes the city hukou index.
TheY-axis denotes the share ofmigrants couples living apart.Data SourceChinaMigrants Dynamic
Survey (CMDS) in 2011
than larger particles (2.5 µm < diameter < 10 µm) with respect to mortality and
cardiovascular and respiratory problems, PM2.5 was not included in the calculation
of API. The number of cities in which API and PM10 were available increased
gradually to 120 in 2012. In 2013, in response to the public demand for the publication
of PM2.5 data, China launched a nationwide, real-time air quality monitoring and
disclosure programme. The Ministry of Environmental Protection started to disclose
real-time PM2.5 data in most large and median-sized Chinese cities in January 2013.
Information on real-time PM2.5 has been available in all Chinese cities since January
2015.Thedisclosure of pollution informationhas an important impact onhouseholds’
efforts tomitigate the effects of air pollution. As illustrated in Fig. 12.9, the number of
indoor air filtration sales increased sharply in response to the release of information in
2013. Future research could study the implications of information disclosure on the
residential sorting decisions of households. Estimates derived from these decisions
can be used to quantify the monetised value of pollution information.
12.7 Conclusion
Economists generally employ two revealed preference approaches to evaluate house-
hold preferences for non-marketed amenities—the hedonic and equilibrium sorting
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Fig. 12.8 Child age and migration couple separation Note The X-axis denotes the age of children
and the Y-axis denotes the share of migrants couples living apart. Data Source China Migrants
Dynamic Survey (CMDS) in 2011
Fig. 12.9 The number of air purifier sales for 85 major Chinese cities from 2006 to 2014. Data
SourceAir purifier sales transaction data collected by a marketing firm in China from January 2006
through December 2014 for 85 cities
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models. The conventional hedonic model assumes that households can freely move
across space. However, when there are significant migration costs, the benefits that
households receive from moving to cities with better amenities must compensate
them for lower-income and higher housing prices and these costs. As a result, the
simple variation in income and housing costs across locations no longer reflects the
economic value of differences in non-market amenities. Mobility constraints hinder
the use of conventional wage-hedonic techniques to estimate household MWTP for
local amenities such as clean air.
In this chapter, we analysed the role of migration costs in household residential
sorting and applied both the hedonic model and the equilibrium sorting model incor-
porating mobility costs to estimate household MWTP for air quality improvement
in the USA and China. Our findings highlight the potential importance of incorpo-
ratingmobility constraints into measuring the value of pollution reductions. Ignoring
mobility costs in spatial sorting will result in underestimating the economic value of
non-market amenities in both the USA and China, and such downward bias is larger
in developing countries such as China where migration costs are substantially higher.
AsChinamoves beyond a narrow focus on the pursuit of economic growth towards
the more holistic policy target of improving the quality of life of its citizens, there
will be new opportunities for revealed preference approaches to contribute to policy
decision-making. Many of the environmental concerns that economic development
has generated will have major impacts on human wellbeing and need to be factored
into economic targets and strategies. For this to happen, their economic value will
need to be quantified and decision support tools for economic policy broadened to
incorporate them. Revealed preference approaches, particularly equilibrium sorting
models, have a potentially important role to play in providing robust estimates of the
economic value of lower pollution, green space, leisure facilities, and the aesthetic
attributes of where people live and work. This chapter has hopefully demonstrated
both the feasibility of estimating equilibrium sortingmodels in a Chinese context and
the need to tailor these methods to the particular features of that context, particularly
with respect to migration costs.
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Chapter 13
Social Frontiers: Estimating the Spatial
Boundaries Between Residential Groups
and Their Impacts on Crime
Ivana Křížková, Meng Le Zhang, Dan Olner, and Gwilym Pryce
Abstract In this chapter, we highlight the importance of social frontiers—sharp
spatial divisions in the residentialmake-up of adjacent communities—as a potentially
important formof segregation. The handful of studies estimating the impacts of social
frontiers have been based in the USA and the UK, both of which are free-market
democracies with a long history of immigration, ethnic mix and segregation. There
are currently no studies of social frontiers in former socialist countries, for example,
or in countries where immigration and ethnic mix are only a recent phenomenon
or non-existent. This chapter aims to address this research gap by estimating the
impacts of social frontiers on crime rates in a post-socialist country, Czechia. We
demonstrate how a Bayesian spatial conditional autoregressive estimation can be
used to detect social frontiers in this setting, and we use a fixed effect quasi-Poisson
model to investigate the impact on crime. Our results suggest that in new immigration
destinations, social frontiers may not be associated with higher rates of crime, at least
in the short run. Moreover, our use of cultural distance measures helps to promote a
more nuanced approach to studying the impact of segregation and highlights the role
of cultural diversity in understanding the link between immigrant segregation and
crime. We reflect on how this approach could contribute to the study of segregation
and inequality in the Chinese context.
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13.1 Introduction
In countries with a long history of immigration, the issue of segregation, defined as
the degree of spatial separation between different groups,1 has been a longstanding
topic of research and debate among academics, policymakers and the general public.
Some view segregation as a symptom of social fragmentation, the inevitable outcome
of a flawed vision of multiculturalism (see summary and critique of this perspec-
tive in Finney and Simpson 2009; see also Bolt et al. 2008; Phillips 2010). For
others, it represents a positive indicator of individual freedom and residential choice
(Cheshire 2007), a natural consequence of the human tendency to make friendship
connections and find social and emotional support among those most like ourselves
(McPherson et al. 2001; Bakens and Pryce 2018). Segregation does not inevitably
preclude convivial relations between separate communities (Neal et al. 2013).
Against this backdrop of political discussion and contrasting social visions, a
vast and growing academic literature has emerged seeking to quantify the various
dimensions of segregation (see Chaps. 2, 4, and 10; Piekut et al. 2019). While huge
advances have been made in computing inference for segregation measures (Lee
et al. 2015), developing multi-group indicators (Yao et al. 2018: (4) and estimating
multi-level measures (Chap. 10; Manley et al. 2018), there are at least four important
aspects of segregation that remain under-researched. First, there has been a focus
on measuring the overall degree of spatial separation rather than understanding the
nature of the interface between different groups (Dean et al. 2018; Legewie 2018).
Second, the focus has been on major cities. As a result, we know comparatively
little about the nature of segregation in towns and small cities, which are typically
neglected in the mainstream segregation literature (Šimon et al. 2021). Third, most
publications dealing with segregation come from Western Europe, the US and other
established migrant destinations, reflecting the wider Anglo-American hegemony in
urban studies and urban geography (Kong and Qian 2017). There are, for example,
relatively few robust empirical studies in former socialist countries like Czechia that
do not have a longhistory of immigration, ethnic diversity and segregation. Therefore,
there is a need to develop a more rigorous understanding of segregation in regions
beyond the usual study areas, where there are nevertheless growing public concerns
about these issues (e.g. Dražanová 2018). Fourth, there is a great deal more empirical
research estimating the nature and dynamics of segregation than their impacts. As
a result, we know relatively little about which types of segregation are problematic,
under what circumstances and for whom.
With respect to this fourth point, a notable exception is a work by Maguire et al.
(2016: 845) which found that, while the overall level of segregation measured using
the dissimilarity index (Massey and Denton 1988; see also Chaps. 2, 4, and 10)
had no impact on mental health, the effects of neighbourhood boundaries were very
large indeed. Their results indicated that living near ‘peacelines’ in Belfast—walls
erected to keep rival Catholic and Protestant communities apart—increased ‘the
likelihood of antidepressant medication by 19% and anxiolytic medication by 39%,
1 E.g. Yao et al. (2018, 1).
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even after adjustment for gender, age, conurbation, deprivation and crime’. The study
byMaguire et al. (2016) reflects a growing awareness in recent years of how important
the spatial interface between different groups can be. It is the overall degree of spatial
separation thatmatters and the nature of transitions between residential communities.
For example,Dean et al. (2018) have argued that sharp spatial transitions between two
groups rather than gradual blending of residents across neighbourhood boundaries
may indicate an aversion to living nearmembers of the other group. This, in turn, may
be indicative of social tensions and potential conflict.2 Dean et al. (2018: 271) coin
the term ‘social frontiers’ to denote these ‘places of sharp difference in social/ethnic
characteristics between neighbouring communities’. These frontiers can have various
consequences, not only on health (Maguire et al. 2016) but also on crime and conflict
(Legewie 2018; Legewie and Schaeffer 2016; Dean et al. 2018). In some instances,
social frontiers may be places of settled difference where relatively few conflicts
occur (Legewie and Schaeffer 2016), while in other cities, they are associated with
negative effects for those living in their proximity (Legewie 2018; Dean et al. 2018).
Researchers have also explored whether there is a link between social frontiers and
xenophobia: Klinger, Müller and Schaeffer (2017) find no significant relationship in
Germany where immigration is somewhat more recent.
Perhaps surprisingly, given the vast empirical literature on segregation inWestern
democracies (Chaps. 2 and 10), research on the impact of social frontiers is relatively
recent as the dates of the above studies demonstrate. In Massey and Denton’s (1988)
much-cited review of segregation analysis, social frontiers are not included in the
‘five distinct axes ofmeasurement: evenness, exposure, concentration, centralisation,
and clustering’. Two decades later, Kramer (2017, p. 2), concluded that ‘empirical
research on neighbourhood boundary making is practically non-existent’. Even now,
evidence on the impacts of social frontiers remains limited to a handful of studies,
all focused on the US and the UK.
Dean et al. (2018) make the theoretical case for broadening the study of social
frontiers. They argue that even if social frontiers do not lead to conflict and crime
in the short run, over time, the lack of contact between groups will lead to growing
potential for misunderstanding and prejudice (Allport 1954). The absence of ‘bridge
builders’—residents willing to live on the other side of the social frontier and
provide links between otherwise isolated social networks—will limit the capacity
of those communities to defuse tensions and prevent incidents escalating into cycles
of violence and threat (Dean et al. 2018).
The aim of the current chapter is to help fill some of these gaps in the literature
by assessing the impacts of social frontiers on crime rates beyond the usual Anglo-
American locations that dominate the urban geography literature. Our case study area
is in a regional capital city inCzechia, a post-socialist country. This provides uswith a
2 Researching the impact of differences in land use on crime has a long pedigree. See e.g. Song
et al. (2017) for an overview of such studies in criminology, based on which they argue that edges
in general may be conducive to crime.
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very different socio-historical backdrop for our quantitative study of segregation, and
one that might be a more relevant comparator for future research on social frontiers
in China.
Our central research questions are: (1) whether social frontiers based on citizen-
ship3 exist in Czechia, and (2) whether there is evidence that social frontiers are
related to conflicts in a country where immigration is recent?We are also interested
in the impact of social frontiers based on more subtle differences in population,
which have not been explicitly researched in the quantitative social frontiers litera-
ture. Cultural difference is a potentially important factor in determining immigrant
integration into the host country: it has proved to be a reliable predictor of conflicts in
countries as dissimilar as the former Yugoslavia and India on the regional level (Lim
et al. 2007). In order to investigate this, we use the concept of ‘cultural distance’
between countries. We examine the relationship between social frontiers—defined
by the cultural distance of foreign citizens (immigrants) from the non-migrant popu-
lation—and neighbourhood conflicts. Our two key datasets give exact geolocations
for foreign individuals, and for crimes within our study city. These unique sources
allow us to investigate these research questions with a level of precision and spatial
resolution not usually possible in the segregation research.
Our case study city is Pardubice, located in Czechia, a Central European country
with over 40 years of socialist past. Shortly after opening its borders in 1989, Czechia
became the main immigration country in the region (Drbohlav and Valenta 2014). As
a result, the country’s ethnic mix is slowly growing and moving past the socialist aim
for homogeneity (Smith 1996). Growing ethnic diversity represents a challenge to the
country’s national identity and has the potential to carve fault lines in Czech society.
Therefore, the specific national context and the country’s unique migration system
make Czechia an interesting case study that broadens the current knowledge of the
impacts of segregation in a previously unexplored setting. Moreover, as the country
is the regional leader in the transition from emigration to immigration (Drbohlav
2012), our observations from Czechia might be indicative of future trends in the
wider Central and Eastern European (CEE) region.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section discusses
in more depth why a post-socialist country should or should not experience the
emergence of social frontiers based on ethnicity and why the latter may have effects
on residents living in their proximity. In the third section, we introduce our case study
area for which we have access to geocoded data on crime and census variables. We
describe our methodology for identifying social frontiers and estimating their impact
on conflicts. In the fourth section, we present social frontiers based on culturally
closer and culturally distant foreign citizens. We report a permutation test results
and a quasi-Poisson regression model to assess the link between social frontiers
and conflicts in a Czech regional capital city. In the last section, we discuss the
implications of our study for policy and further research.
3 Due to the short history of contemporary international migration in Czechia, recent migrants (and
the children born to a couple of foreign citizens, the number of which remains limited) might be
the only source of non-Czech citizens.
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13.2 Social Frontiers and Their Impact on a Society After
Socialism
In the past CEE socialist countries aimed to achieve an egalitarian society (Smith
1996) through political and economic homogenisation policies including property
nationalisation, large-scale housing construction and residential mixing of socio-
economic classes. Despite not fully achieving the goal of equality, socio-economic
inequalities within post-socialist societies were smaller than those in capitalist cities
(Musil 2005).Due to the very limited potential for crossing national boundaries, inter-
national migration was non-existent. Together with the Second World War events,
which led to massive population movements in Central and Eastern Europe, this
resulted in almost absolute ethnic homogeneity in some socialist countries such as
Czechia.4
The lack of experience with diversity engendered by international migration is
possibly one of the reasons why some CEE populations are among the least tolerant
towards immigration in Europe (Čermáková and Leontiyeva 2017). Given the rather
hostile approach to difference in these countries, ethnic differences in neighbouring
areas might constitute a rift in the social-spatial structures of cities. Following
from that, we could assume that themore pronounced the cultural difference between
immigrants and the majority population, the stronger the barrier between the two
would be. Moreover, social frontiers may emerge from ethnic diversity of popula-
tion and the dissimilar lifestyles of migrant and majority populations related to their
respective cultures and time–space behaviour. Similarly, research in Estonia shows
that dissimilar activities of Estonian and Russian speakers in time and space limit
encounters between the two groups, which restricts social integration of the two
language and ethnic groups (Järv et al. 2015).
However, other characteristics of the post-socialist urban context suggest limited
potential for social frontiers’ emergence. The most salient reason for this is the
current proportion of foreign citizens residing in Central European post-socialist
countries. Although their presence is becoming more evident, the limited number of
immigrants in CEE countries precludes the emergence of large spatial concentrations
of these populations compared with established migration destinations (Drbohlav
2012). An exception to this is workers’ dormitories, where immigrants may represent
a substantial part of the local population (Přidalová and Hasman 2018). However,
these concentrations are usually limited to the level of individual buildings.Moreover,
as they are often located near industrial sites, they may be spatially separated from
the remaining populated areas, thereby impeding conflicts over territory. In addition
to this, the authors are not aware of any evidence of foreign citizens living in deprived
areas in post-socialist Central Europe. As most immigration to the area is motivated
economically andoriginates in countrieswith similar cultures or historical experience
of socialism (Eröss and Karácsonyi 2014), the characteristics of immigrants seem to
prevent potential conflict with other non-migrants.
4 In contrast, post-Soviet countries like Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania experienced a growth in ethnic
heterogeneity due to WW2 and Soviet-induced population movements.
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13.2.1 Social Frontiers in a Post-Socialist Society
Despite the demographic factors that limit the scale of social frontiers based on
country of birth, current political developments in CEE countries suggest that such
boundaries may nevertheless emerge as an important issue (Rupnik 2016). The ques-
tion remains whether social frontiers are associated with problems such as neigh-
bourhood conflict and crime in the nascent phases of immigration in the CEE context.
Even if the social frontiers emerge for benign reasons, such as the need formigrants to
be located near family and friends for social, linguistic and economic support, over
time, the separation implied by social frontiers may cause prejudice and conflict
(Allport 1954; Dean et al. 2018). Moreover, several criminological theories provide
reasons to expect crime to occur at the borders between sharply dissimilar residential
areas.
First, social disorganisation theory holds that residents in transition zones, which
are characterised by high residential mobility and ethnic heterogeneity, have fewer
networks. This, in turn, weakens social control and increases crime (Sampson and
Groves 1989) and can give a cause for concern to neighbouring communities. For
instance, the presence of a transient population of studentswas identified as a factor in
weakening social cohesion in post-socialist Budapest (Fabula et al. 2017). Similarly,
lesser social cohesion in areas inhabited by a transitory foreign population might
produce a greater feeling of insecurity in the neighbouring majority-dominated areas
(as shown in Sýkora et al. 2015) and more requests for police activity at community
boundaries. This effect may be great in post-socialist countries with rather negative
attitudes towards immigrants and a strong tradition of reliance on the power of
authorities.
Second, strain theory explains that the discrepancy between expected upward
social mobility and the actual possibility of such an achievement may lead to demo-
tivation and in turn to social pathology (Pratt and Cullen 2005). If immigrants work
as hard as the remaining population and are less rewarded or do not feel welcome,
then spaces of interaction between migrants and non-migrants may become places
of conflict. A similar mechanism can also be in place for the native population if its
members are less rewarded than migrants. Although we are not aware of evidence of
conflicts stemming from the perceived competition limiting the majority or migrant
group’s social mobility known from countries with a more established history of
immigration, signs of concerns in the majority population about competition with
migrants on the labourmarket exist in CEE (Cook et al. 2011; Hlinčíková et al. 2014).
Third, criminological research highlights the role of criminogenic places: loca-
tions that offer opportunities that attract or generate criminal behaviour (Brantingham
and Brantingham 1995; Haberman and Ratcliffe 2015). For instance, Šimon and
Jíchová (2020) observe a stronger concentration of crime in particular places such as
commercial and transit locations in inner city and manufacturing and storage areas
in the outer parts of a post-socialist regional city. If these opportunities are located
close to social frontiers, it is likely that more crime will occur there.
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Nonetheless, social frontiers based on ethnic identity or country of birth need
not always be places of heightened social problems. The rational choice model
of criminal behaviour posits that an individual commits a crime if the gains from
carrying out the crimeminus the potential punishment outweigh the gains from legit-
imate economic activity (Clarke and Felson 1993; Kang 2016). Given the overall
attitude towards migration in CEE countries and the likelihood of harsh punish-
ment for potential offenders compared to the relatively attractive pay, immigrants
in the CEE region (predominantly labour migrants) are presumably less susceptible
to committing crimes. On the other hand, despite unwelcoming political and media
discourse about immigrants, the authors are not aware of high profile crimes related
to ethnicity being reported in the CEE other than hate speech which, however, tends
to be overlooked by authorities (Pejchal 2018). Following this, a general tendency
to avoid potential conflicts by immigrants in CEE can be expected. Second, Gould’s
concept of asymmetric relations states that conflict occurs when several similar-sized
groups compete for their respective rank in society (Gould 2003). This is consistent
with crime patterns in New York (Legewie and Schaeffer 2016), but the extent of
both immigration and conflicts in CEE countries prevents us from testing the same
hypothesis empirically. However, the history of contemporary immigration to post-
socialist Central Europe is supposedly too short to trigger competition over territory
with natives. Third, social problems tend to concentrate in multiply deprived areas.
Post-socialist CEE countries inherited a rather egalitarian socio-economic structure
where the differences between the majority population and immigrant groups remain
limited (Ouředníček 2016). In combination with an urban structure dissimilar from
the Western European one (Šimon and Jíchová 2020), it is unlikely that the popula-
tion of some areas would be comparatively so disadvantaged as to turn to socially
pathological behaviour.
13.3 Methodology
13.3.1 Case Study City
To empirically test the relationship between social frontiers and crime in Czechia,
a case study city of Pardubice was selected. The regional capital has a population
of around 90 thousand, including some 5% foreign citizens,5 their proportion in the
population being slightly above the national average. Two large assembly plants in
the city are the main employers of its immigrant population. While migrants are
scattered across the city, a few spatial concentrations are stemming from the tempo-
rary work agencies’ management of migrant workers (Andrijasevic and Sacchetto
5 Given the short history of contemporary internationalmigration inCzechia resulting in a significant
overlap of the two groups, the terms ‘foreign citizens’ (or ‘foreigners’) can be used as equivalent to
‘migrants.’With the exception of Roma population, the number of which is unavailable, immigrants
constitute the only significant ethnic minority in the city.
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Fig. 13.1 Foreign citizens as percentage of BSU population in 2011. Source: Pardubice:
OpenStreetMap contributors, 2017
2008). Themost pronounced concentration is the former Soviet army barracks which
now serves as cheap workers’ accommodation located in the North-East of the city
(Fig. 13.1). Previous studies in the city have reported on tensions arising from cultural
and language barriers between the majority population and some migrant workers
(Sýkora et al. 2015). This might also be partly related to the rather negative media
coverage of foreign citizens in the country and the city (Šamánek 2008; Zalabáková
2012).
13.3.2 Data
We use two geocoded anonymised datasets made available to the research team. The
first dataset includes all foreign citizens registered to reside in Pardubice in 2011.6
The database contains around 3,500 individual anonymised records, including infor-
mation about the individuals’ country of citizenship. The largest groups residing in
the city according to the database originate from Slovakia (28%), Ukraine (25%),
Vietnam (15%) and Mongolia (5%). The second dataset represents neighbourhood
conflict data which contains all (3,800) so-called minor crimes dealt with by the
municipal police of Pardubice in 2014. These included minor crimes against public
6 The spatial distribution of foreigners in 2011 is very similar to the one in 2014, the data for which
we could unfortunately not use.
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order (67%, e.g. noise at night, immoral behaviour in public), against property (19%,
e.g. damaging others’ property), against civic cohabitation (7%, e.g. verbal threat-
ening) and others (7%, e.g. alcohol and drugs abuse).7 Although the database includes
some details, it does not contain some relevant contextual information about indi-
vidual conflicts, for example whether they involved ethnic or cultural differences in
population, nor does it reveal the ethnic identity of the perpetrator or the victim.
As the datasets are unique and have not been used before, it is important to
highlight their limitations. Both sources contain geocoded entities registered with
the authorities. The database of foreign citizens includes citizens of countries other
than the Czech Republic who hold either a temporary or permanent resident permit.
The citizens of EU countries are only required to report to the Czech authorities if
their stay in the country is to exceed 30 days. Non-registered foreign citizens such as
short-termmigrants andundocumentedmigrants are not taken into account.However,
it can be assumed that the spatial distribution of foreign citizens with a temporary or
permanent resident permit does not differ significantly from those staying short-term
and undocumented ones, as all are dependent on similar infrastructure (Engbersen
et al. 2006; Medová and Drbohlav 2013). As we operationalise social frontiers based
on the difference in the proportion of foreigners in neighbouring areas, this should
not impact our analysis. The conflicts database only provides us with cases where
police officers were called to resolve or encountered aminor crime during field work.
As with most datasets based on crimes recorded by the police, offences unreported to
the authorities thus remain unknown in our data. However, we argue that it is largely
the perceived importance of the issue that makes residents report the offences in
their neighbourhood. Following from this, despite the likelihood of some under-
reporting, our data provides a valid picture of neighbourhood conflicts in Pardubice.
Despite having these flaws, the geocoded data we employ in this chapter represent
the complete sources researchers can use when looking at Czechia. The databases
are more detailed and more up-to-date than the traditional data source on foreign
population, that is the decennial census.
The variables resulting from the two databases used in the subsequent analyses are
the proportion of foreign citizens in the population and the proportion of conflicts
per square kilometre, respectively. For further analysis, the individual data were
aggregated to 94 Basic Settlement Units (BSU), and the crime data to 100 m by
100 m grid squares (the next section explains this in more detail). However, to avoid
distortion of the subsequent analyses by outliers and non-residential areas in data,
BSUs with less than ten residents were excluded from the analysis. This left us with
a final dataset of 61 BSUs.
7 The database which was made publicly available by the municipal police of Pardubice for analytic
purposes also includes traffic and parking offenses and administrative records. These were cleared
from the database prior to our analyses.
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13.3.3 Methods
Following Lee andMitchell (2013) and Dean et al. (2018), we use a Bayesian spatial
conditional autoregressive model as a basis for detecting the presence of social fron-
tiers. The aim of the procedure is to detect step changes where the proportion of
migrants in a BSU differs significantly from those in an adjacent BSU. The full
details of the method can be found in Dean et al. (2018) whose methodology we
adapted from English data to our Czech case study.
For each BSU k the total number of foreigners Yk is a function of the total number
of residents in that BSU (Nk) and the probability of a resident being a migrant (pk).
The logit transformation of pk is a linear function of an unknown parameter 0 and
a random effect uk . The random effect uk is assumed to be spatially autocorrelated
since the proportion of migrants in a zone pk is likely to be correlated with the
proportion of migrants in neighbouring zones due to spatial spillover and shared
causal factors. The full Bayesian model is as follows:
Yk ∼ Binomial(Nk, pk); k = 1, . . . , n
ln(
pk
1 − pk ) = β0 + uk
uk |u−k,W, λ, τ 2 ∼ N
( ∑
k∼lul
1 − λ + λwk+ ,
1
τ 2(1 − λ + λwk+
)
β0 ∼ N (0, b)






logi t ∼ N (0, 100)
where λ is the parameter affecting how the proportion of foreigners in BSUs
surrounding BSU k affects the proportion of foreigners in k. W is the n by n spatial
weights matrix which determines whether or not the proportion of foreigners in
neighbouring zones affects pk . In standard spatial models, the matrix W is fixed
with values of 0 and 1, where 1 indicates that two zones are contiguous and 0 other-
wise. However, social frontiers occur between geographically contiguous zones that
nonetheless have very different proportions of foreigners (i.e. pk). Following Dean
et al. (2018), we allow W to be another set of parameters to be estimated. Starting
from the standard spatial weights matrix, we allow values of 1 to be set to 0. For BSU
pairs where this has occurred, this represents a case whereby two contiguous areas
have very different proportions of foreigners (i.e. a step change). It is these areas that
we identify as social frontiers.
13 Social Frontiers: Estimating the Spatial Boundaries … 295
Three types of social frontiers were identified: (i) foreign citizens as a whole,
and for subsets of (ii) culturally closer and (iii) culturally more distant foreigners.
Cultural distance between the Czech population and the given group was measured
using theWorldValues Survey, specifically its two-dimensional ‘cultural map’where
survey data has been reduced to two axes using factor analysis (Welzel 2013). The
two axes place countries on a scale between protective versus emancipative values
on the one hand and sacred versus secular values on the other. Cultural distance
is then simply the Euclidean distance between countries on this graph. To get two
groups of culturally closer and more distant countries, all countries are ranked by
cultural distance to Czechia and split evenly, so each contains approximately the
same number of migrants.
The association between social frontiers and conflicts per square kilometre was
tested in two steps. First, this was checked at the administrative level of Basic
Settlement Units using 1,000 permutations. Second, a more thorough analysis was
performed using a fixed effect quasi-Poisson model. The expected number of crimes
μi j in a grid square i within BSU j is conditional upon a BSU fixed effect δ j ,
whether a grid square centroid was within 100 m of a BSU boundary xi j and whether
the centroid was within 100 m of a social frontier zi j . The parameter βz indicates the
difference in crime counts between grids near BSU boundaries and social frontiers.
The inclusion of BSU fixed effect controls for between-BSU differences in factors
that might affect crime (e.g. unemployment rates). The quasi-Poissonmodel includes
an additional dispersion parameter to account for the problem of over-dispersion in




) = βx xi j + βz zi j + δ j
13.4 Results
13.4.1 Overview of Social Frontiers
Despite the rather low overall proportion of foreign-born residents compared to
cities in established migrant destination countries, our analysis did identify statisti-
cally significant social frontiers based on ethnicity in Pardubice. The overall propor-
tion of foreign citizens in the population is mainly driven by the culturally closer
group, which also explains why the social frontiers based on all and culturally closer
foreigners are almost identical, being located mostly in the less populated outer
parts of the city (Fig. 13.2). On the contrary, there is only one pronounced concen-
tration of culturally more distant foreigners in the above-mentioned BSU with the
workers dormitory. Apart from that, the culturally more distant population consti-
tutes a similar proportion of population in most parts of the city. As there are fewer
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Fig. 13.2 Proportion of all (a), culturally closer (b), and culturally more distant (c) foreign citizens
in population with the location of social frontiers (red) in 2011
statistically significant and substantially interesting differences between the cultur-
ally distant and remaining populations, there are also fewer borders that qualify as
social frontiers.
13.4.2 Social Frontiers and Neighbourhood Conflicts
Having identified boundaries between areal units which could be called social fron-
tiers, we move on to look at their relationship with conflicts, which we measure
using police recorded data on crime. At the administrative level of the BSU, we
do not observe any statistically significant relationship between crime levels and
the concentration of migrants as a whole, nor for those broken down to culturally
closer and more distant groups, and neighbourhood conflict (Table 13.1). However,
this analysis uses administrative units of different shapes and sizes, which makes
it susceptible to a modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP; Openshaw 1983; see also
discussion ofMAUP in Chap. 2) and which does not allow us to consider the distance
of crimes to the frontiers. Therefore, we next perform amore thorough analysiswhich
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Table 13.1 The differences in conflicts per sq km between areas adjacent to social frontiers and
areas adjacent to borders





All foreigners 18 60.32 0.825
Closer cultural groups 16 14.87 0.538
More distant cultural groups 12 −73.49 0.162
looks at conflicts in areas adjacent to the detected frontiers regardless of the shapes
of administrative units and consider whether the conflicts occurred within 100 m of
the frontier or not.
The quasi-Poisson model with BSU as a fixed effect gives somewhat different
results (Table 13.2). A statistically significant negative relationship was found for
grids within 100 m of frontiers based on all foreigners, suggesting that there is less
conflict nearest to the frontiers. This can be explained by the higher proportion of
migrants as a whole in peripheral parts of the city where fewer conflicts are reported.
Interestingly, another statistically significant relationshipwe observe is a positive one
for more culturally distant migrants within 100 m of the frontiers. However, fewer of
these frontiers and the relationship are likely to be driven by the concentration around
the workers’ dormitories. Moreover, this relationship may be partly a consequence
of some culturally more distant social frontiers detected in the city centre where
more conflicts occur in general (Fig. 13.3). This probably derives from the spatial
distribution of criminogenic places such as pubs, bars and shops, which predominate
in the city centre of Pardubice rather than on the periphery where residential land
use prevails.
Table 13.2 Estimations of the effect of proximity to social frontiers on neighbourhood conflicts
for all, culturally closer and culturally more distant foreign citizens
All Closer More distant
Estimate −0.858c 0.005 0.316b
S.E (0.245) (0.200) (0.146)
Observations 6,644 6,644 6,644
Notes
ap < 0.1; bp < 0.05; cp < 0.01
Dependent variable: total conflicts with a grid within 100 m of the frontier
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Fig. 13.3 Location of individual conflicts and social frontiers (red) based on all foreign citizens
13.5 Discussion and Conclusion
Although our approach successfully identified a number of social frontiers in the
Czech city of Pardubice, the evidence for the relationship between these and neigh-
bourhood crime was mixed. We found no significant link between the spatial distri-
bution of foreign citizens in Pardubice and neighbourhood crime at the BSU level.
The evidence for grid squares within 100 m of a social frontier suggests that while
frontiers based on the proportion of all foreigners are associated with fewer crimes,
the opposite is the case for frontiers based on the proportion of culturally distant
foreigners. On the one hand, the statistically insignificant results suggest that social
frontiers based on the presence of immigrant population in the Czech context tend
to be associated with less conflict or a similar amount to areas not adjacent to social
frontiers. This might be due to cultural similarity between migrants and the majority
Czech population, which creates less tension between the two groups in spaces
where they interact. On the other hand, the positive relationship between culturally
distant foreigners and conflicts might be a spurious match between frontier places
and existing crime, resulting from immigrant housing and the location of conflicts
related to economic opportunity.
Certainly, the estimated impact of social frontiers is much less clear than those
observed in established migrant destination countries where similar studies were
undertaken. A significant relationship between social frontiers and different types of
crime or neighbourhood conflict has been observed in both British and US cities
(Dean et al. 2018; Legewie and Schaeffer 2016; Legewie 2018), although to a
13 Social Frontiers: Estimating the Spatial Boundaries … 299
different extent when taking into account the ‘fuzziness’ of the frontier (Legewie
and Schaeffer 2016). On the other hand, no significant link between frontiers and
xenophobia was observed in Cologne, Germany (Klinger, Müller, and Schaeffer
2017). These differences may be due to our study’s national and local context, where
the levels of immigration and crime are lower than in Western Europe and Northern
America. In Czechia, migrant communities are less established and their segrega-
tion generally only exists at the level of individual buildings. Our results suggest
that neighbourhood crime in Pardubice results from an interplay of factors that are
considered central by theories that expect an opposing effect of social frontiers on
crime, thus pointing to the limited ability of these theories to explain crime in a
specific geographic context.
A natural question to ask at this point is why we observe such different social
frontier effects in Czechia compared to the UK and the USA? At one level, our
results could be interpreted as evidence that social frontiers are not always places of
heightened social tensions. The stark contrast between our finding of no clear link
between social frontiers and crime, and the positive relationship found in established
migration countries (Dean et al. 2018; Legewie 2018), may highlight the importance
of cultural and historical background in modifying social frontier effects. This is
particularly relevant to the current volume, which seeks to apply insights gleaned
from European research on segregation to the Chinese context. History matters for
the meaning and consequences of segregation, and that includes social frontiers.
Given the very different socio-political history of modern China compared with
the traditional study areas for segregation (Chap. 4), we should be cautious about
assuming the consequences of segregation will be the same.
One specific aspect of the Czech historical context is the novelty of mass immi-
gration there. It may be, therefore, that social frontiers are unlikely to be associated
with higher rates of crime when they arise from migrants self-segregating, not out
of antipathy towards the native population, but because of practical necessity—the
need for local support networks among extended family and friendship connections.
Crucially, however, we should be careful about drawing long-run or generalised
conclusions from our results. Our research on Czechia is based on a snapshot in time.
Just because social frontiers appear to have no real impact on crime in the present,
it may not remain so. Social frontiers greatly reduce the potential contact between
migrant and incumbent communities comparedwithmoremixed residential patterns.
The implication of Allport’s (1954) contact hypothesis and Dean et al.’s (2018)
‘absence of bridge-builders’ theory is that this lack of contact could eventually lead
to greater distrust, prejudice, misunderstanding and ultimately entrenched division
if it is not ameliorated.
One implication for future research on China is the need to find ways not only
to explore whether social frontiers have different or similar impacts to the UK and
the USA, but whether or not their effects will eventually converge towards those
observed in theWest.While immigration in China remains negligible, at least relative
to the size of the population, Wei Houkai and Su Hongjian have documented in
Chap. 5 the huge growth in internal migration from rural to urban areas. This has led
to growing residential enclaves of rural migrants (Chaps. 4 and 10), particularly in
300 I. Křížková et al.
large cities. There is also evidence of ethnic segregation (see Chap. 10) and growing
socio-economic segregation following economic liberalisation (Chap. 4). So itwill be
interesting to seewhether the increasinggeographical stratificationofChinese society
is associated with negative social outcomes such as crime, anxiety or depression, as
per that observed in the UK (Dean et al. 2018; Maguire et al. 2016). As with our
Czech results, even if we observe no deleterious impacts at first, the wider European
andAmerican experience suggests that prolonged spatial separation of social groups,
in the long run, can lead to growing tensions and division.
The Czech context also points to the need for further research on the association
between the impact of social frontiers and factors related to the actual size, struc-
ture and characteristics of the immigrant population, along with those of the host
society. The foreign citizen group in Pardubice might not have yet reached the crit-
ical mass needed to engender a sense of threat in the host community, triggering
competition over territory and social conflict of the kind reported in countries with
long-established ethnic minorities (Legewie and Schaeffer 2016). The immigrant
population in our case study typically consists of first-generation labour migrants
from culturally close countries, who seem to be less associated with neighbourhood
conflict as predicted by rational choice theory. In China, however, the number of
rural migrants in many cities is very significant indeed even if external immigration
remains low.Moreover, the binary nature of the hukou registration system has helped
reinforce and entrench social divisions in employment, housing, and social mobility
(Chaps. 4, 6, 7, 8, 12 and 15). So there may be much greater potential in the Chinese
context for social frontiers to emerge and have significant negative impacts.
Finally, the relatively low level of social inequality in Czechia as compared to
countries inWestern Europe and the US (Hasman andNovotný 2015) may contribute
to amore even spatial distribution of immigrants in the long-run, whichmay facilitate
their integration into the host society by an everyday contact with the out-group, as
well as reducing differences across social frontiers, diminishing their impact. So the
social frontiers we observed in our study may only represent transient boundaries.
However, while the socialist legacy also left low levels of socio-economic inequality
in China, the rapid and prolonged pace of economic development there has led to
very significant increases in inequality, leaving it with Gini coefficients above most
European countries.8
Although our findings have identified some conditions which seem to prevent
neighbourhood problems occurring near social frontiers, they are notwithout caveats.
First, due to the small number of immigrants holding citizenship of individual coun-
tries,wewere not able to fully unpack the role of ethnic diversitywithin the immigrant
population and its relationship with crime as suggested by Kubrin et al. (2018). To
at least partially overcome this, we used cultural distance to differentiate between
two major groups. Second, our approach might be criticised for focusing on (minor)
8 The Gini-coefficient is a widely used measure of income inequality. Its values range between zero
and one, with the higher the value, the greater the inequality. The World Bank estimated China
Gini-coefficient to be 38.5 in 2016. This compares with estimates of 24.9 for Czechia, 28.8 for
Sweden, 31.6 for France, 31.9 for Germany, 34.8 for the United Kingdom, 35.9 for Italy, and 41.4
for the United States (World Bank 2020).
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neighbourhood crime while leaving aside serious crimes such as violent and major
property crime. However, major crimes are less concentrated in Czechia (Šimon
and Jíchová 2020), which suggests that the inconsistent relationship described above
would only become weaker when taking major crimes into account. Third, similarly
to previous studies in this field (see e.g. Legewie and Schaeffer 2016), our variables
are unable to distinguish between intergroup and intragroup conflict. Despite that,
they are rather reliable in assessing the ability of communities to maintain order in
their local areas.
Bearing in mind these constraints, we believe this study has several merits. First,
from a theoretical point of view, it stresses the importance of opening the debate in
urban studies to incorporate local findings from beyond the West to achieve a truly
international urban theory of social frontiers. Second, our use of cultural distance
measures helps to promote a more nuanced approach to studying the impact of
segregation and highlights the role of cultural diversity in understanding the link
between immigrant segregation and crime. The third merit of this research is empir-
ical, as it brings forward findings from a previously unexplored context, which has
important policy implications. In particular, together with Klinger et al. (2017) study,
our findings suggest that smaller social stratification (i.e. more social mix) and less
segregation in general are related to fewer neighbourhood conflicts. Promoting social
equality and social mixing in space thus seems crucial, as it is likely to bring mean-
ingful contact which is believed to contribute to social cohesion. Finally, our chapter
does not find evidence that concerns about the negative impacts of immigration, such
as increased crime, are empirically grounded in Czechia. However, this may change
with the recent rise in xenophobia in the CEE region, largely due to the media
reporting on issues with migrant populations in Western European countries and
the refugee movements across South-East Europe. One of the worthwhile avenues
of future research would be to look at whether and how the nexus between immi-
gration and crime progresses by following these developments. The present study
provides the first piece of empirical evidence from the CEE region that can counter
the predominantly negative media claims which are seldom evidence-based.
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Chapter 14
Deprivation Indices in China:
Establishing Principles for Application
and Interpretation
Gwilym Owen, Yu Chen, Gwilym Pryce, Tim Birabi, Hui Song,
and Bifeng Wang
Abstract Indices ofMultipleDeprivation (IMDs) aim tomeasure living standards at
the small area level. These indices were originally developed in the United Kingdom,
but there is a growing interest in adapting them for use in China. However, due
to data limitations, Chinese deprivation indices sometimes diverge considerably in
approaches and are not always connected with the underlying concepts within UK
analysis. In this paper, we seek to bring direction and conceptual rigour to this
nascent literature by establishing a set of core principles for IMD estimation that are
relevant and feasible in the Chinese context. These principles are based on specifying
deprivation domains from theory, selecting the most appropriate measurements for
these domains, and then applying rigorous statistical techniques to combine them into
an IMD. We apply these principles to create an IMD for Shijiazhuang, the capital
city of Hebei Province. We use this to investigate the spatial patterns of deprivation
in Shijiazhuang, focussing on clustering and centralisation of deprivation as well
as exploring different deprivation typologies. We highlight two distinct types of
deprived areas. One is clustered in industrial areas on the edge of the city, while the
second is found more centrally and contains high proportions of low-skilled service
workers.
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14.1 Introduction
Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMDs) are produced by combining a range of rele-
vant economic, social and geographic indicators from different domains. The aim is
to measure the range of factors that affect living standards at the small area level.
IMDs are useful for policy makers seeking to focus resources where they are most
needed. They are also an aid to understanding spatial inequalities in a city, region or
country (Rae 2012) and provide the basic data infrastructure needed to research the
causes, consequences and possible solutions to poverty.
There is increasing interest in creating IMDs in China in order to better understand
the extent and distribution of deprivation (Yuan et al. 2011, 2018; Yuan andWu 2014;
Weng et al. 2017). The interest follows rapidly changing socioeconomic conditions as
a result of Chinese market reforms and economic restructuring. The last few decades
have seen increasing socioeconomic inequality alongside rapid urban expansion and
rising residential mobility, particularly in the form of rural-urban migration (He et al.
2015). This has, in turn, led to new forms of deprivation, particularly in urban areas
(Wu2004;Ouyang et al. 2017).Against this backdrop of social and economic change,
a growing political awareness has emerged regarding the importance of quality, rather
than simply the quantity of economic growth in China.
The need to shift strategic priorities was acknowledged at the highest level in 2014
when President Xi Jinping announced that the Chinese economy would be entering
a new phase which he labelled ‘the new normal’ (Han et al. 2016, p. 176). This was
characterised by a ‘slowdown from high speed growth to high-middle-speed growth’
and a shift from ‘scale extensive growth’ towards a focus on ‘the quality of economic
development’ which is determined by the ‘quality of living of most people’ (ibid). To
implement and assess the success of this policy shift will require measuring not only
economic performance but also the range of factors that affect human wellbeing,
such as housing, health and education.
The spatial distribution of these attributes is also important. Galster and Sharkey’s
(2017) review of the literature on neighbourhood effects, for example, finds over-
whelming evidence that the spatial concentration of poverty itself has a significant
negative impact on life outcomes and living standards. The extent to which poverty
is geographically central or peripheral within a city may also be important as it has
implications for access to employment (Zhang and Pryce 2019) and exposure to air
pollution (Bailey et al. 2018).
Two papers by Yuan and colleagues (Yuan and Wu 2014; Yuan et al. 2018) have
led the development of deprivation indices in China, focussing on the southern city
of Guangzhou and the surrounding area. In these papers, they use two conceptually
distinct methods of creating deprivation indices. The first is an Index of Multiple
Deprivation, an approach pioneered in England (Noble et al. 2006), based on iden-
tifying domains of interest through theory and then combining the domain scores
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into a composite Index of Multiple Deprivation. The second is a general index of
deprivation, developed by researchers in Canada (Langlois and Kitchen 2001). This
is a more data-driven approach, where factor analysis is used to create the different
domains of deprivation, which are then combined, giving most of the weight to the
most important socioeconomic factor.
While these papers provide useful, practical insights into how indices of multiple
deprivations can be computed given the restrictions imposed by existing data, there
are a number of significant limitations in the way the analysis is conducted and
presented. Firstly, they use the two methods without properly engaging with their
respective theoretical backgrounds. This means that they do not adequately reflect
on the conceptual differences between them and their implications for finding the
best and most policy relevant way of measuring deprivation in China. Secondly and
relatedly, they ignore potentially beneficial statistical techniques such as shrinkage
estimation that are important for obtaining reliable estimateswhen dealingwith small
numbers in the data.
Thirdly, although they map the resulting indices, their exploration of the spatial
patterns of deprivation and the implications of these patterns for understanding depri-
vation in China is limited. For example, the degree of spatial concentration of depri-
vation, the relationship of deprivation with the city centre, and how combinations of
deprivation vary across different areas are overlooked. For all their limitations, such
indices can inform urban policy decisions and contribute to wider debates about the
urban environment.
Finally, like most of the more general quantitative literature on the socio-spatial
structure of Chinese cities (e.g. Zhao 2013; Wu et al. 2014; Yang et al. 2015), they
focus on one of the country’s largest cities (>8 million). This is not a problem as
such, and, understandably, these cities receive the main focus of attention. However,
it does overlook the spatial distribution of poverty in smaller but still very large cities,
which remains less well understood. Cities between 1 and 8 million people make
up a large proportion of the population of urban China, and it seems plausible that
different patterns of deprivation may be observed in different sizes of city.
Our overarching aim in this paper is to reconnect deprivation index calculation
in China with the founding principles upon which these measures were originally
conceived and to establish a set of guidelines for computing deprivation indices.
Specifically, we aim to:
1. Draw on the theoretical background of IMD estimation to critically reflect on
the different methods used for calculating deprivation indices in China.
2. Propose a set of key principles for measuring deprivation in a Chinese context
to achieve the most reliable estimation of multiple deprivation.
3. Illustrate these principles by computing indices of deprivation using data for
Shijiazhuang, the capital of Hebei Province and a city with an urban area of
between 2 and 4 million people.
4. Use our IMD results for Shijiazhuang to show how the spatial distribution of
deprivation can be analysed to draw meaningful interpretation from deprivation
results that can contribute to urban policy and planning.
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The remaining sections of the paperwill follow the above sequence.Wewill conclude
with a discussion of the methods used and the implications of the spatial patterns
found in the analysis for our understanding of urban China.
14.2 Theoretical Background to Deprivation Indices
The idea of a deprivation index originated in theUK in the 1980s andmany of the first
attempts to create one were based there (Townsend andDavidson 1988; Carstairs and
Morris 1989). Since then the concept has been applied to other high income countries
such as New Zealand (Salmond 1998) and Canada (Pampalon and Raymond 2000;
Langlois and Kitchen 2001) and more recently to countries with lower levels of
average income such as South Africa (Noble et al. 2010). According to Noble et al.
(2006), who developed the method for calculating the Index of Multiple Deprivation
in England, the approach for measuring deprivation should be led by theory rather
than data or statistical techniques. They stressed the need to first identify a theoretical
framework for a model of small area deprivation and then select a combination of
statistical techniques and indicators which enable that model to be implemented.
This theoretical framework for the English IMD is based around ideas of deprivation
developed by Townsend who describes deprived people as those who:
lack the types of diet, clothing, housing, household facilities and fuel and environmental,
educational, working and social conditions, activities and facilities which are customary, or
at least widely encouraged and approved, in the societies to which they belong (Townsend
1987, p. 135).
Townsend also adopts the idea of multiple deprivation as the accumulation of
different dimensions or domains of deprivation, such as housing, education and
health. While most of Townsend’s work focussed on individual or household depri-
vation these concepts are easily extended to the area context. The model that Noble
et al. (2006) developed from this theoretical framework comprised a set of unidi-
mensional domains of theoretically relevant aspects of deprivation combined, with
appropriate weighting, into a single measure of multiple deprivation. In order to
apply this model, each domain should be measured by combining the most suitable
indicators from the available data.
It is likely that the domains and indicators used in the English IMDare not possible
or appropriate when we seek to generate deprivation indices in other countries. If we
define deprivation following Townsend (1987, p. 125) ‘as a state of observable and
demonstrable disadvantage relative to the local community or the wider society or
nation to which an individual, family or group belongs,’ then clearly the state of the
local community or wider society plays a large role in what it means to be deprived.
China’s socioeconomic trajectory and current circumstances are vastly different from
those of the UK and therefore what deprivation means in a Chinese context will be
different. Nevertheless, the original principles behind the concept of deprivation, still
hold; it is a phenomenon made up of multiple constituent domains. The statistical
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techniques used to improve the reliability and validity of the index, remain relevant.
There is an imperative, therefore, to adapt these to the Chinese context.
Two papers by Yuan and colleagues (Yuan and Wu 2014; Yuan et al. 2018) have
led the development of deprivation indices in China, focussing on the southern city
of Guangzhou and surrounding area. These papers create an IMD following the basic
rationale of Noble et al. (2006) however they ignore two key technical aspects of
the method. Firstly, they do not address the issue surrounding the reliability of the
small area data. This is important because when the score for a domain is based
on indicators with small numbers of observations in each area, the estimate can be
unreliable as it is very sensitive to small changes (e.g. chance fluctuations from year
to year andmeasurement error). This issue is relevant with the Chinese census data as
formanyResidents’ Committees (RCs), the smallest area at which data is available in
the Chinese Census, there are also small absolute numbers of individuals/households
for many of the proposed indicators (see Table 14.2). In our data, this is particularly
true of the indicators we select for the household living environment domain. For
example, for RCs in Shijiazhuang, the median number of households with no toilet
is four. To avoid this problem, we can shrink the raw scores for indicators with high
levels of uncertainty at the small area level towards the mean of the larger areas in
which they are situated. In other words, estimates for small areas ‘borrow strength’
from the larger areas.
Secondly, previous Chinese papers scale each indicator between 0 and 1 but do not
transform each domain to a common distribution before combining the indicators.
This is an issue as different distributions for each domain score would mean that
being a deprived RC in one domain may carry more influence than being a deprived
RC in another domain, introducing an implicit weighting. In the English IMD each
domain is transformed into an exponential distribution, which has two advantages
(Noble et al. 2006). Firstly, an exponential distribution means that low scores in
another domain do not fully cancel out high deprivation scores in one domain. The
conceptual idea behind this is that an area that is highly deprived on one domain but
not deprived on another domain experiences more deprivation than an area that is
moderately deprived on both the domains. The second related reason is to stretch out
the deprived end of the distribution to better identify the most deprived areas.
The two papers byYuan and colleagues also use a second technique for calculating
deprivation alongside the IMD called a general index of deprivation (GDI), based
on a technique developed by researchers in Canada to study deprivation in Montreal
(Langlois andKitchen 2001). The papers byYuan and colleagues use the twomethods
alongside each other without properly discussing their theoretical differences and
the implications of these for which is the most appropriate method to use in China.
Conceptually the idea of the GDI has some similarities to the IMD and the ideas of
Townsend, at least in as far as its calculation is based around the idea of multiple
deprivation as being made up from the combination of several different forms of
deprivation. There are however, two key differences.
The first is that the method does not pre-specify domains of deprivation from
theory or policy interest. It works by entering all the selected indicators into a factor
analysis, creating a factor score for each RC based on the loadings for each factor,
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and then calculating a deprivation index from the combination of these factor scores.
The idea is that each factor will represent some aspect of deprivation and therefore,
in many ways the factors produced from the analysis are analogous to the domains
from the IMD, except that the process for determining them is data driven.
The second difference is that, because Langlois and Kitchen (2001, p. 130) argue
that the socioeconomic component of deprivation plays the major role in, and is even
a ‘necessary condition’ for, urban deprivation, they give this factor more influence on
theGDI score than all of the other factors combined. Furthermore the formula1 is such
that in the extreme, albeit implausible scenario,where aRC is themost deprived on all
of the secondary factors but scores zero on the socioeconomic component, it would
score zero overall, providing complete cancellation. This is, therefore, conceptually
quite different from the IMD,where the idea is that if a RC is deprived on any domain,
this should not be cancelled out by the area being non-deprived on other domains.
In general, we prefer the IMD framework, over the GDI for creating deprivation
indices in China. Above all, we believe specifying domains beforehand as in the
IMD, rather than deciding them through factor analysis, makes more sense from a
theoretical perspective. It also has practical advantages. The IMD domain scores are
more easily interpretable. If the domains are chosen carefully, they will represent the
aspects of deprivation that are of interest to policymakers using the data. This latter
point may also be true for the GDI. However, it is possible that if two domains, for
example income and education, are highly correlated, factor analysis may suggest
that they can be represented by one underlying factor. This is problematic because
even though the same areas have high levels of income and education deprivation,
these areas still suffer from two conceptually different aspects of deprivation. Itwould
make sense from a theoretical perspective for them to make separate contributions
to the final deprivation score as well as being of practical interest to policymakers
working in different sectors to have themmeasured separately.A further disadvantage
of identifying the domains through factor analysis is that they may change somewhat
with different data, leading to difficulties comparing across space and time.
Atfirst glance, itmayappear that the advantageof theGDI is that it does not involve
any subjective judgement, however this is only the case for the choice of domains and
not, for the weighting system used to combine the indicators. This is because to use
the GDI formula, the researcher must identify the highest weighted socioeconomic
factor from the output of their factor analysis. In Langlois and Kitchen’s analysis
in Canada this may have been obvious, however, this does not necessarily mean
that in other contexts in other countries a factor analysis of deprivation indicators
1 The formula for the GDI is.
GDI i =
sik(1 + ∑ j =ksi j )
p
where.
sik is the scaled factor score for resident’ committee i on the most important factor k, sij is the
scaled factor score for resident’ committee i on one of the secondary factors, j, and p is the total
number of factors which are included.
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will always produce a single and self-evident socioeconomic factor. This makes the
weighting system subjective, which is particularly problematic given that the weights
are not made fully explicit in the method, something that Noble et al. (2006) suggest
is imperative to avoid.
In the previous deprivation studies in China (Yuan andWu 2014; Yuan et al. 2018)
the authors appear to ignore the idea of a socioeconomic factor altogether and select
the factor which explains the most variance, assuming this to be the most important.
Letting the data decide, on the surface, seems sensible. However, it makes less sense
with respect to the theory behind theGDI formula. The factorwhich explains themost
variance in both Chinese studies is a factor that loads highly on indicators relating
to lack of housing amenities. These are clearly important, above all as measures of
socially perceived necessities resulting from a lack of income. However, there seems
no reason why these should be considered several times more important than all of
the other indicators combined, particularly when the second factor in their studies
loads highly on indicators specifically measuring income and education.
In practice, the use of the household amenities factor as the most important in
the GDI formula essentially implies that as long as people live in houses with basic
amenities they are not deprived, which potentially overlooks other important types
of deprivation. This is of particular concern for our interests, because as Yuan and
Wu (2014) suggest themselves, it may well underestimate deprivation in urban areas,
where the lack of household amenities is quite rare but other aspects of deprivation,
such as household overcrowding or unemployment, are more prevalent and acute.
The IMD framework gets round these issues by explicitly considering each domain
of deprivation to be important, resulting in the most deprived areas being those that
experience multiple deprivations rather than just high deprivation in a single area.
Therefore, we follow Noble et al.’s ( 2006 ) IMD framework. By considering how
best to apply it to a Chinese context, we identify the following seven steps or core
principles required to produce and interpret IMD estimates. These need to be taken
into account when measuring deprivation in China using census data:
1. Identify domains appropriate to the country and regional context.
2. Identify appropriate indicators for each domain.
3. Apply Shrinkage procedures to improve the reliability of small area data.
4. Combine the indicators within the domain.
5. Rank these scores and then exponentially transform this rank.
6. Combine indicators with appropriate weights into an Index of Multiple
Deprivation.
7. Apply appropriate spatial analysis to facilitate interpretation of the IMD
estimates.
We now discuss these in more detail.
1. Identify appropriate domains
The English IMD has seven domains: income; employment; health and
disability; education, skills and training; barriers to housing and services; crime;
and living environment. While the appropriate indicators to measure these
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domains are likely to vary across countries, the domains themselves havebroadly
universal application, as they represent aspects of life that are thought to be
important in a society. However, we shall take into account data availability.
There is no available data in the Chinese census, or even possibly proxies, on
crime, barriers to housing services, or geographical access to services gener-
ally. For these reasons, we follow Yuan and Wu (2014) and use five domains
to measure IMD: Income, Employment, Education, Health, and Housing and
living environment.
2. Identify appropriate indicators for each domain
Once the domains have been selected, the first task is to measure each domain
by identifying appropriate indicators from the census data. The most difficult
domain to capture is income as the census does not measure this directly, and it
is therefore necessary to resort to proxy measures. Yuan and Wu (2014) use the
proportion of individuals working in typically low-income occupations, which
is a reasonable approach to take. Low-income occupations include industrial
workers, agricultural workers and unskilled service sector employees. Along-
side this, we also include the proportion of individuals whose main income
derives from minimum living allowance, unemployment benefit or family
support, rather than labour income or pension.
The employment, education and health domains are measured by a single indi-
cator which includes the unemployment rate, the proportion of the population
whose highest educationwas primary school or less and the proportion of people
over the age of 60 self-reporting poor health. Unfortunately, the health question
was only asked to those over the age of 60 in the Census questionnaire.
Finally, for housing and living environment, we select four indicators measuring
a lack of household amenities, i.e. the proportions of householdswithout a toilet,
access to a kitchen, clean energy (electricity) and piped water. We also select
a measure of overcrowding, the proportion of households with less than 20m2
housing area per person.
3. Apply Shrinkage procedures to improve reliability of small area data
The first step is to choose the appropriate larger geographical unit to use for the
data shrinkage adjustment. As our calculation of IMD is based on the spatial
level of Residents’ Committee (RC), we use the sub-district (jiedao) for the
data shrinkage adjustment. Sub-district is the administrative level above the RC
and in our data, there are an average of eight RCs in each sub-district. The
shrunken indicator proportion for a RC j, z∗j , is then a weighted average of the
raw proportion for that RC, z j , and the proportion for the sub-district in which
the RC is situated, Z , such that:
z∗j = wj z j + (1 − wj )Z
where the weight, wj , can be calculated by the following equation:







where s2j is the standard error of the RC proportion and t
2 is the variance for





(z j − Z)2
This means that there will be greater shrinkage towards the sub-district mean
when the standard error is high, in other words, when the indicator is not reliably
estimated, and/orwhen there is little heterogeneity betweenRCs in a sub-district.
4. Combine the indicators within the domain
For the housing and income domains, there are two or more indicators and
therefore these need to be combined together to produce a final domain score.
For housing, the five household indicators selected from the censusmeasure two
aspects of housing deprivation. The first is lack of basic household amenities
and four indicators measure this: the proportion of households without a toilet,
a kitchen, clean energy and piped water. The second is household overcrowding
and is measured by one indicator: the proportion of households with under
20m2 of housing area per person. Although these are separate concepts, they
are both important in capturing deprivation due to housing conditions. This is
backed up by our data from Shijiazhuang, which suggests that while the four
amenity measures are moderate to highly correlated (the correlation coefficient,
r, between each pair of measures is between 0.3 and 0.7), they are largely
uncorrelated with the overcrowding measure (r < 0.2 in every case).
We give each aspect of housing deprivation equal weighting. Therefore, the
shrunken proportion of households with under 20m2 of housing area per person
makes up50%of thehousing score.The lack-of-amenitymeasures are combined
to make up the other 50% through factor analysis, as we hypothesise that the
indicators are all influenced by the underlying latent variable, lack of amenities.
To do this, each indicator is first standardised to be on the same scale with
a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Maximum likelihood factor
analysis is used on the standardised indicators, deriving a set of weights taken
from the factor loadings. These weights are then used to combine the shrunken
indicators into a lack-of-amenities sub-domain score.
For the income domain,we give an equalweighting (50%each) to the proportion
of individuals in low-income occupations and the proportion of individuals
whose main income does not come from labour income, again standardising the
variables before combining them.
5. Rank these scores and then exponentially transform this rank.
To transform each domain score to an exponential distribution, the scores are
first ranked from the most deprived RC (i = 1) to the least (i = n). These ranks
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are scaled between 0 and 1 such that the scaled rank, R, for the i th RC is 1/ i ,
meaning that the most deprived RC has a scaled rank of 1 and the least deprived,
a scaled rank of 1/n. They are then transformed using the following formula:
−23ln(1 − R(1 − exp−100/23).
Where ln denotes the natural logarithm and exp is the exponential function.
The scaling factor of 23 results in approximately 10% cancellation, meaning
that if an RC is the most deprived on one domain but the least deprived on
another domain it would be at the 90th percentile in terms of deprivation rather
than at the 50th percentile if the ranks add been given equal weight without the
transformation.
6. Combine indicators with appropriate weights into an Index of Multiple
Deprivation
These exponentially transformed domain scores are then combined into a
composite Index of Multiple Deprivation. In many ways, this is the most prob-
lematic part, as there is no clear theory as to what the best weighting system
might be. Yuan and Wu (2014) compare four different weighting schemes by
ranking all the RCs in Guangzhou by the IMD calculated from each one. They
select the weighting scheme that has the smallest deviation from the average
rank, which also has the benefit of giving importance to both education and
health, aspects of deprivation which can often be overlooked. This preferred
weighting system gives a weighting of 25% to income, 15% to employment,
25% to housing and 17.5% each to health and education respectively. We adopt
this system although we also conduct sensitivity analyses. They produce some
differences in the final rankings yet do not change the substantive conclusions
of the paper, so the results are not shown here for brevity.
All the weighting systems for the IMD,whichYuan andWu (2014) discuss, give
relatively equal importance to each dimension of deprivation. An alternative
would be to follow the logic of the GDI but within the IMD framework and
to consider income deprivation as underlying all other forms of deprivation,
giving this domain a significantly larger weight. While this has some logic,
we would still lean towards the more equal weighting system described above,
rather than one which is dominated by one domain. In the context of China’s
new strategic policy priority to focus on the quality of economic growth, it will
become necessary to ensure that sufficient weight is also given to other domains
such as health and education.
7. Exploration of the spatial distribution of deprivation
Deprivation indices need to be interpreted in a way that is cognisant of their
spatial context. This is important for understanding the local socioeconomic
geography and the wider implications of the particular spatial distribution of
deprivation. Neighbourhood effects arising from the concentration of poverty
(Galster and Sharkey 2017), social fragmentation arising from segregation by
income (Tammaru et al. 2018), and the impact of (de)centralisation of poverty
on exposure to air pollution and access to employment (Zhang and Pryce 2019)
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all provide strong imperatives for investigating the spatial structure of IMD
results.
We first measure the extent of spatial clustering of deprivation in the city to see
whether there are statistically significant clusters of local spatial autocorrelation.
Local Morans measure this I (Anselin 1995), which is calculated through the
correlation of each area with its five nearest neighbours.
We thengauge the extent towhichdeprivation is located close to the city centre as
opposed to the periphery. We calculate a deprivation centralisation index (DCI)
for deprivation in the city based on Duncan and Duncan’s (1955) Absolute
Centralisation Index, which was originally designed to measure the centrali-
sation of a particular group within a city. This index is, in turn, based around
the Gini coefficient. For the classic Gini coefficient each area would be ordered
from the least deprived to the most deprived, in this case the areas are ordered
from those closest to the centre of the city to the furthest. We then calculate the
DCI in such a way as to compare both centralised or more evenly distributed
levels of deprivation throughout the city.













where Xi is equal to the cumulative proportion of the total sumof the deprivation
scores for Area i and Ai is the cumulative proportion of the total number of areas
for Area i .
The index is bounded by the limits [−1,1], with positive values suggesting that
deprivation is centralised, negative values suggesting that deprivation is found
further from the centre and a value of 0 suggesting that deprivation is evenly
distributed throughout the city.
Finally, we explore the relationships between the different IMD domains, which
intuitively leads on to searching for the existence of particular neighbourhood
deprivation typologies—clusters of neighbourhoods with similar combinations
of deprivation domain scores. We conduct a latent class analysis using the
package poLCA (Linzer and Lewis 2016) in the statistical software R. The
domain scores for each of the domains are split into quintiles. We first estimate
the latent class models based on the five domain variables and then repeat the
analysis splitting the housing domain into components such as overcrowding and
lack of amenities. We then separate the income domain into its four parts; non-
labour income, industrial workers, low-skilled service sector workers and agri-
cultural workers. The aim is to look for groups of RCs with similar deprivation
profiles.
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14.3 Application to Shijiazhuang City in Hebei Province
14.3.1 Data and Study Area
The data comes from the 2010Chinese census. The study area covers the five districts
(Xinhua, Yuhua, Chang’an, Qiaoxi and Qiaodong) which make up the urban built-up
area of Shijiazhuang, the capital city of Hebei Province. It is situated to the southwest
of Beijing and is a major city in the Jing-Jin-Yi Region, the largest urban cluster in
North China (see Fig. 14.1). The city has experienced tremendous economic growth
and urban development over the past 30 years, resulting in significant socio-spatial
differentiation. There is a risingmiddle classwithwell-paid jobs living in commercial
Fig. 14.1 Study area of Shijiazhuang urban area (shaded black) within Shijiazhuang prefecture
within Hebei province
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propertieswith a decent residential environment. There are also thosewhoweremade
redundant during the industrial restructuring and the reforms of state-owned enter-
prises (SOE). In addition, low-skilledmigrants from the countryside have swollen the
ranks of the urban poor. The SOE reforms began during the 1990s when many state-
owned enterprises, including many textile factories in this instance, went bankrupt.
Many local residents lost their livelihood and had to seek reemployment opportuni-
ties elsewhere. Most of them are unable to afford commercial properties and live in
dilapidated work unit housing allocated by their previous SOEs. In the meantime, the
city has witnessed enormous urban expansion and rural-to-urban migration, similar
to other Chinese cities. Migrants are excluded frommost social benefits and services
in the city as they lack local household registration status. They are concentrated in
low-skilled jobs and live in peri-urban areas where cheap housing is available. Urban
villages, former rural settlements engulfed by rapid urban expansion, have partic-
ularly become migrant enclaves due to low-cost housing and convenient location.
Because of the dramatic socio-spatial differentiation, it is useful to explore the extent
and spatial distribution of deprivation in the city.
The population of the study area in 2010was 2.7million located in 450RCswithin
59 Sub-districts. The unit of analysis at which the deprivation indices are calculated
is the RC, the smallest geographical level at which data can be produced from the
Chinese census. In the study area these have an average population of 6,000 people.
Spatial boundary data are only available at the higher sub-district level although
at the RC level there is point data approximating the position of each committee.
Additionally, while themajority of the indicators are available at the RC level, data on
employment status and occupation are only available at the sub-district level. When
orderingRCs in terms of their distance from the centreweuseEuclidian distance from
theHebei government buildings (latitude−38.043, longitude−114.471),which local
expert knowledge deemed to be the centre of the city. Sensitivity analyses indicated
that therewere no substantive changes to the resultswhen alternate plausible locations
for the city centre were specified.
Table 14.1 provides a list of the indicators for the five domains of deprivation with
descriptive statistics for our study area.
14.3.2 Empirical Findings
We calculate an Index of Multiple Deprivation with this data using the method
outlined above. We now discuss the spatial exploration of the results.
(a) Spatial Clustering
Figure 14.2 presents maps of the RCs in Shijiazhuang by quintiles of depri-
vation for the combined IMD. A first glance suggests some spatial clustering
of deprivation but at the same time, deprivation spread across the city. For
example, while there is clearly a large area of deprivation on the city’s Eastern
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Table 14.1 Domains and Indicators with descriptive statistics for Shijiazhuang











Employment Unemployed 5.36 (1.38–9.66)
Education 16 + with primary school or
less education
9.84 (<0.01–100)
Health Over 60s reporting poor health 9.29 (0–50.00)
Housing Amenities Households with no toilet










Overcrowding Households with < 20m2 of
housing area per person
19.24 (0–80.26%)
Fig. 14.2 Residents’ Committees in Shijiazhuang by Index of Multiple Deprivation
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edge, there are also several RCs in the most deprived quintile close to the city
centre.
Figure 14.3 confirms this, displaying statistically significant clusters of local
spatial autocorrelation, measured by local Morans I. This map shows a large
cluster of deprived RCs on the city’s eastern edge with a smaller cluster on
the northwest fringe. The largest cluster of areas with low deprivation can be
found to the southeast of the city centre with smaller clusters nearer to the
city centre. This is consistent with previous studies demonstrating that more
deprived areas are usually situated in the suburbs of Chinese cities (Yuan and
Wu 2014). Figure 3 also shows that in most parts of the city, the measure of
local spatial autocorrelation is small and not statistically significant suggesting
no strong spatial patterning of deprivation. In other words, in most of the city
an RC is likely to be surrounded by RCs with varying levels of deprivation.
(b) Centralisation
TheDCI for thewhole city area is negative and statistically significant (−0.14),
meaning that deprived places are on average situated further from the city centre
than affluent places, consistent with our findings above. As with all single
number segregation measures, this global DCI measure hides the information
about the distribution of different groups throughout the city. For example, if
there were high concentrations of deprived areas in the centre of the city, low
Fig. 14.3 Statistically Significant (p < 0.05) clusters of spatial autocorrelation
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concentrations in the areas surrounding the centre and then high concentra-
tions again at the edge, the DCI would imply that deprived areas were evenly
distributed with respect to the centre of the city. This would be somewhat
misleading. For this reason, we explore how the DCI changes depending on
the number of nearest RCs to the centre that is included in the calculation,
adopting an approach proposed by Folch and Rey (2016).
To do this, after calculating the DCI for the whole dataset, we remove the
furthest RC from the centre and recalculate the DCI. We then remove the next
furthest RC from the dataset and calculate the DCI a third time. We keep
repeating this process until only the two closest RCs to the centre remain.
It is then possible to plot how the DCI changes with distance from the city
centre as in Fig. 14.4, giving a more in-depth picture of how different groups
located throughout the city. This also allows us to test the sensitivity of the
DCI to differences in the boundary of the study area. Although selected to
approximate the extent of the city’s urban area, it is based on administrative
areas rather than an in-depth study of the actual city limits.
Figure 14.4 shows that the value of the DCI is sensitive to where the city
boundaries are drawn. If the furthest ~ 50 RCswere removed from the analysis,
the conclusion would be that there is no relationship between deprivation and
the city centre. This makes sense when referring back to the map of deprivation
in Fig. 14.2. This map clearly shows that the largest area of deprivation is on
the periphery to the east of the city; however, there appears to be no clear
relationship between deprivation and distance from the centre.
Fig. 14.4 Deprivation Centralisation Index for number of Residents’ Committees away from the
centre included. (Grey shaded area—95% confidence intervals from simulation)
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(c) Typologies of Deprivation.
To explore the existence of different neighbourhood typologies, we first inves-
tigate the similarities and differences in the spatial patterns for each domain.
Figure 14.5 shows a map of each domain separately. The spatial patterns for
some of the domains appear fairly similar, however, there are some clear and
notable differences. In particular, while income and education deprivation is
high in the east of the city, employment deprivation in this area is low.The corre-
lations between the domains displayed in Table 14.2 provide support for these
preliminary visual observations. There are weak to moderate positive correla-
tions between most of the domains apart from the employment domain, which
appears to be uncorrelated with any of the others. The strongest correlation is
between the income and education domain.
In general, these inter-domain correlations are weak when compared with the
correlations between the domains in IMDs for other countries. For example, the
correlations between the domains in the South African indices of deprivation
Fig. 14.5 Residents’ Committees in Shijiazhuang, with each IMD domain, plotted separately
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Table 14.2 Correlations between the different IMD domains
Income Employment Housing Education Health
Income 1
Employment −0.06 1
Housing 0.24 0.04 1
Education 0.64 −0.04 0.39 1
Health 0.36 0.02 0.23 0.38 1
range from 0.6 to 0.9 (Noble et al. 2010), while for the English IMD the corre-
lations are typically above 0.8 for the major domains (Ministry for Housing
Communities and Local Government 2020). This suggests that there are fewer
areas experiencing multiple deprivations in Shijiazhuang compared with the
study areas for these other indices. Note that our study area only includes
the urban built-up areas and that rural areas of the Shijiazhuang city region
are excluded. From looking at the maps for each domain and the correlations
between the domains, it is clear that the pattern of deprivation is complex and
that it is not simply the case that there are deprived areas that score high on all
the domains and affluent areas that score low on all the domains. There appear
to be some RCs which have particularly high IMD scores but are deprived in
different ways to other RCs which have similarly high scores. In order to learn
more about the distribution of deprivation within the city we therefore use the
latent class analysis to explore whether there are any underlying groupings of
RCs which suffer from similar combinations of deprivations.
The results of this analysis suggest that there is an affluent or non-deprived class
and two distinct deprived classes with different combinations of deprivation
factors. The affluent class comprises half of the RCs. This is the least deprived
class on all of the indicators, with an average IMD rank of 350, where a rank of
1 denotes themost deprived RC and 450 the least deprived. Aswe are interested
in deprivation rather than affluence, we will not focus upon it further.
With the lowest average IMD rank (52), the most deprived class comprises
12% of the total RCs. RCs in this class have the highest levels of income
deprivation, with particularly high proportions of industrial workers, though
low proportions of low-skilled service sector workers. 88% of RCs in this class
are in the highest two quintiles for industrial workers, whereas 98% of the RCs
are in the lowest two quintiles for low-skilled service sector workers. For this
reason, we name it the ‘industrial deprived class.’ RCs in this class also have
the highest levels of health and education deprivation, with 95% and 71% of
them in the most deprived two quintiles for these two domains, respectively.
On the other hand, they have low employment deprivation, with 81% of RCs
in the least deprived two quintiles. In terms of the housing domain, the areas
have high household amenity deprivation, with 100% of RCs in this class in the
most deprived two quintiles, but at the same time low levels of overcrowding,
for which 79% of RCs in this class are in the least deprived two quintiles.
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Thefinal class, consisting of 37%of all RCs, is also deprived but slightly less so.
The average IMD rank in this class is 82. RCs in this class are deprived in terms
of income, though they have low levels of industrial workers (only 27% of RCs
in this class are in the top two quintiles). Instead, they have the highest levels
of low-skilled service sector workers with 78% of RCs in this class in the top
two quintiles for this occupation. We, therefore, name these areas ‘low-skilled
service deprived.’ The level of education and health deprivation of the RCs in
this class is mixed but tends to be higher rather than lower. Some 45% and
48%, respectively, of RCs are in the top two quintiles of deprivation for these
domains. RCs in this class have the highest levels of employment deprivation
and the worst levels of overcrowding with 51% and 54% in the most deprived
two quintiles for these two indicators. They also tend to be deprived in terms
of housing amenities with 61% of RCs in the most deprived two quintiles.
Interestingly although not included in the LCA, further exploration shows that
this class of RCs has by far the highest proportion of rural migrants without
urban hukou status.2
Figure 14.6 maps the RCs in each of the three classes and shows a clear pattern
across the city. This map shows that the RCs in the industrial deprived class
are highly clustered and can be found exclusively on the periphery of the city,
mainly in the sub-districts on the eastern fringe. On the other hand, the RCs
in the low-skilled service deprived class tend to be found closer to the city
centre, although their geographical distribution is more variable across the
city. Table 14.3 summarises the differences between the RCs in the two classes
with different deprivation profiles.
14.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have outlined a general method for producing an Index of Multiple
Deprivation in China.We have shown the importance of drawing upon the theoretical
background of deprivation when calculating deprivation indices and have therefore
been able to build upon previous attempts to measure deprivation using Chinese
census data. Using data from the city of Shijiazhuang in Hebei Province, we have
employed our method to produce an IMD for the city and then used the results to
provide a deeper understanding of deprivation within a medium-sized Chinese city.
The most important substantive finding from this analysis is the complex spatial
nature of multiple deprivations in Shijiazhuang. The latent class analysis has shown
2 Hukou is the name given to the Chinese system of household registration. Urban hukou status is
awarded to individuals born in cities and confers eligibility for employment, housing, education,
health, and social services. Rural migrants who come to work in cities typically do not have urban
hukou but retain their rural hukou status. The system has been reformed over the years but still
remains a key source of inequality between urban citizens and migrant workers. See Chapter 1 for
more information on the history of hukou, and Chaps. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 for detailed examples of
its implications for segregation and inequality today.
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Fig. 14.6 Map of the three types of Residents’ Committee
Table 14.3 The two types of deprived Residents’ Committees compared
Industrial deprived Low-skilled service deprived
• Peripheral to the city
• Many industrial workers but few low-skilled
service workers
• Poor household amenities but low
overcrowding
• Lowest levels of health and education
• Low Unemployment
• Closer to the centre of the city (although
distance varies substantially within group)
• Few industrial workers but many low-skilled
service workers
• Fairly poor household amenities and high
levels of overcrowding
• Mixed, but generally lower than higher,
levels of health and education
• Higher levels employment
that there are different types of deprived areas that experience different deprivation
profiles and that these areas are to be found in different parts of the city. While the
more traditional forms of deprived areas with poor household amenities, low educa-
tion and low incomes still exist, a more modern type of deprived area, with high
levels of unemployment and household overcrowding, has emerged in pockets of
Shijiazhuang. While they did not explore different types of deprivation, this reflects
the analysis of Yuan et al. (2018) inGuangzhouwho found an increase in urban depri-
vation relative to rural areas between 2000 and 2010. This is likely to be explained
by growth in this second type of deprivation. This also fits with other reports of
new forms of deprivation in urban environments that have emerged after rapid urban
expansion. The benefits of rapid economic growth in China have not been shared
14 Deprivation Indices in China: Establishing Principles … 325
equally (Wu 2004; Ouyang et al. 2017). Different policy responses are therefore
important to address areas with varying deprivation profiles. This finding also high-
lights the importance of an approach tomeasuring deprivation thatmeasures different
domains of deprivation separately, as a single measure would hide this underlying
complexity. To take this further, future research should look for similar patterns of
deprivation in cities of varying sizes and also whether there were different groupings
of deprivations in rural as opposed to urban areas. Additionally, understanding the
link between new kinds of deprivation and migrant settlement patterns, particularly
with respect to urban villages, is important (Hao et al. 2013).
The greatest obstacle to calculating deprivation indices in China is the data. For
example, the indicators for some of the domains in this study are only available at
a coarser scale than our unit of analysis. Moreover, some of the indicators are fairly
crude measures of the underlying concept. Further research could conduct some
form of ground truthing—direct observation of living conditions for a selection of
neighbourhoods—to test the validity of the deprivation indicators. These issues are
unlikely to affect our understanding of the overall spatial patterns of deprivation
within the city. However, measurement error becomes potentially very important if
the goal is to use scores for apportioning funding to themost deprivedRCs.While this
ultimately represents a limitation within our study, it also highlights the importance
of the statistical procedures we have outlined, which minimise measurement error
as far as is practicably possible.
One option for future research is to combine other data sources alongside the
census data such as administrative data (as in the case of the English IMD), survey
data, or other types of geographical data. For example, Chen and Yeh (2018) have
recently used points of interest and road network data to develop ameasure of accessi-
bility to services for different areas of Guangzhou. Amethod like this can potentially
be adapted to create an ‘accessibility to services’ domain. Another possible avenue
for future research is to develop a more robust weighting system for combining the
domains. By working with potential end-users of the data it would be possible to
determine the criteria for more accurately weighting indicative levels of deprivation
in China.
In conclusion, while analysing deprivation in China is not easy, we have outlined
a framework using reliable statistical techniques based on the English Indices of
Deprivation, which can create deprivation indices in China. This framework provides
opportunities to improve understanding of the socio-spatial nature of deprivation in
Chinese cities as well as being a potential useful tool for policy makers.
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Chapter 15
Future Directions for Research
on Residential Segregation
and Inequality in China
Gwilym Pryce
Abstract This chapter summarises some of the key findings and themes of the book
and considers their implications for future research on inequality and segregation
in China. I highlight four priority areas. First, there is a need for more research
on the dynamics of residential segregation. I argue that the real story of segrega-
tion is revealed in the factors and processes that drive long-term change. Second, I
emphasise the need for more research on the spatial foundations of inequality—how
inequality leads to the geographical separation of rich and poor and how this segre-
gation mediates and reinforces almost every aspect of inequality. Third, I consider
the relational and psychological impacts of inequality and the imperative for them to
be included in the calculus of policy planning. Fourth, I consider the implications of
the Causal Revolution in research methods and argue that they potentially offer the
prospect of achieving a scientific approach to policy development and evaluation. I
conclude with some reflections on the implications of our findings for future policy
directions in China.
Keywords Social frontiers · Segregation · Inequality · Homophily horizons ·
Social networks · Residential sorting · Spatial persistence · China · Spatial
opportunity structures
15.1 Introduction
Our goal in producing this edited volume has been to explore the shared and
contrasting experiences of segregation and inequality in Europe and China, and to
further the inter-continental dialogue between European and Chinese scholars. Our
work is also highly relevant to current policy priorities in China and to many of the
future social challenges likely to emerge over the coming decades.
In 2014 the Chinese government announced a new phase in the country’s devel-
opment, involving slower economic growth and a greater focus on improving quality
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of life (Han et al. 2016, p. 176). Given the enormous problems of pollution and
overcrowding in many Chinese cities, this new policy agenda was a welcome devel-
opment. But it also raised several important questions. What are the policy changes
needed to enhance human welfare? Is improving societal wellbeing only a matter of
reducing pollution, overcrowding and congestion? Or are there deeper social issues
that need to be tackled if the government is to improvemental and physicalwellbeing?
Income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, for example, has rose
markedly from around 31.0 before reforms began in 1978, to around 37 in 2000
(Kanbur and Zhang 2005). These are likely to be underestimates, however. Once
unreported income is taken into account, Zhang andZhao (2019)1 reckon that theGini
coefficient had risen to around 56.0 in 2003 and to over 58.0 in 2015. In comparison,
theGini index for income inequality in theUSA rose from around 40.0 in the 1960s to
around 47.0 by the late 2000s.2 The question raised by this enormous rise in income
inequality in China, and the associated rise in segregation (see Chap. 4), is whether
it has had a negative impact on the wellbeing and quality of life of its citizens.
Certainly, there is a significant body of evidence from Europe and the USA to
support the view that inequality and socioeconomic segregation, the main themes
of this book, have significant negative impacts on health and wellbeing (Pickett and
Wilkinson 2015; Patel et al. 2018). There is also evidence that they adversely affect
educational attainment, economic growth, crime, social cohesion and social mobility
(Galster and Sharkey 2017; Graham 2018; Corak 2013; Dean et al. 2019; Boterman
et al. 2019).
Such findings pose a dilemma for China’smove towards amarket-based economy,
as inequality and segregation tend to go hand-in-hand with economic liberalisation
(Chap. 3; Tammaru et al. 2015; van Ham et al. 2018). This is because a competitive
labour market provides the greatest rewards for the most talented, and for those who
are the most educated, entrepreneurial and geographically mobile. It also means that
those who have fewer opportunities to acquire qualifications and develop skills, can
become impoverished. The wealth accrued by those who succeed in a meritocratic
system can confer advantages that are transferred down generations. It can be used
for example, to improve the life chances of their own children and erect barriers
to the social mobility of their poorer peers. The better education, and higher status
social networks enjoyed by children of the wealthy provide employment, business,
and marriage opportunities that reinforce their social position. Excluded from these
networks, resources and opportunities, the children of poorer households, on the
other hand, are more likely to become locked into a life of precarious low-wage,
low-skill employment. This pattern of disadvantage is then passed on to their own
children.
1 Official estimates of the Gini coefficient from the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)
show a continued rise in income inequality to around 49.0 in 2009 (Zhang and Zhao 2019). Although
official estimates show the Gini coefficient falling in China to around 46.0 in 2015, Zhang and Zhao
(2019) have shown that this decline is largely due to unreported income in the NBS calculations.
2 See https://www.census.gov/library/visualizations/2015/demo/gini-index-of-money-income-and-
equivalence-adjusted-income--1967.html.
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Income inequality also tends to affect social geography. It becomes an additional
mechanism to reinforce and reproduce these inequalities, leading to the spatial sepa-
ration between rich and poor. As income inequality increases, those at the top of
the income scale will have more purchasing power to facilitate residence in the
most desirable neighbourhoods. As income inequality widens, affluent homeowners
bid up the prices of the most desirable areas, widening the house price differen-
tials between neighbourhoods that have low crime, negligible pollution, excellent
access to employment, amenities and education, and those that do not. In addition,
the wealthy are more likely to be able to own homes in such desirable neighbour-
hoods, thereby reaping substantial capital gains as properties appreciate (Galster and
Wessell, 2019). Thus, once the power of the market to sort people geographically
according to their income and wealth is unleashed, low-income households will be
increasingly concentrated in the least desirable neighbourhoods. This in turn exacer-
bates inequalities in opportunities and life trajectories for adults and children alike.
Over time, segregation and inequality become entwined, creating vicious circles of
spiralling inequality and social division (see Chap. 3 in this volume, Sampson 2012;
Sharkey 2013; vanHamet al. 2018;Galster 2019: ch. 7). It then becomes increasingly
difficult to tackle one without addressing the other. This makes the design of effective
policy programmes ever more challenging. This has certainly been the experience of
Western Europe and North America (see Chap. 3).
We have sought in this volume to draw lessons from the Western experience of
urban segregation and inequality. China’s socioeconomic and political development
over the past century has been radically different to that of theUSandWesternEurope,
marked initially by far-reaching communist restructuring of socioeconomic andpolit-
ical life. There then followed a shift towards a unique form of state capitalism since
the post-1978 reforms. Yet the country now arrives at a similar position to Western
nations, albeit with some uniquely Chinese characteristics (see Chaps. 4–9). China
once flattened the income distribution and eradicated segregation in cities through
the creation of worker and residential units (Chap. 4), and a collective approach to
resource allocation. It now faces income inequality on a similar scale toWestern neo-
liberal economies with growing evidence of residential and workplace segregation
(Chaps. 4, 10, 11, 12, and 14; Sako 2020 Ch. 24).
In the remainder of this chapter, I reflect on these issues and consider the most
fruitful avenues for future research. I identify four under-researched aspects of
inequality and segregation in the Chinese context that are particularly important
for policy development both now and in the future. The first of these is the dynamic
nature of segregation and its causal processes. Most of the research on segregation in
China is based on a static approach, a snapshot of how spatially separated population
groups are at a particular point in time. I argue in Sect. 15.2 that an understanding
of the dynamic patterns in the factors leading to segregation is necessary if we are to
tackle it. The second area I recommend as an avenue for future research is the spatial
dimension of inequality. In Sect. 15.3, I set out the key issues and concepts that come
under this themewhich we believe are vital for understanding the true challenges that
lie ahead for redesigning social policy in China. The third avenue for future research,
discussed in Sect. 15.4, relates to the impacts of inequality and segregation and the
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need to develop rigorous evidence, based on their impacts in a Chinese context. I
argue that the absence of robust quantitative evidence is a major omission when it
comes to improving the quality of life of Chinese citizens. The fourth suggested area
of research for prioritisation is the scientific evaluation of policy. I argue in Sect. 15.5
that for policies to be effective, there must be a rational and efficient mechanism for
evaluating them. We suggest that this can be facilitated by drawing on ‘causal infer-
ence’, a relatively recent development in statistical methods that can shed light on
the impact of policy interventions.
Much of the discussion in this chapter, and across the book as a whole, draws on
lessons from the past, and learning from the experiences of Europe and the USA.We
are mindful, however, that by doing so we risk re-fighting previous battles, rather
than those that lie ahead. To avoid falling into this trap, I offer some final thoughts in
Sect. 15.5 that include some reflections on issues that could dominate the direction
of segregation and inequality in the decades to come.
15.2 Dynamics of Segregation and Its Causal Processes
We noted in the Introduction that much of the research on segregation in China relies
on static analysis. Most of the Chinese segregation research reviewed in Chap. 4,
for example, was based on cross sectional data, estimating measures that provide a
snapshot of various dimensions of segregation—typically evenness using the index
of dissimilarity3 (e.g. Hannum and Xie 1998; Hannum and Wang 2006; Li and Wu
2008). However, such measures do not shed light on the dynamics of the segregation
process, how segregation will emerge in future or the propensity of particular neigh-
bourhoods to become increasingly segregated. The dynamic nature of segregation is
particularly relevant toChina, as the country is in the process of rapid urbanisation and
urban transformation. Market-oriented reforms have resulted in enormous changes
in the urban residential landscape and significant socio-spatial differentiation. Static
approaches cannot capture the changing nature of inequalities and segregation. Our
contention is that to understand segregation, one must understand the underlying
processes that generate it, which in turn means we need to quantify the nature of the
dynamic process. What this means in practice will hopefully become apparent as
we consider some of the core ideas below, mainly drawn from Western experience.
We discuss their relevance to China which has undergone a radical transition from a
centrally-planned economy to a market one.
3 For more information on the Index of Dissimilarity, its applications, limitations and statistical
inference, see Piekut (Chap. 2 in this volume), Massey and Denton (1988), Massey et al. (1996),
and Lee et al. (2015).
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15.2.1 Market Sorting, Homophily Horizons and Budget
Constraints
One of the major advances in the housing and environmental economics literatures
over the past twenty years has been the development of ‘equilibrium sorting models’
(see Chap. 12 of this volume for one of the first examples of an equilibrium sorting
model applied to Chinese data; see also review byKuminoff et al. 2013). Equilibrium
sorting models (ESMs) seek to capture the way markets sort people into particular
neighbourhoods, depending on their preferences for various amenities, proximity to
work, and their preference for living in neighbourhoods with a particular ethnic or
social composition (Bayer et al. 2003; Bayer andMcMillan 2005; Bayer et al. 2016).
These models have their roots in the seminal work on household location choice and
urban social structures by Alonso (1964), Mills (1967), Muth (1969), and Schelling
(1969, 1971).
Schelling’s (1971) contribution was to illustrate the far-reaching impact of even
modest levels of ‘homophily’—the tendency to be drawn to people with similar char-
acteristics to our own (see review by McPherson et al. 2001)—on overall levels of
segregation. Using a computer simulation model based on an artificial grid-square
city, where each cell of the grid-square represents a residential household location,
he was able to simulate the long run dynamics of urban population patterns. In
this model, households are assumed to relocate in the next round of moves if they
are in the minority among their immediate neighbours with respect to some essen-
tial feature such as ethnicity. Immediate neighbours are represented by the 8 grid
squares surrounding the residence in question. Starting off with a random distri-
bution of ethnic groups (e.g. Blacks and Whites) across the city, Schelling showed
how, over time, this behavioural assumption resulted in almost complete segregation.
The outcome of extreme segregation is surprising because none of the households
in the model desired it; they simply did not want to be in the minority among their
immediate neighbours.
While the Schelling model is very simple—there are no house prices or income
constraints, for example, and all neighbourhoods are homogenous in all respects other
than their ethnic identity—it illustrates very powerfully how seemingly innocuous
levels of homophily at the micro level can have far-reaching and unintended macro
consequences. More recently, research has shown that some of the apparently inci-
dental aspects of the Schelling model have major implications for the long run
trajectory of residential segregation. Bakens and Pryce (2019), for example, have
highlighted the importance of the ‘homophily horizon’—the number of concentric
layers of neighbours around a person’s home in which households do not want to be
in the minority.
In the original model, households’ expression of homophily is limited to the
single layer of grid cells surrounding their home. In reality, more distant homophily
horizons may affect household location choice—that is the ethnic composition of
multiple concentric layers of neighbours. Crucially, Bakens and Pryce (2019) find
that increasing the homophily horizon by just one layer of concentric cells will
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dramatically increase the rate at which the city converges towards complete segrega-
tion. For example, if residents seek ethnic or socioeconomic homogeneity not only
among their immediate neighbours but also among their neighbours’ neighbours.
The authors also provide an example using data from Glasgow, Scotland, of how the
homophily horizon could be measured empirically.
The estimation of homophily horizons could be a useful and important measure
for policy makers seeking to understand and influence the drivers of long run segre-
gation trajectories in Chinese cities. This is becausemarket-oriented housing reforms
have resulted in a vibrant urban real estate market. People increasingly have options
to purchase commercial properties according to their preference and budget. Policy-
makers could, for example, prioritise interventions that improve inter-group relations
in areas that are found to have distant homophily horizons and hence are more at risk
of rapidly descending into segregation. Due to its relative ethnic homogeneity—over
90% of the population are Han Chinese – China does not have ethnic and racial divi-
sions on the scale of North American and European countries. Nevertheless, there is
evidence of ethnic segregation (Tan et al. 2019;Morales 2019), ethnic tensions (Smith
2002; Roberts 2018; Irgengioro 2018) and ethnic inequality (Wang 2019; Morales
2019; Hannum and Xie 1998; Zang 2012) in China. As discussed in Chaps. 4 and
10, there is also evidence of segregation emerging along socio-economic lines, and
with respect to hukou household residential status, and ethnicity. Ongoing research
by Owen et al. (2020) as part of the ESRC Understanding Inequalities project also
finds significant levels of residential segregation amongmigrant workers by province
of origin.
Homophily is, of course, only one possible type of preference that households
might exhibit concerning the socioeconomic composition of their neighbours. Some
may prefer neighbours who are better-off than themselves as they may feel it reflects
favourably on their own status. Others may prefer to have someworse-off neighbours
to whom they can feel relatively superior. Recent research on mobility patterns in the
Netherlands byMusterd et al. (2016) and inOslo, Norway byGalster andMagnusson
Turner (2017, 2019) demonstrates the importance of ‘status discrepancy’—the differ-
ence between a household’s income and the neighbourhood’s median income—
in the decisions to both move out of a neighbourhood and choose another. For
example, middle- and high-income Oslo households avoid neighbourhoods with
median incomes higher than their own. People in higher-income households aremore
attracted to places that may demonstrate the superiority of their incomes compared to
the neighbourhood median. These studies also confirm the importance of homophily
but with the vital nuance of threshold concentrations. Middle- and high-income Oslo
households only demonstrate an aversion to a neighbourhood when the share of low-
status households exceeds the average of the region (Galster and Magnusson Turner
2019). These findings suggest that simple segregation models based on universal
homophily preferences across all income groups are grossly oversimplified and may
produce erroneous conclusions. They also imply that although the consideration of
residential income segregation related to the status of neighbours is a powerful driver,
public policies aimed at neighbourhood diversification nevertheless have potential
efficacy due to threshold relationships.
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15.2.2 Equilibrium Sorting Models
The relative importance of these status preferences alongside factors such as income
constraints, environmental characteristics and access to amenities remain largely
unknown in a Chinese context. This is where equilibrium sorting models come into
their own as they can, in principle, disentangle the influence of different drivers of
household location choice. Theydo this by combiningdata on a large number of house
moveswith information on the economic and socio-demographics of each household.
They can be used to compare the value particular groups of households place on
locating near other population groups (Caetano and Maheshri 2019) compared with
the value they place on the proximity of physical attributes, low crime, clean air, etc.
(see discussion of revealed preference methods in Chap. 12, and Bayer et al. 2016).
This kind of research could potentially help policy makers better understand the
drivers behind emerging segregation in China. To what extent, for example, is the
segregation ofhukou residents inChinese cities (Chaps. 4 and 10) based onpreference
for neighbourhood homogeneity (e.g. migrant status homophily), and to what extent
does it derive from financial constraints on location choice? And to what extent does
prejudice among city-born residents against rural migrants drive housing decisions
compared with the impact of other factors such as institutional constraints, choice of
school catchment, housing quality, and proximity to family and friends?
The data requirements of full equilibrium sorting models are, unfortunately,
formidable, typically requiring detailed longitudinal data following individuals and
households over long periods of time and fine-grained location data. Neverthe-
less, Liang et al. (Chap. 12) illustrate how this canbedoneusing existingChinese data.
More extensive and powerful models could be developed through linking existing
Chinese Census data longitudinally in the same way that subsamples of the UK
censuses have been linked. Given that each Chinese citizen has a unique personal id
number, this might be feasible. Less data-demanding methods can, however, yield
insightful results on segregation dynamics. Easton and Pryce (2019), for example,
using house transactions data find that White British homeowners in Glasgow are
more likely to move out the neighbourhood if Pakistani homeowners move within
50 m (see Chap. 2 and the wider US-European literature on ‘White Flight’: for
example Galster 1990; Bråmå 2006; Card et al. 2008; Boustan 2010; Kaufmann and
Harris 2015; Andersen 2017).
15.2.3 Spatial Persistence
We argue in this section that early signs of residential sorting between different
population groups since the onset of China’s reforms could have a disproportionately
important impact on long-term residential segregation patterns. Given that segrega-
tion in urban China was almost eliminated in the communist era, it is possible that
Chinese cities are still in the early stages of the segregation process. Even so, these
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emerging patterns may prove to be surprisingly prescient as indicators of future
segregation trends due to the phenomenon of ‘spatial persistence’, which in turn
may lead to the ‘power persistence’ (Bian and Logan 1996)—the entrenchment of
inequalities and spatial stratification.4
‘Spatial persistence’ is the tendency for early patterns of segregation to have a
determining effect on future patterns, leading to a form of path dependency in the
geographical pattern of particular ethnic or social groups. Olner et al. (2020) argue
that standard approaches to quantifying segregation are intrinsically static, which
means they are at odds with the theoretical literature on segregation dynamics. They
explore the role of ‘polya processes’ to conceptualise and measure these dynamic
processes. To illustrate, imagine an urn containing an equal number of blue and red
balls. Polya selection would involve randomly drawing a ball from the urn, and then
replacing it with the addition of another of the same colour. So, if your initial selection
turned out to be red, you would return the selected red ball and add another red to
the urn. In terms of the impact on future random draws, your initial selection and
replacementwould increase the number of red balls relative to blue ones and therefore
increase the likelihood of choosing a red ball on your next draw but only marginally
so. If you chose a blue ball on your next selection, you would replace it with an
additional blue ball, and the odds would even up again. But as you keep on choosing
balls from the urn and replacing them with others of the same colour, the chances
are that at some point you will have a sufficient run of draws of the same colour
to cause the replacements to tip the chances of future selection markedly towards
that colour. Path dependency starts to emerge so that future selections will become
more and more likely to be of the same colour and the contents of the urn become
increasingly dominated by balls of that colour.
Olner et al. (2020) suggest that this captures the process by which segregated
neighbourhoods emerge. In the first rounds of migration, migrant location deci-
sions are largely determined by financial constraints, proximity to employment and
other practical considerations. This is because, even though migrants may want to
locate in neighbourhoods with high proportions of their own group, no such neigh-
bourhoods exist in the initial stages of migration. Over time, however, clusters of
migrant households will emerge in particular cities, and as these clusters grow, they
will exert increasing gravitational pull on future migrants seeking to locate near their
own group. Using Scottish census data, the authors find very strong evidence of polya
processes at work, with initial patterns of migrant destinations having a long-term
impact on the geography of segregation.5
This kind of analysis could be used to study the emergence of segregation inChina.
Such an approach would reveal the extent to which the segregation dynamics of rural
4 The persistence of power imbalances and inequalities from the old regime to the new one is
exemplified in the redevelopment of urban villages where more affluent families were able to
manipulate the redevelopment processes exacerbating pre-existing inequalities (see Chap. 6).
5 For rather different reasons, we may also find path dependencies in terms of neighbourhood
poverty and social deprivation. Zwiers et al. (2017), for example, find that ‘the original quality
of neighbourhoods and dwellings seems to be an important predictor for future neighbourhood
trajectories, indicating a high level of path-dependency’ (p. 363).
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migrants are characterisedby spatial persistence. Itwouldquantify the extent towhich
the initial patterns of migrant location during the years following the opening-up of
China determine the long run socio-demographic landscapes of its cities. One of the
important implications of the existence of polya processes in segregation dynamics
is that policy makers have much greater chances of shaping segregation patterns
early in the process. In other words, there is a tipping point beyond which patterns
of segregation become very difficult to remedy (Card et al. 2008).
However, in the Chinese context, these findings may need to be qualified some-
what due to the greater proclivity for radical intervention. For example, many urban
villages have been subject to extensive redevelopment by local governments (see
Chap. 6). This can lead to significant welfare loss for millions of migrant resi-
dents who are inadequately compensated during the redevelopment process and are
forced to leave their villages and find alternative accommodation, usually further
from amenities. Nevertheless, China’s propensity for comprehensive intervention
could, if more sensitively and strategically enacted, be used for good, particularly
with respect to issues like entrenched segregation and geographical inequality.
Although much of the research on the dynamics of segregation has concentrated
on residential segregation, Piekut (Chap. 2) notes how the ‘increasing availability
of geocoded data at the individual level, coupled with new, rich sources of (big)
data, could bring further methodological and conceptual innovations for the joint
study of place- and people-based segregation’. Indeed, there has been a proliferation
of research exploring segregation across a variety of domains and dimensions in
European research (e.g. see van Gent et al. 2019, and Chaps. 9–20 in Part II of
Musterd 2020). Given the extent to which people’s movements in China are routinely
monitored by the government, theremaybe considerable research potential in the data
collected to explore how different domains of segregation—residential, workplace,
leisure, education, online—interact and change over time.
15.2.4 Institutional and Political Factors
The process of residential sorting is not, of course, only about mover preferences
with respect to the composition of neighbours. Other factors, such as institutional
context, public policy and inequality in household finances, are also key drivers. As a
result, extensive residential segregation can occur even in the absence of homophily.
I shall discuss the financial drivers of segregation in some detail in Sect. 15.3 as
it has significant ramifications for how inequality is experienced, compounded and
reproduced. First, though, it is worth reflecting on the institutional and political
drivers of inequality which have particular salience in the Chinese context.
China’s opening-up did not lead to the uniform emergence of liberalised markets
and the rolling back of the state as liberals had hoped. Instead, the transition
was idiosyncratic, complex, characterised by significant state control, with many
lingering inequalities and institutional biases from the old communist system. The
upheavals and peculiarities of The Great Leap Forward and The Cultural Revolution
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meant that the Chinese socialist system was highly stratified. Children born to cadre
parents, for example, enjoyed a range of special privileges andmuchmore favourable
life chances than those with working class parents or those born to the ‘distrusted
class’ (Zhou et al. 1996, p. 768)—those with ‘parents or grandparents who were
small business owners (yezliu)[,] … middle peasants (zhongnong), … landlords or
large business owners (zibenjia)’. There were also inequalities among work-units
depending on their political status. Those producing ‘strategic products for the state
(e.g. large steel companies) or … with higher administrative ranking (e.g. provin-
cial level state-owned enterprises) had more bargaining powers when they negoti-
ated with supervisory government agents for resources and investments’ (Chen and
Chen, Chap. 4,p.60). Inequalities in the old system translated into new ones to some
extent due to ‘power persistence’ (Logan et al. 2009). Those who enjoyed privileges
under socialism because of their family or work-unit status were better placed to
take advantage of the opportunities afforded by liberalisation. Persistence in socioe-
conomic and political status associated with hukou (locals vs others, and insiders
vs outsiders) led to a disadvantaged position for migrants in the urban labour and
housingmarkets resulting in spatial segregation betweenmigrants and non-migrants.
Further inequalities emerged because of the reforms themselves. Wu (2004, p.401)
describes the ‘poverty of transition’: new forms of urban poverty arising from the
‘disjuncture between the old and new institutions’.
Perhaps the most prominent example of institutionally-driven inequality in China
is the hukou system of household registration (see, for example, Chaps. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9, 11, 12, 14). It has origins in the household registration systems of ancient China,
but was also influenced by the Soviet passbook system and other twentieth century
registration prototypes (Cheng and Selden 1994). The socialist implementation of
hukou in the 1950s,
‘decisively shaped China’s collectivist socialism by creating a spatial hierarchy of urban
places and prioritizing the city over the countryside; by controlling population movement
up and down the spatially defined status hierarchy, preventing population flow to the largest
cities, enforcing the permanent exile of urban residents to the countryside, and binding people
to the village or city of their birth; and by transferring the locus of decision-making with
respect to population mobility and work from the transformed household to the work unit
or danwei, specifically, in the countryside, to the lowest unit of the collective’. (Cheng and
Selden 1994, p. 645).
Even now, the hukou system remains one of the most potent drivers of both
inequality (Chaps. 7, 8) and segregation (Chaps. 4 and 10). By deepening our under-
standing of how the hukou system has driven the dynamics of segregation using
the methods and models described above, we could potentially help policy makers
become better equipped to address its long-term effects. They could explore ways to
reform the system and monitor the effectiveness of different policy interventions to
redress historical injustices.
One of the most marked injustices described in this volume has been the inequal-
ities inherent in the redevelopment schemes described in Chap. 6 in relation to urban
villages. ‘Familieswith larger residential plots and larger houses hadmore bargaining
power andwould receive bothmore compensation and relocation housingfloor space.
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Large families with a smaller residential plot and smaller traditional houses would
receive less compensation and smaller flats’ (Chap. 6, p.118). The impacts of these
initial inequalities have the potential to cascade down generations.
Of course, the idea that institutional structures can reinforce inequalities is by
no means unique to China. Sharkey (2013, 2020) has demonstrated how, even in
longstanding neo-liberal countries such as the USA, a variety of legal, planning
and political measures have been used to reinforce neighbourhood- and school-level
segregation (see also Yinger 1999; Freund 2007; DeLuca et al. 2013). Similar issues
have even arisen in the social welfare states of Scandinavia (Andersen et al. 2016).
However, there are particular challenges for post-socialist countries seeking to reform
institutions to facilitate the transition to market allocation (see Chap. 13). Wu et al.
(2010), for example, emphasise the structural origins of neighbourhood effects rooted
in public housing estates created in the socialist era that have created long-term path
dependencies in neighbourhood poverty in China.
15.3 Spatial Foundations of Inequality
In the Introduction to this chapter we described the tendency for inequality in income
and wealth to drive the geographic separation of households according to their level
of affluence (see Chap. 3, Musterd et al. 2017, and Tammaru et al. 2015) for empir-
ical evidence from European cities). To illustrate this point, consider a hypothetical
world where every household has the same income, wealth, and preferences, and all
houses have identical physical characteristics. Houses in the most desirable locations
would be in greater demand, so their prices would be higher than those in the least
desirable locations. But this inter-neighbourhood price disparity would be limited
by what consumers were able and willing to pay for the differences in neighbour-
hood desirability. The outcome is that housing in the best neighbourhood would be
affordable to any household who chose to live there. Moreover, all households would
be equally well-off regardless of where they ultimately lived because differences in
housing costs would exactly offset differences in the desirability of the location. Next
suppose that this hypothetical world is transformed by allowing income and wealth
to vary across households. As these individual economic inequalities increase, so
does the potential for house prices to diverge more severely across neighbourhoods.
The larger the inequality in household economic wherewithal, the greater the relative
capacity of the most affluent to bid up house prices in the most desirable neighbour-
hoods, assuming a positive income elasticity of demand for the amenities in such
places. In an unequal society, the outcome is that house prices in the best neighbour-
hoods can rise well beyond the level that poorer households can afford, so economic
segregation follows.
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The purpose of this thought experiment is to illustrate how inequalities in income
and wealth drive the geographical separation of affluence and poverty even if house-
holds have no preference for the socioeconomic status of their neighbours. If house-
holds develop a degree of homophily with respect to affluence as income levels
diverge, then these sorting effects will be amplified.
Our illustration is especially germane to former socialist countries where the
gradual removal of government controls on wages and property prices are likely to
awaken the leviathan of market sorting. China is a powerful example of this, having
transformed from a relatively egalitarian communist country where socioeconomic
segregation was almost non-existent (see Chap. 4) into one where market forces will,
if unchecked, herd the poorest households into themost polluted neighbourhoods and
homes with the worst access to schooling, employment, and other public and envi-
ronmental amenities. At the same time it will empower affluent households to occupy
the most desirable locations. Chen and Chen, in Chap. 4, describes how privatisation
of land and real estate market sorting processes has allowed this inequality to be
increasingly reflected in the geographical distribution of income groups.
Why, then, is segregation based on income, wealth and social position, a problem?
After all, access to desirable neighbourhoods is part of the reward for talent and hard
work that motivates workers to maximise their talents and opportunities. Various
authors (e.g. Cheshire 2009; Merry 2013) have argued that segregation brings
many benefits, not least the creation of ‘specialised neighbourhoods’ that poten-
tially enhance the quality of life of rich and poor alike. The problem with this view
is that segregation by income generates cumulative advantages and disadvantages
that embed and reinforce inequalities over the course of individual lives and across
generations. As in the Schellingmodel, left to its own devices, market forces can lead
to levels of segregation beyond those originally desired by households, and beyond
what is socially just (Galster 2019: ch. 9).
A key source of evidence on these issues is the ‘neighbourhood effects’ litera-
ture (Sampson et ai. 2002; van Ham et al. 2012; Galster and Sharkey 2017) which
explores the extent to which place matters for life outcomes and human flourishing.
Where we grow up affects our life outcomes. It affects our chances of accessing the
skills, knowledge and opportunities to progress in the labour market. It also affects
our exposure to physical and psychological risks that potentially undermine well-
being and our capacity to maximise our potential (Galster and Sharkey 2017; Galster
2019: ch. 8). North American and European research into the impact of place on life
outcomes has bourgeoned into a major strand of social science literature spanning
geography, urban studies, economics, sociology and social psychology. It remains
largely undeveloped in the Chinese context. Yet, an understanding of the long-term
impact of geographical concentrations of poverty and affluence is essential if policy
makers are to achieve their goal to improve wellbeing and life expectancy. Although
the literature is much less developed in China, there is evidence that neighbourhood
effects operate in similar ways to other parts of the world. For example, Wu et al.
(2010, p. 134) find that ‘living in impoverished neighbourhoods increases the proba-
bility of becoming poor’ due in part to the ‘path dependency of institutionally derived
inequalities’. As China’s cities become increasingly subject to the same forces that
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have driven neighbourhood effects in European and American contexts, there will be
a growing imperative to monitor and understand these effects in the sino-capitalist
context and find effective ways of mitigating their long run consequences.
Development of the evidence base will require significant public investment in
data and research capacity because of the dynamic and interconnected ways in which
neighbourhoods affect life outcomes. To illustrate the scale and variety of processes at
work,we now consider some of the keyways inwhich the geographical concentration
of poverty could be a major obstacle to China achieving its new goal of improving
societal welfare.6
15.3.1 Social Relationships and Associations
First, there are effects arising from social relationships within the neighbourhood,
notably the influence of peers and role models. These relationships affect behaviour
(such as the likelihood of engaging in criminal activities), and shape our aspirations,
and values. Research has found that the likelihood of a person offending is strongly
affected by the level of crime and the number of offenders living nearby (Living-
stone et al. 2014, Santiago et al. 2014, Billings et al. 2016; Rotger and Galster 2019).
Santiago et al. (2014), for example, found that teenage childbearing and fathering
are significantly more likely in neighbourhoods with high crime and low occupa-
tional prestige.7 Similarly, Popkin et al. (2010) find that girls whose parents who
move to low-poverty neighbourhoods are less likely to feel pressurised to engage in
early sexual activity. The behaviour and reputation of residents can impact on other
residents in the neighbourhood even without personal connection or behavioural
influence. Stigmatisation of residents, because of perceived associations, irrespec-
tive of their personal attitudes and behaviours, can impose life-long limitations on
housing and employment prospects (Bourdieu 1999, Wacquant 2008; Keene and
Pakilla 2014; Warr 2006).
15.3.2 Risks
An additional layer of disadvantage arises from the concentration of environmental
and safety risks in poor neighbourhoods. Historically, waste disposal sites and
polluting industrial activities were often located in the poorest areas as the result
of those communities having less lobbying power and political influence (Bryant
and Mohai 1992). However, even when highly polluting activities are located in
affluent or middle-income areas, proximity to these facilities will probably cause
6 For a theoretical and empirical review of the various mechanisms through which neighborhoods
exert their influence, see Galster (2012a).
7 The proportion of residents working in professional and high-skill occupations.
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house prices to fall as wealthy homeowners move to less risky locations. These
locations may nevertheless compare favourably with the alternative housing options
within their price range for low-income households, leading to disadvantaged groups
‘coming to the nuisance’ (Depro et al. 2015).
Although the relationship between air pollution and neighbourhood deprivation
can be complex (Bailey et al. 2018), overall the environmental justice literature
‘has found consistent evidence that, within most metropolitan areas, different forms
of environmental hazards are more common in low-income communities’ (Galster
and Sharkey 2017, p. 5). There is strong evidence also of the negative impacts of
contaminants and air pollution on cognitive development, mental health, physical
health, and life expectancy. Exposure to other risks such as violent crime also tends
to be higher in low-income areas.Massey (2004) provides a comprehensive synthesis
of these effects, mapping out the causal pathways from the social environment to
health and cognitive impacts. Income inequality and racial segregation interact to
‘produce concentrated poverty and its correlate, spatially concentrated violence’
(Massey 2004), leading to a higher ‘allostatic load’—accelerated biological ageing
and negative health/cognitive outcomes as a result of cumulative psychological stress.
Subsequent empirical findings, mainly based in the US, generally confirm this view.
Sharkey (2010), for example, finds that a homicide in the neighbourhood has an acute
deleterious effect on children’s cognitive performance. Research by Burdick-Will
(2016, p. 133) reveals that ‘children from more violent neighbourhoods fall farther
behind their peers from safer neighbourhoods as they progress through school’.
Boynton-Jarrett et al. (2008) find that exposure to violence in childhood is associated
with lower health outcomes in adulthood.
Research on these effects in the Chinese context remains relatively undeveloped
and is an important avenue for future investigation. Lei (2018) draws onChina Family
Panel Studies to find a statistical association between the socioeconomic status of
the neighbourhood and children’s verbal and mathematical test scores. However, the
study does not draw on longitudinal analysis to establish causation8 and does not
explore the impacts of specific effects such as violent crime or pollution. There is a
well-established Chinese literature on the incidence and effects of domestic violence
towards children (Liao et al. 2011) but not of exposure to neighbourhood violence.
Again,many of these studies rely on cross sectional datawhichmakes it impossible to
identify the long-term impacts over the course of an individual’s life, or infer causal
relationships. Research on the impacts of pollution is much more developed. For
example, Zhang et al. (2018) link data from a nationally representative longitudinal
survey with air quality data in China to estimate the long-term effects of exposure
to air pollution on cognitive performance. They find significant impacts, particularly
for men and the less educated. To develop a more robust evidence base on relational
neighbourhood effects will require data sets that can facilitate detailed longitudinal
analysis and causal inference (see below). This could be achieved by creating large
8 For a fuller discussion of the challenges related to quantifying the independent causal impacts of
neighbourhoods and techniques for meeting these challenges, see Galster and Sharkey (2017) and
Graham (2018).
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panel surveys, but linkage of existing data is probably more cost effective. Linked
administrative datasets in the Nordic countries, the Netherlands and more recently
NewZealand provide exemplars of what can be achieved. However, the UK approach
that involves linking Census data with administrative data might be more feasible in
the short run and provide a useful interim data infrastructure that exploits existing
datasets.
15.3.3 Externally Determined Resources and Mechanisms
The third source of neighbourhood effects are those arising from external factors and
mechanisms (Galster 2012a). Low-income communities often have access to fewer
resources and are less well-served by public services even though their needs are
greater. An especially troubling example of this is the Inverse Care Law which says
that the ‘availability of good medical care tends to vary inversely with the need for
it in the population served’ (Hart 1971, p. 405). This law, Hart proffered, ‘operates
more completely where medical care is most exposed to market forces’ (ibid). For
similar reasons, access to transport, schooling and employment opportunities will
also tend to be significantly lower in poorer neighbourhoods (Sampson et al. 2002).
While there is a sizeable and growing literature on these inequalities in China (e.g.
Chap. 8, 11, 14; Liu et al. 2014; Chen and Yeh 2019), more research is needed on
their causal impacts over the life-course,9 and how they interact to create cumulative
disadvantage for particular individuals and groups.
To address these external sources of inequality, Chinese policy makers will need
to disentangle the multi-layered political, economic and institutional factors that
drive them. The desirability of particular neighbourhoods and the consequent rise in
rents and house prices, is often determined by factors on a wider geographical scale.
Factors such as economic dynamism, transport facilities and environmental risks can
affect clusters of neighbourhoods and even entiremunicipalities. Thismeans that poor
neighbourhoods are often concentrated in local authority areas with less potential
for economic and housing development. Consequently, they have limited ability to
raise tax revenue through leasing land to developers. This, in turn, means that these
local authorities have the least fiscal capacity to fund the health, education, trans-
port, police, environmental monitoring and enforcement services that are desperately
needed by their disproportionately disadvantaged residents (Galster 2012b).
There also remain pronounced urban-rural (Chen et al. 2016; Lu and Chen 2006;
Cao 2010; Xu and Xie 2015), and regional (Chap. 8) dimensions to inequality in
health, housing, education and employment. Hannum andWang (2006, p. 253) high-
light the extent of inequalities in education between Chinese regions and how these
9 I.e. over the course of a person’s life. The ‘life course approach’ was developed in the 1960s to
look at the effects on different life stages, particularly how events in the formative years affect the
trajectory of a person’s life thereafter. It is an interdisciplinary approach that seeks to understand
the full range of factors that affect life outcomes.
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have been rising since the 1960s, attesting to the ‘enduring significance of geography
as an educational stratifier’. Some of these inequalities are reinforced by limited fiscal
autonomy at the local level. There is a complex system of tax and revenue sharing and
transfers through the various tiers of government in China that leaves local govern-
ments with ‘hardly any discretionary power tomodify taxation’ and ‘fiscal disparities
within provinces remain high and are much greater than between regions in OECD
countries’ (Wang and Herd 2013, p. 1).
The multiscale drivers of inequalities in services, amenities and resources are
mirrored in the multiscale drivers of life outcomes—educational achievement, job
prospects, housing careers, health and wellbeing, etc. If governments overlook the
multiscale nature of neighbourhood effects10 they may severely underestimate the
true impacts of concentrated poverty on wellbeing and life outcomes. The risk of
underestimating these impacts is increased by the complex and multi-faceted factors
involved andbymultiple spatial scales such as neighbourhood, jurisdiction and region
(Sampson 2012, 2019). Many empirical and theoretical studies of neighbourhood
effects fail to capture the profoundly interconnected nature of geographic context,
and we are aware of no attempts to explore this in the Chinese context. Most studies
focus on a particular geographic scale (such as the local neighbourhood), a single
outcome (such as health, educational or employment) and/or a particular strand and
direction of causality.
Galster and Sharkey’s (2017) Spatial Opportunity Structures model provides a
comprehensive theoretical framework for thinking about these effects, one that high-
lights the inadequacy of partial approaches. They argue that the geographic context
of our childhood affects not only our access to good schooling and safe environs, but
also shapes our attitudes and motivations. It affects our ability to make important life
decisions, how we evaluate options and determines the information available to us
to make choices. It affects our perception of ourselves, of our status in the world. It
affects our parents and their attitudes, behaviours and choices, which in turn shape
our own. It affects the cultural, financial, and educational resources available to us as
we grow up. It affects our social networks, our rolemodels and our experience of peer
pressure. The overall impact is amplified through feedback effects as each of these
factors interact with each other, often in mutually-reinforcing and path-dependent
ways.
So, geography matters. It affects life outcomes by structuring the opportunities
available to us both directly and indirectly and does so in ways that interact across
spatial scales. Many of China’s neighbourhoods have only been formed in the past
20 years and many more are in the process of being formed or in a state of transition.
Amenities and public services to support these communities are still in develop-
ment. China still has the opportunity to prevent the geographical entrenchment of
inequality. The Spatial Opportunity Structuremodel offers a powerful framework for
10 ‘Neighbourhood effects’ is the name given to broad range of impacts on life outcomes of the
various features of the neighbourhood environment (housing, transport, exposure to crime and
pollution, access to employment, amenities, health care etc.). See van Ham et al. (2012), Galster
and Sharkey (2017) and Graham (2018) for recent reviews.
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various layers of the Chinese government to develop joined-up policy interventions,
infrastructure and service provision in ways that are cognisant of the interconnected
geographical drivers of inequality.
15.3.4 Housing Wealth Inequality
We have argued that growing income inequality can drive up housing prices in the
most desirable locations, leading to the concentration of highly-educated affluent
households in the best neighbourhoods. This, in turn, can make prosperous neigh-
bourhoods all the more attractive as buyers seek to buy into the social networks
and positive peer group opportunities that such neighbourhoods ostensibly confer. In
principle, this sorting process can further drive up house prices in the most desirable
locations creating significant gains in housing wealth for those who can afford to buy
into up-and-comingneighbourhoods.Housingwealth accumulation can, in turn, rein-
force intergenerational inequalities as affluent homeowners use their housing wealth
to assist with house purchases of their children and grandchildren (Galster andWessel
2019) and contribute towards school and university fees.11
In principle, we would expect rates of housing wealth accumulation to equilibrate
across neighbourhoods (Levin and Pryce 2011). The initial growth in housing wealth
inequality during a periodof economic reformandmarket liberalisation can, however,
confer lasting advantage to affluent households and their descendants. This creates
further path dependencies in poverty and affluence (Toft and Ljunggren 2016; Toft
2018; Galster and Wessel 2019). It is also possible for significant gulfs to emerge
in housing wealth accumulation over prolonged periods between rural and urban
areas (Wang et al. 2020). Inequalities can also emerge at the regional level due, for
example, to the unequal impacts of austerity measures. Particular sectors and regions
of the economymay also experience structural growth while others endure structural
decline (Owen et al. 2020).
15.4 The Relational Impacts of Segregation and Inequality
So far, our discussion of the processes that drive socioeconomic segregation and the
consequences of concentrated poverty has focussed on four key aspects: (i) sociali-
sation effects; (ii) exposure to environmental and social risks such as pollution and
violent crime; (iii) poor access to resources, public services and various amenities;
and (iv) discrepancies in housing wealth accumulation.
In addition to these important factors, another category of influence arises from the
direct effect that inequality has on our sense of worth and self-efficacy.We label these
11 Note the growing for affluent parents to invest in private education for their children to prepare
them for college entrance exams (Shi et al. 2020).
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‘relational impacts’, which, broadly speaking, include the consequences of inequality
and socioeconomic segregation for human relations and wellbeing. Our concern here
is with the psychological, and social impacts of inequality and segregation and the
need for a policy response that is fully cognisant of these effects. We consider the
psychological impacts first, followed by the consequences for social cohesion and
social mobility.
15.4.1 Status Anxiety and the Shame of Poverty
Economics Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen (1983, p. 159) claimed that shame is at the
‘irreducible absolutist core’ of poverty.Mixed-methods empirical research byWalker
et al. (2013, 2014) supports this claim, finding that householdswho are relatively poor
in affluent countries feel similar levels of shame, worthlessness and status anxiety
as poor households in developing countries, even though their living standards are
markedly higher. How steep the hierarchy is, and our perceived position within it, are
potentially important drivers of individual wellbeing and social outcomes (Wilkinson
and Pickett 2009, 2018).
The concern is that income inequality becomes ‘amarker ofwider status hierarchy
that provokes an emotional stress response in individuals that is harmful to health
and wellbeing’ (Layte and Whelan 2014, p. 525). The more unequal the society, the
steeper the social hierarchy, and the greater the pressure at all levels to demonstrate
personal significance through status and acquisition of material goods that signal that
status. Layte and Whelan (2014), for example, explored the relationship between
income inequality and status anxiety using data from a cross-national survey of
over 34,000 individuals from 31 European countries. They found that respondents in
higher-income countries do indeed report higher levels of status anxiety. Wilkinson
and Pickett (2009, 2018) claim that these psycho-social effects have much wider
ramifications, arguing that they are the primary driver of various health and social
outcomes associated with inequality. As a result, inequality is bad for everyone, not
just the poor. Inequality reduces the levels of trust among people, leads to greater
social conflict, higher crime rates, poorermental health andwellbeing, and ultimately
shorter life expectancy (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009; Oishi et al. 2011).
These causal claims remain contentious, however. For example, few of these
studies consider the impact of geographical concentrations of poverty and the wider
Spatial Opportunity Structures noted in the previous section. There are also ques-
tions about the direction of causality: does inequality lead to lower trust and social
cohesion, or does lower trust and social cohesion erode public support for measures
that reduce inequality? Also, it is not clear how the relationship between subjective
feelings of shame and status anxiety estimated in European and North American
contexts translates to China’s very different social, cultural and historical context
and other post-socialist countries.
Nevertheless, the upward long-term trend in income inequality in China means
that these impacts are of growing concern. Estimates by Zhang and Zhao (2019)
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reveal that China currently has a Gini index of at least 58 which suggests a level of
income inequality well in excess of most European countries (though comparisons
across countries are inevitably frustrated by differences in spatial scale, data and
methods). This inequality is marked not only in terms of inequalities between regions
and cities, but also within them. Lie and Wu (2008, p. 404) conclude that, ‘Chinese
cities, once characterised by egalitarianism, are becoming the most unequal cities in
the world’. All this reinforces the imperative to understand the psycho-social impacts
of inequality in the Chinese context and to design an appropriate policy response.
15.4.2 Inter-Group Contact and Social Mobility
One of the most important implications of income inequality, and its tendency to
divide affluent and poor households into separate neighbourhoods, is the conse-
quence for relations between these groups. Allport’s (1954) seminal contribution to
the understanding of the causes and nature of prejudice argues that lack of positive
contact between rival groups can lead to distrust and antipathy (see further discussion
in Chap. 2 and in Pettigrew and Tropp 2006, 2011). This geographical separation can
lead to enduring tensions and conflicts between groups, particularly when income
disparities overlap with other forms of social stratification, such as ethnicity (Tan
et al. 2019; Morales 2019; Wang 2019; Hannum and Xie 1998) or migrant status
(Chaps. 4 and 10).
One of the important implications of Allport’s contact hypothesis is that forms
of segregation that arise initially for benign reasons—as accidents of history, side-
effects ofwell-meaning policies, etc.—can in the long run erode relations between the
separated groups. So, while gated communities in Chinamay haveMaoist communal
origins free from the ‘connotations of exclusivity and xenophobia associated with
gated communities in theWest’ (Chap. 4 ,p. 70), theymay nevertheless, in due course,
become sources of social fragmentation, prejudice, and territorial behaviour.
When the geographical separation of groups takes the form of ‘social frontiers’—
sharp spatial differences between adjacent neighbourhoods in the social, religious or
ethnic mix of residents (see Chap. 13)—these divides can take on territorial meaning.
Social frontiers may, for example, evoke defensive responses from the rival commu-
nities, and increase the likelihood that prejudices, misunderstandings and conflicts
escalate (Chap. 2; Dean et al. 2018). These effects can, in time, have negative impacts
on health and wellbeing. Maguire et al. (2016, p. 845), for example, find that while
traditional measures of segregation had no impact on mental health, the effects of
social frontiers were very large indeed. Proximity to social frontiers—such as the
‘peacelines’ in Belfast, which kept rival communities apart—‘increases the likeli-
hood of antidepressant medication by 19% … and anxiolytic medication by 39%
…, even after adjustment for gender, age, conurbation, deprivation and crime’. The
mental health impacts, in turn, have the potential to affect educational and employ-
ment outcomes, particularly when they are associated with higher rates of violent
crime (Dean et al. 2018), and anti-social behaviour (Legewie and Schaeffer 2018).
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For example, Layard et al. (2014) find that, ‘themost powerful childhood predictor of
adult life-satisfaction is the child’s emotional health’, which highlights the potential
for segregation and inequality to erode human capital and economic efficiency.12
When the psycho-social and relational effects are considered alongside the demo-
graphic and spatial factors discussed earlier, we might expect a measurable overall
impact on economic output and social mobility. Indeed, the research is more than
suggestive that there are macro-level impacts on economic dynamism. Ostry et al.’s
(2014) research for the International Monetary Fund, for example, finds that lower
inequality is ‘robustly correlated with faster and more durable growth’. Moreover,
research by Corak (2013) finds that more equal countries have higher rates of social
mobility.
15.5 Policy Effectiveness
In this section, I discuss recent advances in using robust research methods to inves-
tigate social and economic policy questions and consider practical ways in which
policy making could be improved at various levels of government in China.
15.5.1 Evaluation, RCTs and Causal Inference
One of the most important revolutions in the social science and epidemiological
literature over the past 30 years has been the development of methods that allow
researchers reliant on observational data to mimic the robustness of the scientific
experimental method. In the natural sciences, Randomised Control Trials (RCTs)
have long been considered the gold standard for establishing the causal effects of a
particular intervention or influence. So, for example, if a pharmaceutical company
wants to know the effect of a drug on reducing blood pressure, it will randomly assign
participants to a Treatment Group and a Control Group. The Treatment Group will
receive a genuine dose of the drug, while the Control Group will receive a placebo.
Central to the explanatory power of RCTs is the randomised allocation of participants
between the two groups. Laboratory experiments are rarely feasible or ethical for the
exploration of social questions. Yet, social scientists and other researchers reliant on
observational rather than experimental data have found increasingly innovative ways
to mimic this key attribute of the scientific method.
As a result of this ‘Causal Revolution’ (Pearl and Mackenzie 2020) in social
and economic research, policy makers now have the option to design interventions
in a way that allows for robust evaluation of its causal effectiveness. They now
include a control group and carefully randomise participants. Pilot schemes designed
in this way may not cost much more than those without the randomisation, but
12 For a theoretical analysis of segregation and social efficiency, see Galster (2007, 2019: ch. 9).
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add hugely to how well they can be evaluated. Consequently, randomised policy
experiments have bourgeoned in recent years. See, for example, the plethora of such
American experiments that have emerged in the domains of education (Raudenbush
and Schwartz 2020), employment training (Riccio 2010) or rental housing vouchers
(Sanbonmatsu et al. 2011).
It is also sometimes possible to observe public policy interventions that mimic
random assignment, and these are known as ‘natural experiments’. For example, such
natural experiments involving the quasi-random assignment of households to loca-
tions have been used to quantify neighbourhood effects. These have drawn from
racial-ethnic desegregation programmes in US public housing, the allocation of
tenants to social housing in Canada and Denmark, and the placement of refugees
in particular locales in Scandinavia (see Galster 2019: ch. 8 for a comprehensive
review).
Statistical techniques have also been developed that potentially allow researchers
to infer the causal impacts of historical policy interventions. These include housing-
based urban regeneration initiatives on employment (Zhang et al. 2020), neighbour-
hood policing on crime (Verbitsky-Savitz and Raudenbush 2012), or comprehen-
sive revitalisation strategies on property values (Galster et al. 2006). Many of the
statistical techniques for estimating these kinds of programme impacts are nowwell-
established.13 They include iteratedfixed-effectsmodels (Bai 2009), synthetic control
approaches (Xu2017), difference-in-differencemethods (Zhanget al. 2020), adjusted
interrupted time series (Galster et al. 2004), family fixed effects (Aaronson 1998), and
regression discontinuity (Cunningham 2018; Angrist and Pischke 2008). Moreover,
there are new waves of methodological innovation, such as the rapidly expanding
field of machine learning approaches to causal inference (Kreif and DiazOrdaz
2019). These methods make science-based policy tantalisingly feasible and rein-
force the potential benefits of an evidence-based approach to twenty-first century
policy strategies for tackling segregation and inequality in China.
15.5.2 Shadow Pricing
One of the drawbacks of a policy strategy focussed exclusively on economic growth
is that many of the factors that affect quality of life—clean air, access to green space,
protection from flood risk and toxic waste, access to amenities and transport—are not
accounted for in estimates of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Policies that focus on
GDP growth will overlook these impacts and provide a distorted sense of progress.
How then can China develop an approach to economic accounting that is fit for
purpose in a new policy regime where quality of life (Han et al. 2016, p. 176) and
ecological impacts (Zheng et al. 2019) are prioritised?
13 For a fuller review of these techniques, see Shadish et al. (2002), Graham (2018) and Galster
(2019: ch. 8).
350 G. Pryce
The solution, from an economics perspective, is to estimate implicit prices. Essen-
tially, this entails computing the monetary value that individuals place on their
ability to access non-traded goods, such as beautiful views, clean air, and avoid
non-traded ‘bads’, such as pollution and contaminated land. In Chap. 12, Lian, Song
and Timmins argue that Hedonic Pricing techniques and equilibrium sorting models
provide practical ways to estimate the implicit value of untraded goods and ‘bads’
from consumers’ choices. How much extra are households willing to pay to live in
neighbourhoods with good air quality, for example, provides a useful guide to the
economic value of this attribute.
Suppose we include these implicit prices in economic policy. It will mean that the
cost to society of economic activities that give rise to harmful pollution or contam-
ination will be seen as less attractive than activities without these unwanted side
effects. This will guide policymakers in taxing activities that produce these negative
‘externalities’—outcomes of commercial activity that are not reflected in the market
price. In this way, governments can help reduce the gap between the price paid by
consumers for the products of such firms and the larger overall cost to society.
15.6 Conclusions for Policy
Over the past 40 years, China’s Reform and Opening-up have led to a reduction in
rural poverty for over 700 million people, contributing 70% of global poverty reduc-
tion (Chap. 5). This is a truly extraordinary achievement. At the same time, however,
there has been a rise in income inequality (Zhang and Zhao 2019), socioeconomic
segregation (Chap. 10), and environmental hazards (Wang et al. 2016). The enormous
growth of the urban population (from 172 to 813 million between 1978 and 2017)
as a result of rural to urban migration also brought people into close proximity from
very different social and cultural backgrounds. All this has heightened the potential
for social fragmentation and neighbourhood segregation.
China once again faces the processes that generate inequality and segregation, the
social ills that the 1948 communist revolution sought to eradicate. We have sought to
highlight these emerging challenges and identify the sino-capitalist features that gave
rise to them. An ambitious programme of poverty reduction and inclusive growth
was launched in 2018, but there have been questions about managing funds and
whether they have been appropriately allocated (Diallo 2019). While poverty levels
among those with urban citizenship status has declined, ‘levels of chronic poverty
among migrant workers has continued to grow, accounting for about 75% of the total
population of urban poor’ (Chap. 5).
We also contend that there are deeper andmore systemic questions. Towhat extent
can we address poverty and disadvantage without tackling the entwined processes
of segregation and inequality that are intrinsic to capitalist systems? Poverty and
deprivation in a market economy context should not be viewed as static outcomes to
be fixed by one-off interventions or government handouts. If China’s new phase of
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urbanisation is to succeed, policymakers will need to appreciate the dynamic interac-
tions between the political and legislative sectors, rural and urban areas, and between
social and market forces. Understanding these linkages, and how they are shaped by
local context, will help local and regional governments develop interventions that
bring about lasting structural change (Sharkey 2013).
Multidimensional spatial inequalities can be extremely difficult to rectify;
certainly, that has been the Western experience (Meen and Gibb 2005; Gibb et al.
2019). While China has demonstrated an impressive capacity to bring about trans-
formative social and economic change, it will face challenges in the coming decades
that will make tackling segregation and inequality all the more difficult.
Challenges associated with the country’s rapidly ageing population are likely to
become prominent. The ratio of dependents to workers will increase significantly.
This could suppress growth, exacerbate pressures on public finances, and potentially
increase existing inequalities in income (Chen et al. 2018), health (Gu et al. 2019;
Wang et al. 2012) and social care (Lou and Ci 2014). China’s working age population
is forecast to decline by 63.6% by 2100, one of the largest proportionate declines in
the workforce predicted for any the world’s major economies (Vollset et al. 2020;
Campbell 2019). Further pressures on the economy are likely to come from climate
change (Tol 2018) and growing geopolitical tensions in China’s relationships with
other countries (Kavalski 2020; Le Corre 2020; Walker 2020; Niu 2020). There
could be uncertain but potentially important impacts on trade, export growth and the
domestic economy.
Chinese policy makers will need to grapple with the complexity of these antic-
ipated changes and consider how they might affect the processes of residential
segregation and inequality. A modernising social policy will require strategies
that are specific to China rather than the re-cycling of policy approaches from
Anglo-American and European contexts.
All this heightens the imperative to develop a home-grown evidence base on
which to develop policy. I have argued in this chapter that informed policy will
require a robust empirical approach to analyse and monitor the dynamic processes
that drive segregation (Sect. 15.2) and the associated Spatial Opportunity Structures
(Sect. 15.3). An understanding of how these processes affect health, wellbeing and
social mobility (Sect. 15.4), will help policy makers design better policies, not only
for mitigating inequality and segregation, but for the benefity of society and economy
more generally. Appropriate data infrastructure, and the research capacity to evaluate
the true impact of interventions (Sect. 15.5) are needed to achieve this.
But what should those interventions be? What policies are needed to tackle the
growing problems of segregation and inequality in China and the further entrench-
ment of their impacts upon future generations? In this volumewe have drawn together
leading experts to reflect on China’s remarkable economic success story, and the
policy changes that are needed for the next phase of its development. These recom-
mendations are illustrative rather than exhaustive but nevertheless offer a clear set
of guidelines for policy development in the years to come. They are summarised as
follows:
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• Reform of the hukousystem: a disproportionate amount of the inequality and
segregation identified in by authors relate to the hukou household registration
system. It will be a priority for the government to increase the proportion of rural
migrants with full urban citizenship and to reform the hukou system (Chap. 5).
However, this will have significant resource implications as widening access to
urban public services for rural migrants will require a major expansion of those
services. At present, public services are characterised by ‘dualisation’ in urban–
rural provision and ‘fragmentation’ across regions in terms of the level and quality
of service. To genuinely improve the citizenship rights of migrant workers, China
will need to delineate administrative and expenditure responsibilities, develop a
transfer payment system, diversify and enhance public service supply, integrate
resources, use information technology to reduce public service inequality, and
standardise laws and regulations (Chap. 8).
• Regeneration of rural areas and small towns: One way to ease pressures on
public services in large cities will be to complement the reform of the hukou
system with policies and infrastructure investment aimed to make rural areas and
small towns more attractive places to live and work (Chap. 5). This should include
an integrated set of measures to make shanty town redevelopments sustainable
and attractive (Chap. 7).
• Tackling the decentralisation of poverty: Unlike many UK and US cities,
poverty in China is often concentrated at the periphery and in the suburbs rather
than in urban centres. This places an additional burden on poor families in terms
of the costs and risks of commuting to work and poor access to amenities. Urban
sprawl has been a major feature of city growth in China, but high-quality facil-
ities and services such as hospitals and schools often remain located in the city
centre (Chap. 4; Chen and Yeh 2019). Addressing these significant inequalities
will require concerted reform of planning policy to ensure a more socially just
approach to the location of public institutions, infrastructure and services.
• Addressing the multidimensional nature of the problem: The unequal provi-
sion of public services is just one aspect of themulti-faceted nature of disadvantage
and risk exposure.Hence, inChap. 14we emphasised the need tomeasure depriva-
tion not only in income but also in housing, education, environment, employment,
transport and health. The design of policies to tackle poverty is much more likely
to be successful if these multidimensional features are reliably monitored and
made explicit in policy targets.
• Reform of housing and land ownership system: In Chap. 9, Wang and Dong
highlighted the many administrative barriers that inhibit equal access to housing
and set out a programme of reforms to tackle these. Under the present system,
urban land is owned by the state while rural land is collectively owned. These
two systems are incompatible in numerous ways that hinder new construction
that would benefit rural migrants and prevent capital release to enable them to
access homeownership. Extensive reforms are needed to create an integrated urban
and rural land market that encourages the construction of affordable homes and
improves access to high-quality housing for the urban poor. They also recommend
demand-side measures including subsidies and an expansion of social housing
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construction. Reforms are also needed in the private rental sector which has
emerged rapidly in an unplanned way in response to rapid urban growth. This
sector particularly needs better regulation to address the prevalence of substan-
dard housing and the exploitation of migrant workers by landlords. At present,
rural migrants ‘usually live in temporary sheds or densely populated dormitories
provided by employers’ (Chap. 9). Such accommodation is often unfit for human
habitation and is also highly precarious as migrant workers have no security of
tenure.
• Next-generation planning14: Inspired by the architectural philosophy of Le
Corbusier, the post-war period saw the rapid development of high-rise housing
acrossmanyEuropean cities and the clearance of significant numbers of traditional
urban buildings as a result. However, subsequent changes in demography and
lifestyle aspirations15 led to the demolition of many of these high-rise dwellings,
especially those of questionable construction quality. There has also been renewed
appreciation for traditional buildings and a sense of lost heritage due to the destruc-
tion of the historical urban landscape during the high-rise revolution. The rapid
redevelopment and modernisation of Chinese cities over the past 30 years raises
the question of whether China may eventually experience a similar backlash
against high-rise living. The dissatisfaction reported in Chap. 6 in the context
of urban village redevelopment, for example, may be an early indication of more
widespread disenchantment. Projections of a rapidly ageing population in China
(Vollset et al. 2020)will raise further questions about the bestway to address future
housing and social care needs (Ikels 2004; Vollset et al. 2020). Moreover, experi-
ence of Covid19 has led many to question the desirability of high-density living
in a world where pandemics may become more frequent due to climate change
and increased animal-human contact.16 Chinese policy makers, along with their
counterparts around the world, will need to develop a long-term strategy for next-
generation urban planning that will learn from the mistakes of European planners
and anticipate the housing needs of the future.
• Social integration of ruralmigrants:The research presented in Chap. 11 reveals
the complex and multi-layered nature of social separation of rural migrants and
local urban residents working in care homes in Shanghai. These findings are
illustrative of a wider problem of hidden stratification that emanates from the
14 I am grateful to Sako Musterd for raising the question of impending obsolescence of high rise
housing in China in his comments on this chapter.
15 In the preface to their book, High-rise housing in Europe, Turkington et al. (2004) note that,
‘High-rise housing was constructed on a mass scale in the belief that blocks and estates would
work for everybody who lived in them. However, the world has changed since then. Other housing
types have taken their place, the single family dwelling represents the ultimate aspiration for many
households. Whilst it is clear that the condition and market position of high-rise varies between
countries, many complexes have deteriorated physically, socially, and are in the worst cases faced
with a multiplicity of problems.’.




social inferiority of ruralmigrants in theChinese system. International research on
migration agrees on a crucial point. For migrants to integrate socially, they need to
be able to achieve ‘outcomes within employment, housing, education, health etc.
which are equivalent to those achieved within the wider host communities’ (UK
Home Office report, 2004). Such outcomes are vital because they offer migrants,
minorities and other marginalised groups the opportunity to advance in the labour
and housing markets, and acquire the resources needed to connect with the wider
society. Without equivalent rates of social mobility among migrant workers and
local residents, economic gaps will continue to widen between them, engen-
dering a deepening sense of injustice and discrimination. The negative impact of
the hukou system goes beyond the practical consequences of inability to access
opportunities. There is also an emotional impact that stems from the stigma of
being categorised as second-class citizens. Interventions to address these issues
may involve measures to encourage positive social contact between groups, such
as mixed tenure housing and inclusive approaches to the design of school catch-
ments (Brown and Hewstone 2005; Ramos et al. 2019; McGlynn et al. 2004).
These initiatives may be especially important where there are ‘social frontiers’
(see Chap. 13; Dean et al. 2018).
• Shadow pricing and macroeconomic policy: Earlier in this chapter, and in
Chap. 12, we discussed the importance of incorporating the value of nature, clean
air, and other non-traded outcomes of economic activity into economic decisions.
One way to do this is to make greater use of shadow pricing to place monetary
values on important impacts of economic activity that are currently unaccounted
for in economic planning. This raises a more general issue: the need to synthesise
macro- and micro-economic policy. The focus of our recommendations so far
has largely been on specific areas of social policy and legal reform. However, we
should not forget the role of macroeconomic policy in the generation of socioeco-
nomic inequalities, not only through the taxation of income and wealth, but also
through monetary policy (e.g. Coibion et al. 2017). Taxation of housing wealth
comes under the remit of macro policy but also has implications for the inter-
generational transfer of housing wealth inequalities. As house prices increase
dramatically in boom cities, such inequalities are likely to widen considerably
over the coming decades. Landlords and homeowners may accumulate wealth
rapidly in these areas. Tenants will be excluded from these rewards and may also
face rising rental costs. Macroeconomic policy should therefore be included in
the mix for a fully coordinated response, although it is beyond the scope of the
current volume to explore this in the Chinese context.
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15.6.1 Final Thoughts
Our goal has not been to make the case for a return to communist-era economic plan-
ning.17 Instead, we stress the need to understand the very real challenges currently
posed by a modern market economy and its tendency to generate self-reinforcing
cycles of inequality and segregation. As inequality in China continues to rise, it will
become increasingly important to find an appropriate policy response to shape the
country’s future and determine the success of its new emphasis on improving the
quality of life.
As many of the authors of this volume have noted, China’s economic policies
have achieved an extraordinary rise in the living standards of hundreds of millions
of people. It has also generated growing inequality across regions, between urban
and rural areas and ethnic groups. Those without full access to citizenship rights
suffer most. I have also raised the question of whether the negative consequences of
inequality and segregation can to some extent offset the benefits of economic growth
for the disadvantaged.
Crucially, there needs to be a robust way to evaluate the efficacy of polices and
to foster a culture of policy-making that abandons or reforms policies that are inef-
fective or unjust. I have highlighted various methodological innovations, including
those arising from the Causal Revolution in social science research. Combined with
investment in China’s socioeconomic data infrastructure, these recommendations
pave the way to a more rational and transparent approach to policy development.
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